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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation analyses the process of de-secularization of the Malaysian state.  It identifies 
the political role of Islam as an important element in explaining how the Malaysian state 
sustains the language of special ethnic ‘rights’ to negate the ideal of common citizenship in 
Malaysia.  The historical dominance and constant politicization of Islam reinvents the notion 
of special citizenship ‘rights’ for the majority Malay citizens, which has serious impacts upon 
equal opportunities and fundamental liberties of minority citizens.  This process is further 
buttressed by legal apparatus that separates Syariah jurisdiction from civil courts, leading to 
unequal public access to justice and public deliberation in favour of reasons grounded in 
religious doctrine.   
Drawing on Rawlsian-informed critique of power, the thesis advances previous work on 
Malaysian democracy to critically assess the role of religion in politics that defends state-
sanctioned differential citizenship rights.  The condition of pluralism in Malaysia is an 
important case study for a robust understanding of the value of secularism as a principle of 
state practices.  In doing so the thesis makes the normative claim that religion should not 
reside within the state where it can be politicized with the cost of justifying differential 
citizenship in a multi-cultural democratic society. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Abstract: This chapter presents the problems, background and provides the overall frame to 
capture the historical narratives and contemporary contentions associated with the process of 
de-secularization.  It also sketches the overall plan of the dissertation in the last section. 
1.1 Problems, aims and objectives 
This dissertation analyses the de-secularization process of the Malaysian state.  It examines 
the discourse of public deliberation on the negotiation of the secular as a political value in the 
continuing narratives of the Malaysian political landscape, in different stages – colonial, the 
decolonisation and the transition into the contemporary period.  For this purpose, documented 
public debates by key state and non-state agents will be used as a way to map the historical 
and ideological journey of secular-religious deliberations.  These documented debates will be 
substantiated with contemporary empirical political events to establish the dynamic 
relationship between the nature of the secular state and the political construction of rights for 
Malaysian citizens.  
The analysis of the de-secularization of the state reassesses the concept of the ‘secular state’ 
in Malaysia, in particular how religion, as a dominant cultural feature in the society, 
underscores the dynamics of political relations between the state and the citizens.  Since 
religion is a dominant element in the construction of cultural and political identities in 
Malaysia, the use of ethno-religious category to refer to group dynamics will be used in the 
dissertation.  This is particularly pertinent where the dominant ethnic Malays are concerned 
because in Article 160 of the Malaysian Constitution the Malays are legally identified as 
Muslims, and the position of the Muslims in general is strengthened by its legal proxy to the 
official position of Islam in the Federation.  Ethnicity and religion are the key elements of 
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political control for the state and thus all issues related to the commonality of citizenship are 
affected by the ways in which these elements come into play upon the distribution of the state 
resources.   
The reappraisal of the secular state is especially relevant where religion plays such critical 
role in the public sphere in Malaysia.  There is a need to unpack the relationship between the 
state and religion where the issue of coercive use of state power upon the right of citizens is at 
stake, and this is ideologically interconnected with the political construction of Malaysian 
citizenship right.   This is examined historically in different stages of colonial and 
postcolonial rule, by drawing out the key elements of ideological construction underlining the 
developing political conceptualization of rights through the procedures of constitutional 
amendments.  The amendments being made to the Constitution in the Parliament gradually 
resulted in the political erosion of citizenship rights particularly among citizens coming from 
the minority ethnic and religious backgrounds.  The de-secularization of the state therefore 
critically affects the values of equality and justice usually accorded to all citizens who should 
enjoy the commonality of rights. 
Three contemporary cases are highlighted to substantiate the claim that the de-secularization 
of the state has undermined the rights of minority citizens.  These include the use of the word 
‘Allah’ among non-Muslim congregations, the rise of the Indian HINDRAF (Hindu Rights 
Action Force) movement against institutional discrimination and the religious persecution of 
the LGBT community.  The first case study looks at the official ban on the use of the word 
‘Allah’ among non-Muslim citizens.  It addresses the issue of ‘liberty of conscience’, 
constituting as it does a direct and radical challenge to the dominant conceptualization of faith 
and identity in the country.  The word ‘Allah’ has been used by Christians -mainly in the 
Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak - for Church worship, Biblical studies as well as in 
3 
 
other religious scriptural publications.  The use of ‘Allah’ for Christian worship has been 
somewhat tolerated by the religious authorities until recently when the Malaysian Federal 
government imposed legal ban upon the use of the word ‘Allah’ in Christian publications and 
worship.  This prompted the Christian group, especially the Catholic Church to challenge the 
official ban in the High Court.  The second case looks at the empirical aspect to the de-
secularization process of the state by the HINDRAF movement. The HINDRAF movement is 
an organisation associated with a specific minority ethnic group within Malaysia—the ethnic 
Indians—and making political and economic claims on behalf of that group.  Within this 
theoretical framework, HINDRAF has not for the most part radically contested the dominant 
mode of ethnic bargaining embedded in the state practice.  Yet it is nonetheless interesting for 
two reasons.  Firstly, while it has not extensively challenged the nature of the secular state in 
Malaysia, its emergence was undoubtedly linked to the contemporary de-secularizing trend, 
specifically in relation to the destruction of nearly 80 Hindu places of worship.  Secondly, 
while the movement began as a set of primarily ethnic claims, elements within the movement 
have sought to reorient towards a more structural critique of contemporary ethnic bargaining 
in Malaysia—a shift epitomised by the name change from HINDRAF to HRP (Human Rights 
Party).   
Yet this shift is not uncontested within the movement, and it hence represents a useful lens 
through which to analyse the ways in which strategies of contestation and alternative 
expressions of public reason constitute not only a critical engagement with the dominant 
modes of political ethnic bargaining in the country, but also a critical discourse between 
opponents of the status quo.  The third case concerns the government-backed public 
condemnation of the LGBT community.  Such political repression against the minority group 
is epitomized in recent times when the criminalization of homosexuality is played out in the 
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public discourse - the second Sodomy trial of Anwar Ibrahim, a prominent opposition leader, 
and the police ban on the human rights awareness events organized by ‘Sexuality Merdeka’.  
The experiences of discrimination faced by the Mak Nyah (Transgender) community will be 
highlighted.  Currently four Mak Nyahs are challenging the constitutionality of the Syariah 
law in prohibiting cross-dressing.  Most Mak Nyahs are Malay Muslims, and are therefore 
subject to the penal code under Syariah.  Section 28 of the Syariah Criminal Offences 
(Federal Territories) Act 1997 forbids ‘any male person from wearing a woman’s attire in a 
public place and posing as a woman for immoral purposes’.  Religious authorities at the state 
level have used such legislation to oppress the Mak Nyah community through arrests, 
interrogation, violence and detention.  In November 2011 the Seremban High Court granted 
legal permission for four Muslim trans-genders to challenge Section 66 of the Syariah 
Criminal (NS) Enactment, on the grounds that the Syariah penal code denies them their 
fundamental liberties guaranteed under the Constitution.   All four claimed that they’ve been 
unfairly treated, arrested, sexually abused, beaten and subject to degrading treatments by the 
religious officers.   
These three cases are selected because the Christians experience ideological repression due to 
the ban on the usage of ‘Allah’ in worship and their publications.  The ethnic makeup of 
Malaysian Christians are diverse, they include mainly the Chinese, Indians, ethnic groups 
from Sabah and Sarawak.  The HINRAF movement saw the sudden surge of Indian grassroots 
mobilization that was unprecedented in the history of Malaysian politics.  The Mak Nyah and 
LGBT community include all ethnic groups.  For this dissertation the focus is on the Malays 
Mak Nyah because of the way they challenge religious laws meant to regulate Muslims at 
sub-national level, which is unusual in the Malaysian experience. 
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1.2 Background 
Normative Western political philosophy on secularism and its historical roots within the 
Judeo-Christian tradition has tended to project ‘religion’ as the problematic significant other.  
How faith and politics organize the governing principles of society will have significant 
impact upon the rights of citizens.  Global migration and the expansion of multi-cultural 
communities in a single nation-state place an immediate demand upon most of these 
governments to reassess their political outlook and relations with such conditions of 
pluralism.  The conventional understanding of politics and the ‘political’ within the discursive 
ambit of secularism is increasingly challenged by the empirical upsurge of religious inspired 
civil society formations and political movements in the public sphere (Habermas 2011).  The 
relationship between the ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ and the ways in which their dynamics have 
become entrenched in contemporary politics, have engendered serious polemics in 
deliberative democracy across all societies in the contemporary experience.  The fact of 
pluralism in contemporary societies continues to shape the content of our political debates, to 
the extent that it impacts upon the liberty of conscience of the citizens in the discourse of 
deliberative democracy.  It is therefore imperative to redefine the conceptual meanings of 
secular politics and the significance of religious convictions underpinning political debates in 
the democratic discourse (Taylor 2011).  Religious convictions can play important role in the 
political construction and understanding of citizenship rights and an overlapping consensus 
needs to be developed by communicating ideas through the process of public deliberation.  
The de-secularization of the state emerged as a result of the mismanagement of the condition 
of pluralism in Malaysia.  Like many modern societies, Malaysia is characterized by the 
diversity of values and perceptions grounded in people’s competing comprehensive 
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doctrines
1
.  The provisions that privilege the Malay special position and Islam in the 
Malaysian Constitution partly reflects the political arrangements that prioritize consociational 
power sharing (Lijphart 1977).  The ruling elites have been relying on the Malaysian 
Constitution to sustain the political stability to overcome the competing claims of religious, 
linguistic, ideological, or other cultural divisions.  By invoking the special provisions for 
Malay and Islam in the Constitution, the ruling party UMNO (United Malay National 
Organization) have been able to mediate conflicts and negotiate the process of ethnic 
bargaining on the pretext of protecting the interests of the Malay and Islam for popular 
appeal, as well as for national security.  This in turn leads to instances of group inequality and 
the undermining of equal citizenship at the same time.  
The study draws upon Rawlsian political liberalism to deconstruct the content of arguments 
offered by government agents and to provide the normative avenue for the development of an 
overlapping consensus for the prospect of equal citizenship.  Developing an overlapping 
consensus represents an important groundwork for the ideal of equal citizenship to rise above 
politics that have largely been driven by ethnic consociationalism (Mauzy 1993; Haque 2003).   
In ethnic consociationalism the balance of political power depends on guaranteed group 
representation, and these are often recommended for managing group conflict and maintain 
political stability in deeply divided societies.  Using Rawlsian informed perspective in 
framing political engagements around overlapping consensus would challenge the politics of 
                                                     
1
 A doctrine is fully comprehensive when it covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather 
precisely articulated scheme of thought; whereas a doctrine is partially comprehensive when it 
comprises certain, but not all, non-political values and virtues and is rather loosely articulated.  By 
definition, then, for a conception to be even partially comprehensive it must extend beyond the 
political and include non-political values and virtues.  These include the fundamental conception about 
values of human life, ideals of personal virtues and characters that will inform the conducts of citizens.  
Rawls (1989:240) The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, New York University 
Law Review vol. 64(2) 
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ethnic consociationalism that has so far legitimized the special citizenship rights for the 
dominant ethnic group.  It calls for greater citizens’ participation in the public sphere where 
equal democratic citizens can make claims based on reasons that all can share, instead of 
negotiating claims on the grounds of special ethnic rights.  This is a proposition to shift the 
paradigm from ethnic representation to proactive citizenship participation in the process of 
democratic deliberation. 
The idea of common citizenship has always been problematic in Malaysian political 
developments and ethnic consociationalism has been used as the practical solution to resolve 
many political problems.  Hence the current practice does not sit well with the liberal-
democratic conception of guaranteeing citizens full membership with equal access to 
resources of the state (Marshall 1965).  The politics of ethnic consociationalism has been 
practiced as a mode to mediate the dynamics of political bargaining in the Malaysian 
experience (Milne 1981; Gomez and Jomo 1999) but this dissertation argues that the 
examination of the contestation of the secular state offers an alternative thinking to theory of 
communal politics.  The considerable focus on group politics, particularly on the practices of 
ethnic bargaining among the elites tends to lead to the focus on the political behaviour of 
particular ethnic groups.  There needs to be a new approach in uncovering the nuanced link 
between identity politics and the role of religious ideas in unpacking the coercive means of 
state power that sustains the Malaysian political structure.  The underlying problems of 
common citizenship in Malaysia cannot be explained by the discourse of ethnic bargaining 
alone, and further analyses on the agency of public deliberation needs to be explored in order 
to find out the ideological linkage behind the practices of ethnic bargaining and the power of 
the state.  
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Public debates, deliberation, discussions are important aspects of communicative action and 
reasoning that constitute the vital underpinnings of democracy and political participation of 
the citizens (Habermas 1981; Calhoun 1992).  The conventional approach of the ‘vote-centric’ 
analysis mainly shows the procedural aspects of public decision making and the quantitative 
behaviour of citizens’ preferences in democratic deliberation.  This approach alone does not 
address the critical issue of fulfilling the norms of democratic legitimacy where public debates 
provides to democratic deliberation (Kymlicka 2002).  The main reason is that the ‘vote-
centric’ model does not take into account the significance of public communication, debates, 
and how citizens provide reasons for the persuasions and the claims they make in the public 
sphere.  
The discourse of public deliberation and political debates in Malaysia are largely driven by 
the polemics of ethnic and religious sentiments and this had had tremendous effect upon 
national identity formation of citizens in the plural society
2
.  The lack of common social and 
political will underscores the fractured sense of national identity, which then reciprocates the 
dynamics of ethnic consociationalism the public political culture.  The politics of ethnic 
consociationalism combined with the historical dominance of Islamic precepts within its sub-
national administrative structures results in the complex implementation of the legal 
principles of justice for a nation practicing diverse faiths. 
                                                     
2
 Using J.S Furnivall’s definition, ‘is in the strictest sense a medley, for they [ethnic groups] mix but 
do not combine. Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture [End Page 33] and language, its 
own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market-place,… [and] … with different 
sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. Even in 
the economic sphere there is division of labor along racial lines, Natives, Chinese, Indians and 
Europeans all have different functions, and within each major group subsections have particular 
occupations. Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India.J.S. 
Furnivall. New York: New York University Press, 1956 (1956, pp. 304–05) 
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Since the country’s independence from British colonialism the institutional syncretism of 
secular Constitution and Islamic jurisprudence were formally accepted as part of the political 
governance in Malaysia.   The development of the legal-political structure of the government 
had allowed the ideological fluidity of the religious precepts to gradually furnish the policy-
making among key state agents.  The significance of Islam in furnishing the core values of 
politics and the ‘political’ in Malaysia contrasts in many ways from the normative 
understanding of secularism and politics the West, to the extent that ‘secularism’ has been 
posited as the destabilizing element within mainstream politics. 
Conventional understanding of the secular state apparatus generally requires the state to rise 
above sectarianism and religious disputes in the process of political and judicial deliberation.  
However in the Malaysian context, faith and the fundamental liberties have become the main 
locus of increasing state coercion.  The main reason for this is that Islam plays a crucial role 
in the discourse of the ‘political’ among its community of believers, or Umma (Peletz 2002; 
Tibi 2002; Liow 2004; Peletz 2005; Hiroyuki, Milner et al. 2011).  Political convictions and 
the expression of the political among the Umma tend to be grounded in the Islamic precepts.  
This becomes problematic where ideas of the secular and the practice secularism as principles 
of governance in societies are undermined by the public role of religion.  The normative 
understanding of the fundamental liberties of the individuals as autonomous agents and the 
communitarian principle of faith in binding individuals to certain collective thinking 
constitute the on-going polemics in the debate about civil rights and notions of justice.  Such 
debates have reached critical heights when the dynamics of the secular confront the political 
idioms of religious convictions (Weithman 2002; Rawls 2005; Habermas 2006; Freeman 
2007; Laborde 2008).  For these reasons, these debates are identified within the political 
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trajectories of the modern state, and used to examine how they shape the political conception 
of citizenship and the formulation of civic identity in the Malaysian public sphere.   
 
The critical assessment of the secular state in Malaysia is compelled by the way the 
government utilizes state power and religious values to limit the scope of citizen’s 
participation in the public sphere.  The government selectively interprets the constitutional 
essentials for the purpose of dictating the political conduct of citizens holding other 
competing beliefs, religious or otherwise.  The official role of Islam has been selectively 
interpreted by the state elites to elevate and protect the rights of the dominant Malay ethnic 
group over the rest of the population – thus justifying the preservation of differential rights, 
whilst undermining the rights of other citizens belonging to the minority ethno-religious 
backgrounds and the LGBT community.  The general acceptance of such political practice has 
generated the conditions for key agents within the ruling party to execute systemic abuse of 
the statutory rights granted for the Malay community.  This practice contributes to the process 
of de-secularization of the state resulting in the juridical autonomy of Syariah justice and 
Islamic public policy making.   
Islam has always played a vital role in the history of Malaysian politics.  In so far as Islam has 
the power to unite the Umma, identify the bangsa or the collective consciousness of the 
Malay people, religion becomes instrumental for the political elites to appeal to identity 
politics, fracturing citizens on the grounds of ethnic and religious identities.  As far back as in 
the history of the Malay world, Islam has been tied to the discourse of politics, the 
institutional procedure of ‘separating’ religion from politics, as it is normatively accepted in 
the modern conception of the state, did not really occur in the early formation of the modern 
Malaysian state.  Hence the legacy of institutional syncretism in fusing Islamic values and 
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precepts into modern day governance becomes the established norms of political governance 
in Malaysia.  The problem with the fusion of religious precepts and modern bureaucracy is 
that it gives key stakeholders in the ruling party the autonomy to interpret the official status of 
Islam in the Malaysian Constitution to justify the elevated rights of the Umma over others, 
becoming the mainstay behind the official thinking of the government. 
1.3 The framework to capture the secular-religious polemics of the 
Malaysian state 
This section frames the historical inquiry into the process of de-secularization of the 
Malaysian state. ‘De-secularization’ as a conceptual framework was introduced by Peter 
Berger as a theoretical construct to reassess the theory of secularization against the 
contemporary resurgence of political theology in global politics
3
 (Berger 1999; Karpov 2010).  
For this dissertation, ‘de-secularization’ examines the conceptual erosion of secularism and its 
relationship to institutional violence against religious liberty, ethnicity and sexuality in the 
Malaysian context.   
The problems of institutional discrimination in Malaysia are compounded by religious 
symbolism and arguments to reassert the narratives of ‘rights’ through: 
 The historical dominance of majority ethnic rule, 
 The political legitimacy of UMNO as the sole protectors of the Malay special position 
against the competing claims from minority ethnic groups, 
                                                     
3
 This framework captures the sociological shifts on the ways in which the religious communities and 
its agents challenge the institutional norms underlining the public and private division of faith and 
political conduct 
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 The constitutional position of the special Malay-Muslim citizenship right as the 
preferred status quo in the political culture. 
The political amalgamation of ethnic symbolism (Smith 1986; Smith 2000) with an 
increasingly more religious connotation in the contemporary period is indicative of how the 
public role of religion has displaced substantive political debates in favour of the moral 
polemic of sin and faith – the latter one mainly refers to the public display of religious 
credibility.  Instead of addressing the fundamental problems of differential rights that is 
endemic in this ethnically divided and structurally unequal society, the religious discourse has 
contributed to the perpetuation of the hierarchy of ‘rights’, where the rights of citizens 
belonging to the dominant ethno-religious
4
 group are legally protected over and above the 
minority citizens.    The political discourse on ‘rights’ in Malaysia has in many ways exposed 
the vulnerability of the liberal conception in framing the debates between group right and the 
range of choices and opportunities available to the individuals.  This problem becomes critical 
when the public interpretation of ‘justice’ is framed in dual-legal system – the civil court and 
the Syariah justice system.  It tends to fracture the concept of common citizenship because the 
public understanding of justice is polemically divided between religious truth and humanist 
reason.  This is especially so, when the government actively pursues the value of religious 
credentials to justify political legitimacy. 
At the heart the Malaysian Constitution lays the public role of Islam as the official religion of 
the Malaysian Federation enshrined under Article 3.  The government emphasis on the 
Islamic values in the public sphere increasingly furnishes the popular perception that religion 
should displace the ‘secular’ for good governance and the dispensation of justice.  The critical 
                                                     
4
 This dissertation uses the term ‘ethno-religious’ to denote the importance of both ethnic and religious elements 
in social and political representation. 
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problem of embedding religion within the legal infrastructure of the state rests on the potential 
risk that the state and its agents employ the monopoly of coercion and power over its subjects, 
through the politicization of religious symbolism.  This is further amplified by the legislative 
demands of the Malaysian Constitution necessitating the Malay monarchy to protect the 
‘special position’ of the majority ethnic Malay under Article 1535.  Contrary to the normative 
political consideration for the protection of the minorities in many democratic societies, 
Article 153 in the Malaysian Constitution defends the rights and interests of the Malay 
majority.  Until today the statutory design of the Malaysian Constitution does not permit the 
formulation of liberal principles of citizenship that are all-inclusive and this problem had its 
roots embedded in the history of British colonialism.   
‘The Rulers and their entourages are at the centre of the conservative opposition to 
constitutional reform, especially to reform based on equal rights and opportunities 
for members of all races who have made their permanent home in Malaya.
6
 
The legacy of colonial rule over plural society presents considerable obstacle to the process of 
political democratization because it played critical role in structuring racial domination 
through the legalization of native customs and rights, crystalizing racial identity in the 
subjects and cultivating the political roots of ethnic nationalism in the modern conceptions of 
citizenship (Mamdani 1996; Ndegwa 1997).  The roots of contemporary ethnic nationalism 
grew as a result of the historical arbitration of racial domination in the colonial history, and 
                                                     
5
 Reservation of quotas in respect of services, permits, etc., for Malays and natives of any of the States 
of Sabah and Sarawak.  On Clause (1) of that Article it states that:  It shall be the responsibility of the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong to safeguard the special position on the Malays and natives of any of the 
States of Sabah and Sarawak and the legitimate interests of other communities in accordance with the 
provisions of this Article. Malaysian Constitution (2002) 
6
 Public Records Office CO 1030/67, no.1 ‘United Kingdom policy in Malaya’: CO memorandum for 
UK high commissioners in Commonwealth countries, 14 Sept 1954 
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the institutional credit given to the local practices of the native customs and cultures laid the 
grounds for the contemporary practices of racism and other forms of discrimination to emerge 
in relatively later in Malaysia.  
In the history of British Malaya, the British colonial policy recognized independent 
sovereignty of the Malay rulers in history.  The current Federal system in Malaysia grew out 
of the historical treaties that legally distinguished the differential power of jurisdictions 
between the Federal legislature which was administered by the British colonial officers and 
the Malay Rulers in the Malay States (except the British Straits Settlements of Penang and 
Malacca).  The treatment of the Malay Rulers as independent sovereigns as well as allies was 
critical to the strategic extension of the British Imperial power into the Malays states.  More 
than a decade after Queen Victoria’s “1858 Proclamation to the princes, chiefs, and the people 
of India” – following the Indian Rebellion of 1857 – British foreign policies on colonialism 
shifted attention to the importance indigenous sentiments and the preservation of their 
indigenous rights (Metcalf 1965; Huttenback 1966; Belmekki 2008).  These treaty obligations 
between the British and the Malay sultans underlined the ‘non-interference’ rationale 
expressed in the Proclamation
7
.  By granting the Malay Sultans the power over Islamic affairs 
and the Malay subjects in the Malay states, the indigenous sovereignty and the inherited 
forms of inequality were preserved.  The British had no jurisdictions whatsoever in the affairs 
of the Muslim community, who were (and still in ideological terms) the subjects of the Malay 
                                                     
7
 ‘Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of 
religion, we disclaim alike the right and desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We 
declare it to be our royal will and pleasure that none be in anywise favoured, none molested or 
disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all alike shall enjoy the equal and 
impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority 
under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our 
subjects on pain of our highest displeasure’. (Queen Victoria’s Proclamation, November 1, 1858) 
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Rulers, and likewise the Malay Rulers surrendered the business of administrating the overall 
political economy of Malaya to the British.   
The differential legal powers that divided Colonial affairs from indigenous customs 
constituted the biggest obstacle to the formulation of common citizenship in the post-war 
period.  The British tried to introduce and reconcile the two principles of HM government 
declared policy, which were citizenship by loyalty and the Malay special position
8
 (267 M1).  
The liberal conception of common citizenship that the British attempted to introduce was 
premised on the conviction that political right should be afforded ‘to all those of whatever 
colour or race, who might fairly be held to regard Malaya as their home and object of their 
loyalty’ (353-355 Malaya I).  However the intended policy of the H.M.G became untenable as 
politics on the ground were polarized by the nationalist conservative movements dominated 
by the Malays on the one hand, and the remnants of the left-wing movements from the 
Second World War largely supported by the non-Malay, particularly the Chinese community 
(Cheah 2003).  ‘The Emergency has given the Malays an outlet for the expression of national 
enthusiasm for the defence of their country against a threat inevitably associated with China 
and the Chinese’9.  The Communist Insurgency triggered the polarizing development of 
ethno-religious relations.   
The differential legal powers had considerable implications upon the process of constitutional 
framing for Malaya, resulting in a number of constitutional safeguards set out to prioritize the 
framing of the rights of indigenous Malays and the powers of the Malay Rulers (Fernando 
2001).  The constitutional provisions included safeguarding the socio-economic rights for the 
Malay community, preserving the sovereign functions of the Malay Rulers and the elevation 
                                                     
8
 Public Records Office, CO537/1538 DO 43,  p. (203-209), and (p.267) 
9
   Public Records Document, CO967/84, no.7.  The Emergency here refers to the post 2
nd
 World 
War Communist Emergency movement in Malaya. 
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of Islam as the official religion of the Federation.  The political emphasis given to these 
categorical concepts by the Working Party
10
 generated significant ideological impetus for the 
Malay Kingship to claim the sovereign function in protecting the status of Islam and the 
Malay culture.  The institution of the Malay Kingship is influential to the cultural heritage of 
the Malay community, and these elements of cultural influence have been extended to include 
the sovereign functions of the Malay Rulers.  The most enduring sovereign function inherited 
in history includes the protection of the Malay culture and Islam.  Malay, Islam and the Malay 
Kingship became inseparable elements in the ideological construction of the Malay Kerajaan 
(government), and as these constitute the domineering ingredients of governance, they 
inevitably furnish the logical extension of how the Malay citizen is projected and imagined.  
Gradually Islam becomes the unifying factor in defining the moral and social fibre of the 
Malays as individuals, the Malay culture and the Malay Kingship.  Since Islam is the 
definitive moral compass and the legitimate identity bearer of Malay ethnicity, this becomes 
an established concept in the Constitutional vocabulary. 
Where the evolution of the justice system was concerned, two areas of legal jurisdiction 
furnished the genealogy of legal thinking in the Malaysian justice institution.  Logically 
Malay ethnicity and the foundation of Islamic thinking became legally congealed within the 
Constitutional definition of Malay.  This is reflected in the glossary of definition under Article 
160 where the definition of ‘Malay’ is one who professes Islam, speaks Malay and practices 
the Malay custom.  This definition furnishes the ideological convergence for the ethnic 
identity of the Malays with Islamic doctrine, consequently blurring the lines between the 
social category of ethnicity and the conceptual category of religion as a belief system.  It is 
                                                     
10
 This Working Party was comprised of the Alliance, the Malay Rulers and the British Colonial 
Administration to review the constitutional proposals designed by the Reid Commission (Fernando 
2002:143-188) 
17 
 
implicit in the common understanding that the Malay identity instinctively becomes subject to 
the moral dictation of Islam.  Once the reciprocal linkages between Malay ethnicity and Islam 
were legally bounded, it paves the way for the government to claim the political obligations to 
protect and control the ethno-religious category of Malay-Muslims instead of nurturing the 
value of common citizenship. 
In the 1957 Malaya Constitution billed for an independent nation, the political commitments 
to secular state were only expressed as ‘intentions’ by the ruling elites, leaving gaps in the 
meaning of secular to be interpreted and developed.   Juxtaposing the conceptual dominance 
Malay Kerajaan (government) and the normative values of tolerance, neutrality and equality 
the political values of secularism tended to be perceived in contrary to the inherited special 
position of the Malay majority and the Malay ruling elites.  The special position of the Malays 
has consistently been an integral part of the wider political scheme of economic development 
throughout the country’s developmental progress.  In each phase of the political-economic 
development, the Malay agenda has remained consistent as a priority consideration for the 
ruling party UMNO (United Malay National Organization).  A critical juncture in the 1980’s 
changed the legal-political landscape of the country when the ruling party faced an internal 
crisis, prompting the president of UMNO, who was also the prime minister to make major 
amendments in the Malaysian Constitution.  
The executive action of the Prime Minister in the 1988 Constitutional Amendment had the 
effect of subverting the meaning of the ‘secular’ state in Malaysia.  One of the most 
compelling amendments was the addition of Clause (1A) to Article 121 which effectively 
restricted the High Court from interfering into the jurisdictions of the Syariah courts.  This 
amendment gives the government greater the use of coercive state power against other 
political contenders - Muslim and non-Muslim alike - for questioning the legitimacy of the 
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government.  At the individual state level
11
, it strengthened the juridical autonomy of Syariah 
justice in the policing the moral conduct of the Muslim population.  The legal and 
sociological implications of this particular Amendment has generated unprecedented 
complications in adjudicating justice in matters relating to inter-faith relations - marriage and 
divorce, custodial rights, burial rights, the conversion of minors and apostasy.   
1.4 Contemporary Contentions 
The process of de-secularization in Malaysia is a gradual historical build-up, with it and its 
socio-political implications became apparent when Islam and its principle values are defended 
at the cost of citizen’s fundamental liberties and rights to equal justice.  The intense state 
politicization of Islam has not only limited the scope for liberal interpretation of justice, but 
the official status of Islam lends weight to the dominance of the Malays in mainstream 
politics.  The ideological potency of Islam in politics is considerably linked to the history of 
Malay grassroots politics in Malaysia and because of this, the dynamics of political contention 
was fragmented by the diverse ethnicity and religious perspectives (see Khoo 2010; Cooke 
2003).   
The rise of civil society movements along deep ethno-religious differences presents perennial 
difficulties for the various civil and political organizations to reach a common objective and 
concerted strategy in their quest to challenge authoritarian state policies.  These differences on 
the other hand have been instrumental for the state to keep applying policies of repression 
including the application of detention without trial under the Internal Security Act (1960) 
                                                     
11
 The Malaysian Federation is made up of 13 individual states and the Ninth Schedule of the 
Malaysian Constitution delineates the legislative functions of the government into Federal List and the 
State List.  Under List II of the State List, except for the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan 
and Putrajaya, Islamic laws are administered and legislated under the purview of the State 
government. (Federal Constitution, 2002) 
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upon many political dissidents and leaders of civil movements in the name of public order or 
national security.  This Act is the legal hallmark of the Malaysian government’s repressive 
measure against any further attempts by individuals, civil organizations and other political 
groups to push for a liberal agenda in the political landscape.   
The repressive policies of the ISA (Internal Security Act) combined with the legal 
amendments since the 1980’s shifted the conception of justice from a generous interpretation 
to the elevation of theological discourse.  This constituted a path-dependent that furnished 
significant discursive turn for the political ascendency of Islam as a contentious force in post-
Mahathir era.  Islam has now become an important political conception both for the state and 
other political contenders.  This is particularly so when the organizing principles of 
governance are entwined with the salience of Islam as the doctrinal foundation of the private 
lives and public discourse of the Malay-Muslims. 
1.5 The arguments sketched out 
In Chapter 2, the dissertation locates the history of ideas that structure the relations of power 
underpinning the institutional frame of the ambivalent secular state in Malaysia.  In drawing 
out the strands of thinking behind such power structure the dissertation uses critical 
junctures
12
 to illuminate the explicit institutional changes in the legal sphere that have 
considerable impacts upon the multicultural citizens in the Malaysian society.  The study of 
the state reconstructs a timeline of the critical events that constitute the process of de-
                                                     
12
 Critical junctures frames the events to contextualize the study of multifaceted causal relationships 
usually underscored by multiple causality, path dependencies, contingent events, and complex 
interaction effects.  Büthe, Tim. 2002. "Taking Temporality Seriously: Modeling History and the Use 
of Narratives  
as Evidence." American Political Science Review 96 (3): 481-493. Hall, Peter A. 2003. "Aligning 
Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics" In Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social 
Sciences, edited by J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer, New York: Cambridge UP, 373-404 
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secularization, in particular on how certain ideas about religion and political rights were 
developed and institutionalized within the historical framework of a particular state 
tradition.  It illuminates the interplay between the opportunities of political freedom and the 
immediate constraints imposed upon the prospects of liberal space by repressive state actions.   
The critical juncture framework suggested by Capoccia and Kelemen (2007:348) will be used 
to analyse the events that triggered the production of a certain political practice that transform 
the ideological character of the state that constrains future choices.  This emphasizes the 
significance of political crises and the ensuing decisions that shape the terms and 
understanding of the notions of rights in the political discourse.  This approach aims at linking 
ideas, reasons and values with the institutional practices of the state following the major shifts 
or changes in the political events in Malaysian.  By linking political text – public records, 
justifications for Constitutional amendments, political statements – and debates to real 
political events (van Dijk 1995), it aims to construct a coherent frame with which to underpin 
the process of de-secularization. 
Chapter 3 addresses how government involvement in religion influences understanding of 
secularism as a state practice and how they impact upon the public deliberation.  In re-
exploring the concepts of secularism as state practice, the aim is to bring to light a different 
dimension of state theorizing whereby the inclusion of religion may add to our contemporary 
understanding about its impact upon public deliberations and ideas that underpin Malaysian 
citizenship.  This chapter illuminates the importance of agency within the normative structure 
of secular politics by setting out the dynamics of political relations between the state and the 
citizens within a democratic framework.  
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Chapter 4 is a historical narration about the institutional merging of Colonial Territories and 
disparate colonial state practices.  It traces the problematic emergence of secular governance 
and native customary practices in the Malaysian history.  Where ideas and the practice of 
secular governance were historically framed by colonialism, the colonial creation of the semi-
modern states in Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak incorporated many elements of 
traditional authority and religion was particularly tied to the nature of the local customs.  It 
identifies the important events at which the secular-religious (Islam and other) encounters 
shape the narrative of political interactions and participation.  This chapter reviews the local 
literature and Public Records Documents on the formation of the semi-modern state in 
Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak, paying particular attention to the three important ways in 
which colonialism formalized the establishment of religion within the semi-modern state 
formation: the institutional reinforcing of local or indigenous leadership, establishing the role 
of Islam and the construction of ethnic-communalist ties, bringing the histories of the three 
territories together to analyse Malaysian politics as a whole, rather than different geographical 
partition.  
Chapter 5 examines the political transition from colonial subjects to citizens.  This chapter 
focuses on the problematic transitions from colonial subject to citizens and examines the post-
war conflicts and politics of reconstruction.  Considerable attention is given to the era of the 
Communist insurgency and the ways in which this part of history plays important role in 
implicating the state to dominate a particular narrative about nationalism, loyalty and the 
elements of citizenship. 
Chapter 6 discusses the concept of ‘fractured nation-state’.  It contextualizes the political 
events that had significant impacts upon the re-positioning of the role of Islam in politics and 
society.  It explores the political engagement of the state with religion and its impact upon the 
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Malaysian public sphere.  It focuses on how the events of the ethnic riot in 1969 revitalized 
the use of state coercive power upon individuals and groups that were perceived to challenge 
the special position of the Malays in the Constitution.    This chapter highlights the beginning 
the use of Constitutional amendments as a strategy of control over contestations in Malaysian 
politics. 
Chapter 7 examines the re-positioning the political role of Islam and the de-secularization of 
the Malaysian state.  It traces the emergence of the dominant concept of Malay-Muslim 
identity in the public discourse and identifies the role of political agents in furnishing the 
justification of differential rights through the narratives of political text and debates.  The 
amendments made to Article 121 of the Constitution in 1988 are identified as a major turning 
point in the repositioning of the role of the Islamic laws and this will be linked to the analysis 
of de-secularization.  The chapter argues that amendments to Article 121 had resulted in the 
gradual loss of human rights among the minority communities and uses three empirical cases 
to substantiate the claim.   
Chapter 8 recaps the issues that have been raised in the Malaysian public discourse, 
particularly the use of state coercive power in shaping the trajectories of differential rights and 
the ways in which these have been linked to the undermining of basic liberties brought about 
by the Constitutional Amendment to Article 121.  It illuminates this issue as a problem of 
political legitimacy and to apply Rawlsian informed conception of the role of ‘public 
reasoning’ to frame the problematic issue of legal dualism grounded in the secular-religious 
jurisdictions in Malaysia.  The Constitutional Amendment to Article 121 has contributed to 
significant changes to the political terms and agreement of how basic justice should accrue to 
all citizens.  Whilst the religious institutions have been granted considerable judicial role in 
dictating the moral conducts of Muslim citizens, there have been a significant lack of judicial 
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recourse for citizens who are wedged in between this logjam of legal dualism.  In the final 
analysis this amendment has considerably undercut the meaning of fundamental liberties and 
the liberty of conscience for democratic citizens to co-exist in a multi-cultural society. 
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2  APPROACHES TO STATE POWER AND THE USE OF REASON 
Abstract: This chapter presents the study of secular practices in the Malaysian state in the 
context of the Anglo-Malay development of the institutional concept of Malay Kerajaan.  The 
conceptual underpinnings of the power play within the Kerajaan are then explored in relation 
to conceptual developments of political ‘rights’ associated with common citizenship.  Since 
Islam occupies an important role in the dynamics of traditional legitimacy and the modern 
governance of the Kerajaan, this gives a critical dimension to the modern political debates 
about justice and the conception of rights. 
2.1 Introduction 
The concept of the secular state is intricately tied to a number of institutional considerations 
that are broadly defined in relation to the empirical changes associated with modernity, 
economic industrialization and the process of democratization (Lechner 1991:195; Lechner 
1992).  In this context the institutionalization of a secular state implies the logic of 
secularizing the society, thus entailing a certain break or intellectual rupture from the 
traditional beliefs in religion and its practices of the past, making religion insignificant in the 
public sphere  However the reality is somewhat different because new forms of faith based 
movements have equally emerged with such force that they become assertive the world of 
politics (Cassanova 1994; Asad 1999; Lambert 1999; Sheehan 2003; Norris and Inglehart 
2004; Martin 2005)  Religious revivalism in the public sphere has now reached a cross road 
between religious moral thinking and secular thinking and this necessitates the intellectual 
engagement of the secular with its theological past and in its present relationship.  Where 
competing notions of rights are concerned, the ways in which rights are negotiated and 
deliberated within this frame of religious and secular contentions become key to unpacking 
the fundamentals of human rights in the discourse of democratization.   
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The analysis of the secular state in Malaysia locates politics of citizenship right in the arena of 
secular-Islamic contestation.  The institution of governance is identified as the institutional 
domain to examine the use of public reasoning in the deliberation of citizenship right.  
Although the secular-religious contestations can happen both in the formal (government) and 
the informal (non-government but public) domains, they are not mutually exclusive.  Instead 
these two domains influence one another, and it remains the focus of this study to zero in on 
the kinds of reasons motivating the government to deliberate on political questions related to 
the rights of the citizens.  The examination of the secular state is confined within the 
institutional or the formal domain of the government, but the analysis will take into 
consideration the ways in which state practices and public policies influence the informal 
domains, and in turn, reshape the ideological foundation of the state.   
In the process of identifying these contestations, it is argued that some of the major political 
events have contributed to the de-secularization of the Malaysian state.  These political events 
and contestations have often been stabilized usually through political mediation in the form of 
ethnic consociationalism, or in the extreme case, the coercive use of state power through 
detention without trial.  Unpacking the values of political mediation through examining the 
agency of reasoning constitutes the main focus of the study in reappraising the Malaysian 
secular state.  The call for a Rawlsian informed liberal framework in the Malaysian secular 
constitution is critical here because of how the government has tended to use religion to 
justify increasing coercive measures against political actors and ordinary citizens.  The 
ideological reasoning behind the coercive state practices will be traced through the analysis of 
public text and debates.  The content of these debates will be drawn from archival documents 
and contemporary Parliamentary debates as it explores the motivations behind the political 
reasoning in the formulation of policies and legislations by state agents. 
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The process of de-secularization reflects major ideological shifts in the practices of local 
institutions and these are historically contingent that underscore the political development of 
the Malaysian state.  Local institutions, particularly the Malay Kerajaan for instance, came to 
participate in the alliance partnership with the British colonial government, played a 
significant role in shaping the public role of Islam in institutional governance as well as in 
their obligation towards the political destiny of the Malay community.  In the history of the 
old Malay world, the concept of kerajaan came to mean, ‘the condition of having a raja’ 
(Milner 1982).  In this context, the role of the raja was mainly ceremonious in bestowing titles 
and conducting other cultural ceremonies, and was usually conceived by Malays as the 
upholder of the political and cultural universe.  Hence the historical linkages between the 
cultural world of the Malay community and the role of the Malay Kerajaan continue to shape 
the character of power relations despite the introduction of secular values in modern 
governance. 
The Malay Kerajaan, as a local institution, also interacted with other bodies created for and 
by the immigrant communities that continually shaped the dynamics of the administrative 
domain of colonial governance.  Considerable attention will then be given to the agencies of 
people and the role of ideas, particularly those related to theological convictions and its 
counterparts, in shaping critical policies and legislations that have serious impacts upon the 
initial conception of common citizenship.   
Unpacking the course of de-secularization will combine an exploration into the history of 
ideas and in the making of institutional framework with the contemporary focus on the 
discourse of political reasoning that constitute the substance of micro-level debates in the 
Parliament.  It is a process of continual investigation into the fluidity of ideas linked to the 
dynamics of power and the discourse of reasoning throughout the different stages of history.  
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At the backdrop of these constant and unwavering episodes of historical progression, 
significant political events will be identified as critical junctures that marked considerable 
changes to the state and the society as a whole, to the extent that they produce divergent 
institutional legacies, and for that matter public policies from the preceding era (Collier and 
Collier 1991; Villalon 1998; Greer 2008).  This study recognizes a number critical junctures 
that rendered decisions made about the impending development of politics and public policies 
irrevocable, thus having significant effects upon the fundamental liberties and rights of 
Malaysian citizenship. 
This study locates the Parliament as the important arena of formal decision making following 
a moment major political event to represent a critical juncture.  The Parliament generates the 
outcomes of the important decisions and amendments that are related to the distinct processes 
of change at the broader institutional level.  In examining these political debates documented 
in the formal arena, the recurring ideas and values that the state and its agents employ will be 
traced and scrutinized particularly on how they play significant role in the ideological 
construction of the separate identities for the citizens and the justifications for the policies of 
differential group right.  The ideological construction of separate identities and the 
concomitant policies governing differential rights problematize the broader dynamics that 
fused these communitarian ideas of rights with the symbolic values of religion into the 
foundation of the modern state formation in Malaysia.   
Political events that led to legal amendments have had the biggest impact upon the de-
secularization process, which subsequently undermine the fundamental liberties of the 
citizens.  The study identifies three separate but related informal arenas in the contemporary 
period that have been affected by the political-legal contestations.  The first one is the 
empirical arena where the ideological contestation of secularism manifests in the legal row 
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over the use of the word ‘Allah’ by the non-Muslim faith communities.   The government 
imposed restrictions upon the distribution of the Malay translation of the Bible to the 
Christian believers only, thus putting limits upon the exercise of fundamental liberty of 
Christian citizens to propagate the faith to people who are non-Muslim and non-Christian.  
Article 11 of the Freedom of religion in the Malaysian Constitution, Clause (1) states that 
‘Every person has the right to profess and practice his religion and, subject to Clause (4)13, to 
propagate it.  The second case examines the political activism of the HINDRAF and HRP as a 
significant counter-hegemonic movement challenging the dominant interpretation of Malay-
Muslim discourse in justifying the policies of differential citizenship rights in the Malaysian 
public sphere.  The third one relates to the religious repression of sexual minorities where four 
Malay transgender or Mak Nyah had used the Federal Constitution to challenge the Syariah 
law on cross-dressing.  
2.2 Power, Ideology and Public Reasoning 
This dissertation analyses the secular-religious dynamics of the Malaysian state in different 
phases of political governance: the colonial, the decolonization, the transition into the post-
colonial and the contemporary.  In each phase of political governance, the secular-religious 
dynamics redefine the relationship between the governing state and the subjects or citizens 
through the conceptual interpretation of ‘rights’.  It begins with framing the sociological 
emergence of ethnic power relations since the colonial period by examining its ideological 
dominance in implanting the values of ethnic symbolism into the structure of the governing 
elites throughout the historical process of state formation.  Focusing on the values defining 
the practices of early historical alliances between the British and the Malay Ruling elites, it 
                                                     
13
 Article 11 Clause (4) states that, ‘State law and in respect of the Federal Territories of Kuala 
Lumpur, Labuan and Puterajaya, Federal law may control or restrict the propagating of any religious 
doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam’. 
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draws on the domineering influence of Anglo-Malay relations upon policy choices as well as 
the development of the Kerajaan concept over time.  Once the Anglo-Malay institutional 
alliances were established, colonial policies on the issues of land, culture and legal 
jurisdictions over immigration and citizenship in particular – would be grounded in the treaty 
arrangements that governed the political relations between the British and the Malay Ruling 
elites. The patterns thus created continued to persist within in the basic frame of working 
relations between the British and the Malays Ruling elites.  Unless there are contingency 
forces strong enough to break the pattern, the dynamics of ethnically structured power 
relations constitute the ‘path dependency’ well into the contemporary development of 
Malaysian politics.  
The political structure of ethnic symbolism imposed considerable restrictions upon the 
interpretation of citizenship rights in Malaysia, and as time goes by, ethnic symbolism 
transpired into the contemporary practice of ethnic consociationalism, resulting in the political 
contestation of ethnic related discrimination against minority groups.   These contestations 
emerged as a consequence of the ways in which the political interpretation of special 
citizenship right translate into giving preferential treatment one particular ethnic group over 
others, further entrenching the institutional discrimination against minority citizens.  The 
growing strength of public religion playing a role in the political interpretation of this special 
citizenship constitutes a significant tension between the secular and religious dynamics of 
contention in the Malaysian political climate (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001).  The HINDRAF 
movement, Article 11 and the Malay trans-genders challenging Syariah enactments on cross-
dressing have therefore been identified as the emerging dynamics of counter-movements 
against the de-secularization of the state. 
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This study claims that the de-secularization of the state has resulted in the erosion of the rights 
of citizens belonging to the minority ethnic, religious and LGBT background, thus prompting 
them to mobilize and reclaim their rights to equal treatment by challenging the de-
secularization process.  Underlining the de-secularization of the state is the dynamics of 
contention between religious ideas and secular political concepts structuring the political 
thinking of collective movement at different stages of the development process of the modern 
state.  Whilst ethnicity has been identified as the prime mover of political contention and the 
major point of conciliatory bargaining, the dissertation claims that the main undercurrents 
motivating the mechanics of ethnic politics were the dynamics between religious values and 
the forces of secularity.   
Notwithstanding the historical dominance of the structure of ethnic consociationalism in the 
Malaysian political discourse, this dissertation finds the agency of public deliberation as the 
critical avenue for the construction of the universal ideal of citizenship.  The ideal of 
citizenship is broadly understood here as the non-violation of fundamental liberties by the use 
of state power and where there’s equality of political rights among citizens.  The Rawlsian 
informed framework of public reason is useful as the normative benchmark for gauging the 
nature with which citizens use and evaluate the moral reasons to communicate their grounds 
for political decisions.  Likewise, evaluating the official use of reason is equally significant in 
determining the grounds for its decisions on fundamental political questions.  It is the 
argument of this dissertation that only through the use public reasons in the deliberation of 
fundamental political questions that basic citizenship rights can be upheld.  The three case 
studies identified in the dissertation will highlight the instances of the violation of public 
reason as the study shows the ways in which the government employs religious doctrine in its 
deliberation of fundamental political questions.   Consequently this approach addresses a 
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defining normative argument about how the ‘use of public reason’ can be theoretically 
extended to a society that is constantly struggling to expand the boundaries of political 
democratization. 
The contemporary institution of the state in Malaysia could be problematized in two distinct 
tendencies: the diminishing or demonization of the political values of secularism in the public 
discourse and the potency of religion in reforming government policies.  Within the broader 
political debates surrounding the secular-religious dichotomies, the conventional 
understanding about their distinctions may lead to a problematic interpretation of the 
institutional norms of the secular polity particularly in the context of an ethnic, religious and 
diverse society.  However the normative understanding about the boundaries of secular-
religious distinctions are increasingly nebulous following the growing public role of religion 
and how it has been making inroads into public policy deliberations in many parts of the 
world.  Against this backdrop of public resurgence of religion there is an urgent need to 
review the political construction of the secular state and the assumptions it generates about the 
role of the state in interpreting/regulating religion in the public sphere.   
2.3 Research Questions 
This dissertation straddles empirical and normative debates about secularism and religious 
politics in the Malaysian pluralism.  Normative political theory is rarely completely abstracted 
from empirical realities, but rather takes as its implicit reference point the Western liberal 
democratic experience.  Following broadly in the comparative political ideologies tradition 
that seeks to move away from Eurocentricism (see methods section below), this dissertation 
explores on the one hand how consideration of a non-Western political tradition might inform 
the debates within normative political theory and, on the other hand, how a more explicit 
engagement with Western political theory might illuminate our understanding of religious 
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politics in Malaysia.  The overarching research questions that will provide answers to these 
issues can be expressed thus: 
1. How has the historical evolution of the Malaysian state embodied and enacted 
changing notions of the secular-religious distinction? 
2. What are the factors explaining the contemporary retreat from secularism in Malaysia? 
3. In what ways can the polemics of secular-religious discourse be overcome in 
constructing the universal ideal of citizenship? 
In charting the historical paradigm of the emergence of institutions, and this exercise asks 
how they structure political practices and the conducts of citizens, and tries to connect 
normative theory with empirical research (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Thelen 1999).  By 
engaging in key normative concerns about equality, justice and liberty with empirical 
investigation, this approach discusses contemporary struggles with unpacking the role of 
history in structuring the political thinking and practices behind the process of policy making 
(Skocpol and Pierson 2002).  Juxtaposing these arguments in relation to the historical 
formation of ideas and practices could bolster the analysis of power in social relations, by 
illustrating how inequalities of power are constantly reinforced to become deeply embedded 
in mainstream mode of political understanding. 
The first question addresses the reinforcing process that contributes to the logic of path-
dependence where ‘critical juncture’ generates particular outcomes that set off response 
mechanisms underpinning the recurrence of a certain pattern, in this case of power relations, 
into the future.  A particular pattern of power relations could become embedded in the 
political structure over a period of time which would then dictate the course of political 
agency that may become irreversible.  Skocpol and Pierson (2002:6) argue that it is the event 
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or process occurring during and immediately following critical junctures that will emerge as 
crucial to the impending course of a particular political development.  
Religion as the classical source of knowledge and power in the traditional practices of ancient 
kingdoms is in constant struggle with modern secular ideas in the conceptual validation of 
truth in contemporary political thinking.  This changes the ways in which power relation is 
played out, and produces a particular configuration of truth or reality that will influence the 
conduct of agents in the contemporary experience.  Throughout the historical development of 
particular state tradition or institutional governance, there will be ‘critical junctures’ that may 
constitute a break from the past, affecting the rhythm of development that may prompt state 
agents to intervene for the purpose of maintaining political stability.  During these critical 
junctures, new values, new laws and economic policies may be introduced creating new 
pathways in the formation the state tradition and these will be explored in relation to the thesis 
of de-secularization of the state. 
The second question examines the empirical cases relating to the process of ‘de-
secularization’ with the coercive use of state power.   It investigates the reasoning behind 
political deliberation and its application in public policies.  The third question represents the 
‘so what?’ element of this study.  In many ways, it reflects quite substantially the problematic 
aspect that Rawls’ had identified about finding the avenue for ‘overlapping consensus’ to be 
politically sustainable.  Here the main concern for employing Rawlsian-informed critique of 
the Malaysian state is to put the case for the use of public reasoning and deliberation as the 
path for the liberal and democratizing prospect of free and equal citizenship (Rawls 1985; 
Habermas 1994; Bohman 1997; Elster 1998; Kymlicka 2001).  This dissertation contends that 
the Malaysian political structure does not offer basic conception of persons as free and equal 
where the access of social rights is concerned.  Despite these constraints, the process of 
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deliberation has emerged, where Rawlsian normative approach to the use of public reason is 
anticipated.  
This is the unique problem of Malaysia where the basic principles of rights are unequally 
distributed by the legal provision of affirmative action for a particular ethnic group, through 
Malay special position.  The situation of citizenship right in Malaysia may not fit into 
Marshall’s formulation of the linear progression of civil, political and social rights.  However 
Marshall’s formulation of rights that are distinctly divided into – civil, political and social 
rights will still be useful for the purpose of understanding the political relation between 
citizens and the state.  Civil rights existed as the basic minimum of rights that were required 
to cement the relationship between the state and its inhabitants within a particular territory, 
but these were not spelt out in terms of individual wellbeing, and the claims upon the state 
were non-existent.  Depending on the changes in the society, Marshall identified political 
right as the important catalyst for the achievement of social rights in the development of 
citizenship.  It was argued then that no universal principles existed to define the elements of 
citizenship as it was driven by the collective projection of values, rights and norms a 
particular society. This vein of argument suggests that the notion of citizenship was 
historically contingent and socially located (Marshall 1950:150) and the model of citizenship 
development that was proposed by Marshall was contextualized in the exigency of war-time 
conditions that necessitated the institutional growth of the welfare state in Britain. 
It is submitted that Marshall’s thesis has its limitations for focusing on the rights to political 
participation and the contemporary literature on citizenship have developed beyond the 
elements of rights to include the effects of globalization upon the perception, negotiation of 
identities in the understanding of citizenship (Barbalet and Ingleton 1988; Alexander 1998; 
Linklater 1998; Ong 1999; Turner 2002; Frey 2003).  The civic-republican theorization of 
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citizenship is equally important, where the emphasis on the elements of citizenship is placed 
on the politically educative society in fostering ‘republican virtues’ of moral integrity, 
patriotism and self-discipline of the citizens (Heater 2004:41).  For civic-republicanism, it is 
recognized that there are different ‘will’ at play, setting the stage for the tensions between the 
will of the individual and the general will.  The aim is therefore to realize the common good, 
over and above the satisfaction of individual self-interests (Oldfield 1990; Williams 1991; 
Dagger 1997; Kymlicka 2001). 
Marshall’s theory on citizenship is useful in highlighting the state-centric domination of 
political membership and rights at the same time that saw the various competing claims of 
ethnic and religious rights in the contemporary condition of Malaysian pluralism. Since 
citizenship has largely been a state-driven project, beginning from the post-war reconstruction 
period right until the formation of the Malaysian Federation, drawing out the seeds of 
contention becomes imperative in explaining the onset of de-secularization in the Malaysian 
political development.  
It is in this context of political contention of rights within the ambit of the normative 
argument of Rawls’s use of public reason provides a possible outline to locate for the ideal of 
free and equal citizenship.  The disputed nature of the secular state in the Malaysian political 
discourse, represented by the periodic episodes of contestation or ‘critical juncture’ would 
prompt the state to use coercive means to intervene to restore political stability, and introduce 
religious values to further political legitimacy.  These periodic discontinuities would create 
the conditions for citizens to politically mobilize not only against the increasingly narrow 
interpretation of fundamental liberties but also for the equal access to social rights. In 
analysing how state power operates within the scope of contested secular state, the study tries 
to uncover the active knowledge behind the practices of power that privileges Islamic 
36 
 
discourse in the Malaysian political context.  In order to answer these questions, the 
dissertation addresses two sets of sub-questions, the first one political Islam and the historical 
patterns of state formation, and the second one on locating the middle ground on religious 
contestations.   
Political Islam and the normative worth of the secular state: 
 In what way does the state in Malaysia respond to religious revivalism particularly 
among Muslim social movements in the country?   
 How has state-sponsored Islamization led to the counter-hegemonic movement that 
challenges the dominant interpretation of Malay-Muslim discourse? I will choose the 
case study focusing on HINDRAF and HRP as a marginalized social community in 
Kuala Lumpur. 
 How have changing legal and constitutional norms been driven by ideological or 
pragmatic concerns on the part of the state, and what implications have they had for 
subsequent religious and secular mobilization?  Case study—Constitutional 
Amendment to Article 121 in 1988 and the ideological ban on the use of the word 
Allah among the Christian community. 
 In what way does the Malaysian Constitution empower Malay trans-genders in their 
quest to challenge the Syariah Enactment on cross-dressing?  
Locating the middle ground for religious and secular citizens:    
 In the context of cross-cultural political dialogue, is it possible to locate the historical 
emergence of public reason in the Malaysian political society? 
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 How does the Rawlsian conception of ‘public reason’ provide a means of developing a 
critique of the processes at work in the Malaysian public discourse?  
 In which way can public reasoning be used to analyse/evaluate the changing role of 
the state (i.e. from a relatively secular to one that inclines toward Islamic state) in 
influencing/shaping the discourse of public debate on the competing ideas of 
citizenship for a society in transition like Malaysia? 
 How significant is the role of the secular state in adjudicating the competing demands 
of a culturally divided society in creating the ideal of common citizenship?  
2.4 Legitimacy, stability and the public reasoning of secular/religious 
dynamics 
The citizenship model formulated by Marshall addresses the core issues of structural 
inequalities in a society that develops from a feudal power relation into a capitalist power 
relation, using the British class system as the case study.  Marshall’s work outlined the 
systematic conception of citizenship by looking at how society began to experience 
substantial economic transformations, focusing on how ideas about freedom and equality 
began to change the meaning of citizenship (Marshall 1950:150; Marshall 1965; Marshall 
1972; Marshall 1981; Marshall and Rees 1985).  This was grounded in the historical analysis 
of the development of the social right in the British capitalist society from 1890 to 1945 
addressing the problems of liberty and social inequality.  Structural inequality is still a major 
problem underlining the contestation of citizenship right in Malaysia, and Marshall’s 
formulation provides a good platform as a starting point to understand the social inequities of 
the Malaysian pluralism.  Where Rawls’ contribution is concerned, it is in addressing the 
significance of moral agency in furnishing the substance of political debates and deliberation.   
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Rawls concept of public reason is employed here because it offers the analysis of agency as 
thinking moral agents through the formulation of a person or citizen as ‘reasonable and 
rational’14.  This is a considerable shift from Marshall’s formulation of citizenship that 
analyses the issues of structural inequality to the conceptual analysis of citizens as thinking 
moral agents deciding or evaluating upon fundamental political questions.  Marshall’s 
formulation is effective in that it pinpoints the problems of inequality as the locus of 
contention that mobilizes citizens to reclaim their rights on the moral grounds of equal access 
to social minimum in the form of the welfare state.  Rawls contribution is significant in the 
rethinking of Malaysian citizenship because it provides the analytical tool to unpack and 
evaluate the motivation behind the reasons given for a particular decision, policy or law in the 
context of public deliberation of fundamental political questions. 
The understanding of citizenship in Malaysia involves both an analysis of the structural 
inequality affecting citizens living in the condition of pluralism as well as the reappraisal of 
the kinds of values and reasons being put forth in the process of public deliberation. Given 
that the structural inequalities remain unresolved, and this is an established fact of 
constitutional provision of special citizenship for the Malay ethnic group, the contemporary 
challenge is to uncover the ideological tensions that such legalized inequality have 
engendered in the public sphere.  Despite the general acceptance of government sanctioned 
inequality, political contestations have emerged at different levels of social and economic 
relations.  Where the question of citizenship rights are concerned, fundamental liberties as a 
category of rights would be difficult to quantify and one of the ways to uncover the depth of 
                                                     
14
 In Political Liberalism, Rawls says ‘the reasonable and the rational are complementary ideas’ and 
that ‘neither the reasonable nor the rational can stand without the other’.  In this context, the 
reasonable and rational agents are the basic units of responsibility in social and political life.  A person 
who is rational but wholly unreasonable is not fit for social life, and a person who is reasonable but 
wholly irrational is incapable of concerted action.  
Freeman, S (2007) Rawls, Routledge, New York, pp.345 
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violation against this category of rights is to investigate the nature of political contestation 
initiated by aggrieved citizens. 
Within a minimally acceptable set of democratic institutions, the political culture establishes 
an egalitarian form of government whereby all the citizens participate in the design of public 
policy, uphold the laws and secure the liberty to express their opinions and challenge the 
actions of their state.  This study focuses on the aspect of liberalism that addresses the issues 
of basic civil liberties and the democratic process.  Rawls’ notion of the liberal conception of 
the role of justice will be explored here in relation to the normative argument that government 
should be neutral between the competing ideas of good (Rawls 1993).  This supports the 
claim of this dissertation that using Islam as a comprehensive doctrine for the basis of 
political deliberation undermines democratic governance in Malaysia.  This dissertation 
makes the argument that comprehensive doctrine, where Islam is the official religion, should 
not be used as the foundation for democratic governance in Malaysia, and instead proposes 
that the ‘freestanding conception of political justice’ should be the basis for democratic rule 
and citizenship (Rawls 2005). 
The use of religious comprehensive doctrine, as a basis of political deliberation and 
governance restricts the political interpretation of the human rights of citizens living in 
conditions of pluralism.  Where the establishment of a common law is concerned, every 
citizen should be subject to the same law but the historical presence of the Syariah legal 
system has created a society that is divided by the legal obligations of Islam.  The respect for 
civic order and the principles of impartiality in the system of law has been adversely affected 
by the dominance of political Islam.  Whilst Rawls accepted that it is not unreasonable for a 
particular comprehensive doctrine to become relatively dominant in the government policies 
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of a society, the common good conception of justice must be upheld so that the human rights 
of citizens are not infringed.   
An established religion may have the dominant authority within society and influence 
government policy on certain issues.  Having religious doctrine is not unreasonable provided 
that the liberty of conscience and freedom of thought are given certain flexibility, and the 
other religions are ‘not persecuted or denied civic and social conditions that permit their 
practice in peace and, without fear’ (Rawls 1993:53).  The common good conception of 
justice in any society should fulfil these requirements in order to establish a regime’s 
legitimacy to be accepted by its own people.  Hence a consensus on a common law ensuring 
human rights is not peculiar to the liberal or Western tradition.  The conceptions of justice can 
at least be agreed on terms that do not violate or infringe these basic rights
15
.   
Rawls (1993:59) classified human rights as a special category of rights that have universal 
applications because the conditions of these rights would reflect the state of political 
legitimacy and the legal order of a society.  The conditions of these rights would influence the 
answers to the questions about legitimacy and the legal system of a society.  These questions 
‘are questions of transition, and they start from where a society is and seek effective ways by 
the law of peoples to move the society some distance towards the goal’ (Rawls 1993:60).  
Political liberalism is not about prescribing the liberal principles justice for other non-liberal 
societies, but to widen the scope of the conception of justice by making such transition 
possible through the recognition and protection of basic human rights.  The main object lies in 
empowering the people to take charge of their political life and social institutions, instead of 
advocating structural policies grounded in liberal conceptions.  This is the significance of 
                                                     
15
 The basic rights are the right to life and security, to personal property and the elements of the rule of 
law, as well as the right to a certain liberty of conscience and freedom of association and the right to 
emigration. These rights we refer to as human rights (Rawls 1993:57). 
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thinking moral agency politically mobilize themselves to pursue social rights conceived on 
the grounds of equality and justify these movements on grounds or reasons that are publicly 
accessible and understandable for all.  This idea is important for the Malaysian experience 
because of how public reasoning affects or challenges certain ideological status quo held by 
the state or government that infringes the rights of minority citizens. 
Since many non-liberal societies, like Malaysia, are able to function with limited economic 
resources, this dissertation emphasizes Rawls’ (1993) chief concern about the public political 
culture
16
, particularly the religious and philosophical traditions that structured its government 
institutions.   Political oppression, institutional corruption and the disempowerment of women 
aided by unreasonable ideologies often constitute the source of problems that undermine the 
quality of human rights in these societies.  This makes the question of justice pertinent in the 
legitimate use of coercive power.  In Political Liberalism the norm of legitimacy sets the 
minimum for the use of coercive political power, where it states that the exercise of coercive 
political power over persons is legitimate only when this exercise of power is in accordance 
with a basic structure acceptable by reasonable citizens (Wenar 2006).   
The major criticism to Rawls’ public use of reason comes from Habermas who argues that 
expecting religious citizens to fulfil the criteria for the use public of reason in their arguments 
does not accommodate the democratic requirements of a liberal state (Habermas 2006).  
Rawls’ emphasis on reasonableness and reciprocity in the process of deliberation through 
public use of reason undermines the level of existing conflicts that normally arise from the 
competing worldviews between the secular and the religious citizens.  The existing conflict 
and disagreement of ideas between the secular and religious citizens is far too great to fulfil 
                                                     
16
 A society’s public political culture comprises its political institutions and the public traditions of 
their interpretation, as well as historic texts and documents that have become part of common 
knowledge, Rawls (1993) Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 8-15. 
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the criteria of public use of reason, Habermas argues further that without recognizing this gap, 
public use of reason will remain highly contested.  The main contention against this proviso is 
the lack of consensus on what is considered as reasonable in the light of the competing 
notions about the right to justice.   
Other critics like Weithman contends that in the ideal condition of political liberalism, 
citizens should be allowed to make their political arguments and viewpoints about ‘justice’ 
conceived in religious terms.  Faith movements have long been credited with their positive 
contributions to the moral debates about rights and justice in the political context, and 
religiously inspired political activity and intellectual debates have made valuable influence to 
the emergence of civic virtues in the making of democratic citizens, particularly in the context 
of political participation in the American society (Weithman 2002:62).  There is also the 
extreme proposal by Nicholas Wolterstorff who does not think that the political use of 
religious reasons should be reserved at all.  In fact, his arguments go as far as to allow the 
legislatures to make laws grounded in religious arguments.  He contends that it is not 
reasonable to ask everyone to abstain, as Rawls proposes, from using comprehensive 
doctrines in political debate about questions of basic justice because  
"it belongs to the religious convictions of a good many religious people in our 
society that they ought to base their decisions concerning fundamental issues of 
justice on their religious convictions" (Wolterstorff 1997:105) 
On any issue of significance facing our society, Wolterstorff suggests that it is naïve to expect 
that all adult citizens are fully rational and sufficiently informed about equivalent secular 
reasons along with their religious convictions to deliberate on the fundamental political 
questions. 
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Granted that the public use of reason may seem to impose unnecessary restrictions upon 
religious citizens, it must be emphasized that the liberalism that Rawls proposed does not 
restrict the liberty of religious people alone.  Political liberalism conceived by Rawls 
precludes the domination of any comprehensive doctrine in the formal process of political 
deliberation.  By allowing for a political legislature to make use of religious arguments in the 
formulation of public policies and laws, this would then lead to the parliament becoming a 
forum for theological arguments, giving way for governmental authority to become the agent 
of a religious majority that imposes its will upon the minority citizens, and thus infringes the 
very essence of democratic procedure.  
Rawls’ thesis on the public use of reason is significant for Malaysia because the country’s 
public political culture is structured in such a way that the public interpretation of justice 
tends to be in favour of the Islamic precepts belonging to the religious majority.  The special 
citizenship right for Muslim Malays, established as the legal status quo for the preferential 
consideration in the allocation of governmental resources, defines the criteria of differential 
position in the deliberation of public policies.  The complex nature with which citizenship 
rights are categorically differentiated according to ethnicity and religion has considerable 
implications upon how the notions of rights are negotiated politically, economically and 
culturally, as this dissertation will show, the formulation of special categories in defining the 
criteria of eligibility for minimum social rights violates the fundamental concept of universal 
citizenship right.  Where the ascendancy of such state practice condones the ideological norm 
of differential citizenship right on the grounds of ethnicity and religion, this will result in the 
erosion of the values of impartiality and objectivity consistent with the process of de-
secularization of the state.  
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The idea of liberal democracy extends the vision of a society where citizens are treated as free 
and equal within a frame of social cooperation.  Wenar (2006) highlights the Rawlsian 
abstract ideas of fairness, freedom and equality as the important fulfilling conditions to 
resolve the problem of legitimacy for creating the institutions of a liberal society, and this 
constitutes a proposal where a more extensive scheme of justice can be developed in order to 
give the concept of justice a generous interpretation within a particular public political 
culture.  The problem of legitimacy lay in the process of ‘de-secularization’ of the Malaysian 
state, and as this dissertation will demonstrate in the three case studies, the reasons given as 
justification for political coercion did not comply with the increasing awareness about the 
value of justice that is fundamental to basic human right.  In the Malaysian experience, 
poverty and lack of social mobility are still conceived on ethnic terms where the measures of 
group inequality dominate the studies of socio-economic research (Klitgaard and Katz 1983; 
Faaland, Parkinson et al. 1990; Hashim 1998; Mohamad 2005; Bangura 2006).  These are 
quantifiable measures of socio-economic deprivation that undermines fundamental human 
rights where group rights are concerned.  Liberty of conscience, the right to worship, the right 
to sexual identities, equality of citizenship rights on the other hand, are other examples of 
unquantifiable forms of deprivation that affect both group inequality as well as on individual 
terms, and these are equally important moral and philosophical considerations for 
fundamental human rights in the Malaysian context. 
Religious and philosophical differences do exist in every society regardless of whether it is a 
liberal Western or non-Western society.  It is only reasonable that citizens should not accept 
legitimate coercion on the grounds of religious doctrine and this it is equally valid to suppose 
that citizens should be empowered to seek for a conception of a society that affirms the 
universal ideals of fairness, freedom and equality.  Currently the basis for political stability in 
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Malaysia rests on the public political culture where citizens have to accept the political 
dominance of a majority religious doctrine at the cost of undermining the human rights of the 
minority peoples.  The quest for free, fair and equal terms of social cooperation requires a 
fuller expression of justice where citizens communicate a common vision through overlapping 
consensus, to develop the moral agency for free and equal citizenship.  Central to the criterion 
of legitimacy is that the system of law must be publicly endorsed by all citizens, without 
which the justification for the exercise of state power fall short of fulfilling the basic 
requirements of human rights.   
Having a system of law that can be publicly endorsed by all citizens also means that the 
sectarian engagement on terms of religious and philosophical doctrines should be avoided.  
Political cooperation and consensus of justice should be grounded in the moral conceptions, 
and the cooperative virtues should embody those principles central to the human character and 
expressed in public life (Rawls 1987:11).  The idea of overlapping consensus is therefore 
different from a modus vivendi because it demands citizens to cultivate political conception 
about justice as the moral grounds as well as the agency for public and social cooperation.  
The political conception of justice represents the intellectual movement of thought that frames 
the historical and social circumstances of a society grappling with the principles of state 
power and equal liberty of conscience.   
Social consensus founded on self-or group-interest, or as a result of political bargaining only 
preserves the existing status of group power relation.  In a condition of pluralism where the 
nature of stability is sustained by the practice of political bargaining or interests-driven 
politics, the slight shift in the political power of a particular religious group or an extreme 
political organization would inevitably result in the political ascendency or dominance of a 
particular group.  An overlapping consensus allows for the agreement on how political 
46 
 
conception of justice should be developed, according to circumstances of a public political 
culture.  The political awareness for the conception of justice encourages the exercise of 
intellectual freedom among citizens to apply the principles of toleration for social cooperation 
and resolve the questions of religious and other comprehensive outside the realm of the 
political.   
‘Given the fact of pluralism, what does the work of reconciliation by free public 
reason, and thus enables us to avoid reliance on general and comprehensive doctrines, 
is two things: first, identifying the fundamental role of political values in expressing 
the terms of fair social cooperation consistent with mutual respect between citizens 
regarded as free and equal; and second, uncovering a sufficiently inclusive 
concordant fit among political and other values as displayed in an overlapping 
consensus’ (Rawls 1987:17) 
The kind of social cooperation and the basis for stability that can fulfil the liberal 
conception of justice requires that citizens be regarded as free and equal.  This is an 
important criterion; Rawls calls it the principles of reciprocity, for public deliberation to 
be conducted on the terms of free public reasons.  Justice being conceived in political 
liberalism depends on the ways in which citizens communicate to one another on the basis 
of reasons, the public stock of knowledge that is accessible and legible to all.  The 
Rawlsian approach emphasizes that this is the only manner that the liberal model of 
justice and fairness can account for political legitimacy.   Central to this approach is the 
universal acceptance of the fact of pluralism as a permanent feature of political life and 
the rejection of the oppressive use of state power to enforce a particular comprehensive 
doctrine to legitimize social unity.  Only through the rejection of such legitimate coercion 
the prospect for liberal democracy can be realized. 
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‘Hence to achieve social unity for a well-ordered democratic regime, what I 
have called political liberalism introduces the idea of an overlapping 
consensus and along with it the further idea of the political as a special 
domain.  Political liberalism does this not only because its content includes 
the basic rights and liberties the securing of which leads to pluralism, but 
also because of the liberal ideal of political legitimacy, namely, that social 
cooperation, at least as it concerns the constitutional essentials, is to be 
conducted as far as possible on terms both intelligible and acceptable to all 
citizens as reasonable and rational.  Those terms are at best stated by 
reference to the fundamental political and constitutional values (expressed 
by a political conception of justice) that, given the diversity of 
comprehensive doctrines, all citizens may still be reasonable expected to 
endorse’ (Rawls 1989:247).  
This is where the Rawlsian ‘use of public reason’ can be applied in the Malaysian experience 
to offer the frame of social cooperation where citizens communicate and justify their 
decisions to one another using publicly available values and standards (Rawls 1997). The 
exercise of reason forms an important basis of critique of the multicultural approach and 
ethnic consociationalism that furnish reason for the current regime to defy the principles of 
neutrality and equal treatment in a society like Malaysia.  Rawls’ doctrine of public reason 
can be used to expand role of justice, particularly the normative conception about how the 
state should practice the values of neutrality between competing perspectives of what 
constitutes the good life (Rawls 2005), and finding the common ground between competing 
comprehensive doctrines (Larmore 1999).   
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Cultural pluralism and religious diversity have become the basic facts of life that constitute 
the multiple identities of citizens in Malaysia.  Culture as the basis of common identity has 
become a qualified source of political mobilization and social identification in the 
contemporary history of Malaysian politics.  Whilst arguments based on culture and cultural 
differences have substantive analytical purchase both in the empirical and ideological 
explanations; there is the worrying trend within the multicultural approach that take culture as 
the legitimate catalyst for politics in a diverse society.  Using ‘culture’ as justifications for 
how political thinking and political conducts are grounded could distort the universal 
understanding of justice and equality.  The political argument based on ‘culture’ could pit one 
group against another, thus increasing the risk of ethno-religious polarization on the one hand, 
and thwarting the prospects of advancing the civil liberties and social mobility for the 
individual citizen, on the other hand. 
2.5 Religious power and the use of reason 
Combining the analysis of the ideological power of religion in the construction of social 
relations and Rawls’ exposition of the ‘use of public reason’ to assess the political 
legitimation of state power addresses two important methodological issues.  The first one is 
an issue of timeline, and second one is the merging of normative political theories with the 
area-study focus of Southeast Asian studies.  The first issue of timeline represents the need to 
understand the context of “longue durée”, on how human agency carry the vectors of 
religious values and power that substantiate the process of structural change in the society 
(Giddens 1979; Giddens 1984).  Religious ideas together with the use of power are identified 
as prime indicators on how state agents politically justify certain policies and actions over 
time and space.  This is because individual citizens, who belong to diverse sets of 
communities, are themselves the principal bearers of ideas and values that reciprocate and 
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substantiate the construction of societal norms that are dominant.  In order to understand the 
political constitution of the secular state, it is important to situate the dominant thread of ideas 
that were promoted historically.   
The study identifies the British colonial penetration into the Malay world as the main 
reference point for gradual transformation of the nature of governance and how the strategies 
for population control were put in place under the aegis of Malay Kerajaan.  There were two 
important changes being made to the traditional authority of the Malay Kerajaan, one was the 
introduction of colonial political economy to manage the migrating population in the Malay 
peninsula (Kahn 2006), and the other was the demarcation of the public sphere according to 
religious beliefs.  Under British colonialism, Islam was singled out as the sphere of 
autonomous power to which the Malay Rulers were given the authority to identify and 
structure their relations with their subjects under the Syariah jurisdictions (Gullick 1989; 
Horowitz 1994; Roff 1998).  Similar analysis of how ideas of Syariah justice became 
established within the secular order of colonial administration is provided by Asad (2001), 
who argues that the Sharia principles of justice came to be associated with the colonial 
administration in Egypt as a public discursive strategy to manage the population via the 
private domain of the family (Asad 2001). 
The ideological emergence of Islam in forging the social relations of power and the exercise 
of doctrinal knowledge through Sharia principles of justice brings to light the beginning of 
the historical merging of Islamic social thinking with the modern art of governance.   This 
was made possible under the tutelage of the British colonial administration whereby the 
sovereign tradition of the Malay Kerajaan was retained in line with the policy of non-
intervention.  The Malay ruling elites were granted political power via religious autonomy in 
matters relating to the indigenous communities, thus constituting the path-dependence for the 
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Malay ruling elites to act as agents in modernizing the operational dynamics of the Malay 
Kerajaan in extending their governing powers over and beyond the existing population.  The 
conceptual mechanics of the Malay Kingship
17
 (Kerajaan) examined by historians (Milner 
1981; Gullick 1988; Gullick 1989; Walker 2002) constitute the key elements in framing the 
political motives of the Kerajaan, whereby the primary concern centres on the control of 
subjects and to explore the ways in which people submit to the power grounded in religious 
reasons.  Such authority then becomes contested when state elites deploy religious values as 
reasons for the contemporary interpretation of justice, the application of public policies and 
political legitimation. 
Rawls’ doctrine of public reason is applicable here because it can shift important arguments 
about justice and form the basis of critique against the dominant imposition of religious 
resources in the exercise of legitimate coercion.  This dissertation claims that the use of public 
reason should be considered as the critical pathway to resolve the contestation between the 
secular-religious dynamics impinging upon the Malaysia political discourse, and to alleviate 
the unnecessary burden of religiously motivated ideological imposition upon the fundamental 
liberties of all citizens.  The use of public reason should therefore rest upon the state agents 
who are responsible for the formulation of laws and the deliberation of public policies.  
It cannot be denied that the conceptual interactions between the political ideals of the secular 
state and religious agencies constitute the distinctive character of the secular age (Taylor 
2007).  It is not easy to sever the role of religion in  the ideological makeup of contemporary 
pluralism and in the public sphere (Casanova 2001).  It is not surprising, therefore that the 
tensions between secularism and religious forces in the public sphere are recurring and these 
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 The thesis on the Malay Kingship is further elaborated in Chapter 2, but the main emphasis of this 
concept revolves around the control of men and population as a symbol of wealth and political power. 
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have contributed to the substantive difficulties in setting the common ground for the 
multicultural citizens and democratic political engagement (Parekh 1990; Asad 2003; 
Habermas 2006).   
The political concept of secularism remains elusive particularly where religious beliefs are 
strongly rooted in the lives and the collective experiences of citizens.  When the politicians 
use religious values to justify public policies, this will have negative implications upon the 
fundamental rights of the citizens.  In the absence of secular values, the language of public 
policies and politics that are motivated by religious values not only divide/polarize public 
opinion but may lead to the predominance of religious reasons in the public political 
discourse.  For this dissertation, the examination of the content of secular/religious dialogue 
within the bounds of political debates, involves linking Parliamentary debates with the 
process of legal amendments in the Constitution.  Unpacking the content of political dialogue 
documented in the Parliamentary debates or Hansard will provide insight into the ways in 
which state agents embed the norms of Islamic doctrines that eventually destabilize the 
conceptual principles of the secular state.   
The secular state faces the contemporary dilemmas of institutional adjudication between the 
politics of multicultural recognition and the universal values of liberalism (Bonham 1995). 
The Malaysian case presents this difficulty where there’s always tension between the politics 
of recognition and the universal principles of the right to choose, particularly for individuals.  
This is further complicated by the history of immigration and Malayan federation with the 
Borneo territories that historically furnished the condition of pluralism in Malaysia.  
Contemporary literature on the multicultural approach addresses the cultural considerations 
for the politics of recognition, difference and choice (Young 1900; Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 
2000).  It reassesses the universal values of the Enlightenment and how the ideal solution 
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within liberalism should deal with the cultural relativity of human rights, of individual 
mobility and the minority groups around the world. The emphasis upon the preservation of 
cultural difference substantiates the logic of defending the authentic character of a particular 
group identity against globalization and the homogenizing ‘Western’ cultural force.   
However this has been contested by some liberals that the uncritical promotion of culture as 
the basis for the politics of group identity and the mobilization of right can be detrimental to 
the universalistic liberal principles of equality (Barry 2001).  The political mobilization driven 
by the interests of cultural identity could undermine the political values of justice, equality 
and neutrality that are universally accepted as critical to the protection of fundamental human 
rights.   The argument for ‘moral relativism’ should be contextualized in terms of the 
universal consideration for justice, as a value that every person should be entitled to.  Hence 
there’s a limit to how ‘moral relativism’ can be applied. 
‘But it seems overwhelmingly plausible that some groups will operate in 
ways are severely inimical to the interests of at any rate some of their 
members.  To the extent that they do, cultural diversity cannot be an 
unqualified good.  In fact, once we follow the path opened up by that 
thought, we shall soon arrived at the conclusion that diversity is good to 
the degree, and only to the degree, that each of the diverse groups 
functions in a way that is well adapted to advance the welfare and secure 
the rights of its members’ (Barry 2001:134) 
The invocation of ‘moral relativism’ could undermine the liberal principles of justice, 
toleration and equal treatment in adjudicating the competing interests of diverse groups. 
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‘What liberalism is about is how polities, however constituted, should be 
run.  In particular it is a theory about constraints that should be imposed 
on the use of political power so as to avoid it from being abused’ (Barry 
2001:137).   
The multiculturalist argument on political right involves substantive reinterpretation of the 
universal values of liberalism chiefly on the basis on recognition of cultural practices and 
norms of minority groups.  Where the rights of a group are concerned, the multiculturalist 
emphasizes ‘cultural norms’ as the defining features, which could easily be misunderstood as 
something essential and non-negotiable, thus incompatible with the notion of justice and 
equality framed in political liberalism.  
 Group rights that are essentially defined in terms of cultural membership and/or particular 
ethnic affiliation for self-protection are increasing incompatible with the universal values of 
liberalism(Doppelt 2001-2002:662-665).  There are two significant issues that multicultural 
liberalism attempts to grapple with the politics of group rights, one is the way multicultural 
approach to cultural identity tends to portray only the empowering aspect of group identity 
instead of addressing the underlying problems of exploitative social relations that violate the 
basic liberties of the individual trapped within the ambit of traditional cultural norms.  The  
second issue involves the question of the formation of the liberal identity and the extent to 
which the discourse of rights between the majority-minority cultures contributes to the 
misrepresentation of the liberal democratic ideals of equality and personhood (Doppelt 2001-
2002). 
The other critique of the multicultural approach to cultural identity and group rights lies with 
the demands for state policies that adopt the strategies of difference in addressing the 
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universal problems of socio-economic injustices and inequalities in contemporary societies 
(Joppke 2004).  The recent reversal of the official policies of multiculturalism in Australia, 
Britain and the Netherlands, came about as the result of the lack of coherent strategies 
compounded by the multiple creation of special treatments aimed at minority groups as well 
as the immigrant communities (Joppke 2004:244-48).  Hence despite the aims of empowering 
minority groups according their cultural needs, the net effects have been far more uncertain as 
these policies began to fuel further segregation and separation from the mainstream society.  
Policies aimed at addressing difference can take a life of its own and without the grounding of 
state policies to the universal principles of neutrality and equal treatment; the political 
argument for special treatments and differential rights would actually lead to the reification of 
cultural pluralism that firmly established groups as fixed political entities.   
2.6 Capturing the process of de-secularization 
The secular state provides the prospects or the political space of extending the liberal 
principles of equality of rights to the realities of cultural pluralism.  The dissertation claims 
that the secular state should be promoted with the aim of adjudicating the issues of special 
recognition and the liberal conceptions of the individual right that shape the trajectories of 
public debates in the Malaysian context.  The institution of the secular state rests on the 
normative assumptions that faith resides in the private convictions of citizens and that public 
policies directed at the citizen population should be framed on the political considerations on 
neutrality and toleration.  The reality of cultural pluralism however does not really permit 
such normative position to prevail according to the strict separation of faith in the private 
from public sphere.   Secular interpretations vary from one country to another where in some 
governments’ legal statutes are put in place for the purpose of regulating the relationship 
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between religion and the power of the state, thus implicating the scope of coercive power that 
the state has been able to apply upon the (religious) liberty of the individual citizens. 
The idea of the secular state is defended in what McClay (2001) terms as the ‘anti-theocratic 
understanding of the secular state, fully compatible with the practices of religions’(McClay 
2001:59).  It is reasonable to defend the principle of neutrality within secularism that allows 
for the egalitarian participation in the public and legal sphere for individual citizens regardless 
of ethnic and religious background.   
The de-secularization of Malaysia will be analysed from the conception of the state, 
beginning with the 1957 Malayan Constitution, focusing primarily on how the Malay identity 
and Islam was constitutionally fused as a protected identity in the Constitution.  There were 
critical junctures leading to the de-secularization of the state and these were related to the 
amendments made to the Malaysian Constitution.  By employing the concept of critical 
junctures to link major shifts in political events, this dissertation uncovers the reasons given to 
these legal amendments.  It teases out the discursive nature of these shifts and their 
ideological implications by examining political documents – public records, justifications for 
Constitutional amendments, political statements – and debates (van Dijk 1995).  The 
application of the critical junctures framework (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007) will be used to 
analyse politics the macro-level, as these larger processes will be linked to the analysis of 
‘reasons’ at the micro politics dimension where state agents articulate their ideas, reasons and 
values debating important Bills and Constitutional amendments in the Parliament.   
By focusing specifically on those Constitutional amendments that had considerable 
implications upon interfaith relations in the community and the fundamental liberties of the 
individuals, the dissertation shows the extent to which the prevalence of religious moral 
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discourse has led to the dislocation of substantive political debates and the popular 
demonization of the concept of the secular state. The concept of secular state gradually loses 
its political currency/meaning in relation to the textual changes being made in the 
Constitution.  This manifests partly in the institutional aspect in that it altered the relations of 
power/authority between the secular and the Syariah legal apparatus.  At the societal context 
these legal changes have had considerable impacts upon the civil rights of the multicultural 
citizens in the Malaysian society.  Through critical junctures the framework of institutional 
analysis connects the interactive processes of political decisions that motivate the proposals 
for Constitutional amendments.  In this way the dissertation elucidates, firstly, the connection 
between the declining conditions of the secular institution of the state/government – in other 
words, de-secularization - with the on-going/diachronic ideological justification for special 
citizenship rights.  Secondly to analyse these political decisions in relation to Rawls’ use of 
public reason to identify the extent to which the progressive and liberal elements are 
sustainable, and can be ideologically transferable by human agents to counter the ideological 
rigidity of ethno-religious constructions.   
2.7 Collection of Data 
The bulk of the data for this dissertation will come from the British public records as well as 
the selected Parliamentary Debates in Malaysia.  The mainstream media news report will be 
used to relate political events and experiences of social marginalization with the policy-
making decisions and debates of the state elites.  The researcher has made essential 
connections with political parties and civil society groups which provide very useful and 
invaluable insights into the kinds of questions raised in this thesis.  These groups include the 
HINDRAF movement, the Justice Movement and a few of the churches that have been 
fighting against the government ban on the use of ‘Allah’, and to demand the right to use the 
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word ‘Allah’ in the sermons.  Toward the end of fieldwork, the issue of sexuality became the 
latest target of political control by the government and the mainstream religious groups.  
However the was also an emerging counter movement by the LGBT (Lesbian Gay Bisexual 
and Transgenders) to challenge some of the legal codes that are discriminating to their rights 
as citizens.  The most interesting one involves the legal suit taken up by four Malay 
Transgenders using the ‘secular’ Constitution to challenge the criminalization of cross-
dressing in the Syariah Enactment.  Although the case was dismissed by the High Court in 
October 2012, it forms an important ground for identifying the critical junctures that 
transform the political landscape of Malaysian society.  
  
58 
 
3 LOCATING SECULARISM 
Abstract: This chapter aims to establish the origin of the secular establishment, especially on 
how religious convictions become subject to political governance.  It traces ideas of secular 
as a particular history of the Enlightenment and discusses the importance of neutrality as a 
political value for institutional secular practices.  For purely theoretical discussion, the 
examples of the U.S and France are used here to highlight role of the constitution in 
mitigating religiosity in the public sphere and its implications upon citizenship right.   
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter surveys and discusses the recent literatures on the dynamics of religion within 
the institutional practices of the state.  It focuses on the complex relationship between the 
state as an institution of secular practices and the role of religion in the conception of 
citizenship.  This chapter locates the secular state as the locus of political interplay between 
state practices and the content of religious argument in shaping the debates about citizenship 
in the public discourse.  The secular state plays the role of adjudicating the competing 
arguments that emerge from the public debates with regard to the fundamental questions 
affecting the rights of citizens.  In this context, considerable debates about the nature of the 
separation doctrine, or the secular state itself, are found in the literatures of Western 
philosophical discussion, and for the contemporary discussion, this chapter identifies works of 
Audi (Audi 2000) and Laborde (Laborde 2008) to have considerable implications upon the  
Rawlsian conception of public use of reason, which ultimately is central to the question of 
legitimacy. 
Secularism is a subject of the West, both in historical and political terms.  However the 
secular state is a model of institutional governance that has been adopted by many countries in 
Asia, including Malaysia.  It is argued that secularism is an ‘unfinished project of modernity’ 
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(Habermas 1997) and this is especially true where faith-based movements have garnered 
strengths in contemporary politics (Appleby 1999; Wickham 2002; Fox 2006).  The 
‘unfinished’ project implies that the secular state as a model of institutional governance is 
very much contested.  Religion remains resilient in the public sphere and continues to animate 
the democratic space in societies that may not share considerable grounds with the 
philosophical and the Enlightenment traditions of the West.  Secularism as a comprehensive 
doctrine has consistently derived its authority from the history of the institutional 
establishment of the secular state and as such, the power of the state and religious reasoning 
becomes an indefinite tension in the current political discourse.   The history and the modern 
practices of secularism represent the exclusive the norms of Western liberal democratic 
tradition, and little is known about the historical development of secularism in non-Western 
societies despite the adoption of secular state and its institutions (Taylor 2007).   
Hence one of the greatest challenges in discussing about the secular state from the non-
Western perspective is the existing gap in the literature about secular state and secularism 
particularly from the Asian perspectives.  Contemporary works on re-thinking the discursive 
‘traffic’ of religious and secular ideas from the Asian perspectives are emerging but these 
constitute a diverse mix of studies ranging from sociology, history, politics and law (Heng 
and Ten 2010).  The literatures on the secular state and secularism other non-Western and 
Southeast Asian countries are limited to the local histories, cultures and their linkages to the 
colonial past, and admittedly it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore these other 
issues but to strictly focus on the role of the Malaysian constitution in regulating religion in 
the public sphere, and in this case on how constitutional changes contribute to the de-
secularization of the Malaysian state.  This line of reasoning aims to sustain the normative 
argument that, despite the modern eagerness to embrace identity politics and cultural 
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pluralism, a strong constitutional paradigm that maintains the separation of the state from 
religious activism could strengthen the egalitarian principles that are vital to common 
citizenship.    
The dissertation maintains that the secular state is vital in addressing the meaning of 
citizenship rights and political freedom.  An influential human rights and legal Muslim 
scholar states that,  ‘In order to be a Muslim by conviction and free choice, which is the only 
way one can be a Muslim, I need a secular state’ (An-Na'im 2008: 1).  The secular state is 
interpreted to mean the securing of basic freedom for individuals and groups to express 
religious and other cultural practices without the fear of public reprisal.  The level of freedom 
that individuals can articulate their religious obligations and choices can sometimes become 
restricted by particular state practices and at this point it is important to establish political 
conditions with which a secular state allow for the expression of competing comprehensive 
doctrines. 
The first section of this chapter broadly discusses the normative positions of the separation 
doctrine.  It elaborates the principle of institutional neutrality propounded by Audi (1989; 
2000) and compares it to the approach taken by Laborde (2008).  Laborde’s conceptual 
approach to analysing ideas and assumptions of the state tradition within a particular national 
history is particularly useful because it takes into consideration the agency of the state in the 
exercise of defining secularism (Laborde 2000).  The second section draws on some of the 
important arguments made by contemporary Muslim scholars about how the normative ideas 
of the secular state engage with the obligations of faith in Islamic intellectual discourse.  The 
third section briefly discusses issues related to the legislation and the regulation of the Islamic 
faith. The chapter then proceeds to try and place Malaysia’s location in the spectrum of 
separation-laicism that the dissertation chose to exemplify.     
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3.2 Separation thesis and the public role of religion  
Crucial to debates over ‘secularism’ – both as a normative political philosophy and as an 
empirical political practice – is the relationship between religious and state institutions and, in 
particular, what has become known as the ‘separation thesis’ – the idea that secularism 
demands that the institutions of the state are kept entirely separate from religious institutions.  
Hurd (2008:23) identifies two distinct paths in the ways secularism is constructed and how 
they become dominant in international politics: the laïcité trajectory is a product of the 
European Enlightenment and advocates the exclusion of religion from politics; the second 
trajectory involves the Judeo-Christian understanding of secularism which reinforces the idea 
of the ‘secular’ as a unique Western civilization, culture and identity18.  
There are major differences in the practice of separation in the international arena.  Jonathan 
Fox has written extensively on the varying models of state-religion separation in the 
contemporary world survey, using the concept of the degree of government intervention or 
regulation of religion as a benchmark (Fox and Sandler 2005; Fox 2006; Fox 2008).     These 
institutional arrangements that have emerged tend to vary across culture, and were historically 
contingent depending upon the nature of the relationships between the state and the religious 
forces of the society   A framework of understanding the relationship between religion and the 
state will be important to understand how they relate specifically to the conception of justice, 
political rights and legitimacy.  Since this dissertation focuses on the role of the constitution 
in mitigating religiosity in the public sphere and its implications upon citizenship right, the 
discussion will be limited to the examination of the theoretical debates of the separation 
doctrine by comparing the Franco-American ideal of separating religion and state along 
private and public lines (Hirschl 2012; Hirschl 2013).  Where the secular state is upheld, high 
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 ‘Varieties of Secularism’ in The Politics of Secularism in International Relations (Hurd 2008:23-45) 
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courts have assumed the role of secularism against the perceived threat to the concept of a 
religiously neutral public sphere.  
The debates about the separation of the state from religion highlights a critical challenge 
about defining the scope and limit of the state’s regulation of religion in the public sphere, and 
for this purpose, the extent to which the state adopts or rethink the policies of legal pluralism 
and how the margins of accommodation are tolerated (Hirschl and Shachar 2008).  This 
dissertation will therefore briefly discuss the Franco-American model of separation between 
the Church and the state, particularly on how the theory of separation was conceived 
differently from the history of Western Europe, particularly in France, and then to locate the 
Malaysian version of secular state along the spectrum of separation-laicism debate from such 
normative ideal. 
The main reason United States and France are selected as reference cases for examining the 
public role of religion is because they address the core theoretical differences underpinning 
the state regulation of public religion along the spectrum of the separation-laicism debates.  It 
is submitted that there are limits to this approach as the dissertation omits the necessary and 
categorical comparisons with non-Western societies.  However it will be maintained that such 
omission is not fatal to the essential arguments of the dissertation as it limits its attention to 
drawing references to the abundant literature written mainly on the subject of constitutional 
containment of religion in the Franco-American model.  The values of the West and the non-
Western countries should not be a conceptual barrier to the analysis of the secular as an 
institutional arrangement that can promote or undermine fundamental liberties and human 
rights.  Where the issue of human right and citizenship right are concerned, these concepts 
serve as the common denominator and critical agency to achieve the universal values of social 
justice and equality.   The Asian values discourse that claimed to challenge the global agenda 
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of human rights was mainly promoted by political elites to justify authoritarian practices and 
was hardly the values embraced by the communities of non-Western countries (Sen 1997; 
Thompson 2001; Thompson 2004) 
The dissertation aims to sustain a level of consistency to the values being discussed specific to 
the matrix of separation-laicism.  This is done by trying to draw out the elements where the 
Malaysian secular state locates itself within the matrix of separation-laicism.  The literature 
on the Franco-American model consistently frames the polarizing concept that addresses the 
limits and degrees of state intervention and regulation of religiosity in the public sphere.  For 
this reason, the discussion of other countries has been left out to give more room for greater 
understanding of the theoretical foundation of the separation-laicism and its theoretical 
relevance to the analysis of the secular arrangement in Malaysia.   
The Franco-American ideal epitomizes important dynamics and theoretical implications – 
both in history as well as in the contemporary climate - about how the state, along with the 
law, regulates and negotiates with the ideas of political right and religious beliefs among its 
citizens (Gunn 2002).  Most importantly, as Gunn (2002:452) has extensively written on this 
subject and cogently argues how France and the United States incorporated early concepts of 
human rights in their respective constitutions
19
.  These processes have been instrumental to 
the foundational principles defining the normative relationship between religion and the state, 
underlining the trajectories citizenship rights and identity formations.  The political analysis 
of the separation doctrine has to some extent tended to overlap with the sociological 
dimension of the secularization debates, which shows how the state exerts control over 
religion and its institutions (Keddie 2003).  Nuanced understanding about their historical 
                                                     
19
 France’s first constitution dates to 1791, long before most other European countries, their oldest 
human rights texts, both written in 1789, that are in effect today: the French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and Citizen and the American Bill of Rights. (Op. Cit in Gunn 2002). 
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meanings would illuminate the subtle differences with which the relationship between religion 
and the state was theoretically conceived.   
The focus of scholarly and political debate on the separation thesis has been on the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the constitution, which has come to be seen 
as enforcing the strict separation of state and religion.  Feldman (2002:350) argues that the 
intellectual foundation of the Establishment Clause was traceable to John Locke’s theory of 
the liberty of conscience; which was considerably endorsed by the rationalist deists and 
evangelical Baptists alike underlining the discursive ideas of preserving the liberty of 
conscience as an unalienable right on the one hand, and the restriction of the role of the state 
to act within the bounds of temporal civic ends.  This was particularly pertinent during the era 
of constitution-making in the USA, where the issue of taxation became contentious among 
those who do not share similar religious convictions (Feldman 2002).  The phrase ‘separation 
of the Church and the State’ therefore was grounded within a particular American experience 
that illuminated the historical predicaments of religious persecution where questions of 
religious liberty became increasingly significant in addressing issues of civil peace.  The core 
meaning of the phrase underpins the ‘essence of religion as exercise of conscience’ (Eberle 
2005:312) and Roger Williams, an influential Baptist theologian of the time, attributed the 
individual right to religious liberty as the precondition for the value of tolerance in civil 
engagements.  Hence in order to protect the liberty of conscience – which in this case was 
strictly concerned with religious belief - Williams advocated for the separation of Church 
from the state as the institutional strategy for protecting religion and the liberty of religious 
conviction from the temporal realm of the world, and to limit state control over the right to 
religious belief so civil peace could be secured (Eberle 2005).   In delineating bounds between 
church and state, Eberle (2005:313) attributes the origin of the evangelical strand of 
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separation to the theological discourse of Williams which subsequently became influential in 
the framing of First Amendment
20
 religious protections, substantiating the more secular 
perspectives on separation among the likes of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. 
The intended meaning of the phrase has not been unproblematic, and many legal scholars 
have begun to critically reassess the constitutional implications in the ways which the phrase 
has been understood in judicial understanding and how it feeds into the discourse of American 
liberalism
21
.  Critical reflections upon the concept of separation have generated more 
questions than certainty about how the state mediates its relationship with religion
22
.  A 
number of scholars have questioned on how the contemporary interpretation of the separation 
doctrine justifies the legitimate coercion of the law upon individual religious liberty (Conkle 
2000; Carter 2002).  The unspecified meaning of the phrase is inherently paradoxical because 
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 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment read, “Congress shall make no law respecting on 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof…” 
21
 The Supreme Court’s decision to reinterpret the constitutional meaning of the ‘separation of Church 
and state’ since 1947 had generated debates among scholars about the intended meaning of the phrase 
in preserving religious liberty, ‘Of Church and State and the Supreme Court’ in Kurland, P. B. (1961). 
"Of Church and State and the Supreme Court." The University of Chicago Law Review 29(1): 1-96. 
 ;‘The Separation of Church & State’: A Debate, in Cord, R. L. and H. Ball (1987). "'The 
Separation of Church and State': A Debate." Utah Law Review: 895-926. 
 ; ‘Beyond the Establishment Clause: Enforcing Separation of Church and State Through State 
Constitutional Provisions’ L.S.W (1985). "Beyond the Establishment Clause: ENforcing Separation of 
church and State Through State Constitutional Provisions." Virginia Law Review 71(4): 625-653. 
  
22
 Feldman (2002:729-730) provides the normative argument that political changes and the modern 
reinterpretation of Establishment Clause by the Supreme Court ruling in 1947 had contributed to the 
transformation of the language of the ‘separation of Church and State’ from the idea of individual 
religious liberty into the concerns about religious minorities’ political equality; and since state 
supports both religious and non-religious institutions under the rubric of ‘political equality’, the 
‘equality’ argument tends to undermine instead of justify the separation of Church and State Feldman, 
N. (2002). "From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause." California 
Law Review 90(3): 673-732. 
 .  Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township (1947) was a landmark case that saw the 
Supreme Court in the U.S extending the Establishment Clause to the state laws, which previously was 
applied only to the Federal laws.  Detailed case can be referred to http://supreme.justia.com/us/330/1/ 
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in its broadest understanding, it ‘forbids relationships between church and state’, and that 
such interpretation fails to take into consideration the inevitable day-to-day contacts between 
government and religious organizations that have always been part of the American political 
life
23
(Hamburger 2002).  Despite the competing interpretations of the phrase in the 
contemporary American political discourse, the ‘separation of Church and State’ remains a 
salient metaphor in conceptualizing the relationship between the state and religion, the limit 
of the state in regulating religion in the public sphere and the American case provides an 
important philosophical landmark in assessing some of these trajectories relating to the liberal 
interpretation of citizenship right. 
The metaphor of the ‘separation of Church and State’ took on a different historical meaning in 
the French experience.  The historical conditions for the emerging secular phenomenon of the 
‘state’ came about as a result of the vicious power play between the religious and the political 
communities that gradually began to challenge the uniting principles of Christendom in 
Western Europe, and such dynamics subsequently influenced the intellectual conception of 
citizenship right underlining the development of positive legal framework that constituted the 
fundamental principles of the modern state (Mock 1975:123-125).  He cites the example of 
the conception of the ‘state’ in the French Declaration of Human Rights in 1789 which was 
grounded in the recognition of individuals as free and self-determined – the Rights of Man, 
and emphasizes the emerging principles of neutrality of the state in the French Constitution 
1791 to protect the fundamental freedom of individuals with regard to religious beliefs (Mock 
1975).   
                                                     
23
 Hamburger (2002:18) argues that the phrase – ‘separation of Church and State’- is problematic and 
‘lends itself to a prohibition on contact between institutions that inescapably must have contact with 
each other –whether through the government‘s protection of churches and church property or through 
the church’s participation in moral and political movements’. 
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The term ‘laicism’ was associated with the educational reforms introduced by Jules Ferry24 in 
early 17
th
 century France paving the way to free education and the introduction of laic 
(secular) instruction in the content of public education(Osterwalder 1999).  The institutional 
separation of the Church and the state was adopted through the introduction of two articles in 
the 1905 French Law
25
 whereby the state was obliged to be neutral, neither disadvantaging 
nor recognizing, financially supporting and subsidizing religious establishments (Robert 
2003).  Jean Baubérot
26
 (2003:459-464) writes that the French Revolution had had long 
lasting impact upon the character of French secularity whereby the motivating rationale of the 
anti-clerical movements was to challenge the authority of the ecclesiastical institutions in the 
matter of religious faith, by insisting the idea of ‘free religiosity’ with regard to the 
individual’s relationship with the Divine.  The political triumph of the anti-clerical 
movements in French history played significant role in the development of French-style 
republican secularism.   
Having said that, the French model of the secular state is now confronted with the pluralizing 
of contemporary culture through immigration where new issues – particularly the wearing of 
hijab among schoolchildren - are challenging the laïcité principles of the republican nation-
                                                     
24
 Ferry’s Legal Concept of the “École laique” is discussed in Osterwalder (1999:54-57) “The Laicism 
and Its Religious Limits”. 
25
 Article 1: The Republic ensures the liberty of conscience. It guarantees the free exercise of religion, 
under restrictions prescribed by the interest in public order. 
Article 2: The Republic does not recognize, remunerate, or subsidize any religious denomination 
(Robert 2003:640) 
26
 A leading French academic on the sociology of secularism who was the only member of the Stasi 
Commission to abstain from voting the legal reforms being made to ban conspicuous religious 
symbols in schools.  The Stasi Commission was set up by Bernard Stasi in 2003 to reassess the 
application of laïcité in France in the light of the Islamic headscarf controversy, and in 2004 it became 
law that prohibit the wearing of all religious symbols in schools. Baubérot critical assessment of the 
French secular law is available at www.info-france-usa.org/IMG/html/secularism.html Baubérot, J. 
(2006). The Secular Principle, French Embassy in the U.S.A: http:\\www.info-france-
usa.org/IMG/html/secularim.html. 
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state(Baubérot 2003). The legislative intervention into the regulation of overt religious 
symbolism in the public generated more questions of interpretation than the reaffirmation of 
the principles of laïcité in the context of civil liberties.  Balibar (2004:359-361) highlights the 
critical dynamics with which the power of the state confronted religious reasoning in the 
public arena.  Firstly the hijab case implicated the public schools in taking up the mediating 
role of neutralizing the ideological polarization between French republican secularism and the 
plurality of religious identities on the school ground; and secondly the feminization of hijab 
exposed the contradicting situation with which female Muslim citizens are made to struggle 
between the powers of ‘patriarchal authority wrapped up in religion on the one hand, and the 
national authority wrapped up in secularism’(Balibar 2004). 
Juxtaposing the different historical trajectories of religion and state relations in U.S and 
France, it is possible to draw the spectrum of political capacity and limitation to which the 
state and its apparatuses are capable of legitimating intervention in religious establishments 
and movements.  Whilst the model remains committed to the ideal of separation, it cannot be 
denied that nature of state intervention in religious matters, whether it is limited or extensive, 
tend to have significant impacts upon the rights of citizens and this has continually attract 
contestations by civil society as well as individual citizens.  The political understanding of 
secularism, the mediation of the relationships between the state and religion exemplified by 
the Franco-American model show the significant role of history and the empirical conditions 
in framing the dynamics of change and contention in the societies that contribute to the 
emergence of secular governance to adjudicate competing views of rights entwined with the 
formation of national and civic identities.   Hirschl (2011) maintains that the secular precept 
remains resilient in the practice of constitutionalism, and even though Malaysia does not 
subscribe to the strict separation model and categorizes Malaysia as having constitutional 
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theocracy
27
, the institutional adoption of constitutionalism is itself an appreciation of the 
secular principles.  Hence the model of secular state was adopted in the Constitution of post-
independence Malaysia but it is the contention of this dissertation claiming that the Malaysian 
Constitution gradually loses its secular appeal as the result of numerous politically motivated 
amendments to the Constitution to accommodate the political force of Islam as the established 
religion of the country.   
3.3 Conduct of the state and the citizens as the agency of secularism  
The content of public debates involving constitutionalism, religious laws and human rights 
can shape the conceptual framework of a secular state.   The conception and interpretations of 
the ‘secular state’ may differ from one country to the next, but the formation of the modern 
state and the spread of the nation-state systems were significantly a universal by-product of 
secular rationalization (Meyer, Boli et al. 1997).  The nation-state arrangements adopted by 
most post-colonial societies have in principle established secular institutions advocated in 
many Western liberal democratic countries.  The legal-rational expansion of the state 
bureaucracy, the process of differentiation involving the specialization of the various public 
institutions in the society enabled the state to become institutionally autonomous from the 
doctrinal influence of religion, and one of the most important outcomes of the process of 
rationalization was the gradual extension of citizenship to the members of the society 
regardless of ethnicity, religious, gender and class differences (Lechner 1991).   
                                                     
27
 Constitutional Theocracy refers to the ‘simultaneous adherence to modern constitutional principles, including 
the core distinction between political and religious authority and religious authority.  Hirschl argues that this 
model emerged in response to the increased intensity of religious activism around the world.  Some of the basic 
features of constitutional theocracy include the sanction of a ‘state religion’ and the recognition of religious law 
as ‘a’ or the main source of legislation.  More importantly, the study conducted by Hirschl examines the 
relationship between state and religion as a part of a larger continuum of ‘state and religion’ models.  Hirschl,R 
(2011) Constitutional Theocracy, Cambridge, Havard University Press. 
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The adoption of the secular institutional arrangement may not necessarily bring about the 
universalization of human rights and the equality principles of citizenship that the modern 
state claims to uphold (Chatterjee 1995).  The question of secularism needs to be understood 
as a dialogue about how it addresses the political conception of citizenship rights to address 
difficult questions of relating to religion and fundamental liberties, instead of accepting the 
cultural fault lines as a given (Lewis 1990; Huntington 1997; Gottschalk and Greenberg 
2007).  The analysis of the ‘separation’ between religion and the state in this dissertation 
transcends the boundaries of constitutionalism to include a reassessment of  how the empirical 
grounding of the secular along with the accommodation of religious authorities frame the 
debates about legitimate coercion and the adjudication of rights in contemporary pluralism.   
The dominant perspective on the ideals of the secularism, it is suggested, underestimate the 
complexity of the relationship between the religious and the political in many non-Western 
societies (Bajpai 2002) and, in a curious way, actually privilege a particular Judeo-Christian 
perspective on the state (Hurd 2008).  The institutional impacts of secularization in structuring 
the legal and institutional norms have been viewed by the religious groups as marginalizing 
the democratic space for religious movements and the public relevance of faith among 
believers; and such interpretations have led to the call for the return of the sacred into the 
public sphere by some religious movements (Keane 2000-12).  Keane’s depiction of the ‘self-
contradictory principles of secularism’ (2000:10) echoes a similar but more nuanced 
conception of secularism propounded by McClay’s positive and negative understanding of the 
concept (McClay 2001).  
Drawing on Isaiah Berlin’s two concepts of liberty, McClay (2001:60-69) grounds the 
understanding of secularism into the negative and positive conception.  The first one 
emphasizes the importance of the liberty of individual’s conscience to allow for religious or 
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non-religious beliefs as well as recognizing the public vitality of congregation in sustaining 
the social world of religion.  Negative secularism therefore does not assume that religious 
impulse is confined to the individuals and it identifies religion as a social institution that 
allows for the freedom of associations in the public sphere.   The positive understanding of 
secularism on the other hand, is linked to the modern development of knowledge, and in 
particular the validity of ‘science’ as the legitimate explanation for the existential life, the 
nature of social and political reality.  The  competing ‘truth claims’ can be hijacked by the 
extremes of the secular and religious political agenda and this can become polemical, thus 
undermining the prospect of substantive engagement on fundamental issues relating to civic 
virtues and civil liberty, this is the main reason why Rawls proposed the avoidance of relying 
upon comprehensive doctrines in the realm of the political.   
Where the role of the state is implicated between the positive affirmation and the restrained 
imposition of the secular ideals in its mitigation of religious forces in the public sphere, the 
Franco-American model shows the difference in emphasis upon which the agency of secular 
responsibility is located.  In this context, the secular responsibility generally refers to the 
component of values, reasons and evidence that are not grounded on theological 
considerations or the existence of God.  The debates and discussions generated by Robert 
Audi and Cecil Laborde have shown how the separation-laicism debates present the 
divergence of deliberation between the agency of the citizen and the agency of the state in 
relation to the burden of secular responsibility.   More importantly, the content of these public 
debates have in one way or another shape the institutional feature of the secular state, thus 
influencing the relationship between the state and its citizens on how the secular responsibility 
is sustained in the political discourse.   
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The term ‘separation doctrine’ may be more specific to the American experience, as it has 
been discussed in the previous section, but for the purpose of analysing state practice the 
terminological differences between ‘separation’ and ‘secularism’ will be considered as one 
category of state practice.  In order to recap, nuanced differences between the US version of 
‘separation doctrine’, which has a long history of constitutional arrangement to secure 
religious freedom and communities from state intervention, and French laïcité which seeks to 
protect the state from the influence of religion, provide important empirical insights as to how 
these ideas became crystallized (Gunn 2004).   Ideas of separation were grounded in the 
empirical conditions of social relations.  The ‘separation doctrine’ was crucial in the 
rethinking of the relationship between the meanings of civil and religious liberty and its 
impact upon the loyalty to the American nation (Hamburger 2002:489-90).  Whereas French 
secularity developed as a result of a protracted struggle on the part of the French civil 
government to gain political autonomy from the authority of the Catholic Church grounded in 
the 1789 Revolution. The philosophical tradition and moral implications of laïcité have had 
long history in addressing fundamental issues of civic obligations as well as ethics of modern 
state practices that have been underscored by the themes of equality, liberty and fraternity 
(Laborde 2008:7-8).  These differences were historically contingent and to some extent, 
ideologically pertinent but the core issues surrounding the relationship between religion, civil 
liberties and the substance of political reason remain central to address the political 
relationship between the state and the citizens. 
The normative grounds for the separating doctrine rest on the central premise that religious 
liberty can be only secured if the neutrality principle frames the institutional relationship 
between the government and religious institution (Audi 1989:274).  State practices as well as 
religious institutions therefore need to stick to the institutional principle of neutrality because 
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of how they may implicate upon the norms of individual conduct, which in this case Audi 
refers to as the principles guiding the obligations of citizens in articulating issues of laws and 
public interests (1989:278).   
‘In a free and democratic society, people who want to preserve religious and other 
liberties should not argue for or advocate laws or policies that restrict human 
conduct unless they offer adequate secular (none religious) reasons to support the 
law or policy in question (where an adequate reason for a law or policy is a 
proposition whose truth is sufficient to justify).  By “secular reason’ I do not mean 
one that is consciously held in contrast to a religious one, nor is there anything 
anti-religious implicit in a proper use of the term’ (Audi 1989:278). 
The principles of secular rationale and motivation propounded by Audi constitute the 
methodical process where the formulations of public laws and policies are concerned, and 
whilst such principles do not restrict the scope of religious liberty and expression among 
ordinary citizens, they are applicable to government officials
28
.  The normative position that 
Audi proposes is an important institutional framework that works out the details of how 
public opinions should be articulated and on what grounds such reasons should be motivated.  
These constitute the criteria for tolerance and mutual respect in political engagements, and the 
translation of the religious values into an official instrument of the law or public policy should 
only be considered if there were adequate secular motivation supporting such values.  The 
vital strength of the secular motivation lies in, 
 ‘the decisive principles and considerations can be shared by people of differing 
religious views, or even no religious convictions at all.  If, beyond this, people 
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 Audi elaborates this extensively in “Religious Commitment and Secular Reason”, (2000:90-110) 
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follow the principle of secular motivation to the best of their ability, the issues are 
much less likely to be decided along religious lines’ (1989:290) 
Audi (1989:291-92) stresses that ‘a moral agent need not necessarily be religious’ and that 
basic of moral principles of civilized living can be built upon consensus by those who are 
religious and non-religious.  Such normative grounds in framing the political dimension of 
secularism share similar points with proponents of constitutional secularism.   The central 
idea  underlines the need for the public reason of law, “that humans are capable of testing 
their experience without reference to transcendental concepts and concerns” as opposed to the 
divine or revealed source of law, in order to establish the conditions for accessible reasons 
accepted by all citizens (Sajó 2008:608).  This is a way of overcoming the existing reality 
with which the plurality of strong religions could easily undermine the negative understanding 
of secularism and inevitably threaten the scope of religious liberty (Sajó 2008).    
Audi’s positions emphasizes the need to offer relatively strong secular motivations on the part 
of the government officials when it comes to the formulation of laws and public policies as 
well as setting the normative parameters upon how citizens should participate in the public 
sphere.   A slightly nuanced with more empirical substance added to the institutional principle 
of neutrality comes from Laborde’s critical secularism suggesting the state setting the norms 
of secular restraint upon the how minority religious citizens should be allowed to make claims 
in the public sphere (2008:89).  In the French Hijab controversy, Laborde challenges the 
neutrality role assumed by the state, which had become uncritical of the dominating facet of 
the secular state, thus undermining the ideals of religious liberty in a democratic framework.  
Laborde is critical of the Judeo-Christian assumption of the secular that imposes domineering 
secularist demands upon minority religious citizens.  To avoid this, Laborde insists upon two 
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vital provisos - the ‘basic free exercise’ and the ‘contextual parity’29 - in reappraising the 
secular state practice in a plural society, which although in this case she specifically addresses 
the issues raised by minority Muslim communities in France, Laborde suggests the practical 
rethinking of the role of the secular state in considering the values and adjudicating 
multifaceted claims made in the name of religion in contemporary society.   
Some relevant points will be highlighted to distinguish her position slightly from that of Audi.  
The first proviso – basic free exercise - concerns the need for the secular state to guarantee the 
rights of religious citizens to practice their religions and undertake systematic re-evaluation of 
the kinds of reasonable demands made by religious citizens following the basic tenets of 
religious freedom.  The second proviso stresses the need for the secular state to shift from the 
neutrality principle into non-dominating secular impartiality when it comes to consider 
religious issues, to allow for greater reflection upon the equality of opportunities consistent 
with contemporary philosophical discourse on social justice (Sajó 2008:88-89).  These 
debates have important ramifications upon how the issues of right are conceptualized when 
competing religious convictions are expressed in public political terms.  For Audi the public 
political conduct of the citizens ought to be framed in secular terms, whereas Laborde 
emphasizes the conduct of the state to give generous definition for the religious liberty.  These 
positions are both imperative because having such institutional benchmark ensures non-
sectarian public sphere to flourish by guaranteeing the basic rights and exercise of beliefs 
among citizens.  It also reflects how the boundary of tolerance within the secular state can be 
negotiated, thus mediating the nature of public dialogue from the overbearing dominance of a 
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 The actual parity of status between the majority and minority religions, chapter 4 in Critical 
Republicanism by Laborde (2008) 
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particular comprehensive view, into one that is more reflexive, inclusive and non-
discriminatory. 
3.4 Secularism and the historical debate of Islamic state 
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, stresses that the idea of an Islamic state has no basis in pre-
colonial Islamic history and that its historical innovation was linked to the development of the 
state and law under colonialism (An-Na'im 2008).   An-Na’im argues that Syariah is a matter 
of religious obligations for all Muslims and ‘can best be achieved when the state is neutral 
regarding all religious doctrines and does not claim to enforce Syariah principles as state 
policy or legislation’ (2008:3).  This perspective strongly recommends the institutional 
separation of the state apparatus from religion chiefly because the religious obligations will 
have a considerable impact upon the behaviours of government and state officials who are 
Muslims, thus putting unnecessary burden upon the grey area between official authority and 
voluntary conviction in Islam.  This position relates closely to Rawls’ concern about how the 
state uses political power to impose a particular comprehensive doctrine in the society.  The 
normative argument for Syariah rests on the idea of voluntary religious convictions to grow 
among individual believers within the Muslim society.  An-Na’im emphasizes that ‘coercive 
enforcement promotes hypocrisy (Nifaq), which is categorically and repeatedly condemned by 
the Qur’an’ (2008:4).  The significance of this position underlines the recognition that state 
power as a collective agency encompassing the judiciary, administration and the legislative 
arms could become entangled with the individual obligations of faith; and that this may 
engender a dominating position of the state with regard to the practice of religious obligations 
within the society.   
An-Na’im’s critical assessment of the relationship between the state and Islam as a faith 
reflects a similar analysis from, Asma Afsaruddin, who argues that within the historical and 
77 
 
the intellectual discourse of Sunni political thought, there was no religious basis for the 
establishment of a specific political institution (Afsaruddin 2006).  The emerging conception 
for a kind of Islamic governance was located within a very specific historical and political 
context especially after the passing of Prophet Muhammad whereby early Muslim thinkers 
began to rely on the Qur’an, and the practice of consultation or the collective decision-making 
(Shura) to establish a sense of political order that would reflect the precept of the Islamic 
faith.  Afsaruddin (2006) argues that the primary sources of Islam provided substantive 
principles for the righteous conduct of Muslims in the public sphere; and Islamic religious law 
(Syariah/Shari’a) functions primarily as a broad moral guideline to regulate the mechanisms 
of human transactions, relations including political behaviours, and these legal rulings were 
never specifically translated into the political ordering of human life, let alone designating the 
particulars of political administration.   
Mashhour (2005) explains that Shari’a is not a rigid code of religious laws and the process 
with which Shari’a is applied involves the primary reference to the Qur’an and the Sunna30, 
supplemented by the rule of Qiyas, Ijmaa and Ijtihad
31
.  The Qur’an and Sunna  formed the 
primary source of divine ruling that underscore the tenets of ethical principles and moral 
guidelines in Islam, and these are supplemented by strenuous exercise of contextual analogy, 
consensus and reasoning which draw attention to the role of human agency and reason in 
interpreting justice in the context of Shari’a (Mashhour 2005).   The role of human agency is 
stressed here because in as much as the human world is considered as the temporal realm, the 
exercise of human reason, interpretation and propagation carries the burden of the 
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 Sunna means ‘tradition’, referring to the oral teachings or practical traditions and model of behavior 
of Prophet Muhammad (Mashhour 2005:566) 
31
 Qiyas refers to reasoning by analogy, Ijmaa points to the consensus of opinions and agreements of 
decisions taken among Muslim scholars (Mufti), and Ijtihad is the exercising of independent juristic 
reasoning to the textual foundations of the Qur’an and Sunna. Ibid., 
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transcendental ideal of religion, in this case Islam.  To some extent Mashhour (2005) 
highlights the reflexive nature of Shari’a in a way that would allow its interpretation to 
critically assess traditional practices that undermine women’s status within the Muslim world 
and restore justice to gender equality consistent with the tenets of Islam. 
The issue of constitutional rights and the legal equality of non-Muslims is another major 
concern where the application of the public laws of Shari’a are increasingly building towards 
the foundational structure of an Islamized state (An-Na'im 1996).  In as much as the call for 
Shari’a and the idealization of an Islamized state have become the central plank in the 
discourse of Islamic revivalism, the implications of such laws - even if applied as ‘personal 
laws’ to Muslims - do not itself give substantive constitutional guarantee to non-Muslims that 
there would not be unnecessary burden placed upon the civil liberties of non-Muslims in a 
country where Muslims are the majority population.  The impact of Shari’a upon the shared 
public sphere between the Muslims and the non-Muslims could potentially result in the 
unintended segregation along religious lines.  The application of laws which are exclusively 
intended for regulating the conduct of Muslims in the public sphere raises two important 
issues.  Firstly it creates unparalleled notions of justice along with the setting up of different 
legal codes and jurisdictional apparatus that is amendable to the interpretations of the Holy 
Book.  Secondly it can put pressure upon the kinds of social relations that citizens are 
normally engaged in within the contemporary environment and may even restrict meaningful 
dialogue.   
The recognition of the role of human agency in informing the interpretation of the divine text 
is central to the application of Shari’a justice in establishing the avenue for the prospect of a 
communicative ground where reasons of a public nature could be negotiated. 
79 
 
‘Shari’a is not divine because it is the product of human interpretation of 
these sources.  Moreover this process of construction through human 
interpretation took place within a specific historical context which is 
drastically different from our own.  It should therefore be possible for 
contemporary Muslims to undertake a similar process of interpretation and 
application of the Qur’an and Sunna in the present historical context to 
develop an alternative public law of Islam which is appropriate for 
implementation today’ (An-Na’im, 1996:185-86).  
Where the issues of human governance and political administration in the temporal world are 
concerned, the source of authority and the delicate line between what is recognized as God’s 
sovereignty and the sovereignty of the people – problematizes as well as polarizes the 
intellectual and political movements in Islam at various historical and contemporary  locations 
(Tamimi 2007).  Drawing on the intellectual influence of Ghannouchi
32
, Tamimi (2007:54) 
argues that Islamic thinking and the ‘transcendent morality’ in Islam can contribute 
significantly to the theory of governance to frame the ethics of democratic practice in the 
contemporary world.  The principles of Shura combined with the deliberate inclusion of the 
Umma (community) in the government do not deviate considerably from the basic principles 
of Western democratic consensus.  As the procedural dimension of democratic institutions 
have now been widely adopted in many Muslim countries, the substance of state practice and 
the question of how Shari’a could adequately address the issue of ‘contextual parity’ that will 
implicate the status of citizens particularly from minority religious background remain highly 
serious when it comes to reassessing the political relation between the state and religion. 
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 Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism by A. Tamimi 2001.   
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Drawing on this discussion about Islam and the secular state, the core emphasis rests on the 
obligations of the believers in understanding and exercising the holistic requirements of the 
scriptures in becoming a practicing Muslims.  The institutional support for the believers is 
equally important but these were not required to be part of an official arrangement as the 
social participation of the community of faith in providing the welfare of the Umma has 
greater social value than the need for institutional legislation.  The role of interpretation is 
critical where Syariah laws are used in the resolving civil disputes and regardless of the 
institutional nature of the state, the individual believers of Islam have the obligations to be 
knowledgeable as well as to enlighten others about their conduct in the public sphere.  Where 
the state shoulders the burden of secular responsibility, this should not be an issue a problem 
for religious citizens unless this infringes upon their liberty to profess and exercise their 
religious expression in the public sphere.   
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter briefly discusses the nature of institutional arrangement of the secular state 
epitomized by the separation-laicism of the Franco-American model.  The dissertation 
justifies the selection of this model for discussion because it captures the role of the 
constitution in particular, in regulating the role of religion in the public sphere.  The other 
important aspect that can be drawn from this model is the ways in which it differentiates the 
agency of the state from the agency of the citizen in locating the burden of secular 
responsibility.  The separation thesis approaches the issue from a minimalist state intervention 
stance, where the emphasis is upon the citizens to carry the obligation of the normative role in 
upholding the value of secularism.  The laïcité perspective generally stresses the importance 
of the role of the state in retaining the value of secularism by regulating religious expression 
and activism in the public sphere. 
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Where the secular responsibility is placed upon the state, it matters significantly as to the 
degree of state intervention it imposes upon the fundamental liberties of citizens professing 
different beliefs.   For this reason, the idea of the secular itself presents no threat to religious 
citizens committed to their respective obligations, and as An-Na’im has convincingly argued, 
the secular state is normatively considered to be more conducive for Muslims to profess and 
practice their religious obligations.  The main contention here is the ideological content and 
motivations of the state that in implementing the secular values.  The reasonable expectation 
would be that secular state should promote and encourage the liberty of conscience and 
expression beliefs instead of restricting the liberal vision on the pretext of maintaining 
security and order in the public sphere.   
As a country adopting secular constitution, the Malaysian state should be carrying the burden 
of secular responsibility in creating the condition for the harmonious living of citizens 
professing different faiths and of different ethnic backgrounds.  Historically Islam has had a 
dominant presence both in the public sphere as well as in the government.  The political 
significance of Islam in the government renders the secular meaning ambiguous, and for that 
matter, the ambiguity of secular meaning provides a default position for the government to 
actively promote Islamic principles and values, thus minimizing the secular responsibility 
normally expected from the secular constitution.  This paradoxical position that caught the 
Malaysia state between a secular constitution and politically driven Islamic appeal meant that 
there’s a constant pull and push between the agency of the state and the citizens in defining 
the nature of the secular state in Malaysia.  Hence the task of this dissertation to show the 
direction with which this paradox is going and the events that had driven the course of de-
secularization.    
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4 COLONIAL TERRITORIES AND DISPARATE STATE PRACTICES: FROM 
BRITISH MALAYA TO MALAYSIA 
Abstract: Malaya, North Borneo (Sabah) and Sarawak make up the country that is Malaysia 
today.  The history of each colonial territory tells different stories about colonial practices 
and political cultures.  Mainstream political analyses in Malaysian studies tend to focus on 
West Malaysia and the political relations of the Malays-Chinese-Indians ethnic identities.  
Political developments in Sabah and Sarawak are analysed differently not only because of 
their distinct histories from Malaya but also the fact that these two territories have diverse 
mix of ethno-religious backgrounds compared to Malaya.  This chapter aims to weave the 
disparate histories into a coherent understanding, and argues that analysis of Malaysian 
politics should be inclusive in conceptualizing common citizenship. 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter locates the early notions of ruler-subject relations in context of differing colonial 
practices in Malaya and the Borneo territories.  Malaysia as we know it today came from a 
diverse history of colonial administrations: British Malaya and the Straits Settlement, North 
Borneo under British North Borneo Company and Sarawak under three generations of Brooke 
rule.  The differences with which these territories were governed by different colonial masters 
had considerable impacts upon the construction of political relations, the nature of legitimacy, 
and the ideological construction of right.  As this chapter is closely linked to Chapter 5 – 
where the political transition from subject to citizens will be explored – the colonial 
construction of right examines the historical institutional context in which ideas of indigenous 
custom and religion shape the trajectories of political legitimacy and notion of right in 
Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak.   
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Political legitimacy addresses the question about the right to govern and this chapter identifies 
‘whose right to govern’ as a by-product of colonial intervention in the political construction of 
identity.  In the Malaysian historical context the ideological construction of ‘right’ was linked 
to the processes of indigenous claims to territorial belonging harnessed by the colonial 
policies of ethno-religious identification.  This became significant with the arrival of foreign 
immigrants and their increased roles in the socio-economic landscape. In comparing the 
institutional practices of the three colonial territories and the historical contexts of how the 
discourse of indigenous claims to ‘right’ developed, this chapter shows how the intensity of 
ethno-religious contestations differed and why the level of contestation in Malaya was higher 
than in the Borneo territories.  Such disparities between Malaya and the Borneo territories 
constitute serious challenges to the preliminary conceptions of Malaysian citizenship. 
4.2 Merging the historical narratives of Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak 
Merging these historical narratives highlights the critical issues underpinning the problems of 
coherent analysis of political developments in Malaysia.  The inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak 
as an integral part of the analysis of Malaysian politics provides vital insight into the 
discursive challenges of political Islam and how religion underpins the conception of ethnic 
indigenous right.  Ethno-religious contestation and the nature of colonial politics in Malaya, 
North Borneo and Sarawak contributed significantly to the construction of differential notions 
of right in these colonies.  In examining the colonial practices of conceptualizing rights 
among the indigenous and migrant communities, this chapter illuminates the historical 
processes to which Islam began to furnish the meaning/content of the Malay identity, in 
particular the substance of their special rights.  The structured ethno-religious identification 
began to anchor the political deliberations about rights and these were critical to the early 
notions about citizenship in the Malaysian historical discourse.  
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Many scholars of Malaysian political studies tend to focus solely on the history of the 
Malayan Peninsula, thus neglecting the important historical contributions of Sabah and 
Sarawak in understanding the dynamics of Islamization and the idea of citizenship rights in 
the making of Malaysian identity. The geographical separation from the Malayan peninsula 
and the lack of systematic study on Sabah and Sarawak meant that these two territories have 
been somewhat neglected from the mainstream Malaysian political analysis.  Bringing Sabah 
and Sarawak into the mainstream of Malaysian political analysis offers the critique of 
indigenous claims to right that centres on Malay special position, and unpacks the differing 
layers of ethnically driven notion of citizenship in the Malaysian political culture.  This would 
hopefully transcend the excessive focus on the reified relations of the tri-ethnic political 
culture (Malay-Chinese-Indian) in the Malayan peninsula by exploring the organizing 
principles that define the practices that governed the colonial subjects in Malaya, North 
Borneo and Sarawak.   
The policy for ‘Special Position’ was created by the British colonial state for the Malay-
Muslim community and this policy consideration affected a whole host of other rights 
belonging to other ethno-religious political communities and individuals.  The special 
treatment for one ethnic group remains politically contentious even until today because, firstly 
the idea of ethnic identity, so rooted in the history communal politics, never fails to come in 
conflict with the notion of civic identity and increasingly the issue of religion is digging into 
the deeper meaning of civil liberties and rights of citizens in Malaysia.  Such institutional 
framing of unequal rights further contributes to the problematic conception of justice, making 
religion a forceful factor in the issue of political legitimacy.  
Religious forces and critical historical contingencies accentuated the formation of individual 
and group identities in relation to the state, and the interplay of these forces can become 
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dominant in the contemporary public sphere (Eley and Palmowski 2007).  The remnants of 
colonial practices that structured group identities continue to pepper the language of rights 
when the institutionalization of citizenship came to associate with the formation of the 
modern state in Malaysia.  The Anglo-Malay treaty agreements established an exclusive 
institutional partnership that promoted the special domain for the Malay ruling elites to 
reformulate their indigenous political power within the ambit of Islamic authority and 
jurisprudence
33
 (Horowitz 1994).   Despite the seemingly separate domains of secular-
religious governance, certain ideological links between the British colonial government and 
the Malay ruling elites began to flourish, and that ideology harnessed a particular conceptual 
notion of protecting the right of Malay indigenous way of living.  
The reorganization of the indigenous political authority by the British was contingent upon 
commercial profitability
34
(Smith 2001).  Maintaining secular governance was instrumental for 
British commercial interests in land use, and as the systematic formulation on the use of land 
for plantation agriculture, mining and taxation increasingly became central to the business of 
colonial administration, the colonial state claim to forest land began to take precedent over 
local customs and indigenous inheritance.  The colonial interpretation of land use and the 
subsequent imposition of land coding formed the basis for the emerging notions of customary 
native land rights in most colonial territories in Southeast Asia.  Although the notions of 
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 The dual existence of the Colonial civil courts and the indigenous Syariah courts during the colonial 
period that characterized the complex legal world of the inherited duality in Horowitz, L. D. (1994). 
"The Qu'ran and the Common Law: Islamic Law Reform and the Theory of Legal Change." The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 42(3): 543-580. 
 , ‘The Qur’an and the Common law: Islamic Law Reform and the Theory of Legal Change, 
pp.254-258. 
34
In Piloting Princes: Hugh Clifford and the Malay Rulers, Smith (2001) shows the extent to which 
the British colonial policy was designed to preserve the power of the Malay rulers and how key 
colonial agent like Clifford was convinced that the institution of Sultan was appropriate for the well-
being of the Malay society.  
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indigenous customary rights vary according to the local conditions, population and the extent 
of immigrant settlers, the colonial claim to land use and the interpretation legitimate access 
formed the genesis of  discursive trajectories with which ideas of indigenous right took shape 
in this region (Peluso and Vandergeest 2001:778-780).   
The following section compares the different colonial policies in Malaya, North Borneo and 
Sarawak.  It draws out the ways in which differential notions of customary indigenous rights 
were developed under colonialism and explores the decisive factors that form the basis for the 
claims of indigenous political right that motivate the agenda of citizenship rights.  The British 
post-war effort to renegotiate the treaty agreements with the Malay rulers was an important 
factor that distinguished the mode of indigenous claims to right between Malaya and the 
Borneo territories.  These were key moments where issues of constitutional development and 
the political status of the colonial subjects in the region were taken into serious consideration 
as part of the decolonization policy of the British Colonial office
35
.   
The development of the secular state and its relationship with religious forces are historically 
situated, and as much as the normative positions discussed in the previous sections 
contextualized the norms and ethics of desirable political practice, these concepts will remain 
meaningless if they were not illuminated by the empirical substance of social history.  The 
historical examination of the Malay Kingship will illuminate how state power is conceived in 
the making of the modern state in Malaysia and why Islam becomes vital to the constitutional 
make-up of the state.  This explains the historical dimension of the relationship between the 
state and religion as well as lending preliminary assumptions about how Islam set roots within 
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the discourse of Malay political identity and subsequently the crystallization of the ethnic 
conception of rights.  
4.3 The conception of the secular state, the Malay Kerajaan and 
religious forces 
This section examines the institutional emergence of the syncretic mix of secular-religious 
matrix characterising the British colonial regime and the Malay Kerajaan (Kingship).  By 
situating the historical construction political authority, this provides an insight into making of 
the modern state and the content of public political culture in the Malayan history.   Within 
the dynamics of the Malay Kerajaan, Islam plays an important role in harnessing control 
upon the mind, body and soul of the Umma.  These involve the elements of coercion as well 
as reciprocity in terms of gaining enough support from civil groups in the society to sustain 
political legitimacy.  In the realm of state-society relations, many have focussed on the socio-
economic and structural transformations underpinning the dialectics of power relations 
between the state and social forces (Migdal et al 1994; Migdal 2001).  This dissertation claims 
that the role of religion and its agents play important parts as vectors within these setting, 
particularly on how the state attempts to link these resources to capitalize and contain the 
civic resources and networks that religion promotes/generates within the society (Casanova 
2001; Weithman 2002; Turam 2004).  But before this analysis can be extended to the modern 
state in Malaysia, the subject of inherited traditional authority and the origin or the source of 
such power needs to be elaborated in the context of the Malay Kerajaan. 
The traditional practices of legitimacy in the Malay Kerajaan retained many of its features in 
the modern Malaysian Kerajaan.  The secular practices that emerged from within this state 
tradition are historically contingent, which subsequently shape the public political culture.  
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The pre-colonial Malay Kerajaan marked the reference point with which ideas about religion 
and political practices interacted with the secular administration of the British colonialism.  
The secular colonial state was the primary model upon which the modern Malaysian state 
established Islam as the official religion of the Federation of Malaysia (Article 3) and 
constitutionally provided the legal caveats protecting the rights of the majority Malay citizens 
under Article 153.  These special provisions are the results of the many treaty protections that 
the British established with the traditional Malay authorities, thus projecting a particular 
historical construction of the relationships between the state, Islam and ethnic identity.   
The pre-colonial states in Southeast Asia emerged differently from the Western European 
experience but how they were transformed at the height of colonial penetration and drew 
ideas from the secular institutions of the colonial state contributes significantly to an 
alternative conception of the state.  Early examinations into nature and patterns of ancient 
civilizations in Southeast Asia gave insights into the hypothesis of the ‘Indianized native 
societies’ (Coedès 1968:25).  Increasingly historians and social anthropologists are taking a 
situated approach in reconceptualising the origin of power and the underlying networks that 
sustain the cultural matrix of power centres in the Southeast Asian history.  Wolter’s concept 
of the ‘men of prowess’ revolutionized the ways in which the study of localized power 
relations and the ways in which political space are created in the Southeast Asian context 
(Wolters 1999).  This line of reasoning is by far and away the most consistent thesis that 
supports other studies that locate people or communities as the centre of power play in the 
formation of local leaderships and the locus of mobilization for political power.   
In the pre-colonial Malay Kerajaan, the concept of Kerajaan (Kingship) departs significantly 
from the Western institutionalized conception of territorial state power.  Kerajaan means the 
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‘condition of having a raja’ and this underscores the understanding of the cultural 
identification of the Malay people to the symbol authority in the traditional custom.  
 ‘Every Malay considered himself be living not under a divinely revealed law but 
under a particular Raja, an institution which, it will be seen, had deep roots in the 
Malay world’s animistic and Indian influenced past’ (Milner 1981:49)  
It shares a parallel analysis with Geertz’s Balinese state in Negara that emphasizes the 
significance of ‘the symbolic dimension of state power’ (1981:122) in 
institutionalizing/homogenizing a common identity through the display of court ceremonies.   
Allegiance to the Raja had important material bearings upon the livelihood of the Malays and 
this had spiritual bearing upon the political relation of power between the ruler and subject.  
Walker emphasizes the significance of such ‘ritual relationship’ particularly in the form of 
ceremonial rituals of the royal courts as it strengthened the material and spiritual bondage of 
the subjects to the ruler (Walker 2002).  Despite the ceremonial display of traditional power, 
the interpretation of the omnipotence of the Kerajaan ideology should not be taken as 
unchanging and that the textual portrayal of royal absolutism must be critically examined to 
account for the substance of power relations that contributed to the sustainability as well as 
the vulnerability of the Kerajaan ideology (Walker 2005).  
The institution of Kerajaan was not uncontested, in fact, there were two significant processes 
of change that compelled the Malay Kerajaan to shed some of its Indianized past in the 
attempt to establish Islam as the source of symbolic authority at the turn of the 19
th
 century.  
These changes came about as a result of the growing social force of Islam among the Malay 
communities and the impact of colonial bureaucratization upon the administration of the 
populace.  Mass conversion occurred particularly during the 13
th
 to 16
th
 century through trade, 
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commerce and the courts embracing Islam (Hamid 1982; Alatas 1985).  Islamic conversions 
continue to play critical role in changing the demographic landscape of the population as well 
as forging the dynamics of political relations throughout the modern history of Malaysia. 
Milner (1981:60) documents that initially the Malay Sultans tried to restrict the spread of 
Islamic teachings that went against the grain of the ceremonial display of power associated 
with the Indianized Kerajaan, but the influence of Syariah oriented Islam among the Malay 
indigenous society eventually compelled the Malay Sultans to incorporate Islamic doctrines 
into their rule, and with the advent of British colonial rule, the terms within treaties of 
protection actually aided the Malay Sultans’ attempt in usurping the symbolic role of Islam 
through the formalization of the Sultan’s role as the protectors of Islam and the Malay 
customs (Milner 1981).   The key to  sustaining the Islamic dimension of the indigenous 
Malay political institutions lies in the vibrancy of the Islamized Malay community and where 
the source of political power was concerned, the patronage support
36
 of local chiefs was 
central in channelling the wealth and resources generated over the control of population 
(Gullick 1988).   
Islamic conversion aside, education resulted in the gradual loss of the Kerajaan’s Indic past. 
At the turn of the 19
th
 century there were growing forces of Islamization in Malaya and 
Islamic teaching and observance came to dominate the communal life of the Muslim Umma 
(Roff 1998).   These elements of Islamic teaching became significant for the village and 
communal life of the Malays, religious scholars and the praying facilities like mosques, 
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 The significance of ‘political following or entourage’ as an established locus of power among 
successful local chiefs and the ways in which the political space was generated by these ‘men of 
prowess’ in mobilizing sizeable following within a locality has now been recognized as one of the 
enduring forms of political relations within a growing corpus of literature that engages with the public 
political culture in Southeast Asia (Walker 2002; Warren 2002; Abinales and Amoroso 2005).   
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surau
37
 and pondok
38
 schools and constituted the central organizing principle of Malay 
customary life.  It formed the earliest system of religious education for the Malay 
communities at the village level (Gullick 1989:277-303).  Since then Syariah oriented Islam 
grew influential at all levels of the Malay society (Milner 1981:58-89) and the Malay Rulers 
gradually felt the loss of traditional power under the Residential system and Islam became an 
ideological force with which the Malay Rulers could re-establish the social infrastructure to 
link with the religious leaders and their congregations at the village level (Gullick 1989).   It 
was no coincidence that the Malay rulers observing the ‘treaty reservation’39 of the 
Residential system in the Federated Malay states were able to play key roles in supporting the 
expansion of Islamic jurisprudence (Muhammadan law) in matters relating to Malay customs 
as they remained autonomous from the judicial practices of the British colonial 
administration. Such development actually contributed to the concentration of doctrinal and 
administrative religious authority in the hands of the hierarchy of officials directly dependent 
on the sultanate establishments for their position and power (Roff 1998:212). 
Islam began to undergo successive bureaucratization at the turn of late the 19
th
 century.  
Despite the supremacy of the secular courts developed according to English legal system, the 
parallel growth of Islamic Syariah courts were greatly influenced the procedural judicial 
                                                     
37
 These are community halls at the village level. 
38
Literally translated as small hut but in this context some religious schools provide training facilities 
and boarding. 
39
 The British came to Malaya for trading purposes and were never interested in getting involved in 
domestic issues. The on-going feuds among the local chiefs in the Malay states however prompted the 
British to stabilize the political situation for economic purposes and this situation led to the British 
involvement in the politics and administration of the Malay states. Penang, Melaka, and Singapore 
were brought together as the Straits Settlements headed by a government in 1826. The British 
Residential system was first introduced in Perak after the Treaty of Pangkor in 1874 and such 
administrative system was expanded to include Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang. The treaty 
specifically defined the role of the British Resident in administering all secular matters with the 
exception of Malay customs and the Islamic religion whereby these were regarded as the protected 
royal privileges of the Malay sultans (Hooker 2003:128-130). 
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template of the former, resulting in the current template of inherited duality (Horowitz 
1994:254-260).  The Syariah court came to be part of the indigenous state apparatus and the 
dynamics of nationalist politics followed by such process of institutionalization have been 
addressed by many scholars examining the question of Islam in the Malaysian political 
landscape (Hooker 1984; Roff 1994; Hooker and Othman 2003).  The colonial interaction 
with the Malay Kerajaan as well as the indigenous society marked an important shift in the 
ways power and authority were to be legislated, arranged and institutionally organized at the 
turn of the century.  This was an important historical juncture as the modern institutional 
arrangement began to take shape and where the conditions of secular and religious 
distinctions departed considerably from the norms of the separation thesis conceived in the 
Western context.   
Official recognition was given to the existing system of Muhammadan law and Malay custom 
to deal with matters relating to the land, inheritance and social issues affecting Malay 
communities.  However the content of Islamic law and how they were applied to the customs 
(Adat) in different localities – Adat Temenggong, Adat Perpateh40 - and in different social 
circumstances by the elders and the local chiefs were not translatable into the normative 
understanding of justice in the secular courts (Sutherland 1980).   Such sentiment was 
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 ‘The term "adat perpateh" has a fairly well defined meaning so far as law is concerned. It means a 
body of rules based upon the existence of a set of unilineal descent groups, which are organized on a 
matrilineal and matrilocal basis. There is no such definite meaning attaching to "adat temenggong." 
This term is generally used to refer to the contents of the Malayan Legal Digests and also sometimes 
to adats outside the adat perpateh areas of Negri Sembilan. This latter use is almost exclusively 
confined to commentators on adat perpateh who use adat temenggong to mean an adat which is not 
perpateh. The Malays themselves generally use such terms as adat kampong, adat ketua, adat mukim 
or pakat.  The content of these various terms is a strictly local matter’. Op cit, p.442 Hooker, M. B. 
(1968). "The Interaction of Legislation and Customary Law in a Malay State." The American Journal 
of Comparative Law 16(3): 415-430. 
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reflected by the legal adviser in the proposal for the amendment of the Muhammadan Law 
and Malay Custom 1929 into Enactment No.4 of 1930, 
 ‘...the Supreme Court, while it cannot know Muhammadan Law, is debarred 
from informing itself what the Muhammadan Law is. It has, therefore created an 
impasse out of which we have to find a way.  It also raised the question whether 
this particular matter – a case involving a woman who just became a widow and 
her right to her late husband’s inheritance – was one of Muhammadan Law.  It is, 
I believe, a disputed point whether it is Muhammadan Law or whether it is 
Malay Custom’41.  
Under British Malaya the distinction of the secular from the religious was made on the basis 
of foreign and indigenous distinction of political practices.  The secular administrations of the 
British colonial state co-existed with the indigenous authorities of the Malay Kerajaan.  Islam 
as a religion was granted autonomous authority from the secular considerations of colonial 
government (Hussin 2007:779-783), giving the Malay Rulers power to regulate Malay 
customs and Islam.  The colonial regime effectively established Islamic jurisprudence tied to 
the patronage of the Malay Sultans at the turn of the 19
th
 century, giving ample substance to 
the ideological conception of Malay Kerajaan as an outgrowth of an Islamic civilization.  The 
colonial interventions into the traditional system of authority had in fact fused religion into 
the local political practice through Malay indigenous system of authority, strengthening the 
substance of faith with power play for the Muslim Umma.  Faith and the norms of religious 
observance were institutionally amalgamated with the symbolic authority of the Malay 
Rulers, creating the autonomous sphere with which Islam and politics were allowed to grow 
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 Proceedings of the Federal Council of the Federated Malay States for the year 1933, FMS 
Government Press 1934 
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within the Malay society, thus enabling the interested parties and individuals to appropriate 
Islam as a source of faith and cultural identification to expand the networks of political 
relations.   
The close link between religion and power play is highlighted in the discourse of ‘little wars’ 
in the Strait settlement of Melaka
42
, as Chew demonstrates how the local Malay chiefs played 
significant role in drawing spiritual resources from the syncretism of religion and culture to 
form indigenous resistance against foreign encroachments into the their lives.  These 
resistance movements prompted the British  to employ tactics of collaboration with the local 
power elites to subdue the widespread lawlessness in the western Malay states, thus paving 
the way for the Pangkor Agreement in 1874 (Chew 1998:373-381).  As local collaborations 
proved to be successful in subverting indigenous resistance to foreign encroachment into the 
livelihoods of the indigenous society
43
, the Pangkor Agreement provided the strategy for the 
successive treaties conducted between Malay Rulers and the British.   These also included, 
 ‘new security arrangement’ in which the Malay Rulers under the treaty 
obligations were expected to provide logistical support to the Indian troops 
stationed in these four Malay states and the Straits Settlements, ‘should war 
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 ‘In common with the other minor Indian presidencies of Madras and Bombay, the Straits 
Settlements – Penang, Melaka and Singapore - in 1826 had a Governor and council responsible to the 
Governor General in Calcutta.  In turn the Governor General was subordinate to the Court of Directors 
of the East India Company and the Board of Control established under the terms of Pitt’s India Act of 
1784, as the dual government of the Company in London. Straits Settlements became Crown Colonies 
in 1867’ p.52 
43
 British colonialism transformed the livelihoods of the local chiefs, mainly in terms of channeling the 
collection of revenues and natural resources to provide for the infrastructural support for British 
capital and economic interests Chai, H.-C. (1968). The Development of British Malaya, 1896-1909. 
Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press. 
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break out between Her Majesty’s Government and that of any other power’ 
(Haron 1990:284). 
The re-invention of Malay Kerajaan, with the concomitant appearance of Islamic laws and 
authority as part of the Malay Ruling apparatus and the obligations to protect the British 
commercial interests generated dissenting voices in the form of indigenous resistance among 
ordinary Malays who were critical of such unholy collaboration.  The Kelantan rising in 1915 
for instance provided important insight into the ambivalences in the way the Kelantan Rulers 
conducted their dealings between the British.  The Malay subjects, and most significantly the 
strength of local leaders, in particular the ability of the religious leaders –Imams and Hajis 
(Allen 1968:252-257) – to articulate their increasing scepticism about the advisory role of the 
British Residents system among the Malays on moral grounds (Allen 1968; Kershaw 1977).   
The British policy of non-interference in the ‘religion and custom’ of the Malay society 
actually engendered the separation of administration and legal jurisdictions according to 
religion and ethnicity.  As the ruling elites developed a system of religious administration 
akin to the Western bureaucracy in managing their customary affairs, other grassroots 
religious leaders and scholars began to question the religious credibility of the traditional 
elites (Roff 1994).  By late 19
th
 the religious education had considerable impact upon Malay 
political awareness and such ‘awareness’ communicated via modern prints and journals in the 
Malay society, prompting the British colonial state to brand these Malay leaders as ‘deviants’ 
(Khoo 1974:197-198).  Local Malay journals like Al-Imam, Al-Ikhwan became critical of the 
Rulers who failed to improve the welfare of the Malays, and as these writers were non-
English educated, their writings were treated with greater suspicion by the British, unlike the 
aristocratic Malays who were groomed to become the bureaucrats of the Malayan civil service 
(Khoo 1974).   
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The political challenge against the customary authority of the traditional elites came from the 
reformist Muslims in this period, who began to question the validity of ‘orthodox Islam’ and 
progressively adopted the use of reason (akal) as the basis for the a religious-driven political 
activism (Roff 1994:54-90).  Such critical discourse also animated the local politics in the 
Malay states as the economic and social landscape were transformed by foreign capital and 
the rising numbers of labour immigration originating mainly from India and China.  These 
changes considerably structured the social relations between the indigenous and the migrant 
communities (Freedman 1960; Khoo 1981; Abraham 1983; Lee 1989).  Colonialism and the 
pluralisation of the socio-economic relations during the colonial period fostered cultural 
division grounded in the perceptions of livelihood and the use of natural resources that was 
structurally linked to the ethnic division of labour (Stockwell 1982; Hirschman 1986; 
Hirschman 1987).   
Prior to the Japanese Occupation, the British non-interference policy on indigenous ‘religion 
and custom’ anchored the autonomous condition for Islam to be the symbol of monarchical 
authority within the apparatus of Malay Kerajaan.  In time the position of Islam as a source of 
monarchical legitimacy became the source of indigenous mobilization within Malay society.  
Such development reflects the complexity with which Islam as a religious force is constantly 
being pulled in different directions within the Malay society; polarised and fragmented by the 
demands of individuals, community groups and most importantly, the Malay Kerajaan itself.  
However as the preservation of Malay-Muslim monarchies in the Malay states were vital to 
the political economy of the British colonial state and the extent to which non-interference 
came to be associated with protecting the sovereignty of the Malay rulers, what seemed to 
continue up to the Japanese Occupation was apparent, that  
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‘political power in Malaya was the prerogative of the British administrators 
and the traditional Malay establishments alone. Disputes might arise about 
which should have the lion's share, but nobody else was to have any share at 
all’44 (Allen 1970). 
4.4 The business of governing and the politics of belonging 
The section aims to highlight how the formalization of leaderships was increasingly driven by 
religious and ethnic concerns, and how they underpinned the conceptions of the colonial 
subject. The historical narratives present how the different territories were governed by 
different colonial institutions and to draw out the competing notions of national identity in the 
historical context. Under colonialism state-making was set against the backdrop of a 
pluralizing society through immigration and the deliberate colonial policy of structuring 
economic roles according to ethnicity and the power of capital.  However in deciding who had 
the political right to govern, the British colonial regime had the upper hand.   
4.4.1 Malaya 
The Anglo-Malay alliance under the British colonial government tended to prefer the Malays, 
especially from the aristocratic background, to participate in the civil service and they were 
actively encouraged to go through special training schools to learn the skills of becoming 
bureaucrat (Roff 1994).  These differed from colonial practices in North Borneo, Sarawak, 
and Singapore. The historical diversity in these colonial policies and local participation in 
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 ‘High Commissioner Sir Hugh Clifford told the Federal Council in 1927 that the States were, and 
must remain, Malayo-Muslim monarchies; Britain had neither the mandate nor the desire to make 
them anything else. Any form of democracy was totally inapplicable to them. Clementi, his successor, 
wrote confidentially that 'the Sultans [were] not an anachronism [but] a buffer between us and the 
Chinese, a buffer too... between us and events such as have been taking place in Ceylon'. Op Cit. 
P.153 Allen, J. d. V. (1970). "Malayan Civil Service, 1874-1941: Colonial Bureaucracy/Malayan 
Elite." Comparative Studies in Society and History 12(2): 149-178. 
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governance and administration constituted major problems in conceptualizing national 
identity for Malaysia.  The problem of consensus on nation-building is not only a reflection of 
the increasingly conflicting ideas of national identity projected by the local nationalist elites in 
Malaya and Singapore but it is symptomatic of a deeper misreading about the histories and 
the identities of the other colonies (Stockwell 2004; Stockwell 2005) .   
The previous section discusses how Malaya came under the consolidation of British 
colonialism through various treaties with the Malay sultanates, and how the pre-colonial form 
of Malay kingship and the forces of Islam within the indigenous Malay society generated the 
condition for the substantive interaction of religion and political practice in the Malay 
Kerajaan.  The Malay Kerajaan formed the well spring of traditional form of political 
legitimacy underpinning the development of the legislative apparatus of the colonial state.  
Towards the early part of the 20
th
 century, the colonial administration of Malaya was carried 
out in ‘seven-fold fragmentation of administration’ - the Crown Colonies of the Straits 
Settlements in Penang, Melaka and Singapore; the British Residency system in the Four 
Federated states (Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan) – whilst the rest of the five 
Malay states (Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, Terengganu and Johor) remained fairly independent at 
the periphery and subject to the varying strengths of British control (Tilman 1961).    
The complex institutional administration that characterized the British Malaya regime 
undermined the original policy intention of the British to maintain original intention of ‘non-
interference’ policy.  Where the issues of land tenure, ownership and inheritance were 
involved, the drafting of land laws began to demarcate land for commercial development and 
those under Malay Reservations in the Federated Malay States.   The Torrens System land 
registration in the Malay states was introduced as part of the administrative demands of 
increasing European enterprises in tin mining industry and the growing plantation estates 
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among foreign investors (Allen and Donnithorne 1957; Wong 1975).  It was argued that the 
British rule established different legal codes for the indigenous population in the name of 
protecting their land holdings, and title ownership of land for the use of commercial industries 
invested by foreign capital.   
The idea behind the conception of the Customary Land rights for the Malay population began 
to take root following the rubber boom when the British officials in Selangor discouraged the 
sale and conversion of village sites into rubber cultivation estates
45
 (Ho 1967; Kratoska 1983).  
In the attempt to protect what the British officers thought was the proper ancestral province of 
the Malay peasant community against the influx of Chinese and European commercial 
ventures, ‘peasant tenure, or the right to hold Customary Land’ was legislated under the 
Selangor Land Enactment 1891 which required the ‘original holder to be a Mohammedan’46.  
Lands that were gazetted under such ancestral consideration were then effectively 
incorporated into the Malay Reservations Enactment 1913
47
, hence gazetted areas considered 
to be Customary Land to which the original holders must be Mohammedans became 
embedded within the land tenure of the Malay Reservation Enactment 1913 -  substantiating 
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 W.E.Maxwell, an official who came to Malaya in 1865 and was appointed Commissioner of Lands 
for the Straits Settlements in 1882, became the British Resident of Selangor in 1891.  His local 
knowledge on Malay land tenure led him to believe that land laws for areas under British control 
should follow indigenous forms. Maxwell played an important role in drafting the land legislation for 
the state of Selangor (which in fact owed little to indigenous land tenure) and the Selangor law later 
became the basis of land enactments put into effect throughout the Peninsula. Maxwell created a 
category of "customary land" for peasant smallholdings which provided security of tenure (the law 
refers to "a permanent, transmissible, and transferable right of use and occupancy") but made no 
mention of matters such as leases and mortgages, as these were considered unnecessary for land under 
peasantry subsistence cultivation (Kratoska 1983:151). 
46
 Both Means (1972:32-33)) and Kratoska (1985:26-27) explain how legal strategies were employed 
by the British officials to restrict the conduct of the Malay peasants from disposing  and mortgaging 
their land for cash particularly from non-Muslim creditors. 
47
 Under the Malay Reservations Enactment, neither state land nor private land owned by a Malay 
within any area designated a Malay Reservation could be transferred to a non-Malay; mortgaged land 
could be sold in execution of a court decree only with the consent of the State Council, and could only 
be purchased by a Malay. (Kratoska 1983:154) 
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the conceptual genesis of defining a Malay who was ‘a person belonging to any Malayan race 
who habitually speaks the Malay language or any Malayan language and professes the 
Moslem religion’ (Means 1972; Kratoska 1982; Kratoska 1983; Kratoska 1985).   
By the early 1920s, where tin and rubber made up about 60% of Malaya’s total exports, 
official statistics showed that the 97.6% of Malays worked in rice planting, 95.5% of Chinese 
were employed in the tin-mining industry and about 53.1% Indians worked as agricultural 
coolies
48
.  These figures began to convince the British Residents in the Federated Malay 
States that the birth right of the Malay peasants, as the ‘sons of the soil’ in the rice industry, 
must be safeguarded (Kratoska 1982:304-309).  The categorical assumptions about ethnicity 
and livelihood formed the basis of colonial pseudo-sociological analysis of work ethics 
differentiating the ‘laid-back Malays’, the ‘money making Chinese’ and the ‘amendable 
Indian coolie’, giving substance to the colonial policies to differentiate workplace, living 
space and most importantly, constructing the notion that migrant subjects did not ‘belong to 
the local society…where only Malay aristocrats and their colonial advisors should be allowed 
full participation in political or administrative roles’ (Hirschman 1986:353).   
Maintaining ethnic frontiers was increasingly instrumental to the business of colonial 
governance in which ‘the census, landownership, the regulation of labour, education policy, 
representation on the Federal Council’ was based on ethnicity (Stockwell 1982:57).  Years of 
structured segregation in work and living spaces went hand in hand with the 
institutionalisation of government departments dealing with issues relating to particular ethnic 
groups, i.e. Chinese Protectorate and the Department of Labour dealing mostly with Indian 
immigration and estate employment (Stockwell 1982), where ideas about ethnicity 
continually feeding into the institutional practices of segregation building the basis for early 
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 Op. cit in Kratoska 1982: 291. 
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racial ideology consistent with the business of governing in British Malay (Hirschman 1986; 
Hirschman 1987). 
In the year 1933, some of the clauses in the Malay Reservation Enactment 1913 were subject 
to a number of amendments with the aim of ‘preventing the negotiability of land as an article 
of commerce’ and to prevent Malay landowners in the Malay reservations from getting into 
debt
49
.  Official estimates on the amount of debt incurred upon land in Malay reservations 
went up to about 5 million dollar
50
 by 1930 and the colonial government intended to protect 
lands in Malay reservations from all commercial, legal and administrative dealings that had 
nothing to do with the Malay community
51
.  Whilst the British Residents and most of the 
Malay Rulers were in agreement about the role of the government intervention to alleviate the 
problem of indebtedness among the Malay peasants and to restrict the transactions and 
legality of money lending charged upon Malay reservation lands between Malays and non-
Malays
52
, a handful of the legislative council members expressed concerns about the ways in 
which the policy of ‘non-interference’ on the part of the government implicated upon the 
issue of justice to persons who were not Malays.   
‘ …I do assume that Government desires to be just to all races in the Federated 
Malay States and does not desire to be partial merely to one, and that is the Malay 
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 Malay Reservation Bill, 1933, B132 official documents of the Federated Malay States Government, 
1934. 
50
 The Straits dollar, issued by the Government of the Straits Settlement was the currency until 1939., 
Ibid 
51
 Ibid,. 
52
 B132-B161, Ibid,. The Raja Muda of Perak was particularly adamant about the necessity of such 
involvement, ‘…To my mind, this amended law is absolutely necessary in the interests of the Malay 
community.  I am quite sure that anybody who has lived in this country with the Malays since the 
rubber boom and particularly those who are really in sympathy with the many shortcomings and 
weaknesses of the Malays, will agree with me that this Bill. Though very drastic as it appears, is really 
needed to protect the interests of the Malays in general.’ 
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race.  As this Enactment stands, it will cause gross injustice and great hardship to 
persons not of the Malay race...We must remember and we are all aware of the 
fact that this country is a country inhabited by several races, and there can be no 
doubt that the ill-feeling and resentment to which I have referred will be 
intensified when one race is selected for specially privileged treatment at the 
expense of others.’53 
With the passing of the amendments made to the Malay Reservation Enactment, 1934, the 
British ‘non-interference’ policy turned out to be one of positive intervention when it came to 
the issues of land tenure and the perceived role of the Malay peasant community.   Compared 
to the other colonial territories, the idea of indigenous land tenure and native rights to special 
treatment did not resonate strongly among the colonial masters of British North Borneo and 
the Rajah Brooke in Sarawak.  It is not within the scope of this thesis to find out why there 
were differences in the institutional practices of colonial governance; however what was 
effective about the legislation of land right and its implication upon the development of the 
constitutional protection of the Malay special position was the ways in which the ideas of 
indigenous Malay rights and the role of Islam became dominant in the language of political 
representations and citizenship rights as these colonies merged into a Federation. 
4.4.2 North Borneo 
North Borneo and Sarawak came into the radar of British Imperialism through the ‘agency of 
political structures and vehicles outside the direct control of Whitehall’ (Wright 1972:39).  
The Chartered Company of North Borneo and the Brooke raj, it was argued, were mere 
proxies to the British Imperial power, hence there were neither direct British colonial 
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 Mr. E.D Shearn, member of the Federated Malay States legislative council.  B161, Amendment of 
Section 9, Malay Reservations Enactment, 1933. Ibid,. 
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responsibility nor systematic imperial funding granted for the internal administration in these 
territories (Wright 1972).  North Borneo and Sarawak became British Crown Colonies in 
1946 after the end of the Japanese Occupation.  The pre-colonial histories of indigenous 
political systems in North Borneo and Sarawak shared some similarities to the Kerajaan 
model in Malaya, where local chiefs or Datu played pivotal roles in making and breaking 
alliances with the established sultanates in Brunei and the Sulu Archipelago (Kathirithamby-
Wells and Villiers 1990; Manguin 1991; Walker 2002; Abinales and Amoroso 2005).  The 
political authorities of these Sultanates were limited to the coastal areas of North Borneo 
because the vast areas of the interior were almost impenetrable. Historians focusing on the 
maritime trading in this region documented how slave trading and maritime piracy became 
vital to the maritime economy and the political structure of the Sulu Sultanate in the Southern 
parts of the Philippines
54
 (Wright 1966); these activities were extended to the northern parts 
of the Borneo island which significantly influenced the nature of traditional authorities in 
areas under the suzerainty of the Brunei Sultanate (Pryer 1883; Pringle 1974; Sutherland 
1983; Bently 1986; Nicholl 1989; Warren 2002).  Regional instability following the activities 
of slave raiding, piracy and local rebellions against the Brunei Sultanate
55
 as well as the 
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 The issue of North Borneo sovereignty prior to the history of colonialism is unresolved, although 
this remains a thorny diplomatic issue between Malaysia and the Philippines in the light of the 
recurring territorial claims of the Sulu Sultan over Sabah Jayakumar, S. (1968). "The Philippine claim 
to Sabah and International Law." Malaya Law Review 10(2): 302-335. 
 , Abd. Samad, P. and D. Abu Bakar (1992 ). "Malaysia - Philippines Relations: The Issue of 
Sabah." Asian Survey 32(6): 554-567. 
 , Fernandez, E. S. (2007). "Philippine-Malaysia Dispute over Sabah: A Bibliographic Survey." 
ASIA-PACIFIC SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW 7(1): 53-64. 
  
55
 ‘When Sir James Brooke made it his business to administer the country, it was for the natives and 
by the natives, and it is by that equitable system of government that the country has grown practically 
without bloodshed and without ill-feeling on the part of the natives….The only thing that the 
Government puts down with a firm hand are murder and head-hunting and theft…the natives may 
retain all their customs, their religion is not tampered with’Haddon, Lord Stanmore, et al. (1900). "In 
the Heart of Borneo: Discussion." The Geographical Journal 16(1): 59-62  
105 
 
presence of other European powers – French in Indo-China, Spanish in the Philippines, Dutch 
in West Borneo and the Indonesian Islands – were cited as the key turning points that 
influenced Great Britain to assume protectorates over Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo in 
order to secure the international trade routes within the South China Sea (Tarling 1962; 
Wright 1970).   
It was crucial for Britain to secure the trade route from India via the South China Sea to the 
various ports in China as opium was a profitable commodity and was shipped to Ceylon, 
Siam, Cochin China, Straits Settlements, Netherlands India, Natunas Islands, Sarawak, 
Labuan, the Philippines, Japan and China
56
.  Official figures on the total value of opium 
exported from India from the year 1904-1905 was £7,082,295 of which opium to the value of 
£5.5 million was shipped directly to the ports in China.  The net opium revenue for the British 
Colonial Government in India was estimated at about £ 4,050,999 of which £3 million was 
derived from the opium exported directly to China
57
. 
The acquisition of Labuan Island (off the west coast of North Borneo) in the British-Brunei 
Treaty in 1847 coincided with the end of the first Anglo-Chinese opium war (1839-1842) and 
this treaty rested on the justification of protecting the British international trade routes from 
China to Singapore against piracy and the mining of coal deposits in the island (Galbraith 
1965; Horton 1986).  When the Sultan of Brunei ceded the north-western part of North 
Borneo to an American Trading Company in 1865 for the purpose of commercial venture for 
ten years, the British became aware of other colonial threats to her strategic position in the 
region (Tregonning 1954).  When the American settlement failed, the ceded territory was then 
                                                                                                                                                                      
  p.59 
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 HC Deb 27 Feb 1908 Vol.185 cc51-2   Official figures on the total value of opium exported from 
India from the year 1904-1905 was £7,082,295 of which opium to the value of £5.5 million was 
shipped directly to the ports in China. HC Deb 30 April 1906 Vol. 156 cc233-4 
57
 . HC Deb 30 April 1906 Vol. 156 cc233-4 
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renegotiated in a three-way arrangement between the Brunei, the Sulu Sultanate and the 
Overbeck and Dent Association (ODA), whereby the ODA acquired the right to govern North 
Borneo independently in return for annual fees of 15,000 straits dollars to the Brunei Sultan 
and 5,000 straits dollars to the Sulu Sultan(Tregonning 1965)
58
.  These rights were secured on 
condition that the sale of the North Borneo lease must be approved by the British 
Government, paving the way for the ODA to apply a Royal Charter for North Borneo  
(Tarling 1971; Tarling 1978). 
Pending approval for the Royal Charter, the ODA employed British Residents to secure peace 
in the territory, the cooperation of local chiefs and proceeded with instituting the Residency 
system of administration in the territory (Tregonning 1954).  Although some of the local 
chiefs were willing to participate in the Residency system, many were unhappy with the 
introduction of taxation and other forms of sanctions, particularly the abolition of the slave 
bondage system in the communities (Black 1968; Reid and Brewster 1983).  The British 
North Borneo Company (BNBC) officially began administering North Borneo in 1881
59
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 Pre-colonial North Borneo was territorially divided between the suzerainty of the Bruneian riverine 
system Kathirithamby-Well, J. (1993). "Hulu-hilir Unity and Conflict: Malay Statecraft in East 
Sumatra before the mid-Nineteenth Century." Archipel 45: 77-96  
 , Hall, K. R. (2001). "Upstream and Downstream Unification in Southeast Asia's First Islamic 
Polity: The Changing Sense of Community in the Fifteenth Century Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai Court 
Chronicle." Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 44(2): 198-229. 
 and the maritime trading prowess of the Sulu kingdomWarren, J. F. (2002). Iranun and 
Balangingi: Globalization, Maritime Raiding and the Birth of Ethnicity. Singapore, Singapore 
University Press. 
  In ‘The Historical Note on North Borneo Dispute’, Wright (1966) provides an excellent 
genealogy of the territorial rivalry between the Brunei and the Sulu Sultanates, and how these were 
complicated with the British chartering of North Borneo.  
59
 There was a debate in the House of Commons where Sir John Gorst protested that ‘the Company is 
not a commercial but a British political Company’ and the fact that the Company was ‘authorized and 
empowered to take Sovereign rights from two Sultans of the Island, who are authorized and 
empowered by the Government to use and exercise those rights under the supreme authority and under 
the control of the Government of Great Britain’  and therefore had hidden political agendas behind the 
façade of a mere trading company. HC Deb 17 March 1882 vol. 267 cc1148-230 
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through the appointment of Governor, a Legislative council and a civil administration. As a 
business organization the role of BNBC was to secure peace
60
, open up the territory for 
foreign investments, pay dividends to its shareholders in Britain and follow the authority of 
the Courts of Directors in London
61
(William 1981).  With regard to its policy of non-
interference in local religion and custom, Article 8 and 9 of the BNB Charter
62
 specifically 
required the Company to exercise discretion in its treatment of the local inhabitants (British 
North Borneo Chartered Company 1878).  In hindsight, this policy of non-interference was 
impractical as the BNBC was legally the Government of North Borneo where the ‘law of 
England, both Civil and Criminal, became the law of the State’ (Macaskie 1912:201). 
The first Governor of the BNBC was pessimistic about the commercial viability of the 
company (Treacher 1891:128-129).  This was due to the increased administrative costs and 
the lack of concrete development plans designed for the territory(Treacher 1891).  Land 
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 One of the MP (Mr. Richard) was particularly sceptical about the ways in which peace could be 
secured in North Borneo given the historical evidence of how the Englishmen as the colonizing race 
managed to come into contact with ‘any other nation, tribe or race, in any part of the world without 
quarrelling and fighting with them…We must remember that the people of these ceded Provinces have 
not been consulted in regard to this transference; and nothing is more likely than that they will rebel 
against the authority of the foreign adventurers to whom they have been handed over without their 
consent and possibly without their knowledge. Indeed, we are not without a warning example even in 
Borneo. We know what took place before under Rajah Brooke. Ibid., cc1186-1187 
61
  Sir Rutherford Alcock, Richard Biddulph Martin, Richard Charles Mayne, and William Henry 
Macleod Read, with the Petitioner Alfred Dent, were the founding Directors of the Association 
(BNBC 1878:7). 
62
 Article 8 on the ‘Religions of the Inhabitants’ – ‘The Company as such, or its officers as such, shall 
not in any way interfere with the religion of any class or tribe of the people of Borneo, or of any of the 
inhabitants thereof’;  
Article 9 on the ‘Administration of Justice to Inhabitants’ – ‘In the administration of justice by the 
Company to the people of Borneo, or to any of the inhabitants thereof, careful regard shall always be 
had to the customs and laws of the class or tribe or nation to which the parties respectively belong, 
especially with respect to the holding possession transfer and disposition of lands and goods, and 
testate or interstate succession thereto, and marriage divorce and legitimacy, and other rights of 
property and personal rights (1878:9-10). 
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became the fall back commodity to which the major source of income for the BNBC would be 
derived, ‘…the source from which the shareholders are to be recouped is the surplus revenues 
which a wisely administered Government, would ensure, by judiciously fostering 
colonisation, principally by the Chinese, by the sale of the vast acreage of ‘waste’ or 
Government lands, by leasing the right to work the valuable timber forests…by custom duties 
and ‘farming out’ of the right to sell opium, spirits, tobacco etc.’ (1891:129).  The Company’s 
intention to protect the ‘rights of the native inhabitants’ were driven by the conditions of 
settlement
63
, where restrictions were gradually being introduced as a way of reducing the 
practice of swidden agriculture and as a result changes were made on land tenure, labour
64
, 
and the acquisition of rivers as well as the introduction of taxes on the indigenous collection 
of jungle produce.  The interpretation of the phrase (a) "lands possessed by customary tenure” 
required the fulfilment of one of the other conditions in Section 26 of the Land Law (1913) in 
order to meet the test of customary tenure.  Hence the individual native was required to prove 
a ‘right’, subject to the conditions written in the said Section in order to demand a title for the 
land or money compensation from the Company (Macaskie 1921).   The legalization of the 
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 Proclamation 3 of I889 laid down rules by which native rights to land by customary tenure should 
be decided; these rules are embodied in s. 26 of the Land Law (Ordinance 7 of I9I3) which defines 
native rights as follows:  (a) "Land possessed by customary tenure or occupied for residential purposes 
for the last three years preceding settlement. (b) " Land planted with fruit trees, when the number of 
fruit trees amounts to twenty and upwards to each acre. (c) " Isolated fruit trees, and sago, rotan, or 
other plants of economic value, that the claimant can prove to the satisfaction of the Collector were 
planted or upkept and regularly enjoyed by him as his personal property. (d) " Grazing land that the 
claimant agrees to keep stocked with a sufficient number of cattle or horses to keep down the 
undergrowth. (e) Wet and dry padi or other grain land that has been cultivated within three years. (f) " 
Burial grounds or shrines. (g) " Usual rights of way for men or animals from rivers, roads, or houses to 
any or all of the above." (Macaskie 1921:207-209). 
64
 The Company policy on the importation of Javanese and Chinese labor to meet the demands of 
plantation estates was underscored by the official’s view that the indigenous workers were tied to the 
seasonal planting of paddy, hence the need to return to their respective villages for the planting and the 
harvesting season North Borneo (1949). Annual Report 1949. Jesselton. 
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access to land and jungle resources considerably affected the traditional ways in which the 
indigenous communities utilize land and in many ways contradicted the indigenous practices 
of collective ownership (Cleary 1992; Cleary 1996; Cleary 2002).   
In the eyes of the Company officers, the indigenous people failed to make profitable use of 
land in North Borneo and their local custom defied the norms of landownership understood in 
the Western legal concept, and this led them to view the natives as 'squatters', instead of 
landowners (Doolittle 2003).  As the inhabitants of North Borneo were very diverse and they 
tended to be nomadic and lived in small clusters of villages, early colonial description of the 
population classified the major tribes into three main categories - Bajau, Dusun and Murut
65
 - 
Kazufumi (2001:229) in particular presents quite a detailed classification of ethnic groups in 
North Borneo (Sabah) from 1891-1991; as successive census report since 1921 recorded more 
than 30 different ethno-linguistic groups existed in North Borneo.  Colonial anthropology 
depicted the difficulty in assigning the native communities of North Borneo into a structured 
identity, where this was also exacerbated by the lack of coherent settlement structures among 
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 As this was the broadest classification of ethnicity in the earliest colonial account, various 
anthropological studies on the various ethnic and linguistic groups of Sabah indigenous communities 
are available among these scholars - Williams, T. R. (1963). "The Form of a North Borneo Nativistic 
Behavior." American Anthropologist 65(3): 543-551. 
 , Williams, T. R. (1965). The Dusun : a north Borneo society New York, Holt, Rinehart & 
Winston. 
 , Appell, G. N. and R. Harrison (1969). "The Ethnographic Classification of the Dusun-
Speaking Peoples of Northern Borneo." Ethnology 8(2): 212-227. 
 , Brewis, K. S. (1990). The Timugon Murut. The Social Organization of Sabah Societies. S. G. 
Lingenfelter. Kota Kinabalu, Sabah Museum and State Archives Department. 
 , Sather, C. (1997). The Bajau Laut: Adaptation, History, and Fate in a Maritime Fishing 
Society of South-eastern Sabah. Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press. 
 , Kazufumi, N. (2001). Pirates, Sea Nomads and Protectors of Islam: Changing Images of 
Sama and Their Self-Identification in the Malaysian Context. International Association of Historians 
of Asia (IAHA). Kota Kinabalu, Kyoto University: 212-230. 
 . 
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the population largely subscribed to the local animistic practices that tended to vary from one 
place to another according to different ethno-linguistic grouping
66
(Ireland 1905; Evans 1923).   
Towards the end of the 19
th
 century
67
, indigenous resistance to the Company’s policies on 
land and taxation led to the Mat Salleh revolt from 1895-1903 as well as the Rundum 
Rebellion among the Murut community from 1900 to 1915
68
.  In the aftermath of the revolts, 
the BNBC began to restructure its administration to include native participation by 
establishing the Advisory Council for Native Affairs
69
 alongside the existing Legislative 
Council which deliberated the commercial aspects of the Company (Kahin 1947).  Since then 
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 ‘The Bajaus are a race of sea gypsies, pirates turned fishermen, under British guidance, the Dusuns 
are a coast folk living in small villages or kampongs by the shore and along the foothills, the Muruts 
are a half-savage tribe in the far interior…These people differ greatly from one another in many 
important respects, but from the administrative standpoint they have this much in common, that they 
have no written language, no cities, no wealth and that the internal relations of each tribe are purely 
feudal in character.’ (Ireland 1905:42) 
67
 Operations against the Natives  HC Deb 23 May 1887 Vol. 315 cc871-2 
68
 The studies done by scholars on the two major indigenous resistance under the BNBC showed that 
local chiefs and their communities were unhappy with the ways the Company alienated considerable 
tracts of land for commercial developments, the introduction of taxation on land, rice and jungle 
produce as well as the coercive employment of indigenous people in the construction of bridle paths 
linking the various stations of the BNBC in the interior region Tregonning, K. G. (1956). "The Mat 
Salleh Revolt, 1894-1905." Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 29(1): 20-36. 
 , Wookey, W. K. (1956). "The Mat Salleh Rebellion." Sarawak Museum Journal 7(8): 193-
201. 
 , Black, I. (1981). The Rundum Rebellion of 1915 in Sabah: Millenarianism and Social 
Protest. Seminar on the History and Society of Sabah. Kota Kinabalu, 12-16 August. 
 , Black, I. (1985). A Gambling Style of Government: The Establishment of Chartered 
Company Rule in Sabah, 1878-1915. Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press. 
 , Brewis, K. S. (1990). The Timugon Murut. The Social Organization of Sabah Societies. S. G. 
Lingenfelter. Kota Kinabalu, Sabah Museum and State Archives Department. 
 . The case of Mat Salleh had attracted the attention of the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
regarding the correspondence between the company and Mat Salleh. That correspondence ought to be 
placed upon the Table of the House, so that the House might ascertain whether Mat Salleh had been 
treated fairly by the company. HC Deb 02 March 1900 vol. 79 cc1604 
69
 The institution of native council was interrupted when the Second World War affected North 
Borneo in 1935 and there’s no information available on whether it was revived under the 
administration of the Crown Colony in 1946 or a different model of native participation was re-
introduced by the British Colonial administration. 
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there had been increasing awareness on the part of the BNBC to include the indigenous 
leaders in the running of the administration, but this new relationship was still framed within 
the overriding concern of the Company to achieve profitability and accountability to the 
shareholders in Britain, and far from the ‘protectionist’ approach in Malaya.  The commercial 
pursuit of the BNBC not only favoured the privileging of private and the commercial 
ownership of land over the interests of local customary practices but the exclusive monopoly 
over timber resources by BNBC also drew flak from other Chinese investors
70
.  
Under the BNBC no comparable measure on specific land reservation was accorded to the 
‘native’ that was analogous to the Malay Reservation Enactment in British Malaya.  In so far 
as the definition of customary land tenure was concerned, the BNBC did not provide specific 
legislation that linked the protection of land tenure to the interest of the indigenous 
communities.  Instead land became the prerogative of the Company government - where some 
of these dominant state discourse appeared to linger in the modern government practices 
(Doolittle 2005) - practical recognition of native customary rights has been subject to state 
approvals, restrictions and at times contested within the common law framework in 
Malaysia
71
 (Bulan 2001; Xanthaki 2003).  The contemporary issues of native customary right 
and access to land in one sense highlights the complexity of legal pluralism and the issues 
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 Over 300 Chinese merchants of North Borneo sent a petition to the British North Borneo Company 
protesting against the grant of exclusive rights to the British Borneo Timber Company, Limited, to cut 
timber for export on all State lands challenging Clause 17 of the BNBC Charter on the grounds of 
unjust trade practices. HC Deb 09 June 1921 vol. 142 c2100W 
71
 23/12/2005 (Daily Express) Land issues dominated the list of 720 complaints received by the 
Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (Suhakam), between January and November, 2005. Suhakam 
Vice-Chairman Tan Sri Simon Sipaun said there were 358 complaints on land issues, followed by 129 
assorted cases involving identity cards, birth certificates and passport.  Other complaints included 55 
cases on work issues, police (43), basic facilities (35), EPF/insurance/Socso and pension claims (25), 
legal matters (17), housing (12), education (3) and other matters (43). Cases of land scams are also 
rampant in Sabah where many have resulted in entire villages and lands going to certain individuals 
and corporations 30/01/2010 (www.Malaysiakini.com) 
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about fundamental rights in Malaysia.  Several points of differences can be made on the 
colonial practices of the BNBC, firstly there was no special alliance that mirrored the 
establishment of Anglo-Malay alliance in Malaya as the treaties for North Borneo were 
negotiated on the basis of cession from the Brunei and Sulu Sultanates.  Secondly the BNBC 
did not single out a particular ethnic group to identify with land ownership as there were more 
than 30 ethno-linguistic groups living in disparate areas.  Thirdly, in terms of religious 
identification, Islam was influential among the coastal communities of the Bruneian and 
Bajau population whereas the interior population were largely animistic.  It was not until the 
arrival of Christian Missions in the middle of 19
th
 century that the Christian faith became 
popular among the Chinese immigrant communities in the towns and the indigenous people in 
the interior region where the missions began to transform their lives and communities
72
.     
4.4.3 Sarawak 
The colonial history of Sarawak differed greatly from Malaya and North Borneo in that the 
political landscape of the territory was considerably shaped by the dynastic ruling of three 
generations of the Brooke family beginning from 1842 until it became Crown Colony in 
1946
73
.  Sarawak lies in south of Brunei and was under the suzerainty of the Brunei Sultanate 
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 The Christian missions included St. Joseph Foreign Missionary Society established since 1859, 
others included the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, Seventh Day Adventist and the Borneo 
Evangelical Mission – these churches played significant roles in the teaching of English, provision of 
medical and health services as part of its mission to spread Christian faith among the Chinese and the 
native communities in the interior British North Borneo (1952). Annual Report 1952. Jesselton. 
 , Rooney, J. (1981). Khabar Gembira: A History of the Catholic Church in East Malaysia and 
Brunei (1880-1976). London and Kota Kinabalu, Burns and Oates/Mill Hill Missionaries. 
 , Pugh-Kitingan, J. (1989). Cultural Development in Sabah, 1963-1988. Sabah: 25 Years 
Later, 1963-1988. M. J. Ongkili and J. G. Kitingan. Kota Kinabalu, Institute for Development Studies. 
 . 
73
 James Brooke was an ex-officer of the East India Company, who became an adventurer after 
inheriting a fortune from his father in 1835.  He was described as very religious in his pursuit of 
civilizing the natives of Borneo, ‘If it please God to permit me to give a stamp to this country which 
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where early colonial anthropology described the incessant feuding tensions between the 
Brunei chiefs and the local Dayak population
74.  James Brooke’s initial role in containing 
local rebellions earned him the title of the Rajah of Sarawak.  His relentless pursuit to defeat 
the terrors of piracy and to promote the civilizing mission
75
 were officially recognized as the 
designated British agent of the British Government in Borneo when he became the first 
Governor of Labuan in 1847 (Keppel 1846; ST. John 1897).   Initially the terms and 
agreements on the governorship of Sarawak were negotiated personally with Raja Muda 
Hashim, in which James Brooke was expected pay an annual sum of 2,500 dollars and refrain 
from infringing  “upon their customs or religion; and in return, that no person is to interfere 
with me in the management of the country" (Brooke 1842:29-30). In the account of Brooke’s 
intervention in Sarawak, he not only revealed the humanitarian concerns about the violent 
                                                                                                                                                                      
shall last after I am no more, I shall have lived a life which emperors might envy’ (Ireland 1905:63).   
James Brooke was conferred the Governorship of Sarawak in return for the support he gave to the 
Malay chief of Sarawak, Raja Muda Hashim (the uncle of the Bruneian Sultan Omar Ali), to quell a 
rebellion under the Raja Muda administration.  The Brooke dynasty lasted three generations whereby 
the first Raja Brooke ruled for twenty-six years (1842-1868), was then succeeded by his nephew Sir 
Charles Johnson Brooke (1868-1917) and finally Charles’ son, Charles Vyner Brooke (1874-1963). 
74
 ‘For generations the Dyak and the Malay had been enemies.  To the Mohammedan Malays the Dyak 
appeared merely as a barbarous infidel, whose country was just the spoil of the faithful.  His religion, 
since it was not Mohammedan, was false…it was clearly from the Malay standpoint, a race to be used 
as long as it would submit, to be exterminated as soon as it resisted.  The Dyaks, on the other hand, 
regarded the Malays as their tyrants and oppressors, the people who had come over the sea, to rob 
them of their country, to destroy their customs…’(Ireland 1905:66-67). 
75
  ‘Dec. 31.1844...I am surprised, however, that they say they do not understand my intentions.  
Independently of my published letter, I thought they had had my intentions and wishes dinned into 
them.  My intention, my wish, is to develop the island of Borneo.  How to develop Borneo is not for 
me to say, but for them to judge. I have, both by precept and example, shown what can be done; but it 
is for the Government to judge what means, if any they will place at my disposal.  My intention, my 
wish, is to extirpate piracy by attacking and breaking up the pirate towns; not only pirates direct, but 
pirates indirect.  Here again the Government must judge.  I wish to correct the native character, to gain 
and hold an influence in Borneo proper, to introduce gradually a better system of government, to open 
the interior, to encourage the poorer natives, to remove the clogs on trade, do develop new sources of 
commerce.  I wish to make Borneo a second Java.  I intend to influence and amend the entire 
Archipelago, if the Government will afford me means and power…’ (St. John 1879:68)   
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implications of the activities of piracy – largely condoned by the Bruneian chiefs - upon the 
interior Dayak natives, but also indicative of the Christian mission upon which he intended to 
introduce to the native Dayak communities by protecting them from the terrors of slave 
raiding
76
.   Middleton (2010) argues that the epic characterization of Brooke’s campaign 
against piracy captured the British public imagination on two important grounds: the first one 
concerned the reputation of British Imperialism in Britain and secondly the increasing 
anxieties about legality of foreign intervention as an individual, as an official British agent for 
the British Government and his sovereign status as a the Rajah of Sarawak
77
.   
The controversy
78
 surrounding Brooke’s position in Sarawak throws an interesting light to the 
role of proxies in the history of British Imperialism, and in particular the role of the British 
East India Company in shaping the entrepreneurs of British imperial agents in the Far East - 
the likes of Stamford Raffles (Singapore), Francis Light (Penang) and James Brooke 
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 The missionary drive with which James Brooke expressed in his humanitarian reasons for 
intervening in the lives of the Dayak natives were emphasized in pages 19-20, 26,31,35,40 in his 
personal letter to James Garner Brooke, J. (1842). A letter from Borneo with notices of the country 
and its inhabitants. J. Gardner. London, L. And G. Seeley. 
  
77
 This article documents how domestic politics in the Victorian period was affected by the ‘projection 
of British character’ abroad and the extent to which these were appropriated in the form of ideological 
battles for the political parties involved Middleton, A. (2010). "Rajah Brooke and the Victorians." The 
Historical Journal 52(3): 381-400. 
  
78
 A Royal Commission of Inquiry was conducted in 1853, headed by the Advocate-General of India, 
Charles Henry Prinsep, and a government agent, Humphrey Bohun Devereux – the charge was that, 
‘James Brooke settled in Borneo with the sole object of seeking profit by trade, of having meddled in 
Brunei politics for his own personal ends, of having made cruel attacks on the inhabitants of Borneo 
on  the pretext that they were pirates, but really to subject them to his rule, and of having obtained the 
assistance of the ships of the Royal Navy and of the East India Company in making these barbarous 
attacks.’ Although the findings of the Commission exonerated James from the charges brought against 
him, attempts by others to re-open the case on Battle of Batu Maru (Beting Marau) had been 
unsuccessful.  The Commission concluded that the Rajah had been pronounced a vassal of the Sultan 
of Brunei and in no way entitled to call upon the protection of Great Britain.  His prestige in the East 
was damaged, and there were elements there which did not fail to notice his official isolation. (St. John 
1867:114-117) 
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(Sarawak).  Compared to his predecessors, James Brooke had to defend his role in the mission 
to civilize the governing affairs of Sarawak
79
  and in doing so; Brooke highlighted the 
contradiction of British involvements in the native affairs elsewhere in the form of British 
Residents and how their role as  advisors to the local elites were somewhat similar to his 
position,  
‘Mr. Hume has asserted that there is a law against a subject of England becoming 
the ruler of a foreign country.  I know no such law, and supposing such a one 
could be discovered, and could be enforced, of what practical use would it be?  
Would such a law preclude a British subject becoming the minister or the adviser 
of a native chief? And supposing Mr. Hume’s objections to the tenure of Sarawak 
to be valid, what practical result could follow?’ (Brooke 1853:46-47) 
This statement critically illuminates the issue of the British Imperial power undermining the 
existing indigenous sovereignty in the colonial territories where the advisory roles of British 
Residents were concerned, which echoed the point made by Wright (1972:48) that the British 
Government had known, and tacitly supported James Brooke for more than 10 years.  
Brooke’s intense participation in the native affairs was reflected in his own admission the he 
was ‘personally bound to the son of the late Raja Muda Hashim’ - the legitimate contender to 
the Brunei throne murdered under suspicious circumstances – (Brooke 1853:55).  The Brooke 
family was intensely engaged in the complex power struggles against the various Muslim 
ruling clans to administer a predominantly pagan Iban and Melanau population in the areas of 
Kuching, Sarebas and the Rejang (Pringle 1974).  It was only after James Brooke was 
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 In his defence Brooke had offered  to make Sarawak a British protectorate (p.11) and repeatedly 
expressed his disinterest in commercial pursuit (p.20),  Brooke, J. (1853). A Vindication of His 
Character and Proceedings: In reply to the statements Privately Printed and Circulated by Joseph 
Hume, MP. H. Drummond. London, James Ridgway. 
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succeeded by his nephew, Charles Brooke
80
, the dynastic pattern rule became fused with 
modern administration (Pringle 1974).   
James Brooke was able to capture the cultural symbols and relations of power and 
appropriated these local customs into his state-building prowess (Walker 2002).  Walker’s 
(2002) account of the origin of power and how the substance of trade underpinned the 
development of power relations among the coastal Muslim-Malays, Ibans (Sea Dayaks) as 
well as the nearby Bidayuh (Land Dayaks) hill dwellers, also draws upon the spiritual 
dimension of culture that supported the ideological hierarchies of power in 19
th
 century 
Sarawak.  Brooke’s position as an independent ruler allowed him to penetrate into the cultural 
symbolism of social affirmation where he was able to capitalize his position as the white 
Rajah to seize upon the traditional hierarchy of power relations in Sarawak (Walker 1998).  
Isolated from the bureaucratic demands of the Colonial and Foreign Office but instrumentally 
supported by the military prowess of the British Navy, this situation enabled him to project 
the logistic scope of military prowess that overwhelmed the traditional weaponry among the 
indigenous people, thus congealed the coercive power of the Kingship that he was 
establishing.  James Brooke used his material privileges and spiritual engagement to reinforce 
the centrality of his prowess by ‘staging ceremonies in which he dispensed gifts of clothes 
and weapons’ as a way of cementing the layers of dependency relationships that accrued from 
his generosity (Walker 1998:101-105).  The necessity to cement the ties of dependency was 
continued through the recognition of the authenticity of the native customary land use and this 
became useful in shoring up the support among the native communities (Ngidang 2005:52).  
Sarawak’s land mass measures about 125,000 sq. km almost equal to the size of Malaya and it 
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became imperative for James Brooke to introduce a system of land regulation in 1863 in 
which land came under the possession of the Government for revenue purposes.  Where land 
had been plentiful, Brooke’s sovereignty over the territory of Sarawak was translated into the 
regulative policy of categorizing forests into productive commercial use and ‘unoccupied 
waste lands’ (Colchester 1993; Cramb 1993; Kaur 1998).   
Successive Brooke administrations changed the migration and the settlement patterns of the 
native communities in Sarawak
81
.  The recognition of customary tenure among the local 
communities was granted only in so far as no existing tenure rights had been established upon 
an unoccupied land.  When the 1842 Law Code was introduced to allow Chinese immigrants 
to settle on lands unoccupied by the Malays or Dayaks, the new settlement policy had the 
effect of segregating the living spaces between the immigrants and the natives, as well as 
physically restricting the movements of the native communities on the basis of land codes 
(Ngidang 2005).  Despite the moral recognition of the existing practices of native customary 
land tenure, in reality however, indigenous peoples have never really been granted titles under 
Sarawak land legislation for much of their lands
82
. 
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The Brooke administration was able to depend upon the support of these coastal communities 
through the rituals of cultural symbolism and patronage; however there were pockets of 
resistance to the ways in which James Brooke tried to channel the revenue resources of the 
existing trade networks in Sarawak.  The main resistance to Brooke rule came from the 
mining communities where Chinese capital and enterprise had been dominant.  One of the 
most profitable trades in Sarawak was mining –gold, coal, antinomy, quicksilver and diamond 
– and as the Chinese community had settled in parts of Western Borneo and Upper Sarawak 
since the early 19
th
 century through retail trading and agriculture, they played a significant 
role in the political economy of the mining industry in Bau where large deposits of gold were 
found (Lockard 1971; Lockard 1978; Chew 1990; Kaur 1995).  In the 1857 Chinese rebellion 
against the Brooke administration, Lockard (1978: 91-95) details how the growing 
administrative prowess of James Brooke began to threaten the territorial control of the Bau 
Chinese over the mining areas, leading some of the society leaders to contest Brooke’s 
sovereign rights over Bau and the Upper reaches of Sarawak.   
As a result of the gold merchants’ conflicts with James Brookes, most of them decided to 
change their trading port from Kuching to the Dutch port in Samba, thus depriving the Brooke 
authority the necessary export duties, causing greater resentment between the Brooke 
administration in Kuching and the Chinese business communities in Bau.  The events that led 
to the Chinese sacking of Kuching in February 1857 and its deadly consequences upon 
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European settlers and Malay casualties are interpreted elsewhere
83
 but what was critically 
illuminating about the attack was the ethnic dimension to the whole conflict.  The Chinese 
rebels specifically targeted the Europeans.  The following counter attack against the Chinese 
was led by James Brooke with the help of Malays and the Dayaks
84
.  An estimated 3,500 
Chinese were killed, almost half of the casualties were women and children (Lockard 
1978:95).   
‘The Chinese will play no further treachery here, and in future we shall prevent 
their being associated in companies, disavow them, and reduce them to a daily 
obedience to the laws and a strict surveillance…’85.   
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Disloyalty to the Brooke regime became a punishable crime.  Aside from the Chinese who 
had borne the brunt of regime punishment from James Brooke, the indigenous population 
living in the interior and near the Dutch borders were not spared from punishment for refusing 
taxes imposed by the Brooke administration; and the successive Brooke administration under 
Charles was known to practice the mantra that ‘only Dyaks can kill Dyaks’86 in their punitive 
measures to discipline the unrepentant Ibans who defied Brooke’s orders on head-hunting 
practices, paying taxes and the prohibitions on the practices of ‘bejalai’87(Wadley 2001). 
There was a gradual shift from the emphasis of kingship and the ritual relationship onto a 
more secular outlook with regard to the Government administration of Charles Brooke, the 
second Raj (Walker 2005).  It appeared that Charles was reluctant to join in the ceremonial 
practices that James Brooke used to partake in the maintenance of the Brooke state and 
Charles was more than eager to reform the ritual basis of kingship that his uncle had 
established.  Since 1873 Charles restructured the Brooke system of administration in Sarawak 
into three main Divisions, whereby such reform necessitated a slow diminution of the ritual 
basis of kingship (Kerajaan) into a Weberian basis of modern bureaucratic government 
(Walker 2005:439-44).  The changes initiated by the second Raj saw the emphasis of native 
participation – particularly in remote stations - in the modern sense of bureaucratic 
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 ‘Bejalai’ defines the world of the Iban community, which means a kind of voyage, journey of 
discovery that forms a fundamental core of Iban identity.  Peter M. Kedit (1993) ‘Iban Bejalai’ 
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government.  The Brooke’s administration appeared to assume the practice of differential 
treatment where the appointment of native representation or leadership was concerned.    
‘Every Malay and Melanau village had its chief (Tua Kampong) who was 
elected by the people and, if approved by the Rajah (which was normally the 
case), was given a commission on the taxes he collected.  The Ibans, Kayah, 
Kenyahs and other indigenous people were under distinct chiefs (Penghulus or 
sometimes Orang Kayas) appointed by the government; except in rare cases 
they were usually the choice of the people’(Reinhardt 1970:856).   
The Brooke administration granted political autonomy for the Malay Muslim community to 
elect their leaders; however the principle of selective appointment remained in place for the 
native leaders of non-Malay indigenous communities.  The Brooke administration also 
employed strict rules upon the physical and spatial mobility among the Ibans where they were 
expected to stay put in their respective districts in the interior unless the permit to travel was 
given by the Resident
88
.  This policy originated from the cross border agreement between 
Charles Brookes and the Dutch following the Kedang Expedition in 1886 where heavy 
casualties among the ‘unrepentant’ Ibans forced them into submission and accepted the orders 
to move away from the border and be subject to control and surveillance (Wadley 2001:635-
636). 
Since the Chinese had been living in relative autonomy, they were less likely to experience 
direct control under the Brooke administration.  However after the 1857 Rebellion, the 
Chinese increasingly came under the Brooke’s surveillance particularly where activities of the 
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secret societies were suspected
89
.  The Chinese community were active in business and 
plantation agriculture; industrious and contributed considerably into the government’s coffers 
through trade and taxes, vital to developing the economy of Sarawak.  On the other hand, 
there existed  instances of exploitation of the indigenous people – through trade and the use of 
land for cash crops - (Chin 1997:23).  This provided the reason for the physical segregation of 
ethnic communities under the Brookes administration, entrenching the ethnic identification of 
livelihood by the nature of political relations with the Rajah.  Under the first Rajah, the 
Chinese leaders were expected to ‘govern’ the internal affairs of their communities, playing 
the role of Kapitan whereby they were regarded as agents performing the intermediary roles 
in conveying the laws and decrees of the government to their respective communities
90
 
(Lockard 1971).  The different practices to which the Brooke administration conducted its 
political relations with the various ethnic communities saw the gradual development of a 
government system where different sets of laws were applied to different the ethnic 
communities.   Within the broad structure of the Sarawak Council Negeri
91
, there were 
different civil courts for the Malays and the Chinese that was established in 1911, with the 
aims of addressing civic needs – i.e. marriage, property inheritance - according to the customs 
of the respective ethnic communities (Lockard 1971:207-208; Reinhardt 1970:857).   
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Education under the Brookes administration developed in ways that followed a similar pattern 
to the regime’s political relation to the ethnic communities.  As an integral part of his 
civilizing mission, James Brooke actively encouraged the early establishment of Christian 
missions among the Dayaks in 1848 but stopped short of any attempt to convert the coastal 
Muslim communities into Christianity, in which subsequent generations of Dayaks became 
nominal converts through the association of Christianity and modern education
92
 (Taylor 
1983; Saint 1985; Saunders 1992; Boulanger 2002). 
James Brooke was regarded as the ‘Christian ruler of a Mahommedan and heathen land’ and 
he granted Christian missionaries land and the autonomy to educate the non-Muslims through 
the Christian faith whereby ‘The new religion presented to the natives is the religion of "their 
white friend," as they call their Christian Rajah; and for this reason it is, as well as for the 
manner in which operations have been commenced by the Missionary mixing freely with the 
natives, and offering them medical assistance, and secular as well as religious instruction, that 
the Mission has been introduced without exciting the Mahommedan prejudices of the 
Malay..’93.  The ethnic segregation of living and social spaces were further underpinned by 
the Brooke’s ad hoc policies on the issue of education, where ethnic intermingling was 
discouraged, setting the pace for the gradual progression of the vernacular education system 
particularly for the Chinese community, and further entrenching the views held by Charles 
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Brooke that promoted the case for the segregation of education system that would preserve 
the cultural identities, customs and traditions of each native group(Ooi 1990; Ooi 1994; Ooi 
1996; Ooi 1999). 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter spelled out the historical conditions for the different colonial administrations in 
Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak.  The original British intention of non-intervention 
actually ended up becoming one of active intervention where issues of religion and native 
customs were concerned.  There were two reasons for its empirical failure: the first one was 
the introduction of the Torrens land laws where the procedure of land registry which 
necessitated the role of the state to intervene in the categorization of land use.  Secondly the 
commercial need for the use and tenure of land was one of the top priorities of the colonial 
regimes in these territories as plantation agriculture, timber extraction, and mining constituted 
major revenue earnings for the colonial governments, thus contradicted, in some significant 
way, the local customs and traditions with regard to the communal access to land and 
inheritance.  Ironically the introduction of laws and codes in the use of land had also led to the 
conception of belonging and this idea began to take considerable purchase where the rhetoric 
of the ‘sons of the soils’ was gradually wormed into the legislative definition of the Malay 
special position.   
In North Borneo and Sarawak, no such provision was designed for the indigenous population 
where the colonial regimes of the British North Borneo Company and the Brooke 
administration differed in form and policy content.  The nature of the societies in the Borneo 
territories was also very different from Malaya where the non-Muslim indigenous population 
was larger and more diverse in terms of religious beliefs and customs than the coastal Muslim 
communities that represented the legacies of the Bruneian Sultanate in Sarawak and to some 
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extent, the Sulu Sultanate in North Borneo.  In that sense Christian missionaries providing 
education and medical provision were actively supported if not considerably encouraged by 
the Colonial regimes in these two territories compared to the pre-dominantly Islamic outlook 
in Malaya. 
Understanding these institutional differences is vital in order to comprehend how the idea of 
special right became the dominant language of the Malay elites and why it was absent among 
the indigenous communities of North Borneo and Sarawak.  This particular aspect of history 
has enormous impact not only upon the nature of relation between the state and the structure 
of ethnic identities on who’s right to govern but more importantly how it is shaping the 
trajectories of transition where colonial subjects became citizens of a new nation state.     
Central to the problem of designing a governmental framework for the independent nation of 
the Federation of Malaya was the idea that the Malay special rights needed to be secured 
through measures that would guarantee the Malay access to public services and land 
ownership, to prevent the submergence of the Malays from the other immigrant 
communities
94
.  The earlier British policy on the Malay Reservation Enactment gave way to 
structured Malay notions of privilege which were extended to the employment in the civil 
service and the Malay regiments, underlining the British policy of favouring the Malays, and 
such hierarchical structure of ethnic favouritism also became integral to the Japanese Military 
Administration which remained largely unchanged whereby the post-war attempts of the 
British to re-enact the special alliance were actively pursued (Groves 1959; Wilcox 1978).   
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5 POLITICAL TRANSITION FROM SUBJECTS TO CITIZENS 
Abstract: This is an important historical period of political conflicts that had had a long 
lasting impact upon the conception of citizenship and political belonging in the Malaysia.  
The ethnic dimension to political conflicts became most potent particularly after the Japanese 
Occupation and the Communist Emergency.  These ethnic conflicts continued right through to 
the Malayan independence and manifested in aggressive ideological battle that divided the 
conceptual formation of modern citizenship. 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the impact of the Communist Insurgency upon the conception of 
citizenship and subsequently on how it shaped the content and hierarchy of political ‘rights’ 
for the different ethnic and religious communities in Malaysia.  The Insurgency was an 
intense period of civil conflict in Malaya that inadvertently placed the Malays and the Chinese 
in extreme political contention.  The bone of contention in this conflict lay in the competing 
political right over the negotiation for common citizenship right and the Chinese population 
became the target of political contention because of their active political movement and close 
links to the political parties in mainland China.  This period saw the sharp emergence of the 
concept of citizenship right and the claims to right in Malaya as the result of the Communist 
Insurgency.   
The left-wing movement was mainly mobilized by the Chinese as they were not only the 
biggest immigrant community in Malaya but also the most persecuted community by the 
Japanese in Malaya during the war.  As the largest immigrant community in Malaya, the 
Chinese made up  about 37% compared to the Indians who made up about 11% of the total 
population in Malaya from 1947-1957 (Hirschman 1975).  The emergence of a largely ethnic 
Chinese movement in the left-wing movement was not only seen as a threat to the 
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predominance of the Malay ‘Special Position’, but also seriously destabilized the British 
colonial economy in Malaya. The emphasis moves back to Malaya because the political 
intensity of the conflict not only shaped the political meaning of right but it also began to 
implicate the political notion of national security as well.  After the Japanese Occupation 
ended, the conception of ‘special position’ remained resilient in defining the notion of ‘who’s 
right to govern’ where the value for ‘loyalty’ came to furnish the criteria to acquire citizenship 
for the non-Malay population in Malaya.  Over time, the ethno-religious grounding of 
‘Special Position’ created ideological challenges to the establishment of secular governance 
that destabilized the ideal of common citizenship. 
This chapter argues that the conception of Malaysian citizenship has been largely shaped by 
the ideological battle that pitched British colonialism against the Malayan Communist Party 
struggle for the ‘rights to self-determination’.   The Communist Emergency episode has been 
instrumental to the conception of Malaysian citizenship.  Increasingly the history of the 
Communist Emergency is selectively narrated to suit the Malay nationalist agenda and the 
historical role of UMNO as the main protagonist in the fight for Malayan Independence has 
strong presence both the public discourse and the popular imagination.  The Communist 
movement on the other hand was portrayed as violent banditry that condoned many acts of 
terrorism, and because of that they have been written off from history books and the collective 
consciousness.  In one of his political ceramah (public speech) Mat Sabu highlighted the 
historical contribution of the left-wing movement in the fight against British colonialism, by 
saying that the guerrilla fighters who attacked the police station at Bukit Kepong had 
contributed to the country’s independence as the police at the time served the interests of the 
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British colonial master
95
.  The simple suggestion that the Malayan Communist Party had 
fought for Malaya’s independence prompted widespread outcry from UMNO and other Malay 
nationalist NGOs, to the extent that a historian, Professor Zainal Kling made a statement on 
behalf of the Malaysian National Professor’s Council denying British colonialism ever took 
place in Malaya, ‘that Malaya had in fact never been colonized and was only a protectorate of 
the British
96
.  The emphasis on the Malay states as British protectorates implies the ageless 
character of Malay royal ascendancy that prevailed throughout the period from Pangkor 
Treaty 1874 until Malayan Independence 1957.  The selective chronicling of history to 
support the ideology of the Malay political right to rule is a reassertion of,  
‘the notion that Malaysia is still Tanah Melayu, a nation embodying Malay 
sovereignty, and a nation inscribed in whose innermost nature is the principle of 
Malay primacy’97 (Clive Kessler). 
The Malay-centred nationalist conception of citizenship finds powerful expression in the 
contemporary public and popular discourses.  Such selective conception undermines the 
political histories and cultural heritage of other minority citizens, especially from the ex-
British colonies of North Borneo and Sarawak.  Malay conception of special citizenship is 
further strengthened by the history of Malay sovereignty and ‘special position’, making 
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Malay an exclusive political identity from other groups in the conception of Malaysian 
citizenship. These processes of ideological struggles and how they were translated into the 
public discourse will be examined, where the trajectories of colonial politics and left-wing 
movements are included to demonstrate power dynamics that exposed the contestation of the 
nation’s sovereignty in the run-up to Malayan independence 1957.   
This chapter identifies two significant political transitions that set the tone for the modern 
conception of Malaysian citizenship: British Malaya to independent Malaya (1957) and 
subsequently the Malaysian Federation – in 1963 with the inclusion of North Borneo and 
Sarawak.  These were historical junctures that dictated the polemical divide of the ethnic 
indigenes vs. civic nationalism of the ‘Pendatang’ (immigrants).  The political question over 
the issue of common citizenship was an important one for the departing colonial government 
and this matter came to dominate the constitutional agenda that was being framed for 
Malaya’s Independence in 1957.   In preparation for decolonization process, the colonial 
government must address the future residency status of the ‘immigrant races’ whilst at the 
same time ‘safeguarding the special position of the Malay race’98.  The colonial government 
had to find the right political approach to admit non-Malay communities into a political union 
with the Malays.  But in doing so the British must put in place, a kind of constitutional 
guarantee that civil service employment and the ownership of land ought to be reserved for 
the Malays so that ‘common citizenship’ would not result in the submergence of the Malays 
in the political and social field.  Initially this approach drew criticism from the War Cabinet 
Committee that became increasingly aware of how the pre-war system of British Residency 
would adversely affect the prospect of broad-based governing institutions,  
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‘There are important non-Malay Asiatic communities in the country which have 
substantially contributed to its development and have acquired permanent interests 
therein.  But the Malay Rulers have always set their faces against any proposals to 
recognise as their subjects any person not of Malay race or Mohammedan religion.  
The relaxation in due course of British official control over the Rulers would 
therefore, on the basis of the pre-war constitutional system, not be likely to 
provide the other communities with adequate prospects of participation in the 
government of the country’99. 
The British Residency system institutionalized the Malay Rulers as the rightful claimants of 
the Malay states and the Malay subject
100
.  These processes inevitably contributed to the 
emergence of an exclusive ideological conception of Malay ethnic awareness about their 
rights over land, public governance and religious authority.  This contrast sharply against the 
increasing influx of human migration, particularly with the British importation of foreign 
labourers from India, China and the surrounding Indonesian islands under Dutch colonialism 
– in order to fulfil the demands of capitalist expansion in Malaya.   
Strict socio-economic segregation between the immigrant and the Malay communities was 
grounded in the protectionist policy that the British took towards the Malay Rulers and their 
subjects.  This contrasted sharply against the migrant labouring communities whose 
livelihoods were largely shaped by poor conditions of work, employers’ abuses and depressed 
wages.  This generated the blossoming of local self-help organizations, especially among the 
Chinese communities, in the form of reading societies and the night schools generated by the 
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local Kuomintang and Communist movements.  The creation of an informal public sphere 
where ideas related to these movements were communicated to the labouring communities, 
providing essential platforms for the diverse working groups to articulate their grievances.  
These movements played considerable role in setting the pace for a particular political 
awakening about the rights to decent livelihood.  However the experience of Japanese 
Occupation changed these sentiments from the workers’ demand for decent livelihood to the 
demand for equality of political rights in the process for political independence. 
5.2 The cultural conversion and the differentiation of colonial subjects 
Under British colonialism, Malaya was governed by complicated maze of administrative and 
legislative apparatus differentiated by the political criterion of the Federated Malay States, 
Un-Federated Malay States and the Straits Settlements(Carnell 1952; Carnell 1953; Lau 
1989).  At the same time considerable number of non-Malay communities without legally 
recognizable status of nationality and residency had settled in the segregated domains of such 
complex administration.    In the early 1920s, as the rate of immigration increased along with 
the growing economy in Malaya, the British Residents and the Malay Rulers reacted to this 
new situation by emphasizing the obligations to protect and empower the Malay community.  
Through the Malay Reservations Enactment (1933), the creation of a Malay regiment, the 
reservation of seven out of ten government posts for Malays and the promotions of Malays in 
senior Malay Civil Service
101
 (Allen 1970; Turnbull 1974; Sidhu 1980; Heussler 1981; Roff 
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 In ‘The Malays and the British: The Middle Years, Roff (1994:91-123) provides a very extensive 
account of the ways in which the British Residents played significant role in structuring the 
participation of the Malay aristocrats and ‘Malays of good birth’(p.22) into the expanding system of 
administrations through the provision of residential education at the Malay College of Kuala Kangsar 
(The Malay Eton) as the primary step to grooming the Malay elites to become administrative civil 
servants. 
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1994) – these legislative measures were sought as preliminary means to protect the ‘Special 
Position’ of the Malays against the surge of immigrant communities in Malaya.  
Having established the legislative measures to protect the ‘Special Position’ of the Malays in 
land and the employment of civil service, the other significant policy was the practice of 
classifying colonial subjects into different ethnic and religious categories.  The policy of 
categorizing immigrants ‘graded’ according to their assimilability to the native Malays began 
to have an impact upon the criteria of granting legal residency status as well as citizenship 
rights to the immigrant population.  Due to their status as migrant labourers as well as their 
distinct cultural origins, Chinese and Indian labourers were not only considered as ‘transient’ 
but also “unassimilable”[sic] by the British.  This was in contrast to the migrants who came 
from the Indonesian archipelago, who were automatically granted legal ‘Malay’ status by the 
Colonial regime (Roff 1994:111).  Becoming Malay or ‘masuk melayu’ symbolizes a cultural 
rite of passage that involves the conversion of a non-Muslim into Islam, thus constructing the 
Malay identity concomitant with Islamic civilization (Hirschman 1987; Andaya 2001; Reid 
2001; Christopher 2005).  Upon embracing the cultural identity of being Malay, the rite of 
passage also confers certain privileges that are guaranteed in the legislative measures where 
the ‘Special Position’ of the Malays in land reservation and civil service positions was 
guaranteed.   
This rite of passage occurred not just in the Malay Peninsula but also in other parts of Borneo 
as well (Freedman 1955; Nagata 1974; Horton 1986; Mutalib 1990; Gerke 1995; Saunders 
2002; Mutalib 2008).  The process of Masuk Melayu represents a dynamic aspect of the 
Malay society whereby day-to-day interaction with other ‘migrants of similarity’102 continue 
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 “Wang Gungwu described the Chinese and Indians in Malaysia as "migrants of difference" because 
they have cultural backgrounds totally different from the local Malay people.  In contrast, the 
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to redefine the boundaries of cultural assimilation and distinction(Miyazaki 2000), however 
the continuing practice of the British rulers in using ‘Malay’ as the umbrella term of reference 
overshadowed other competing ethnic diasporas – Achenese, Javanese, Bugis etc - in the 
colonial censuses.  The British colonial census taking was firmly established in India and it 
set the precedent for the method of enumeration for other colonies where conditions of 
plurality existed (Christopher 2005:104-105) .  Although racial categorization was commonly 
applied to simplify the diversity of human representation on numerical terms (Appadurai 
1993; Maheshwari 1996), in the Malayan experience, the colonial approach to the problems 
racial identification rested on religion as the key determinant(Christopher 2005). 
Where intermarriage and cross-cultural assimilation occurred between the native Malays and 
Chinese, Masuk Melayu was a socially accepted norm among the minority Chinese who 
eventually became the descendants of the Peranakan Baba population in the Straits 
Settlements of Penang, Malacca and Singapore
103
 (Edmonds 1968:59-60).  Within the 
Chinese community itself, differences in the socio-cultural and linguistic backgrounds tended 
to shape the multiple levels of associational dynamics and organizational networks that helped 
sustain the social fabric of the immigrant communities (Freedman 1960; Mills 1966; Ownby 
and Heidhues 1993; Yen 2000). Linguistic differences play an important role in 
deconstructing the myth of homogeneity within the Chinese community.  With the exception 
of the Baba Malay of Malacca who mainly spoke Malay and English, the rest of the Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Javanese-Malays and the recent migrant workers from Indonesia are described as "migrants of 
similarity" because they follow Islam as the Malay people, speak languages closely related to Malay 
and have similar customs”. Op. Cit in Miyazaki 2001:77   
 
103
 The Baba population are descendents of the pre-colonial Chinese Muslims who adopted the Malay 
language and Malay customs but in social identification remained Chinese. Peranakan originally 
refers to the descendents of inter-cultural union between Chinese and the Malays or other indigenous 
groups, but it has a wider usage nowadays to refer to the off-springs of cross-cultural marriages. 
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regarded Mandarin as the language of the Chinese heritage providing essential template for 
the Chinese education movement and cultural connections to Chinese sojourners around the 
region.  The linguistic distinctions that characterise the varying cultural dialects of the 
Chinese – Hokkien, Cantonese, Hakka, Foochow, Teochew, Hainanese – to name a few, have 
been equally important in preserving their cultural history and political alliances (Tan 2000; 
Chin 1997); increasingly studies on these communities show the positive effects on the ways 
which ethno-religious syncretism contribute to the rich social fabric of Malaysian 
multiculturalism (Gosling 1964; Raghavan 1977; Tan 1988; Tan 1997; Teo 2003; 
Dhoraisingam 2006). However the degree to which the Chinese were able to penetrate the 
cultural borders of assimilation with the Malays and other indigenous communities tended to 
vary according to regions.  The space for social interaction was also determined by the 
administrative policies of the Colonial government, and these tended to be restrictive 
especially in the Malay States and in Sarawak where the Brooke legacy discouraged inter-
ethnic marriages between the Chinese and the indigenous people.  If there were cases of 
miscegenation the children would strictly belong to one or the other ethnic group(Chew 
2000).  Cross-cultural intermarriages and the Peranakan phenomenon on the other hand was 
were higher in the Straits Settlements and North Borneo (Sabah).  Under the British North 
Borneo Company rule, no restriction was imposed upon the social interactions between the 
Chinese migrants and the indigenous communities.  This explains why intermarriages are still 
being practiced widely in the modern times where the official creation for the Sino-Native 
status in 1991 reflects the facts of social life in contemporary Sabah society (Roff 1969; Reid 
1997; Wong 2000).  
Until the early 20
th
 century, Masuk Melayu and the Peranakan communities were socially 
acceptable intermarriage prospects for both the immigrant and the host communities.  
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Changes in the socio-economic circumstances began to usher in new forms of bounded 
identities in Malaya.  Firstly the number of new immigrants from China went up relatively 
more than the previous generation and when combined with locally born Chinese, they made 
up about 39.2% of the total Malayan population – 1,709392 out of the total population of 
4,385,346 – in the 1931 official census.  Overseas Chinese in Thailand, the Spanish and the 
Dutch colonies tended to be in the minority, however in Malaya and Singapore the Chinese 
constituted the majority population as Singapore by then was ethnically dominated by the 
Chinese communities (1956:268).  Secondly, Hirschman (1986, 1987) argues that the official 
categorization of ‘race’ came to play an important role as the colonial administration began to 
expand, and by 1921 a single census taking was designed to include the Straits Settlements, 
the Federated and Un-federated Malay States.  Ten years later official classification listed the 
main categories of population in British Malaya as - ‘Malaysians by Race’104, ‘Chinese by 
Tribe’, ‘Indians by Race’ and ‘Others by Race’ – Malaysian as understood from the 1931 to 
1957 was an inclusive category for Malays and peoples from Borneo and Indonesia 
(Hirschman 1987:563).  The practice of census taking, the categorical summarization of racial 
grouping combined with the generic allocation of economic functions
105
 gradually set the 
pace for the crystallization of structured ethnic identification according to the means of 
livelihood (Lim 1995; Chin 2000; Phang 2000; Huff 2002) 
Thirdly, the Chinese migrants and settlers relied upon the traditional networks of clan or 
family associations for basic welfare provisions and financial aid; and whilst some of these 
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 Malays, Javanese, Boyanese, Achenese, Batak, Minangkabau, Korinchi, Jambi, Palembang, 
Sumatra, Riau Lingga, Banjarese, Other Dutch Borneo, Bugis, Other N. E. I., Dayak, Sakai, Other 
(Hirschman 1987:576).   
105
 Rural Malays tilling the land, the Chinese communities working on the banking, mining, 
agricultural estates and retail businesses, Indians being employed on the rubber plantation estates, and 
the urban Malays being groomed into politics and the civil service under the tutelage of the British 
Residents 
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organizations began to establish primary Chinese education and trade guilds, where they also 
undertook serious petition works demanding better conditions of treatment in trade, 
immigration from the local authorities (Mallory 1956; Yen 1981).  By the 1900s some of 
these associations began to shed their conventional roles when they no longer able to 
accommodate the changing circumstances of their communities, where some had immensely 
affected by the political developments in mainland China (Heng 1983).  Between 1900 until 
1911, increasing revolutionary forces came into conflict with the Imperial Qing Dynasty, and 
the parties in conflict began to turn to wealthy overseas Chinese for revolutionary effort and 
other counter-revolutionary efforts within China(Duara 1997).   These movements had 
profound impact upon the political bearing of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, whereby 
various political groups in Singapore and Malaya began to establish links supporting the 
republican movements led by Sun Yat Sen (Yen 1976).  Since then these political groupings 
ushered in the modern forms of Chinese political organizations in Malaya that were split 
along ideological and class differences – the Kuomintang Malaya (KMTM); the Communist 
Party of Malaya (CPM) and the Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA)
106
 – playing 
significant roles in providing relief effort for China under Japanese Occupation and becoming 
more engaged in the local issues in their adopted countries (Yen 1982; Heng 1983). 
One of the major predicaments facing the Chinese communities in Malaya was the lack of 
bargaining power among Chinese labourers and the poor treatments given to their working 
conditions (Leong 2000:170).  There were different policies regulating the recruitment of 
labourers in Malaya and the Straits Settlement; the Indian labourers came under the 
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 The ideological outlook of the Kuomintang and the MCP in Malaya tended to correspond with the 
respective nationalist and communist movements based in mainland China.  Whilst they drew their 
support from the existing traditional clan based organizations in Malaya, the SCBA derived its support 
mainly from the Baba population of the Straits Settlements (Heng 1983: 292-2930). 
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Department of Labour whereas the Chinese Protectorate dealt exclusively with Chinese affairs 
(Stockwell 1982:57).  The abusive practices in the recruitment of Indian labourers received 
the attention of the government authorities and was abolished on the basis of political 
negotiations between the Malayan government and the Government of India, leading to the 
promulgation of Labour Codes of 1912 and 1923
107
(Parmer 1960; Tinker 1993).  These 
measures were intended to stop the scale of violence experienced by the Indian labourers but 
they remained ineffective in addressing appalling living conditions, low wages and the daily 
assaults which drove many labourers to desert the plantations (Ramasamy 1992). The 
recruitment of Chinese labourers on the other hand was carried out by private agents and the 
government in the Straits Settlement did not intervene against the mistreatment of the Chinese 
labourers.  The employers’ abuse on Chinese workers fell outside the supervision of the 
authorities(Ee 1961; Leong 2000).  The recruitment systems practiced by these private agents 
who tended to label themselves ‘heads of piglets’ worked on the basis of debt bondage, where 
most of these workers were reduced to subhuman status where terms like ‘piglets’ were 
generically used to designate bonded labourers who were locked up in lodging houses in the 
evenings and were expected to work their way out of debts in deplorable conditions (Blythe 
1947; Ng 1961; Trocki 2001; Cottle and Angela 2007; Li 2010).    
In 1913 the Colonial government in Singapore sought to end the indentured system imposed 
upon Chinese immigrants by introducing the Labour Contracts Bill with the aim of ending the 
elements of coercion that characterized the main feature of the debt bondage contract.  
Despite the passing of the Bill in 1914 leading to the abolition of the system of indentured 
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 The Labour Code of 1912 aimed to regulate the working hours, pay, housing and accommodation 
among the Indian labourers in the rubber estates.  The later Acts provided the controller of Labour to 
inspect these premises and to compile reports of worker mistreatments with the extra power to 
prosecute those who committed violence against Indian labourers. 
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labour on the Chinese immigrants, the legislation could not address the real issue of poverty 
among Chinese immigrants and the problem of debt-bondage (Ee 1961:41-42).  Strategies of 
labour control included opium addiction and gambling among the labourers to keep them 
indebted, as well as the lock-up system imposed upon labourers and their families in the 
barracks (Kongsi houses) (Ramasamy 1992:92-95) 
Labour exploitations became the source of contention where local mobilization was initiated 
by the Kuomintang parties in Malaya under the guise of night schools
108
 (Png 1961; Yong and 
McKenna 1990).  The revolutionary ideas of Sun Yat Sen became powerful
109
 - ‘San Min Chu 
I’ the  abbreviated concepts relating to ‘anti-Imperialism’ (Minzhu), ‘the sovereignty of 
people’ (Minquan), and ‘livelihood of people’ (Minshengzuyi); the flowering of literatures 
related to the discourse of imperialism, the collective awareness of overseas Chinese through 
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 In 1924 Dr. Sun Yat-Sen established the Overseas Affairs Bureau whose aims were to see that the 
overseas Chinese received equal treatment in the territories they were living, to facilitate overseas 
Chinese returning to study in China, and to protect overseas investors.  As early as 1910 the Reading 
Societies had sections dealing with schools and many Kuomintang branches in Malaya were set up in 
the guise of night schools.  For more details see Png (1961: 17-23) in KMT in Malaya.  
109
 Bergère (2000) highlights the role of Sun Yat Sen as the voice of Chinese Diasporas, ‘expatriate 
Chinese settlements’ worldwide at the turn of the 20th century and the ways in which his ideas of the 
Three Principles of the People were spread to overseas Chinese through his extensive travels and 
networking. For further elaboration of San Min Chu I, see Sun Yat-Sen Three Principles of the People, 
pp.352-394 in Sun Yat Sen Bergère, M.-C. (2000). Sun Yat-sen. Stanford, Stanford University 
Publisher. 
 .  Earlier works on the political doctrine of Sun Yat Sen and the historical developments on the 
ideas of nationalism, democracy and socialism have been written by Linenbarger(1937) in The 
Political Doctrines of Sun Yat Sen: An Exposition of the ‘San Min Chu I’Linenbarger, P. M. A. (1937). 
The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat Sen: An Exposition of the 'San Min Chu I'. Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins. 
 .  Sharman’s (1968) account of Sun Yat Sen provides very rich biography of Sun as a child of 
peasantry background, disadvantaged by the elitist system of the learned Chinese society, became an 
émigré at the age of 12 in Hawaii and was educated by the Anglican Church in his formative years.  
This biography indicates the ways in which Sun operated through Christian missionary movements, 
the formulation of his modernist political philosophy and revolutionist callingSharman, L. (1968). Sun 
Yat-sen, His Life and its Meaning: A Critical Biography. Stanford Stanford University Press. 
 .      
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the term ‘hua ch-iao’ and the increasing concern about the national status of ‘hua ch-iao’  vis-
à-vis the Republic of China (Wang 1981); communist literatures also began to reach Malaya 
by 1921 where early mobilizations of Chinese labourers, mining workers and working class 
youths in schools were initiated through collaborative efforts of the local Kuomintang and 
Chinese Communist Parties.  The death of Sun Yat Sen in 1927 caused an ideological split 
between these two parties (Yong 1991).  Despite this the night schools and reading societies 
for the working labourers continued to raise awareness about the workers’ plight particularly 
during the 1930’s economic depression (Leong 2000:170-174).  The trade unionist 
movements galvanized by the Chinese Communist Party in China also continued to fuel the 
awareness of workers’ plight, challenging the mercantilist power of the guilds that were more 
inclined to protect the interests of foreign powers in Malaya and the Straits Settlements.   
Beginning from the early 1930s until the Japanese Occupation in 1942, labour unrests among 
the Chinese and Indian workers in the factories, the mining industries and the rubber 
plantations became endemic (Gamba 1958; Gamba 1962; Stenson 1970; Wilson 1981).  
These unrests were sporadic and ethnically divided, reflecting the British policy of ethnic 
economic segregation.  The Chinese Unions, English-speaking unions and Indian unions 
existed side by side, with the main target going against the Colonial regime (Trocki 
2001:123).  These unrests set the scene for the Communist Party of Malaya to play key roles 
in mobilizing dissatisfied workers in the various industries and estates towards changing 
public opinion, particularly among the Chinese communities, about the exploitative capitalist 
policies of the British Colonial regime(Chin 2003).   Gradually the Colonial officials began to 
blame communist propaganda as the main agitator to these labour unrests (Leong 1999; 
Leong 2000; Tai 2000).  
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As far as the reactions from the Malay community were concerned, these unrests prompted 
the rallying call for an alliance of religious conservatism across the aristocratic-peasant 
divide, and mobilize political defence for their rights and privileges against the immigrant 
communities (Edmonds 1968; Roff 1994; Smith 1994).  Some pre-war Malay scepticism 
towards the special alliance of the British and the Malay royals remained resilient, resulting in 
a persistent split within the community 
110
(Ahmad Fauzi 2007).  Within the immigrant 
communities, save for the mercantile elites, the immediate predicaments of the immigrant 
labourers lay in the condition of debt-bondage and the growing uncertainties about their status 
following the Great Depression.  For the descendants of the immigrant communities, their 
status as locally born Chinese, Indians, Peranakan and Others remained ambiguous.  Since the 
overriding concern of the British Residents during the pre-war period was the obligation to 
secure the special interest of the Malay ruling class and the British mercantilist, against the 
possible threat of submergence by the economic power of foreign Chinese capital, a sentiment 
that was shared by the Malay intelligentsia and the Malay press – it was therefore imperative 
that these special interest must assume the prerogative of political authority which essentially 
exclude transient migrant communities
111
.  
                                                     
110
 See Ahmad Fauzi (2007) ‘Malay Anti-Colonialism in British Malaya: A Re-appraisal of 
Independence Fighters of Peninsular Malaysia, Journal of Asian and African Studies, pp.376-382. 
111
 See Roff (1994:211-248) “New Elites and National Organizations in the 1930” in The Origins of 
Malay Nationalism. For other works discussing the role of Islam in Malay nationalism in the century, 
see Funston N.J. (1976) ‘The Origins of Parti Islam Se Malaysia’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 
7(1):51-70; Funston (1980) ‘Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of the United Malays National 
Organization and Party Islam’. Mohamad Abu Bakar(1986) ‘Islam and Nationalism in Contemporary 
Malay Society’ in Abdullah Taufik and Sharon Siddique (eds) Islam and Society in Southeast Asia, pp. 
155-174. Singapore: ISEAS 
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5.3 Post-war left-wing movement and the politics of the right of abode in 
Malaya  
The Japanese Occupation polarized an already pluralistic Malayan society, dividing the local 
population mainly along the lines of allies and resistant movements. When the second Sino-
Japanese war broke out in 1937, overseas Chinese in Malaya and Singapore provided capital 
toward the China Relief Fund to support the anti-Japanese guerrilla movements in mainland 
China(Akashi 1970; Hayashi 2008).  Because of the movement to support the China Relief 
Fund, the Japanese forces became increasingly hostile to Chinese communities in Malaya who 
were actively involved in the anti-Japanese campaign.  This in turn compelled the Japanese 
Military Administration to seek local allies from the non-Chinese population in Malaya.  The 
official reports among the British army confirmed the news that the Malay nationalist group - 
Kesatuan Melayu Muda
112
 (KMM) – was instrumental to the Japanese Military 
Administration at the early stage of the invasion (Cheah 2003:20).   
The Japanese administration co-opted the Muslim leaders through the strategy of drawing 
analogy between the Greater East Asia and the Islamic concept of Jihad (holy war) against 
Western imperialism.  This was propagated through the use of mosques and surau to spread 
their Occupation propaganda, however this practice actually caused deep resentments among 
local Malay-Muslims (Abu Talib 2002; Abu Talib 2003).  Despite the apparent cooperation 
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 The KMM or the Young Malay Union was the first leftwing Malay political organization, its main 
protagonist; Ibrahim b. Haji Yaacob drew inspiration from the Indonesian nationalist movements 
against the Dutch regime in the 1930’s.  Ibrahim Yacoob was one of the new breed of Malay 
nationalists at the turn of the century, very influential in the Malay publishing industry and in 1939 
became the editor of Majlis – a pro-Malay publication that tended to voice certain anti-imperialist 
sentiments against the British.  Ibrahim was reported to receive financial support from the Japanese to 
buy another daily Warta Malaya for the purpose of anti-British propaganda (Roff 1994:173).  For 
more details on the role of Ibrahim Yaacob, see Cheah Boon Kheng (1979) ‘The Japanese Occupation 
of Malaya, 1941-45: Ibrahim Yaacob and the Struggle for Indonesia Raya’ in Indonesia, Vol. 28, pp. 
84-120. 
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established between some of the local leaders with JMA, the Malay community did not escape 
the regime brutality and violence if they showed any resistance against the Japanese (Kratoska 
1995; Kratoska 1998).  Under the brief and extremely brutal regime of the Japanese Military 
Administration from 1942-1945, selective persecution of the Chinese led to the deterioration 
the social relations among the various ethnic groups in Malaya.  These narratives of war 
memories are beginning to convey the demands for moral accountability and redress among 
survivors and perpetrators (Wong and Lim 2000; Frei 2004; Akashi and Mako 2008; 
Blackburn 2009).   
The initial military operation against anti-Japanese elements led to extreme abuses and 
widespread genocide – codename Sook Ching113 – inflicted upon the local population by the 
Kempeitai (Japanese Military Police), the casualties among them were disproportionately 
Chinese.  The Chinese were also forced to establish the Overseas Chinese Association (OCA) 
for the purpose of raising 50 million in local currencies to atone for their pre-war anti-
Japanese resistance movements
114
.  The Sook Ching episode and the financial extortion drove 
many, especially the Chinese into the Malayan Communist Party and its paramilitary wing the 
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 Sook Ching means ‘purge through purification’ (Akashi 1970:63), also known as ‘Operation Clean-
up’.  They started out on the grounds of military operation to wipe out anti-Japanese sentiments; 
however a combination of factors led to these operations becoming violent, including the need to 
maintain security with limited army personnel and the fear of guerrilla attacks from the communists in 
Singapore and Malaya.   The primary targets included the British, members of the KMT and MCP, 
supporters and financiers of the China Relief Fund Committee, members of the secret societies and 
Chinese immigrants who came to Malaya after the Sino-Japanese War.  The operations first began in 
Singapore but were later extended to Malaya where they degenerated into wanton killings of innocent 
civilians who were mostly Chinese (Cheah2003:21-24). Similar operations were carried out around the 
neighbouring countries, see Geoffrey C. Gunn (2007) ‘Remembering the Southeast Asian Chinese 
Massacres of 1941-45 in Journal of Contemporary Asia, 37(3), pp.273-291. 
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 Low and Cheng, This Singapore, pp. 33-34; Y.S. Tan, "History of the Formation of the Overseas 
Chinese Association and the Extortion by J.M.A. of $50,000,000 Military Contribution from the 
Chinese in Malaya," Journal of the South Seas Society III, Part I (September, 1946). (Op. Cit in 
Akashi 1970) 
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MPAJA
115(Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army) (Cheah 1981).  Crucially, it was the 
MPAJA that was the only functioning resistance movement in Malaya after the Japanese 
invasion and in December 1943 the British sought the assistance of MPAJA for the Allied 
cause at Blantan camp in the Perak jungle(Cheah 2003; Chin 2003). 
The Japanese military operation against these resistance movements remained top priority 
when the Malayan Military Administration was established in 1943.  Under the MMA, the 
recruitment of local civilians and the militarization of local Malay youths became imperative 
in maintaining security and the campaign against the communist insurgents.  Subsequent 
Japanese administrative strategy tried to reverse the damaging effects of Col. Watanabe 
Wataru’s116 hard-line position against the Chinese since the beginning of the Occupation; 
however the pro-Malay policy – administrative and clerical positions, the military training of 
Malay youths, and the role of the Malay rulers - remained largely unchanged from the pre-war 
period.  The pro-Malay policy of the Japanese administration ‘made the occupation both an 
opportunity and an arena for communal confrontation’ (Cheah 2003:xiv).   
After the Japanese surrendered, Sino-Malay relations took a fractious turn in Malaya
117
.  The 
sense of distrust that was sowed under the Japanese occupation was compounded by the post-
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 MPAJA was the armed guerrilla movement established under the command of the Malayan 
Communist Party in 1942, and the MPAJU (Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Union) was the civilian 
organization that provided funds, food, clothing and other logistics support to the guerrilla movement.  
These movements worked together with the British Force 136 reconnaissance party in Japanese 
occupied territories.  See Cheah (2003) Chapter 3, ‘The MCP and the Anti-Japanese Movement’ in 
Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict during and after the Japanese Occupation, 
1941-1946, pp.56-100. 
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 See ‘Colonel Watanabe Wataru: The Architect of the Malayan Military Administration, December 
1941- March 1943’ in New perspectives on the Japanese occupation in Malaya and Singapore, 1941-
1945,(eds) Akashi, Y & Yoshimura, M. pp. 33-64 
117
 See Cheah Boon Kheng (2003:25-45) on the clashes between the Chinese dominated MPAJA and 
the pro-Japanese Malay collaborators in Red Star over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict during 
and after the Japanese Occupation, 1941-1946, Chapter 2. 
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war crusade against the local collaborators – codename Japanese ‘running dogs’ – which 
inevitable turned communal in nature
118
.  The religious undertone of the ‘cult of invulnerably’ 
began to manifest strongly amongst the Malays in their retaliation against the perceived threat 
of the MPAJA guerrilla taking over Malaya after the Japanese surrender, and in these violent 
retaliations the identities between guerrillas and innocent civilian Chinese were blurred, 
which in many cases led to wholesale attacks upon Chinese settlements
119
.  These sentiments 
became entwined with the nationalist fervour that set the two communities apart, giving 
substance to the nationalist idea of claiming ‘Malaya for Malays’ by spreading the 
propaganda that the ‘Chinese desired to make Malaya a part of her empire’, creating fear 
among the Malay communities
120
. 
The post-war conflict coincided with high rates of unemployment, particularly among the 
labouring masses, widespread poverty and illnesses, and the general breakdown of the 
capacity for the local communities to rebuild their lives (Harper 2001).   The British tried to 
initiate a ‘liberal experiment’ against this backdrop of social dislocation in the form of the 
Malayan Union Scheme (Harper 2001) on the grounds that the restoration of the pre-war 
constitutional and administrative system will be undesirable in the interests of efficiency and 
security for the  declared purpose of promoting self-government in the Colonial territories
121
.  
The war provided the impetus  for the Colonial Office to rationalize the administrative system 
and to address the problem of dual sovereignty over the ethnically segregated  population in 
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 See Cheah (2003), ‘The Malay/MCP/Chinese Conflict’ in Chapter 8 in Red Star over Malaya: 
Resistance and Social Conflict during and after the Japanese Occupation, 1941-1946, pp.195-240. 
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 See Cheah (2003:199-209) on the Kiyai phenomenon and the Holy war army of the Red Bands.   
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 Public Records Document CO 537/1581, no 14, 15 and 16 [Communal violence and political 
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Malaya
122
, forming the central planks of the Malayan Union
123
(Purcell 1946).  A caretaker 
government – British Military Administration (BMA) – was then established to commence 
the post-war reconstruction from September 1945 until the Malayan Union proposal could be 
implemented as part of the civil administration in April 1946.  
5.4 Conceptualizing Political ‘rights’: From colonial subjects to citizens 
The major concern of the BMA was to restore political stability in post-war Malaya.  In the 
run up to the decolonization process, the issue of citizenship for the immigrant British 
subjects in Malaya was a significant consideration in the Constitutional design for Malayan 
nation-state.   Common citizenship was at the crux of the Malayan Union scheme that was 
conceived as part of the constitutional transfer of sovereignty from the Malay Rulers to the 
British Crown
124
.  Malayan Union aimed at establishing centralized governance in Malaya 
and reassessing Malay ethnic privileges in relation to enfranchising the non-Malay British 
subjects into common Malayan citizenship.  The Malayan Union included all the Malay states 
as well as the two Straits Settlements in Penang and Malacca, with the exclusion of 
Singapore
125
.  In principle the Malayan Union Scheme was liberal on the citizenship proposal; 
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 ‘In the interests of Malayan unity, the anomalies of citizenship had to be removed.  The Malay 
states had now a large non-Malay population, but whilst the Malays were the subjects of their sultans, 
and Indonesian Mohammedans who immigrated into Malaya were also recognized as such by the 
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however the post-war treaties with regard to the transfer of sovereignty carried out between 
Sir Harold MacMichael and the nine independent Malay Sultans became questionable.   The 
lack of proper engagement with the local population with regard to the British intentions in 
Malaya
126
 raised suspicions among the Malays to agitate against the Scheme.  It crystalized 
around the citizenship proposal, expressing the unwarranted fear among the Malays that the 
non-Malays would gain competitive access to Government appointments
127
.   
The Pan-Malayan Malay Congress
128
  emerged with the sole intention of opposing the idea of 
‘common citizenship’.  Since then the BMA were forced to compromise its stand because 
they were dependent upon the support of the local police to maintain security.  This episode 
changed the political tone of the BMA’s message to the War Office in Britain emphasizing 
the importance of establishing collaborative support with the Malays and to sustain favourable 
Malay public opinion
129
.  Most Malays led by the Malay Congress under Dato Onn Jaafar 
were considerably apprehensive by the citizenship proposal and religion became instrumental 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the hands of the Malay Ruling class in Malaya became an important reason for the unwillingness of 
the Chinese community in Singapore to link their fortunes with the rest of Malaya. CO 1030/67, no.1 
Public Records Document 
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 Public Records Document CO 273/675/18, 20, ‘We are, in fact, far in advance of general public 
opinion.  After all it has taken over three years of hard thinking by a number of people at home to 
arrive at the policy as announced…It must always be remembered that in addition to introducing a 
radical change in policy, we are trying to restore a country which has with difficulty survived three 
and a half years occupation by a ruthless enemy’ – [Political position in Malaya with regard to the new 
policy proposals: memorandum by Brigadier A T Newboult, 31 Dec 1945]  Newboult was a Malayan 
Civil Service officer attached to the BMA. 
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 Public Records Document CO 537/1528, no 44 [Malay reactions to the White Paper]: Minute by H 
T Bourdillon.   
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 The Malay Congress subsequently founded the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) in 
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 Public Records Document CO 537/1548, no 31 – BMA (Malaya) to War Office on the resolution of 
the Pan-Malayan Malay Congress.  ‘Majority of the Government servants, including Police, are 
Malays and we are very dependent upon retention of their goodwill.  We can only implement new 
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get given further time for discussion with new Governors.’ 
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in galvanizing the support against the proposal, but there was ‘no indication that the policy 
has provoked any reaction whatsoever from amongst the non-Malays’130.   
Against the backdrop of Malay resistance against the Malayan Union, other forces of politics 
were at play: the Malayan Communist Party and the General Labour Union were mobilizing 
labour strikes in ‘widespread localities, including Singapore, Penang, Kelantan, Ipoh and 
Province Wellesley’ and these openly confronted the British Military Administration131.  The 
BMA
132
 was not impartial in its mode of governing (Rudner 1968:102-104).  Its selective use 
of private agencies to manage rubber exports and other the imported goods, led to unfair trade 
practices against the Chinese traders.  The re-employment of Malay bureaucrats who served 
under the Japanese regime also intensified communal distrust as the memory of collaboration 
began to haunt the survivors of the Japanese regime.  The capability of the BMA was severely 
undermined by the emergence of the ‘heterogeneity of Malaya’s political activity’ 
immediately after the war, and suggested the importance of finding collaborative support from 
‘moderate and responsible leaders’ in the future civil administration133.   
The differentiated response to Malayan Union was a manifestation of the deliberate 
segregation policy that had polarized the collective livelihoods of the Malayan population 
crystallized around the ideas of the ‘sons of the soil’ and the ‘unassimilable’ migrants.  The 
citizenship proposal of the Malayan Union had provoked an acute sense of political awareness 
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among the Malays particularly with regard to their pre-war established notions of rights on 
landholding and government positions, ‘where the principle of Malay ‘Paramountcy’ formally 
enunciated by the British in 1927 was unchallenged by the non-Malay’ (Carnell 1952:506).   
As these notions of rights were protected by the British through legislative means prior to the 
war, they became increasingly forceful in defining the collective position of the Malays vis-à-
vis the non-Malay communities.  The bulk of immigrant communities on the other hand, 
never really had definitive notions of ‘rights’ accorded to them apart from the nominal rights 
and obligations to work in the mining, the plantation estates etc.  In many cases these 
labouring masses had to endure poor working conditions, job insecurity, and debt bondage.  
Instead of addressing the immediate concerns of the workers’ predicaments and the 
insecurities of the unemployed, the Malayan Union citizenship proposal had focused more on 
drawing out the sentiments of ‘loyalty to Malaya’134 among these communities with the aim 
of ‘promoting common interest and the development of common institution’ (Lau 1989:67).  
The final assessment of the ‘local reactions’ to the Malayan Union by the British Colonial 
office classified public opinion along ethnic lines where the Malay opinions were given 
weight over the Chinese and Indian labouring communities
135
.   
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The Malayan Union proposal became significant turning point where the different notions of 
rights structured the socio-political mobilizations in Malaya.  On the one hand it appeared to 
be an optimistic introduction of liberal conception of citizenship to the Malays (Ishak 1960), 
on the other hand such liberal proposals were undercut by the British anxieties over anti-
colonial sentiments and their pre-war obligations to protect status of the ‘sons of the soil’.  
The conception of citizenship in this case was largely driven by the persistence of indigenous 
claims to right grounded in the ‘sons of the soil’ and the Malay Rulers’ sovereign obligations 
to defend this ‘Special Position’ against a politically agitated the left-wing migrant workers. 
When the Malays boycotted the scheme, the British set up an exclusive consultation Anglo-
Malay Working Committee in the subsequent renegotiation paving the way for the Federation 
of Malaya that restored the symbolic position of the Malay Rulers (Soh 1960)
136
.   The 
Malayan Union roused the political sentiments among the Malay elites to form UMNO 
(United Malays National Organization) and this brought Malays from all social standing into 
a semblance of ethnic unity (Stockwell 1977).  UMNO was a polarizing contrast from Trade 
unionism and industrial strikes that grew substantively among the non-Malay communities 
under the mobilization of the Malayan Communist Party and the General Labour Union 
(Hawkins 1946; Allen 1967; Stenson 1969; Turnbull 1974; Stockwell 1979; Lau 1981).  
The British colonial post-war policy underestimated the political mobilization of the 
labouring forces among the Chinese and the Indians calling for better living and working 
conditions in Malaya (Stenson 1969:347), and because of its support for the British 
merchants, the colonial regime undermined the Malayan Communist Party’s call for 
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democratic and multiracial government in the aftermath of the Japanese surrender(Turnbull 
1974:250).  The BMA’s experiment in democracy involved a number of socially oriented 
policies employed with the aim of rejuvenating a war-torn society through self-help 
movements (Harper 2001:62-83), with the left-wing movement gaining considerable foothold 
in these social dynamics, where competing notions of ‘democracy’ began to flourish.   
The ‘experiment in democracy’ involved abolishing pre-war restrictions upon the freedom of 
association and saw the flowering of social movements the public sphere in Malayan politics.  
The official Protector of Chinese in the Malayan Planning Unit, Victor Purcell actively 
encouraged public participation from the local population.  Through self-help movements 
encouraged by the BMA, they provided the space for people to express their post-war 
anxieties and control political radicalism.   It was a deliberate attempt to regenerate local 
support among the community leaders and to ease the transition from military administration 
into civil administration as the British prepared for the reoccupation of Malaya via the 
Malayan Union scheme.  More importantly the BMA was morally obliged to recognize the 
role of the MCP during the Japanese invasion and to reverse the pre-war policy on restricting 
Chinese public opinion.    
The official tolerance of such liberal experiment notwithstanding, the public sphere was 
constantly monitored by the colonial regime.   Through the vernacular press
137
, organized 
labor movements, the left-wing politics of the Malay Nationalist Party and the Malayan 
Communist Party in particular, these discursive trends began to challenge the boundaries of 
‘legitimate public debate’ constructed by the colonial government.   The conflicts over land 
use between the colonial authority and the landless squatters, plus other localized conflicts 
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and the Malayan Union was particularly targeted in this period (Harper 1999).   
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among the warring factions involving the Triads, the KMT and the MCP posed serious 
challenge to the general administration of the BMA.  Despite these, the defining role of the 
MCP and the trade union organizations in general gave structure and institutional support to 
the existing squatters who were landless as well as the laborers employed in the estates 
(Harper 2001:107-113). 
The ongoing postwar conflicts prompted the colonial regime to employ legal restraints against 
trade union activism in Malaya in 1948.  The Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance that was 
passed by the colonial regime in 1948 imposed legal restrictions upon the trade union 
administrative procedure and membership affiliation (Shurcliff 1951)
138
.  This restriction 
aimed at undercutting communist infiltration into the trade union movements by prohibiting 
persons not employed by the industries from holding office
139
.  Subsequently the trade union 
movement was disempowered by the declaration of Emergency mid June 1948 following the 
murder of three European planters and two Chinese estate overseers
140
.  The Emergency 
Regulations passed by the colonial government extended the provisions for ‘death penalty for 
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June. 
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unlawful possession of arms, power of detention of any persons, search of persons and 
premises without warrant, and power to occupy properties’141.   
The declaration of Emergency was galvanized by the concerted pressure from the European 
business interests in Malaya.    
‘The government shares the belief of your Association that in many instances of 
unrest on estates the workers are being subjected to exploitation by subversive 
political elements which have no interest except to disturb good relations in 
industry to the detriment of both workers and employers’142.    
The alliance between the big businesses, estate employers and the Colonial government 
effectively severed the organizational links between trade unionism and the left-wing political 
movement associated with the MCP through legal means to protect European business 
interests and its revenue sources from the tin and rubber industries.  The legal approach was 
also used as a strategic public policy to demonize the MCP as ‘terrorists’ in the public 
discourse.  
5.5 Ideological preamble to the definition of citizenship 
‘Many members present here do not obviously accept the communist ideology, 
while some of them do. For my part I do not. I am a positive person, not an 'anti' 
person. I want positive good for my country and the world. Therefore, are we, the 
countries of Asia and Africa, devoid of any positive position except being pro-
communist or anti-communist? Has it come to this that the leaders of thought who 
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have given religions and all kinds of things to the world have to tag on to this kind 
of group or that and be hangers-on of this party or the other carrying out their 
wishes and occasionally giving an idea? It is most degrading and humiliating to 
any self-respecting people or nation. It is an intolerable thought to me that the 
great countries of Asia and Africa should come out of bondage into freedom only 
to degrade themselves or humiliate themselves in this way’ (Kahin 1956) 
(Prime Minister Nehru, Speech to Bandung Political Committee, 1955 – cited in Kahin 
1956:64-72) 
The Malayan Government’s use of political language in shaping public perception on 
‘Communism’ had had tremendous implications upon the politics of communal relations and 
ideas of citizenship rights.  The resistance movement galvanized by the Communists against 
the Japanese Occupation continued to have long lasting impacts upon the labour strikes, trade 
unionism and the left-wing politics until the 1960’s.   There was a compelling economic 
reason for the British to outlaw communism and weaken its ties to the trade union movements 
after the Japanese Occupation.  At the early stage of the Emergency declaration, the British 
government was reluctant to lend credibility to the MCP as a political movement that was part 
of a global anti-colonial struggle.  Instead the MCP were labelled as ‘a band of thugs and 
criminals’ for fear of the withdrawal of insurance cover on the estates in Malaya (Deery 
2003).  The official anxiety over this issue was related by Henry Gurney – British High 
Commissioner of Malaya, 
‘In the event of prolonged terrorism and heavy damage to property, the insurance 
companies may consider withdrawing cover under the “riot and civil commotion” 
clause of their policies…it is therefore advisable to avoid the use of terms in official 
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statements which might serve as a handle to the insurance companies.  These terms 
include “enemy”, “war”, “insurrection”, “insurgents”, “rebellion”, etc., and these 
considerations lie behind the preference for such names as “bandits”, “thugs” and 
“terrorists” which have not the same significance for insurance companies’143  
Great Britain’s determination to re-colonize Malaya and defeat communism was also driven 
by the territory’s dollar-earning power (Deery 2007).  Creech Jones, who was the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, reported that,  
‘During 1947 the total value of exports of Singapore and the Malayan Federation 
together was £151 million of which dollar exports accounted for £56 million. 
Malaya is by far the most important source of dollars in the colonial empire and it 
would gravely worsen dollar balance of the Sterling Area if there were serious 
interference with Malayan exports’ (Op Cit in Deery 2007:37) 
The Briggs plan was designed to counteract the Communist insurgency beginning in May 
1950.  It aimed at cutting the logistic supplies from the People’s Organization (Min Yuen) in 
predominantly Chinese populated areas and resettle them along with the existing ‘squatter’ 
Chinese communities, estate and mind labourers – who were susceptible to Communist 
recruitment – into compact ‘New Villages’144.  Under the administrative control of the ‘New 
Villages’, new road communications were linked to these villages with police posts being 
established in these areas to contain further spread of Communist activities with a propaganda 
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expert to engage in ‘psychological warfare’ against Communist banditry145.  Five months into 
the implementation of Briggs plan, the Federation Government in Malaya was already seeking 
financial assistance from the U.K Government meant for the Emergency
146
.  A joint 
memorandum written by Sir H Gurney, the British High Commissioner and Sir H Briggs in 
June 1951 showed mixed progress being made in the implementation of the Briggs plan - 
citing the successful resettlement of about 240,000 people, the marginal increase in the arrests 
of bandits and their supporters, changing public perception among the Chinese population 
against Communism, whilst at the same time highlighting the seriousness of Communist 
attacks in South Malaya, the increasing demand for costly building materials and the request 
for reinforcing the Police Jungle Squads and medical services
147
.  In exactly four months, Sir 
Henry Gurney was assassinated in an ambush, this prompted the Secretary of State to criticise 
the approach of Briggs plan being too soft on combating Communist banditry and tougher 
measures were needed to protect European business interests in the rubber estates and the tin 
mining industries
148
.  In February 1952 Sir Gerald Templer was appointed as the new High 
Commissioner to Malaya as well as the Director of Operations for the Emergency. 
The intensification of the Communist attacks in the estates and the intimidation of labour 
brought the economy almost to a standstill, so much so that in 1951 the extra cost for the 
Federation Government arising from the Emergency came to about £13.8 million, in which 
the major burden came from the recruitment of police forces (£5.6 m.) and resettlement of 
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Chinese squatters (£4.8 m)
149
.  By the end of 1953 the Federation had mounting deficits and 
this coincided with falling revenue in the rubber and tin prices for two consecutive years
150
.  
The Head of the Colonial Office Finance Department reported that the public spending meant 
for the program of rehabilitation and development following the Japanese Occupation had 
been channelled to the cost of Emergency, which amounted to £80 million over the whole 
period
151
.  The battle against the Communist Emergency was initially framed in the context of 
protecting the economic interests of the British Empire but increasingly the Federation 
Government began to target the Chinese communities for resettlement, collaboration and 
punishment as the bulk of the supplies for the Communist armed forces was supported by the 
Chinese, who constituted about 37% of the civil population
152
.  The Government realized that 
the Emergency situation in Malaya would not come to a peaceful conclusion unless the 
Chinese were won over and the MCP denied from legitimate political representation.  The 
next step was to give the Chinese community the option to participate in the decision making 
process of running their own villages affairs, under the guidance of the Government, 
‘They had never viewed Government as in [an] instrument to which they 
themselves could belong and in which they could take part.  This attitude of mind 
does not change quickly, and has constituted a strong barrier to Chinese co-
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operation with Government in its struggle against the Malayan Communist 
Party’153   
The plan was to encourage the Chinese community to participate in the Government program 
and reject the Communism ideology.  On this account, it was then imperative for the 
Federation Government to stop the MCP from penetrating into party politics in Malaya lest 
the international fight against imperialism and the MCP struggle against British colonialism in 
particular found its way into the collective consciousness of the Chinese community.  The 
fight against the Emergency became ideologically driven when the Federation Government 
could no longer justify the economic cost of fighting the Emergency largely burdened by the 
U.K taxpayers
154
.  The Government propaganda resorted to polarized discourse between 
nation-building and the fight against ‘Communist terrorism’ as the means to sway public 
opinion.  After the Bandung Conference
155
 in April 1955 the MCP offered the letter of 
negotiation
156
 to the Malayan government.  However the British managed to convince the 
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Executive Council and Malayan leaders not to recognize the political legitimacy of the MCP.  
The British officials feared that if the Federation government did not take a hard line position,  
‘the MCP would be in a far stronger position than any Communist party in 
Western Europe, where Communism cannot dominate to so great an extent by 
fear and where it is not backed by the racial ties that exist between the Chinese in 
Malaya and their kinsmen in Communist China’157. 
The British were apprehensive about the depth of ethnic consciousness in Communist 
ideology and they encouraged the Malayan leadership to adopt a defensive political approach 
in their negotiation effort with the MCP.  The most important conditions tied to the amnesty 
proposal included the uncompromising position of the Federation Government in denying the 
MCP a legitimate recognition as a political organization, the criminalization of the 
Communist ideology as a political movement that condoned the acts of violence against the 
Federation government and the people, and demanded the Communist leaders to redeem 
themselves by pledging loyalty to Malaya
158
.   The pledge to loyalty was set as a precondition 
for the Communists to prove their allegiance and political commitment to Malaya if they 
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wanted to participate in the bargaining process for independence from the British.   Implicit in 
this pledge of loyalty was a sense of fear against the ideological momentum of the 
Communist as a political organization in Malaya.  When Chin Peng, the lead negotiator of the 
MCP asked for the meaning of ‘Loyalty to Malaya’ the Alliance leader, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman insisted that, 
‘You have to prove that this is the country to which you really owe your allegiance 
because today the people in Malaya, one and all regard the Communist activities 
as something entirely foreign to the Malayan way of life.  They regard the 
Communist Party as belonging to a power outside this country, and consider its 
members give allegiance to that foreign country and not to Malaya’159   
Such loyalty also implied the acceptance of the position of the Rulers and their constitutional 
roles as the guardians of Islam and the Malay customs, setting the parameters of ‘duties and 
responsibilities’ in the early definition of good citizenship in Malaya.160.   The subjective 
emphasis on ‘loyalty’ underlined the ideological preamble to the Government’s attempt at 
regulating the liberty of conscience of political subjects, to which Chin Peng countered,  
‘As a member of the MCP, we still believe in our ideology.  We will never allow 
ourselves to be forced by others to give up this ideology, but we wish to put our 
ideology to the people to decide, if that is possible.  Now that the Government 
requests us to give up this ideology.  As a citizen, of course, we have obligations, 
but at the same time we must have freedom of thought, the right of freedom of 
thought, but the Government’s point is that they don’t want this’161. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter teases out the socio-economic aspects structuring cultural identifications in the 
history of Malaya and how the different strands of ideas about identities in Malaya began to 
develop throughout the different stages of colonialism.  The pre-war era was an important 
turning point for the transformation of the social demography of Malaya, but the processes of 
transformation were structured by the policy of ethnic segregation that dominated colonial 
politics then.  What were significant about this era were the multiple processes of cultural 
identification having simultaneous grounding with the emerging polemic of political 
awareness (consciousness).  The British colonial policy engendered these divergent 
discourses: on the one hand, defending the socio-economic position of the indigenous Malay 
community grounded in the moral obligations of the Anglo-Malay treaties; on the other hand, 
nurturing capital investment and the protection of the European business interests in Malaya 
generated the need for the increasing importation of migrant labours from other countries.  
These polemics were increasingly characterized by two main ideological expressions, one that 
was grounded in ethno-religious terms that were synonymous with the politics of ethno-
nationalism, whereas the left-wing movement was largely shaped by the ideological fight 
against colonial capitalism, trade unionism and the Japanese invasion in Asian countries. 
These two distinctive ideological processes appeared to have strong correlation with the ways 
the British colonial government rationalized the management of colonized subjects in Malaya.  
The Chinese community were victims of Japanese military persecution during the war, the 
dynamics of persecution led to their increased political mobilization through the Malayan 
Communist Party.  The British re-occupied Malaya after the Japanese surrendered and 
instigated war against the Malayan Communist Party, the British propaganda and campaign 
against the Malayan Communist Party played significant ideological role in shaping the 
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perceptions of ethnicity, loyalty and citizenship in Malaya.   The pathological picture of the 
Communist ideology projected by the British, glorified the acts of political aggression that 
overshadowed the other memories of more violent atrocities committed by the Japanese army 
during the Occupation.  The demonization of the Communist ideology ultimately dominated 
the political discourse of the Malayan agenda for self-government.   
Self-government was in turn constructed on two polarizing theme, the nationalist movement 
that was framed in the context of peaceful political negotiation on the one hand, and the 
violent acts of terrorism condoned by the Malayan Communist Party on the other hand.  At 
the backdrop of the polemical narratives of the Malayan agenda for self-government were the 
simmering undercurrents of problematic ethnic relations, compounded by the issues of 
divided loyalty and the definition of common citizenship.  These would become the pertinent 
factors that constantly feed into the ideological contestations about citizenship rights and the 
contemporary political debates that increasingly identify the political and civil ‘rights’ of the 
citizens in historically situated interpretations of ethno-religious origins and political cultures. 
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6 MALAYSIA: THE FRACTURED NATION-STATE 
Abstract: The problem of identity politics is historically contingent, and when citizenship 
rights are not conceptualized in the universal language of the rights to decent livelihood, 
equal of opportunities, access to justice or fundamental values that are important to human 
living, the notion of citizenship would be narrowly understood to serve the abstract ideals of 
preserving traditionally conceived identities.  When these ideas become dominant in the 
governmental institution, ethno-religious stereotypes underpin the rules of public 
engagement, making it insurmountable to construct the space for common citizenship.   
6.1 Introduction 
The notion of ‘state without nation’ (Stockwell 2004:97) problematizes the political 
imagination of the Malaysia as a nation-state.  The Communist Insurgency had the effect of 
fracturing conception of common citizenship in the making of Malaysian Federation.  As a 
product of decolonization the Malaysian Federation was politically engineered to prop up the 
institution of a new state, and the nation-state was externally designed by the policies of 
decolonization (Zubaida 2002).  The Malaysian nation thus created was politically 
constructed through a process of imagining that differed both in substance and ideological 
outlook (Anderson 1991).  The imagination of the nation was further fractured by the 
politicization of two conflicting ideologies: 1) the Malay-centric ideal of citizenship that was 
driven by the principle of indigenous claims to right, and 2) the concept of Malaysian 
Malaysia grounded in common citizenship.  Malaysian Malaysia was introduced by 
Singaporean leaders that shook the foundation of the Malay special position and for that 
matter, Singapore is included in this Chapter because of how its brief partnership in the 
Malaysian Federation unravelled the Malay Special Position.  The making and the break-up of 
Malaysian Federation was therefore an important historical episode to examine the ways 
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citizenship were debated and adjudicated in the absence of secular principles governing the 
terms of official political debate. 
The Malaysian Federation was envisaged to operate on the model of federal system but the 
executive role of the government was hijacked by party political control under UMNO and 
power of the executive grew highly centralized (Watts 1996; Work 2002).   Despite its 
modern adoption, most of the colonial features of governance have been retained especially 
the application of repressive laws that were used to combat the Communist Insurgency, and 
which are still being applied today upon political dissidents on the pretext of national security.   
Previously the colonial state had used the legal apparatus to regulate the population on two 
significant grounds, mainly to structure land rights and reserve public service appointments of 
the Malay-Muslim communities, and subsequently to suppress the forces of left-wing 
movements in Malaya.   
Some of the legal provisions under colonialism, especially the Bill of Rights for its special 
citizenship provision were embedded into the original framework of the 1948 Federal 
Constitution of Malaya that was eventually enshrined to the Malaysian Constitution (Saunders 
1995).  The Constitution also defines the administrative roles and responsibilities of the 
Federal government and the state-level/or subnational governance into Federal and State List 
respectively.  The institutional arrangement was inherited from the historical structure of the 
British Residency and the Malay states, progressing out of the inherited duality of legal 
system (Horowitz 1994) that reflected the separated authorities of the colonial regime and the 
local ruling elites.  Where the regulations of the colonial subjects were concerned, the 
immigrants were administered by the British Residents and were subject to the secular courts.  
Whereas the local Malays were the loyal subjects of the Rulers governed under the 
Mohammedan laws.  The separated domains of legal administration underpinned a critical 
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aspect of the British colonial legacy that divided colonial subjects according to migrant and 
indigenous groups, making institutional governance a function of the default lines of ethnic 
and religious differences.   
The duality of legal system underpinned the ideas of differential ‘rights’ that had had 
considerable impact upon the framing of the Constitution and subsequently on state practice.  
It is argued that citizenship right is not a mere legal formula, and it should occupy a central 
place in the administrative structure and political culture of the modern nation-state and state 
system (Brubaker 1992:23).  In the development of the nation-state, the dynamics between the 
state and the nation are conceived as independent entities in shaping the historical trajectories 
of citizenship.  Hence the ways in which citizenships were constructed depended upon the 
historical primacy of the existence of either the state or nation (Hein 1993).  Under British 
colonialism the primacy of Malay special position in the Malay Kerajaan was recognized as 
politically legitimate, and the Malay nation was conceived simultaneously with the Malay 
Kerajaan (government).  This simultaneous conception of Malay-Muslim identity and Malay-
centred governance was then buttressed by the special provisions in the modern Constitution.   
The legal provision of ethno-religious identities posed a critical challenge to the development 
of common citizenship.  The discourse of ethnic identification has been reinforced by the 
sovereign role of Malay Rulers to protect Islam, and demand for ‘political loyalty’ from the 
migrant communities domiciled in Malaya.  They constitute the emerging ideological precepts 
that dominated the political thinking of the elites who played key roles as the agents of nation-
building.  The systematic thinking behind such ideological precepts provided important basis 
for the state-centred construction of the nation and the legal justification of differential 
citizenship rights Malaysia.   
165 
 
The state-centred narrative for the construction of a particularly Malay nationalist conscience 
set the stage for the ideological construction of the other ‘less significant’162 identities whose 
loyalty to the state would always remain suspect.  This was especially true for Communist 
insurgents, in which the state began to politically engineer a particular strand of nationalism.  
These sentiments, expressed in terms of the Malay ethnic right to govern, gained considerable 
momentum through the legislative validations of the Colonial public policies.  The legislative 
elevation of one ethnic group above the rest resulted in the development of fragmented 
identities within the Malaysian nation (Loh Kok Wah and Kahn 1992). 
6.2 A fractured vision of nation-state 
The examination of a fractured vision must include Singapore
163
, and whist its presence was 
brief in the Federation, its subsequent expulsion had deep implications upon the negotiation of 
common citizenship in Malaysia.  The vision of ‘Grand Design’ mooted during the wartime 
planning by the British government as a strategic consideration for decolonization after the 
Second World War.  Decolonization process in Malaya differed greatly from the Borneo 
Territories and Singapore.  When the Federation of Malaya was granted self-government in 
1957, the Communist Insurgency had not ended and this aspect of the political conflict had 
had serious implications upon the conception of citizenship.  In between this period and the 
political consideration for the ‘Grand Design’, the question of ethnic balance and the political 
threat of Communism dominated the official thinking behind the political negotiations of 
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 Singapore is only mentioned in this chapter because its political involvement in the Malaysian 
Federation was only very brief, from 1963-1965.  However the issues surrounding its severance from 
the Federation were closely tied to the problems of citizenship and its implications upon the 
conception of nation merit discussion in the context of political right.  Singapore had established its 
own system of government way before the Federation and its inclusion into Malaysia was the result of 
the decolonization process of the British in Southeast Asia. 
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merging the Federation of Malaya with the other British colonial territories of Singapore, 
Brunei and the Borneo territories.   
The ‘Grand Design’ had focused significantly on the institutional aspects involving the 
merger of disparate colonial territories whilst leaving the problem of the ‘nation’ couched in 
ethno-religious differences.  The liberalization of citizenship proposed in the 1946 Malayan 
Union scheme that was fiercely contested by UMNO, was subsequently replaced by the 1948 
Federation of Malaya Constitution, restoring many old features of the Anglo-Malaya 
administrative framework.  The written Constitution was described by a colonial officer as  
‘…primarily devised not as an instrument of administration but as a political 
compromise, with the Central Government safeguarding the non-Malay and the 
States [protecting] the Malay interests’164.   
This enabled the ruling party UMNO to have executive control over the federal government 
and through its politics, promoted the ideology of Malay special citizenship right through the 
practice of ethnic consociationalism, subsequently the deepening problems of patronage in the 
public political culture (Means 1972; Case 1996; Case 1996; Crouch 1996; Gomez 2004; 
Jomo 2004).   
The ideology of special citizenship, so historically rooted in the Malayan public political 
culture contributed to the intense political debate against the call for Malaysian Malaysia that 
eventually led to the abrupt separation of Singapore in the space of two years after the 
establishment of the Federation in 1963.  The two historical events that defined the moment of 
intense ethnic conflict were the Singapore exit from the Malaysian Federation in 1965 and the 
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ethnic riot on 13 May 1969.  In 1965, the conflict began as an ideological one that 
subsequently manifested into actual physical violence in 1969.  In the analysis of the 
Parliamentary debates, the ideological thread behind these debates could be traced, and by 
illuminating the reasons and justifications of these arguments, it is possible to establish how 
the role of ideas could become forceful in the manifestation of the acts of violence in the 
community.  These were the critical junctures that transformed the dynamics of ethnic and 
religious contestation in the Malaysian political development, and after the ethnic riot in 1969 
the ruling party introduced a number of Bills and amendments in the Malaysian Constitution 
to restrict the scope of dissent in the name of national security. 
The analysis of Parliamentary debates is an important exercise to uncover the defining themes 
of public debates because the ideas and reasons professed in these arguments associate closely 
with the political conducts of state agents.  By retracing some of the big debates on the 
creation of common identity, these Parliamentary debates will illuminate the root of the 
polemical divide between ethnic and civic values in shaping the trajectories of political rights 
and citizenship for the new Malaysian nation.  The ideological tension hinges on the 
problematic dislocation between the normative conception of the secular state and the 
preservation of Malay sovereignty and special position.  With the union of Singapore and the 
Borneo territories, the preservation of traditional authority and the Malay ethnic position in 
Malaya was tested by the challenges of civic demands associated with the emergence of neo-
liberal political thinking.  The political dynamics between the preservation of Malay political 
power and the demand for common citizenship in the name of Malaysian Malaysia led to the 
unprecedented expulsion of Singapore from the Federation in 1965.  This was then followed 
by the 1969 ethnic riot, which then saw the cumulative dominance of ethnic Malay political 
power, creating the condition for the gradual de-secularization of the Malaysian state. 
168 
 
6.3 The secular state and differential rights in Malaysia 
A ‘State without nation’ problematizes the subjective tensions between the imaginations of a 
political territory and a community or nation that lacked shared histories, cultural identities 
and commonality.  The lack of commonality has been entrenched by the unqualified value of 
differential rights that were deep-seated within a particular state tradition.  Where the idea of 
the secular (and the practice of secularism) was undermined within a particular state tradition 
and where the primacy of race and religion was instead promoted, this creates the condition 
for partiality to prevail.  Malaysia presents an important case to the problem of secular state 
because common citizenship was overruled by the partiality of the state to allow for the 
preferential treatment of the dominant Malay ethnic group.   Central to the problem of 
designing a governmental framework for the independent nation of the Federation of Malaya 
was the idea that the Malay special rights needed to be secured through measures that would 
guarantee the Malay access to public services and land ownership, to prevent the 
submergence of the Malays from the other immigrant communities
165
.   
This was the inherited British policy on the Malay Reservation Enactment that privileged the 
Malays in the civil service and the Malay regiments (Groves 1959; Wilcox 1978).  When the 
1948 Federation of Malaya Agreement replaced the Malayan Union scheme with the 
restricted scope of citizenship, 
‘it had created a distinct Malayan political community whereby, Malays who 
were subjects of any of the nine sultans and British subjects in the 
Settlements of Penang and Malacca automatically qualified for Federal 
citizenship, leaving the rest of the domiciled non-Malays as non-citizens’ 
(Fernando 2002:73).   
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The official accounts of the political tensions over the issues of citizenship during this period 
of time only represented the views of the Alliance leaders of UMNO (United Malays National 
Organization), MCA (Malayan Chinese Association) and MIC (Malayan Indian Congress), as 
the positions of the legitimate political parties representing the three main ethnic groups in the 
Federation of Malayan Government.   
In the Constitution, the Alliance leaders negotiated for the legislative power and political 
control to remain within the purview of the central government (Fernando 2002:71).  The 
Alliance memorandum for the Reid Commission demanded ‘strong central government’ for 
the Federal government and the State governments.  The Alliance also advocated that ‘…in 
times of national crisis, the central government should have the residuary legislative 
powers’166.  Through the design of the Constitution, the ruling party UMNO was granted 
considerable scope to appoint party elites into executive positions and monopolize control 
over the functions of the Federal government.   
Within the Alliance coalition, the ethnic representative parties resembling each of the major 
ethnic groups in Malaya – UMNO, MCA, and MIC – negotiated over the criteria of how 
Malayan citizenship should be framed in the Constitution.  The main contention rested on 
UMNO’s proposal for the incorporation of the Malay ‘special provision’ into the Constitution 
and the MCA political demand over the liberalisation of the Citizenship Law, ‘jus soli’ and 
the procedure for the application of citizenship for non-Malay immigrants
167
.  There were 
fundamental disagreements among the parties over the content of citizenship right as the 
justification for unequal or differential right was dominated by the narrative of migrant-ethnic 
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distinctions.  UMNO’s rejection of the 1946 Malayan Union scheme had led to the shift in the 
British liberal position on the criteria of citizenship, which was then replaced by the 1948 
Federation of Malaya Agreement.   
The 1948 Agreement institutionalized differential citizenship around the concept of Malay 
subject and sovereign kingship (Fernando 2002:73).  It reinforced the position of the Malays 
as subjects of any of the nine Sultans, granted Federal citizenships to the British subjects in 
Penang and Malacca but left the rest of the immigrant population to fulfil strict residential 
requirements in order to apply for Federal citizenship. As a result, considerable number of 
domiciled non-Malays did not have citizenship status.  For instance, only about 320,000 out 
of the total of 2,011,000 Chinese populations in Malaya were qualified to apply for Federal 
citizenship
168
.  The 1948 Agreement created two tiered citizenship rights - special position 
conferred to the Malays complete with the bundle of social rights, whereas the immigrant 
population were fortunate enough to be granted the right to remain in Malaya
169
.  The creation 
of two tiered citizenship had significant influence over the core ingredients of Malayan 
constitutional framing process. 
In 1956 an independent commission called the Reid Commission was set up to formulate a 
working constitution for the independence of Federation of Malaya.  The Reid Commission 
was a product of consensus from the London Conference between the Alliance leadership, the 
representatives of the Malay Rulers and the Secretary of State to design a constitutional 
template for self-governing Malaya.  The challenge for the Reid Commission was to try and 
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formulate a working constitution that would conform to the norms of parliamentary 
democracy and constitutionalism, with due considerations to the facts of pluralism in Malaya 
(Fernando 2002:97).  In the light of the recent post-war conflicts, the left-wing movements, 
the Communist Insurgency and the stateless condition of a large number of migrant workers, 
a liberal framework was not achievable.  The liberal framework was hampered by the 
prevailing institutional structure of the colonial government, i.e. Federal executive power 
residing in the colonial administration whilst the traditional authority rested among the Malay 
Rulers at State level administration.  The new governing framework had to include the terms 
of traditional authorities to prevail and this meant that the rights of Malay subjects were to be 
secured along with the governing privileges of the Malay Rulers
170
. 
The Alliance memorandum to the Reid Commission in 1956 stated clearly the non-negotiable 
‘right’ the special position of Malays and religion:  
On Religion: ‘The religion of Malaysia shall be Islam.  The observance of this 
principle shall not impose any disability on non-Muslim nationals professing and 
practising their own religions, and shall not imply that the State is not a secular 
State’.171  
On special position of Malays: ‘While we accept that in independent Malaysia, all 
nationals should be accorded equal rights, privileges and opportunities and there 
must not be discrimination on grounds of race or creed, we recognize the fact that 
the Malays are the original sons of the soil and that they have a special position 
arising from this fact, and also by virtue of the treaties made between the British 
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Government and the various sovereign Malay States.  The Constitution should, 
therefore, provide that the Yang di-Pertuan Besar (Malay Rulers) should have the 
special responsibility of safeguarding the special position of the Malays.  In 
pursuance of this, the Constitution should give him powers to reserve for Malays a 
reasonable proportion of lands, posts in the public service, permits to engage in 
business or trade, where such permits are restricted and controlled by law, 
Government scholarships and such similar privileges accorded by the 
Government; but in pursuance of his further responsibility of safeguarding the 
legitimate interests of the other communities, the Constitution should also provide 
that any exercise of such powers should not in any way infringe the legitimate 
interests of the other communities or adversely affect or diminish the rights and 
opportunities at present enjoyed by them’.172 
The privileges derived from the special position outlined above are intended only for existing 
nationals of Malay descent and their descendants.  We therefore suggest the following as a 
definition:  
‘A person shall be deemed to be a Malay, if: He practices the religion of Islam; He 
habitually practises Malay Customs; and, He habitually speaks the Malay 
language;
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The Malay identity defined under Article 160 of the Interpretation and General Clauses 
Ordinance (1948) is tied to Islam.  This definition makes the Malay identity and culture 
inseparable from Islam.  The sovereign position of the Malay Rulers is secured in the 
Constitution part XIV in Articles 181 – 183, whereby their symbolic roles in safeguarding the 
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Islamic faith and the Malay civilization remained intact (Milner 2011).  Certain provisions in 
Article 3(5)
174
 and 153(2)
175
 underline the sovereign role of the Malay kingship in preserving 
their ceremonial persona in the modern statecraft.  These provisions serve to buttress the 
subjective meaning of bangsa Melayu that is historically tied to the sovereignty of the Malay 
kingship (Kerajaan).  
6.4 Ideological dominance of Islam-Malay and fractured citizenship 
The relationships between Islam, Malay identity and the ‘secular practices’ have reciprocal 
links with the public political culture in Malaysia.  In the process of state making, the ‘secular 
practices’ have been increasingly circumscribed by the state agents whose primary object is to 
protect and expand the ideological identification of Malay and Islam as an ethno-religious 
category.  While the framing of the Malaysian constitution afforded only a symbolic position 
for Islam and was envisaged of as primarily secular, the increasingly strong link between 
Malay ethnic identity – which was legally enshrined and protected constitutionally – and the 
politically revivalist Islamic identification has undermined the secular nature of the 
constitution in the contemporary experience.  With the historical position of Islam established 
as the official religion of the Malaysian Federation through the Constitution and where the 
dominant Malay-Muslim agents continue to actively promote the values of Islam in 
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governance; this paved the way for the subtle shift from a secular intention into making Islam 
central to politics, thus created the gap to the process of de-secularization. 
Hitherto the colonial state preserved substantial aspects of the traditional structure of the 
Malay sovereign kingship through the protection of the Malay special position and the 
sanctity of Islam.  The official policy to safeguarding the Malay ‘special position’ established 
the definitive citizenship premise for Malays to magnify their rights to claim government 
resources over and above others – non-Malays - on the basis of the legal enactment of 
ethnically based privileges in the Constitution.   Some British officers expressed concern over 
the idea of special privileges as a strategy of decolonization,  
‘restoration of the pre-war constitutional and administrative system will be 
undesirable in the interests of efficiency and security and our declared 
purpose of promoting self-government in Colonial territories’,176 
However these officers were obliged to abide by their official commitments to the old treaty.  
The War Cabinet suggested abandoning the pre-war system of autocratic rule in favour of a 
self-governing system that would provide for, 
‘a growing participation in the Government by the people of all the 
communities’, however for Malaya this political system would be– ‘subject to a 
special recognition of the political, economic and social interests of the Malay 
race
177
.   
                                                     
176
Public Records Document CAB66/50, WP(44)258,  Appendix I to 25 (for Malaya) and Appendix II 
to 25 (for Labuan, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak) 
177
 Ibid,. There was no special recognition of a particular race for the Borneo territories. 
175 
 
This policy of special recognition took important precedent in the post-war constitutional 
development and structured the development of ethnic politics in the Malaysian public sphere. 
The provisions of Malay ‘special position’ expressed in Article 153, emphasizes the 
definitive/affirmative rights of the Malays to claim greater access to opportunities in the 
government provisions for human capital development as per guaranteed by the Malay Rulers.  
Within the Alliance leadership, the ruling party UMNO had played a central role in 
entrenching ethnic nationalism by promoting the idea of the ‘Malay’ ethnic group as the 
rightful owners of Malaya.  In this context the Constitution was framed to accommodate the 
range of legal rights designed for the political survival of the Malay ethnic group.   Since the 
provision for the Malay special position had its precedent in the previous government setting, 
the sense of moral obligation to continue the provision in order to assist the Malays socially 
and economically became compelling (Fernando 2002:126).   
The 1957 Malaya Constitution had set the tone of how citizenship rights should be granted 
according to the criteria of ethnic privileges.  It was against this political backdrop when the 
Grand Design was actively pursued and at a time when the British government was becoming 
conscious of the financial cost of maintaining colonial territories. 
‘By 1960, there was no material asset in the area essential to our national economy 
to compare with, for example, oil in the Middle East.  Rubber and tin were no 
longer essential to our balance of payments and we are spending money for 
political reasons rather than any prospect of financial gain.’178  When the British 
finally decided to officially end its colonial policy in the Southeast Asian region, 
the official approach aimed at merging all the British colonies was largely 
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motivated by ‘the security of the region and the expense of maintaining it’ 
(Stockwell 2004:xlvi).  Hence in the Grand Design, the British was far more 
concerned about the strategic positioning of its security interests, resulting instead 
a ‘brokered compromise’ that was followed by an uneasy agreement in the 
merging of Malaya,  Singapore, Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak.  Aside from 
the long-term strategic interest of the presence of the British defence in the region, 
the formation of Malaysia was political driven as a way of overcoming the threat 
of communism in Singapore.  However it is also important to emphasize the 
failure of the political leaders in addressing the fundamental issues affecting 
citizenship.  The ideological preoccupation of merging the disparate colonies in 
the region resulted not in ‘the fulfilment of nationhood but a structure for nation-
building’ (Stockwell 2004:lvii).   
The formation of the Malaysian Federation went ahead despite incoherent process of 
‘consolidation and fragmentation’ (Stockwell 2005:193).  The ‘Greater Malaysia’ agenda was 
ideologically driven by elites expecting a community of people to identify their sense of 
belonging Malaysian Federation on the assumption of close ethno-cultural proximity without 
fully addressing the problems of differential citizenship.  Tunku Abdul Rahman (the first PM 
of Malaya) anticipated the prospect of culturally assimilating the indigenous people of North 
Borneo and Sarawak with the Malays in Malaya on the assumption that the various 
indigenous peoples of those territories are of the same Malay racial group
179
.  At the same 
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time, Tunku was also driven by the fear of the majority Chinese and left-wing elements in 
Singapore which could potentially destabilize his leadership position within UMNO
180
.   
Table 1: Population by ethnicity in Malaya, Singapore, British North 
Borneo and Sarawak, 1961 
Ethnicity Estimated number Percentage 
MALAYA 
Malays 3,500,000 49.3% 
Chinese 2,675,000 37.6% 
Indian 795,000 9.8% 
Others 125,000 3.3% 
Total 7,095,000 100.0% 
SINGAPORE 
Malays 227,500 13.3% 
Chinese 1,289,600 75.7% 
Indians 145,100 8.7% 
Others 45,000 2.3% 
Total 1,707,300 100.0% 
BRITISH NORTH BORNEO 
Non-Muslim 233,081 49.9% 
Muslim 72,804 15.6% 
Chinese 116,016 24.8% 
Others 45,099 9.7% 
Total 467,000 100.0% 
SARAWAK 
Indigenous Non-Muslim 353,130 44.7% 
Indigenous Muslim 47,400 6.0% 
Chinese 243,320 30.8% 
Malays 137,460 17.4% 
Others 8,690 1.1% 
Total 790,000 100.00% 
Grand Total 9,598,300  
Source: Public Records Document CAB 134/1949, GM(61) 11   Date: 20 Oct 1961 
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Table 2: Population of the proposed Greater Malaysia, 1961 
 Estimated 
number 
Percentage 
By Territory 
Malaya 7,095,000 70.51% 
Singapore 1,707,300 17.00% 
North Borneo 467,000 4.64% 
Sarawak 790,000 7.85% 
Total 10,059,300 100.00% 
By Ethnicity 
Malays 3,906,610 38.90% 
Indigenous Muslims 
(Borneo) 
49,654 0.50% 
Indigenous Non-Muslim 
(Borneo) 
595,561 6.00% 
Chinese 4,340,086 43.00% 
Others (including 
Indians) 
1,167,389 11.60% 
Total 10,059,300 100.00% 
Source: PRO CAB 134/1949, GM (61) 11   Date: 20 Oct 1961 
Table 1 shows the population breakdown in each of the territories in Malaya, Singapore, 
North Borneo and Sarawak.  Table 2 shows the estimated population figure in the territories 
for the proposed Greater Malaysia, with the estimated percentage of ethnic breakdown of the 
overall population.  The estimation of the population breakdown by ethnicity in Table 2 
shows a relatively higher percentage of Chinese and Other population combined together 
compared to the Malays. The prospect of non-Malays emerging as the majority communities 
in Greater Malaysia exacerbated Tunku’s fears of the possible intensification of the left-wing 
movements, which could undermine his attempt at mediating the competing factions within 
UMNO.   
The power play among the elites came to dominate the overall process of the merger to the 
extent that the British colonial agents were overwhelmed by the local political momentum that 
overshadowed the meticulous deliberations for the desired constitutional groundwork in an 
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independent Federation (Stockwell 2004:lvii).  As the forging of the disparate colonial 
territories in Southeast Asia was carried out in a rather incoherent process of ‘consolidation 
and fragmentation’ throughout the decolonization period (Stockwell 2005:193), the state that 
was framed upon ‘contradictory objectives and painstaking negotiations’181 came to represent 
a big political void that the local elite players were keen to fill in with their imagined prospect 
of bounded nationhood, 
‘National identification in a large and powerful federation comprising a grand 
total of nearly ten million people with a total of 130,000 square miles as against 
the Federation’s (Malaya) of 50,000 and Singapore’s 225 square miles would hold 
the hearts and minds of the people. Pride in a more powerful and viable state, 
which may be called the ‘Federation of Malaysia or the United States of Malaysia, 
would give a boost to nation-building to the mutual advantage of the three 
territories and would help to stabilise the future of the whole region.’182 (Lee Kuan 
Yew, the first PM of Singapore, 9 May 1961) This sentiment was reiterated by the 
first Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in his 
letter to the British Prime Minister, Mr Macmillan on 26 June 1961 in which he 
stressed how the federation would create ‘a national pride which would go a long 
way in building up a feeling of loyalty to the country’183. 
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The nationhood that was to furnish ‘Greater Malaysia’ was largely constructed upon the 
unproblematic notion of a community of people that would readily express/identify their 
sense of belonging on the assumption of primordial or close ethno-cultural proximity.  Tunku 
went as far as claiming the prospect of culturally assimilating the indigenous people of North 
Borneo and Sarawak with the Malays in Malaya on the basis that ‘Racially the various 
indigenous peoples of those territories are related to the Malays, in fact they come of the same 
stock’184.   
How people were imagined as sharing a ‘similar genealogy of ethnic stock’, as expressed by 
Tunku, reflected a deeply primordial assumption of the people’s instinctive subjective 
identification through ethnicity.  Both the Muslim and non-Muslim indigenous people in 
North Borneo and Sarawak were assumed to possess supposedly closer primordial association 
to Malays on the qualifying assumption of their status as natives in their own lands.  The 
dominant thinking behind such primordial assumption reflected the politics of ethnicity and 
secular/religious segregation practised back in British Malaya.  The administrative 
circumstances of segregation worked in tandem with the logic of categorization that generated 
the divisive mental schema where people were historically grouped into different ethnic 
backgrounds on the basis of customary norms and religious laws and economic placement of 
the migrant communities.  Whilst such conceptual schema highlights the importance of 
cognitive-stereotyping approach to illuminate the way of thinking about ethnicity  (Brubaker, 
Loveman et al. 2004), the reasoning for this mental schema was ideologically constructed 
upon the ‘protective’ legislation that was meant to safeguard the special position of a 
particular ethnic community.  The existing legislative guarantees came to structure important 
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ideas, perception and thinking about the relationship between ethnic identification and the 
fundamental rights of the citizens. 
The cognitive perspective of ethnic identification here draws upon the dynamic process of 
official categorization and classification of subjects which had been crucial in structuring 
people’s self-understanding and the projection of shared as well as overlapping cultural 
identification (Caplan and Torpey 2001).  In the Malaysian public culture religious doctrines 
gradually came to synchronize with the cultural perceptions of ethnic identification.  These 
have considerable reciprocal impacts upon the ways in which knowledge, beliefs, and 
expectations are structured about group identities as well as the expectations about ‘rights’. 
The legal provision of ‘right and the language of ‘right’ that are couched in terms of the 
sanctity of religious belief contributes to the shared ecumenical representations of particular 
Bangsa Melayu or Malay identity, which in many ways have led to the fractured concept of 
citizenship.  This fractured concept of citizenship was sustained by the non-negotiability of 
Malay special position and had arguably broken the deal of Greater Malaysia through 
Singapore’s ejection from the Federation in 1965.  More importantly, the undermining of 
secular values in the Constitution since the beginning of self-governance in Malaya had 
contributed to the gap in upholding the neutrality principles within the governmental 
apparatus, thus allowing this fractured perception of citizenship to take firm hold upon 
political debates. 
6.5 Separation of Singapore from the Malaysia Federation 1965   
‘Indeed, the Malaysia that was inaugurated on 16 September 1963 failed wholly to 
satisfy any of the parties to it.  It was neither forged through nationalist struggle, 
nor did it reflect a homogenous national identity.  Rather it was the product of 
grudging compromise and underpinned by only fragile guarantees; its formation 
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was peppered with resistance and that it came into being at all was regarded by 
many at the time as a close-run thing.’ (Stockwell 2004: xxxvi) 
The ideological tensions between the Malay special position and Malaysian Malaysia 
underscored the dynamics of ‘citizenship debates’ prior to Singapore’s secession from the 
Malaysian Federation.  These ideological contentions stemmed from the dominant customary 
conceptions of rights that the local state formation inherited from the legacy of colonialism 
(Mamdani 1996; Mamdani 2001) and these found articulations in the form of political 
belonging, rights and obligations when a certain ethnic group successfully captured the post-
colonial state for their ethnic agenda (Ndegwa 1997).    
Initially the secular commitment was declared by Tunku Abdul Rahman on May 1, 1958, in 
Parliament,  
 ‘I would like to make it clear that this country is not an Islamic state as it is 
generally understood; we merely provided that Islam shall be the official religion of 
the State’185 
The consensus reached by the Alliance leadership gave the assurance that the Constitutional 
position of Islam ‘...shall not imply that the State is not a secular State’.  The political 
assurance given by Tunku in the Alliance Memorandum on the concept of ‘secular state’ was 
not as morally convincing as it was given to the Constitutional establishment of Islam.    The 
role of the ‘secular state’ was never spelled out in the Constitution, thus rendering the 
normative interpretation of ‘secular state’ for Malaysia absent.  With the position of Islam 
being defined as the official religion of the Federation, the interpretive scope for the ‘secular 
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state’ is limited.  There’s no categorical definition for  the Constitutional establishment of the 
secular state in Malaysia that is comparable to the contextual definition of the political-legal 
relationship between the role of religion and the state - discussed in ‘Locating Secularism’ in 
chapter 3.  The lack of proper definition in political-legal terms has therefore resulted in the 
demonization of the political value of secularism in relation to the dynamics of Islamic 
politics in the country.  Juxtaposing ‘bangsa Melayu’ and ‘common citizenship’ highlights the 
polemics of ethnic and civic nationalism that parallels the tension between the increasing 
Islamization of politics and the secular values in Malaysia.     
The political imaginations of the new nation came undone by the growing identity politics and 
nationalist movements that polarised the ideas of citizenship into two discernible political 
trends at the time.  On the one hand there was the political assertion of protecting the rights of 
the indigenous Malays along with the symbolic role of the Malay Rulers that furnished the 
Malay nationalist movements led by Tunku.  On the other hand, there was the bounded 
territorial definition of ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ that was inclusive of the various peoples of the 
participating territories envisioned by Lee Kuan Yew.  Citizenship issues aside, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman was determined to retain executive control over proportional representation and 
internal security at the Federal level in Kuala Lumpur, and his main demands were 
documented in the report of the Official Committee for ‘Greater Malaysia’ as follows186: 
The first demand was the immediate inclusion of the Borneo territories as a political 
strategy to offset the threat of increased percentage of the Chinese population (43%) 
against the Malay population (38.9%) in the proposed merger.  Once the first 
demand was secured, Singapore would then be allowed to join the Federation on 
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condition that she would have proportionately smaller representation in the central 
Parliament than it could claim on a population basis if it came in on the same 
footing as the other existing States.  The existence of communist threats in 
Singapore had in many ways obliged Lee Kuan Yew to negotiate the Merger that 
would both address the strength of the People’s Action Party and accommodate 
Tunku Abdul Rahman’s condition where the Federation retain control over 
Defence, External Affairs and Internal Security, while Singapore would keep 
control of Education and Labour.  In essence the main agreement between the two 
leaders was that the Federation should have complete Constitutional safeguards 
against any possibility of the Singapore Chinese upsetting the political dominance 
of the Malays in the Kuala Lumpur House of Representatives.  On the subject of 
political authority, the number of seats granted to Singapore in the House of 
Representatives would be 15 instead of 25 to which she was entitled by reason of 
her population, and that Singapore citizens should not become Federation citizens 
on Merger despite them being given Malaysian nationality and passports
187
. 
There was thus the special agreement on the reciprocal restrictions on franchise right and 
between the Governments of Malaya and Singapore.  These restrictions were imposed upon 
the citizens originally from Singapore with regard to their eligibility to vote and stand as 
political candidates in any part of Federation outside Singapore.  Likewise, a citizen of 
Malaysia, who was not a citizen of Singapore, would not be allowed to vote or stand in 
election in Singapore.  In addition to that, citizens originating from Singapore would qualify 
for the right to enfranchisement in Malaysia provided that the person ‘satisfies the residence 
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and other qualifications for citizenship under the Federal law to qualify for a registration as a 
voter in the Federation outside Singapore.  So long as he is registered in the Federation, his 
name will be deleted from the electoral roll of Singapore’188. 
These official statements show that political representation based on ethnicity came to be a 
defining problem in the conception of citizenship for the Federation.  The explicit political 
identification of ethnicity with power play inspired a very ethnic-centric view in the official 
thinking behind the notion of differential citizenship rights.   Whilst the criteria for 
disenfranchisement were categorically spelt out for Singapore citizens, there was no mention 
of how their contribution to the new nation would be taken into consideration.  The deliberate 
measure on the part of the UMNO leadership to exclude citizens of the Singapore territory 
from voting and standing as candidates outside Singapore contributed to the fractured sense of 
political ownership to ‘Greater Malaysia’ whereby the civic contribution of one particular 
group of citizens was not given due recognition by the Federal Government in Kuala Lumpur.   
This fractured sense of political ownership was compounded by the conflicting visions of the 
local nationalist leaders and their lack of empathy towards the individual histories of the other 
merger territories, which ultimately underscored the fragility of the Malaysian Federation in 
its early years (Stockwell 2005: 210-11). How the issues of national identity were being 
addressed by the political elites, combined with the kinds of ideas that informed their 
perspectives about what constitute citizenship rights underscored the ‘fragile guarantees’ that 
destabilized the Malaysian Federation in its early years.  One of the major signs of such 
instabilities was the expulsion of Singapore from the Federation in 1965, largely due to the 
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problem of finding a common ground to agree upon the rights of citizenship for the Malaysian 
subjects in a multi-ethnic society (Grossholz 1966; Milne 1966; Milne 1970; Siddique and 
Suryadinata 1982; Crouch 1996).  The idea of a common citizenship in the form of 
‘Malaysian Malaysia’ proposed by Lee Kuan Yew was enthusiastically supported by non-
Malays in the Peninsula as well as the political parties in Sabah and Sarawak through the 
formation of the Malaysian Solidarity Convention in 1965.  This was fiercely resisted by 
UMNO because ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ posed a serious political threat to the prevailing status 
quo of UMNO as the dominant power bloc in the Federal government.  More importantly, the 
call for a common citizenship rights to the Malaysian identity brought about the fear among 
the Malay elites of the prospects of Singaporean Chinese dominating in the political 
mainstream (Tan 2008).     
It became increasingly apparent that what the leaders of UMNO envisaged for the Malaysian 
nation was never defined in terms of the duties and obligations of citizenship, instead it was 
grounded in the political will to power for Bangsa Melayu.  The Merger was therefore 
negotiated upon a one-sided view of political dominance that was conceived in terms of a 
particular ethnic ownership of the nation.  Whilst the fragility of the Merger had been caused 
by other material and ideological reasons, the issue of political ownership grounded in the 
differential citizenship rights had triggered the ideological split between Tunku Abdul 
Rahman and Lee Kuan Yew.  The fundamental disagreements over the principles of 
citizenship began to fuel the political gulf between the Federal government led by Tunku in 
K.L and the PAP government led by Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, which contributed to the 
unilateral decision by Tunku to expel Singapore two years after the Malaysian Federation, 
was established.   
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6.6 The Constitution and Malaysia (Singapore Amendment) Separation 
Bill, 1965: The erosion of parliamentary democracy 
The Constitution and Malaysia (Singapore Amendment) Bill, 1965 was Parliamentary motion 
that severed Singapore from the Malaysian Federation and in about three hours of 
deliberation, it was the fastest constitutional resolution ever achieved in the politics of 
peaceful secession (Young 1994).  The aim of this analysis is to highlight the critical debates 
that dominated the ideological foundation of the political ownership of Malaysian Federation.   
At the heart of the debates lay the ideological contrast between the historically-constructed 
privileges of the Bangsa Melayu and the call for equal citizenship rooted in the Malaysian 
Malaysia campaign galvanized by the Malaysian Solidarity Convention.  Prior to the creation 
of Malaysia, the politics of ethnic consociationalism had been practiced by the Alliance as the 
means to sustaining the ideal of political right for Bangsa Melayu under the mitigating 
concept of ethnic bargaining (Lijphart 1977; Mauzy 1993; Case 1996; Lijphart 1998).  
However two years after the inauguration of the Malaysian Federation, the ideological thrust 
of Malaysian Malaysia – one that centred on the political demand for equality – was deemed 
hostile by the Alliance leadership. 
Lee Kuan Yew dissolved the state assembly a few days after the inauguration of Malaysian 
Federation on 16 September 1963 to make way for a fresh election.  However political 
tensions between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore began to intensify as each began getting 
involved in the politics of the other.  The Alliance coalition fielded UMNO candidates to 
contest in Singapore’s state elections, but were trounced by the political might of the PAP 
(Trocki 2006:125-126).  A year later the PAP ran its candidate, Devan Nair who won the 
Parliamentary seat of Bangsar in the April 1964 Malaysian general election.  Tunku accused 
the PAP’s of meddling in the political affairs of Malaysia and hinted that the PAP had broken 
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its agreement (Milne 1966:180).  The said agreement referred to the ‘secret London 
Agreement’ 1962189 signed between the Harold Macmillan (for the British Government) and 
Tunku Abdul Rahman (For the Malayan Government) because the agreement covertly 
transferred sovereignty of North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore to Kuala Lumpur before the 
Merger.  Whilst the London Agreement was never made public, it signified the concealed 
assurance of the British Government to guarantee absolute political hegemony for the 
Malayan Government to dominate national administration and prevail over political dissents. 
Few months after the election, the State government in Singapore began to pursue the policy 
of non-discrimination that fell short of extending Article 153 to the Malays in Singapore.  On 
19 July 1964, Lee Kuan Yew and the Minister of Social Affairs, Othman Wok met with the 
leaders of Malay community to explain the policies of equal opportunities for all Malaysians.  
However the Singapore UMNO Action Committee reacted negatively to this policy and 
accused Lee of undermining Sino-Malay relations (Leifer 1965; Clutterbuck 1984).  This was 
then followed by protests from the Malays fuelling into further ethnic and religious tensions 
(Leifer 1964; Abraham, Liu et al. 2002).  Against the backdrop of these tensions, progress on 
establishing a common market became challenging even though Singapore had committed to 
fund substantial development loan to Sabah and Sarawak
190
.  In December 1964, the Federal 
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Government had also begun to demand a higher percentage of Singapore's revenue in order to 
meet defence expenditures incurred fighting Confrontation
191
 .   
The strategy of non-discrimination continued to shape PAP’s political outlook in the 
Malaysian Federation to the extent that Lee Kuan Yew took the initiative to add to the speech 
of His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (Report 1965c:10-32) by way of an amendment 
the following statement.   
‘But regrets the Address by His Majesty Yang di-Pertuan Agong did not reassure 
the nation that Malaysia continue to progress in accord with its democratic 
Constitution towards a Malaysian Malaysia, but that on the contrary the Address 
has added to the doubts over the intentions of the present Alliance Government 
and over the measures it will adopt when faced with the loss of majority popular 
support’(Report 1965b:568) 
Lee Kuan Yew’s motion to include the concept of Malaysian Malaysia to the King’s speech in 
the House of Representative was an attempt to force the agenda of non-discrimination into in 
the debates.  His motion for Malaysian Malaysia to be included in the Malaysian political 
discourse was a strategy to counter ideological dominance of loyalty to the political party and 
shift the political nature of loyalty back to the concept of government as the representation of 
the will of the people
192
.  The PAP found four opposition parties from Malaya and Sarawak to 
form the Malaysian Solidarity Convention to support the Malaysian Malaysia concept.  This 
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concept was sharply distinguished from Bangsa Melayu by Lee Kuan Yew, in his speech 
during the Malaysian Solidarity Convention in 1965.   
‘We are co-owners.  This is important.  We are fighting for Malaysia: agreed.  
Who own Malaysia?  This is very important because having fought for Malaysia, 
10 years of Confrontation, suddenly we find only some are owners.  The others are 
what Dato Syed Albar has called Orang Tumpangan, or squatters…I like Tunku’s 
way.  He says, “Soft talk.  Come let us talk, let us say anything” Very honestly, I 
used to talk with him for hours, yes.  He said he is prepared to listen for more 
hours.  I was very cheered when I read that, because I will have to talk to him for 
more hours.  But a long talk is in order to achieve certain fundamentally agreed 
objectives.  What are we fighting for? You say donate Defence Fund, mobilize the 
people, Vigilante Corps, National service.  I say alright, agreed.  But what is this 
for?  For Malaysia? Agreed, very good.  Who gets the benefits out of Malaysia?  
Who gets the benefits out of Malaysia?  In other words, to whom does Malaysia 
belong?  To some or to all Malaysians?  If to all Malaysians, regardless of race, 
language, culture, religion, I say well, three cheers, full agreement, proceed.  
Satisfied, win or lose we will fight on.  But if there is any doubt about that, I say 
let us clarify this first’ (1965: 11, 21)193. 
As most of PAP members were of Chinese ethnic background, UMNO leaders began to 
politicize this as a Chinese plot to take over control of Malaysia. The situation got worse in 
the following months, with abusive speeches in the House of Representatives including 
demands for the arrest of Lee Kuan Yew and other PAP leaders by UMNO extremists.   
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Fearing further outbreaks of communal violence, Tengku Abdul Rahman decided to separate 
Singapore from Malaysia. The reason gives was the alleged divisive ‘communal issue’ that 
was brought up by the leaders of Singapore.  Tunku’s immediate response to Lee Kuan Yew’s 
call for Malaysian Malaysia was, ‘(1) to take repressive measures against the Singapore 
Government or their leaders for the behaviour of their leaders; and (2) in the course of action, 
which we are taking now, to severe connection with the State Government of Singapore that 
has ceased to give even a measure of loyalty to the Central Government’ (Report 
1965a:1460).   
The sudden introduction for this Bill was described as a ‘certificate of emergency’194 in the 
Parliament.  Lim Chong Eu (MP for Tanjong) went as far as to claim that 9 August ‘is not 
only the day of liberation for Singapore but it will be remembered as the day of the death of 
Constitutional procedure in Malaysia’(Report 1965a:1502).  The Malaysian Malaysia ideal of 
common citizenship was seen as a serious political challenge not only to the Alliance practice 
of ethnic bargaining, but also threatened the safeguards for Malay political power.  The threat 
to Malay political power essentially motivated UMNO leaders to justify the imposition of 
repressive measures against the Singapore leaders on the grounds of ‘national security’ and to 
diffuse the political threat via the procedure of Constitutional amendment. 
The tabling of the 1965 Bill to separate Singapore from the Malaysian Federation at the 
Parliament marked an important watershed where a serious Constitutional precedent was 
committed amounting to the political abuse of the Constitution by the executive power.  Since 
1965 the procedure to amend the Constitution as a political strategy has been used by the 
ruling party UMNO time and again whenever there’s considerable challenge to Malay 
political power.  In its political quest to preserve Malay political power, UMNO’s strategy to 
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amend the Constitution in every major crisis destabilizes the impartiality of the state, further 
eroding the fundamental liberties of citizens by widening the differential gap between the 
majority Malay citizens professing the Islamic religion and the rest of the population.    
6.7 Constitutional restrictions on free speech after 1969 ethnic riot: the 
cultivation of self-censorship in the public political culture. 
The Constitutional act of severing Singapore from the Malaysian Federation in 1965 provided 
the impetus for the Federal government to contain political dissents and consolidate power 
through the use of the law.  Immediately after the Singapore debacle, local leaders from the 
Borneo territories expressed anxieties and dissatisfactions against the Federal government for 
failure to consult them over the separation crisis.   In order to stem further demands from the 
Borneo leaders for the review of the terms of Malaysia Agreement, the Federal government 
engineered the downfall of the non-Muslim leaders in Sabah and Sarawak in 1967 by setting 
up proxy alliances with Muslim leaders in both territories
195
 (Means 1968).  It was important 
for the Federal government to contain political dissents in Sabah and Sarawak at the time in 
lieu of the General Election in 1969.  The Alliance party did not envisage heavy losses in the 
General Election, losing its popular support from 58.4% in 1964 to 48.4% and winning only 
66 seats out of 103 total parliamentary seats contested.  The Opposition parties had 
collectively increased their support from 41.6% in 1964 to 51.6% and winning a total of 37 
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parliamentary seats, thus denying the Alliance coalition from a 2/3 majority in the Parliament.  
Perhaps the most significant impact of the Singapore ejection upon the 1969 General Election 
was the emergence of the DAP as the leading opposition party.  After its antecedent, PAP 
(People’s Action Party) won a single seat in 1964, the DAP increased its Parliamentary seats 
to a total of thirteen in 1969 (Ratnam and Milne 1970; Rudner 1970). 
The reduced majority of the Alliance created the condition for the politicization of ethnic 
sentiments that pitched the Malays against the Chinese communities in the Peninsular 
Malaysia.  The Malaysian Malaysia debate and the Singapore ejection from the Federation 
could have contributed to the loss of support for the Alliance coalition.  Within the Malay 
community, the main contention between UMNO and PAS (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Part) 
rested on the ideology of selling the rights of the Malays to the Chinese; similarly the Chinese 
were politically divided on the concept of ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ where the DAP (Democratic 
Action Party) insinuated the MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association) of colluding with UMNO 
to undermine the prospect of building equal society in Malaysia (Milne 1970; Comber 1983; 
Case 1993; Lee 2000; Horowitz 2001; Kua 2007).  Three days after the conclusion of the 
General Election on the 13 May 1969, violent ethnic clashes mainly between the Malays and 
the Chinese took place in the capital.  Official records stated that 196 people were killed and 
this followed the declaration of national emergency by the Malaysian government giving way 
to the National Operations Council to be the caretaker government between 1969 until 
Parliament was resumed in February 1971.   
When the House of Representatives reconvened in February 1971 the motion to amend the 
Constitution was tabled by the new Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak in a bid to stop the 
resurgence of political demand for common citizenship right.  The proposed amendments had 
two important aims:  the first one was to deter the public discussion of sensitive issues in 
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order to maintain the smooth running parliamentary democracy, and the second one was to 
restore inequalities between the ethnic groups (Report 1971:550).  The motion to restrict the 
public discussion of sensitive issues fell under the Constitutional remit of Article (10) 
‘Freedom of speech, assembly and association’196, and Article (63) ‘Privileges of Parliament’ 
as well as Article (72) ‘Privileges of Legislative Assembly’.  The need to restrict the freedom 
of speech and the public articulation of opinions was argued on the grounds of the national 
security of the Federation.  Tun Razak stated that, by such amendments, this strategy would 
give power to the Parliament to approve laws that prohibit the acts of questioning anything 
related to the citizenship provisions in Part III of the Constitution, the rights, status, special 
position in Article 153, the privileges of the national language in Article 152, as well as the 
institution of the Malay Sultans in Article 181(Report 1971:56).  Anyone who is found guilty 
of such public expression will be subject to Sedition Act 1948 and can be arrested without a 
warrant
197
 
 ‘Let those who are citizens of Malaysia under this provisions be ensured clearly 
that their rights shall not be challenged.  The basic provisions relating to the 
acquisition of citizenship represented a fair and balanced compromise.  The same 
careful and balanced approach runs through other provisions in the Constitution 
protecting the legitimate interests of all races in Malaysia.  MPs and State 
Legislators should be publicly accountable for their roles in public discussion.  
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Since these debates are recorded and would be disseminated into the public, 
Parliament must be given the authority to approve laws to restrict the freedom of 
speech among MPs and State Legislators in the House so that they would not 
bring issues of sensitive nature into public political discussions.  The freedom of 
speech for elected public representatives is not equivalent to the right to insult and 
instigate communal hatred’ – Tun Razak (Report 1971:57-60) 
Two important issues linked to this Constitutional amendment are the reservation of 
educational opportunities and the restructuring of the Malaysian economy.  This is because 
these two subjects have considerable impacts upon the citizen’s right to equal opportunities 
and the prospects of social mobility.  The reservation quota for higher education opportunities 
was addressed by the amendment to the Constitution was the inclusion of a new clause 
8(A)
198
 under Article 153, ‘which places the responsibility on the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
(King) to safeguard not only the special position of the Malays but the legitimate interests of 
the other communities’.  The inclusion of the new clause afforded greater Constitutional 
scope for the sovereign role of the King to offer categorical protection to the specific 
provisions reserved for the Malays and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak.  
The term ‘Malay’ Article 160199 is specifically read with the provision of Article 153 within 
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the ambit of the New Economic Policy.  The term ‘native’ for Sabah and Sarawak under 
Article 161A defines their status as belonging to indigenous race, but not carefully defined as 
the definition for ‘Malay’200.  Whilst the extension of special position to the natives in Sabah 
and Sarawak was meant to protect the indigenous communities in the territories
201
, it is 
debatable whether their protection was on par with the Special Position enjoyed by the 
Malays particularly when the Federal government abrogated the power of the Chief Ministers 
in both territories on policy of civil service appointments.  
The 1969 ethnic riot shifted the pre-Malaysia concern about Sino-Malay power balance to the 
focus of Malay special rights and the executive decision over how these rights were to be 
safeguarded.  The Prime Minister emphasized that these changes to the Constitutions were 
necessary not only on the grounds of moral obligation but also underlined the legal 
commitment of the Government to rectify the ethnic group inequalities in the fields of 
education and economy.  This shift in focus emerged as a result of the perception that ‘Malays 
                                                                                                                                                                      
interpretation of the Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of any written law within the 
meaning of that Ordinance, but with the substitution of references to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong for 
references to the High Commissioner. 
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Clause 6(A) of Article 161A ‘Special Position of natives of Sabah and Sarawak: 
(a) In relation to Sarawak, a person who is a citizen and either belongs to one of the races 
specified in Clause (7) as indigenous to the State or is of mixed blood deriving exclusively 
from those races; and 
(b) In relation to Sabah, a person who is a citizen, is the child or grandchild of a person of a race 
indigenous to Sabah, and was born (whether on or after Malaysia Day or not) either in Sabah 
or to a father domiciled in Sabah at the time of the birth. 
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Sians, Tagals, Tabuns and Ukits. 
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felt insecure about the existing gap between them and the non-Malays in the fields of 
education and economy’ (Report 1971:64).  Hence the conceptual grouping of the Malays and 
natives of Sabah and Sarawak into the new umbrella term of Bumiputera became the new 
target group thought to be more deserving in the restructuring agenda of New Economic 
Policy. 
 ‘The privileges that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong can give under Article 153 to 
the natives of Sabah and Sarawak will only be in respect of Federal matters, i.e., 
matters under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government.  These amendments 
will not in any way affect the power of the State to provide privileges to the 
natives in the two States in matters which are under their jurisdiction.  By these 
amendments, it can now be clearly seen that the natives of Sabah and Sarawak 
are placed exactly in the same position as the Malaysians in the States of West 
Malaysia’ (Report 1971:64).  This entailed the cancellations of Clauses (1), (2) 
and (3) under Article 161A– on the ‘Special position of natives of the Borneo 
states’ - where it involved the power of the Chief Ministers in Sabah and 
Sarawak to decide on the matters relating to the reservation of public services in 
the two states, so as to streamline the decision making under the Federal 
jurisdictions (Report 1971:63) 
These amendments to the Constitution proposed by the Prime Minister, Tun Razak had two 
important political implications.  1) The use of legal sanctions against the freedom of speech 
among citizens and elected representatives.  This was politically motivated to censor the 
public discussion on certain issues classified as sensitive issues.  The decreeing of the 
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‘penalties for opinion’ to paraphrase J.S Mill202 marked the discursive start for the 
criminalization of public opinion as a political strategy to undermine the dynamics of 
contestation.  2) The Constitutional amendment to override the power of the Chief Ministers 
in Sabah and Sarawak on the issue of public service appointments was justified on the 
grounds of streamlining the special position of the Bumiputera (Sons of the soil) in Sabah and 
Sarawak that would commensurate with the special privileges enjoyed by the Malays in the 
West Malaysia.  This had the effect of transferring political control over the appointment of 
key public service positions into the hands of UMNO in the Federal government.   
“Bumiputera” (Sons of the soil) became a de facto category that was formulated exclusively 
as a policy measure to fulfil the educational and economic demands of the Malays in West 
Malaysia as well as the other indigenous groups in East Malaysia.  Whilst the NEP has been 
instrumental in addressing the issue of Malay poverty (Ariffin Omar 2004; Faruqi Shad 
Saleem 2004) and many studies have shown that it contributed significantly to the expansion 
of the Malay middle-class in West Malaysia (Gomez 2004; Maznah Mohamad 2004), the 
same could not be said of the “Bumiputera” in Sabah and Sarawak.  This is due to the unequal 
political weight designated to the concept ‘right’ largely in favour of the Malays in West 
Malaysia.  
UMNO makes exclusive claim upon the political meaning of Malay identity and privileges 
(Singh 1998).  The NEP was designed to alleviate conditions of poverty among the Malays 
and other indigenous people in Sabah and Sarawak categorized as “Bumiputera”.  However 
UMNO’s exclusive claim to uphold Malay special rights exposes the ambiguous and layered 
meaning of “Bumiputera”, especially when we consider its purpose and its ideological 
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underpinning vis-à-vis Sabah and Sarawak “Bumiputera”.  Whilst Malay as an ethnic 
category has a Constitutional definition and tangible provisions, the designation of 
“Bumiputera” and how it is understood in Sabah and Sarawak is definitely not as 
empowering.  “Bumiputera” has no legitimate status in the Malaysian Constitution and 
remains an abstract concept that is only instrumental for political arguments. 
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter traces the problematic development of nation-state and its repercussions upon the 
conception of Malaysian citizenship: ethnic claims against the political language of Malaysian 
Malaysia.  The Grand Design for the Malaysian Federation was a politically motivated 
decolonization project on the part of the British to retain a certain strategic influence in the 
region.  The political deliberations involved in achieving consensus over wide-ranging issues 
were challenging, not least on the accounts of the key agents, notably Tunku Abdul Rahman 
and Lee Kuan Yew, having conflicting ideas over the issues of political power and criteria for 
citizenship.  Despite these conflicts the Malaysian Federation was inaugurated in 1963.  The 
new Federation was structured or institutionalized as a state system that was somewhat 
divorced from the political histories of the people, particularly from the Borneo territories of 
North Borneo (Sabah) and Sarawak.  These territories were geographically separated not only 
by the South China Sea but also from the centre of all important political decisions in Kuala 
Lumpur and Singapore.   
The first major political crisis emerged as political disputes between the Alliance party in 
Kuala Lumpur and the PAP in Singapore over the content of Malaysian citizenship.  Lee 
Kuan Yew’s attempt to galvanize political support for the Malaysian Malaysia agenda 
resulted in Singapore’s ejection from the Federation through the 1965 Separation Bill tabled 
by the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman.  The effect of this Bill had created the 
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Constitutional precedent for the ruling party UMNO to employ similar political strategy to 
contain the dynamics of contention from the opposition.  The constitutional amendments as a 
political strategy to contain dissent was employed again following in 1971 after the ethnic 
riot, and this time it was used to criminalize citizens and elected representatives for publicly 
challenging UMNO’s legitimacy in the government.  The 1965 and 1971 Constitutional 
amendments were critical junctures that paved the way for the ruling party to resort to 
legislative procedures to eliminate political dissension and stay in power. 
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7 RE-POSITIONING THE POLITICAL ROLE OF ISLAM AND THE DE-
SECULARIZATION OF THE MALAYSIA STATE 
 
Abstract: The process of de-secularization of the Malaysian state occurred both within the 
institutional changes in the law and in the conduct of political agents.  These have had 
significant impacts upon the citizenship rights of minority citizens in the country. The 
progressive de-secularization of the Malaysian state emerged as a result of the ideological 
shift in the ways laws have been publicly interpreted to legitimize the power of the state on the 
pretext of fulfilling the obligation of Islamic grounded moral precept.  The process leads to 
the erosion of fundamental liberties of the citizens who in turn contested the legitimacy of the 
state by reasserting the humanistic principles enshrined in the supposedly secular Malaysian 
Constitution.  Such contestation demands a conception of justice that is not narrowly 
interpreted to serve the dominance of Islamic comprehensive doctrine, signifying the 
reinvigoration of the political agency to reclaim common citizenship right.  
7.1 Introduction 
‘Malaysia ini Negara Islam.  You tidak suka, you keluar dari Malaysia’203 
[Malaysia is an Islamic country.  You don’t like it, you get out of Malaysia] 
(UMNO MP for Jerai, Kedah: Dato Paduka Haji Badruddin bin Amiruldin, Parliamentary 
Debates, 11 July 2005, pp. 34-35) 
The promotion of the idea of Malaysia as an Islamic country in the public discourse has 
generated the implications of ‘who owns Malaysia’ and ‘on what terms the criteria for 
citizenship are negotiated’.  Loyalty to the government becomes imperative to retaining 
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citizenship and Islam has somehow assumed the signifier of privilege to preferential 
citizenship in Malaysia.  The de-secularization of the Malaysian state appeared to gain 
momentum ever since the ‘Allah’ controversy first emerged under the Abdullah Ahmad 
Badawi administration
204
, coinciding with the political quest for an Islamic state post 9/11.  
This accelerated pace of de-secularization of the state has generated a fractured sense of 
identity with dire implications upon the ideal of common citizenship rights. 
This chapter presents three cases highlighting the relationship between the de-secularization 
of the state and the fractured sense of citizenship in the contemporary experience.  These 
cases show the ideological, empirical and legal implications of the de-secularization of the 
state upon citizenship rights.  Historically the unique confluence of the sovereign Malay 
Kingship and Western colonialism created the syncretic legal framework of Civil-Syariah in 
the Malaysian Federation and the dynamics of the religious and secular have had reciprocal 
bearing upon the politicization of citizenship rights that was split into indigenous and migrant 
dialogues throughout the history of colonialism.  The tension between these two strands of 
ideological perspective of citizenship rights intensified during the Communist Insurgency and 
continued to influence the making of the Malayan constitution in 1957.  In its political 
transition into the 1963 Malaysian Federation, the contention over citizenship right found 
political articulation and mobilization that divided the issue into Malay special position 
supported by the Alliance led by Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew’s Malaysian Malaysia backed by 
the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee; this subsequently led to the ejection of 
Singapore in 1965. 
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The ejection of Singapore in 1965 marked the critical juncture where the use of Constitutional 
Amendments was employed to eliminate political dissent.  This practice was again employed 
after the 1969 ethnic riot in which the Malaysian Government justified using ‘national 
security’ as the main reason to amend the Constitution again 1971 (discussed in Chapter 6) to 
contain the political conduct and the public expression of the citizens.  Since then the main 
ideological thread to this mode of eliminating dissent was the increasing emphasis upon the 
language of political right, grounded in the symbolic complexes of Bangsa Malay, Islam and 
Raja.   
These political events show that the values accorded to the symbolic complexes of Bangsa 
Malay, Islam and Raja has become indisputable, and therefore acquire the status of morally 
defensible in the public political culture.  It has now reached the point where the Malaysian 
government has taken the legal approach to defend these values not only because they are at 
risk of being submerged by the forces of modernity but more importantly, it is defending the 
sense of ‘ownership’ conceived in terms of the heritage of the Raja, and the ecumenical 
representation of Bangsa Malay founded on the civilization of Islam.  In the process of 
defending these values, the state policies and practices were then grounded in the language of 
‘rights’ as the overriding reason to sustain public order, or in other words, to avoid further 
communal conflicts in the name of national security.  In such condition, the understanding of 
the nature of the secular state and the process of its de-secularization in the Malaysian 
experience has to be contextualized in terms of the reciprocity between political events and 
the interpretation of Malaysian Constitution. 
Unlike Islam, no special provision for secular state was established in the Malaysian 
Constitution, and whilst the political commitment to a kind of secular state was formally 
articulated by the Alliance leadership, the values that were central to the normative 
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understanding of secular state were not expounded as it should.   Although the awareness for 
secular state was given due political recognition, the absence of legal obligation for the 
Malaysian government to apply the values of neutrality and equal treatments in the condition 
of pluralism in the Malaysian society is all too apparent.  In the ‘Equality’ provision in Article 
8 of the Constitution where it states, 
 in Clause (1) ‘All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal 
protection of the law’, its interpretation would be subjected to Clause (2) that 
states, ‘Except expressly authorized by this Constitution, there shall be no 
discrimination against citizens on the ground only of religion, race, descent, 
place of birth or gender in any law...’205   
Within the ‘Equality’ provision alone the scope and meaning of equality is fairly restricted 
because of the caveat on Clause (2) relates to the special position provisions that the 
Constitution has explicitly authorized for qualified safeguard.    
Since the ‘Equality’ provision does not carry as much legal weight as the provisions for 
Bangsa Malay, Islam and Raja, discriminatory offences that are grounded in overt racism and 
sexism for instance, are less likely to get criminalized by the Malaysian State.  The Education 
Minister, Muhyddin Yassin who is also the Deputy Prime Minister, recently admitted publicly 
that he has no power to take action against two secondary school principals over racism in 
secondary schools, where teachers told Chinese students to go back to China for disrespectful 
behaviours
206
.  The Education Minister gave the reason that the disciplinary matters involving 
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high ranking civil servants comes under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Department
207
 
and not considered to be a criminal offence.   
After many decades of state driven nation- building agenda through education, higher learning 
institutional expansion and economic restructuring, the ideal of integrated Malaysian 
citizenship has not prevailed.  Instead the country  remains a nation of ‘ethnic citizens’ 
whereupon the basic criteria of loyalty and absolute gratitude to the government are central to 
the conception of nationhood (Brown 2007).  Loyalty and gratitude as virtues of citizens are 
promoted in favour of other virtues like justice and equality, as they may be destabilizing to 
the special position of the Malay status quo - that found its way into the national school 
curriculum in the Form Five History workbook.  The following question is found in Chapter 
4, which relates to the topic on ‘The Federation of Malaya: 1948 Federation of Malaya 
Agreement’: 
 “If you are a leader, name two steps you can do to defend the Malays’ status quo?”208 
The answer to the question, which is found on Page J10 of the book states: “To tighten 
citizenship” and “Pressure the British to protect Malay interests”. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
quoted, ‘Chinese students are not needed here and they can return to China or attend Foon Yew 
Chinese Independent School.  The Chinese and the Indians are squatters in the country and therefore 
they should not have equal claims upon the country similar to the Malays.  Non-Malay students are 
squatters in this 1Malaysia concept, and that is why the special right of the Malays must be defended 
under Article 153 ’. 
 
The other case of school principal making racist remark was Ungku Aznan, the head teacher of SMK 
Bukit Selambau in Sungai Petani, Kedah.  The principal apparently told off some Chinese students for 
not respecting their Muslim friends and that they should return to their country of origin if they did not 
show such respect.    The Star 21 August 2010, ‘Another racist school head in Kedah’.  
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7.2 De-secularization of the state 
The Malaysian government was never designed to be an Islamic theocratic state.  However, 
the ways in which the legal-political apparatus was established, along with the creation of 
special provisions in the Constitution to defend the position of the Malay, Islam and sovereign 
Kingship, contributes the inclination towards Islamic governance on the back of modern 
constitutionalism.  This paper adopts the Christian terminology ‘ecumenism’ to describe how 
the ruling party UMNO (United Malay National Organization) tries to homogenize Malay 
citizens through the universalization of Islamic values in the public sphere. The course of de-
secularization cannot be understood in terms of the design of the institutional framework of 
the state alone as it requires careful analysis of the ideological thinking behind the strategy of 
the state elites, in this case UMNO (United Malays National Organization), to sustain power 
and political legitimacy through the use of law. 
‘De-secularization’ as a conceptual framework was introduced by Peter Berger as a 
theoretical construct to reassess the theory of secularization against the contemporary 
resurgence of political theology in global politics
209
 (Berger 1999; Karpov 2010).  In this 
dissertation, ‘de-secularization’ addresses the conceptual erosion of secular responsibility and 
its relationship to the institutional violence against religious liberty through the application of 
the laws.  The normative components of secular responsibility include neutrality, tolerance 
and equality, essential to the operational requirements of secular governance to ensure that all 
citizens, regardless of religious backgrounds are equal in the eyes of the law.   
.   
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This chapter highlights three significant cases that challenged the deliberate practices of the 
Malaysian state in promoting the universalization of Islam for the preferential treatment of the 
majority ethnic group.  The first case relates to the government ban on the use of the word 
‘Allah’ among the Christian congregation, in the printed materials and the Bible that are 
meant for the Christian readership.  The Christian community is the third largest faith 
community in Malaysia, comprising about 9.1% of the population after Islam (60.2%) and 
Buddhism (19.2).  Although the Christians have been using the word ‘Allah’ for many years, 
the ideological claim upon the exclusive right to use the word ‘Allah’ for the Muslim 
community has become a recent political contestation raised by some radical Muslim groups 
and government leaning Muslim scholars.  The second case is the urban mobilization of the 
Indians by HINDRAF in 2007 as a crucial moment of counter-Islamization movement that 
challenged the de-secularization of the state.   
The third case is the challenge of sexuality in the Islamized public discourse, where four 
Malay Mak Nyahs (transgender people) have submitted legal challenge against the Syariah 
law for criminalizing cross-dressing
210
.  Violent abuses against the transgender community 
have risen especially at the hands of the authority and the religious police
211
.  Under the 
Syariah criminal law, the Muslim transgender can be persecuted for being a man who dresses 
like a woman (lelaki berlagak seperti perempuan).  In almost every state, this offence carries 
a jail term of six months (or one year in some states) or RM 1000 fine (up to a maximum of 
RM 5,000 in one state).  The constitution, organization and procedure of Syariah courts have 
jurisdiction only over persons professing the religion of Islam, and the administration of 
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Syariah justice comes under List II - State List in the Ninth Schedule of the Federal 
Constitution
212
.   
The process of de-secularization of the state in Malaysia reflects the politicization of Islam 
and ethnicity in Malaysia.  The rapid momentum of the process has been linked to the 
ideological implication of the laws being amended, resulting in the unequal protection of 
rights against religious discrimination.  The status of Islam as the official religion in the 
Federation with the juridical autonomy of the Syariah courts in the Malaysian sub-national 
states often result in conflicting interpretation of laws when it comes to the subject of rights 
for Muslims and interfaith relations.  Over the years Islam’s role has expanded in the official 
formulation of policies in legal systems, religious instruction in schools, funding and permits 
for the building of the places of worship, and other matters confined to its Constitutional 
remit.   
As the most influential set of comprehensive doctrine in Malaysia, Islam surpasses other 
competing forms of knowledge as the socially accepted guiding principles for just 
governance, the regulation of inter-faith relations, and where the adjudication of legal matters 
are concerned, justice is mainly understood within the context of Fiqh or Islamic 
jurisprudence.  Because of its position as the official religion, Islam has been institutionally 
recognized as the standard bearer of moral truth in the public discourse, and for this reason it 
precludes the consideration of other non-Islamic values as morally valid.  It is on this basis 
that any form of critical analysis or the questioning of public policies formulated within the 
theoretical frame of Islam will be interpreted by the Malaysian government as violating the 
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religious sensitivities of the Muslim community and this would constitute an offence under in 
Section 3 (1) of the Sedition Act 1948
213
. 
The lack of impartiality in the nature of government intervention in Malaysia has been further 
intensified by the way the ruling party UMNO (United Malay National Organization) tries to 
dominate the social forces of Islam that emanate from within the Malay community.  Through 
the government machinery, UMNO has engineered a sense of bounded entity grounded in 
Malay-Muslim ecumenism by emphasizing the moral virtues of loyalty and gratitude to the 
government as the essential character of patriotic citizenship, an imagined patriotism for 
slogan pleasing purposes during Independence Day celebration
214
.  The emphasis on loyalty 
and gratitude displaces the other competing virtues like justice, equality and human rights that 
are increasingly finding a foothold among citizens in their challenge against the 
homogenizing policies of state Islamization.  In its attempt to universalize Islamic values in 
the public sphere and monopolize the official interpretation of Islam, the Malaysian 
government compromised some of the fundamental values that are central to the impartiality 
of the secular state.  Impartiality here does not imply that the state should not reflect the 
concerns, interests and aspirations of the citizens at all; on the contrary, the state that is 
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secular allows for the rule of law to protect the fundamental liberties and the human rights of 
all citizens living in the social condition of pluralism.   
What UMNO, has done so far – with regard to the Constitutional amendments – was to focus 
only on the rights of the majority Malay-Muslim group on the pretext of protecting the 
position of Islam in the country.  The latest publication of the Federal Constitution (2006) 
shows that there had been about 300 amendments to the Articles being made, excluding those 
made to the Schedules
215
.  Of all these amendments being made to the Constitution, the 1988 
amendments marked the critical juncture that contributed to the loss of the independent role of 
the judiciary, and subsequently the rapid de-secularization of state practices.  The reason for 
the rapid de-secularization of the state was because the 1988 amendment to the Constitution 
created a legal lacuna that risks undermining the judicial role of the High Court in mediating 
cases grounded in interfaith conflicts.   
The events leading to the amendment played critical role because the motivation behind the 
proposal for the amendments were ideologically driven and politically charged.  The main 
contenders for Islamic leadership credentials are UMNO (United Malay National 
Organization), a Malay ethnic party and PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia), a Muslim political 
organization.  Political rivalry between them triggered the Islamic revivalism in the 1980’s 
leading the government to keep reforming the public institutions and make these services 
appear Islamic.  Increasingly, the provisions in the Constitution have been sought to find ways 
to make Islam an exclusive political prerogative for UMNO. 
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7.3 Selective government intervention in the structuring of economic 
nationalism via the New Economic Policy in the 1970’s 
The process of de-secularization of the state in Malaysia involved the active role of the state 
in promoting values in line with the safeguarding the Malay special position.  The 
introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1971, two years after the 1969 ethnic riot, was a 
case in point.  It is a policy that deliberately gave priority considerations to Malay-Muslim 
citizens in education, civil service employment and the businesses through the design and 
allocation of opportunities, social resource and the reservation of training opportunities as 
well as employment positions for Malay citizens.  The 1970’s was a period of significant 
government intervention in the investment of rural development and the restructuring the 
socio-economic through a series of Constitutional reforms in Malaysia that was ideological 
driven by Malay ethnic nationalism (Jomo 1986; Lall 1995; Crouch 1996).   
The expansion of Malay entrepreneurship and the intensification of Malay ethnic participation 
in public enterprises was bolstered by the amendment to the Industrial Relations Act in 1975 
giving the Ministry of Trade and Industry the powers to direct and control the development of 
industrial development, including the power to issue manufacturing licenses grounded on the 
terms of the New Economic Policy (Milne 1976; Wong 1990; Kuruvilla 1995).  The role of 
the state in the regulation of industrialization coincided with the Federal government control 
over the mining of oil and its related exploration activities, thus enabling the state to carry out 
its redistributive policies aimed addressing the problems of ethnic inequality and poverty 
(Gale 1981; Rasiah and Shari 2001; Jomo 2004).   
The deliberate industrialization strategy and the redistributive policies in the 1970’s 
undermined the role of impartiality in the systematic inquiry involving the understanding of 
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social problems and subsequently the formulation of public policies (Davies, Nutley et al. 
2000; Sanderson 2002)
216
.  Whilst the overall aims of the New Economic Policy were to 
eliminate poverty and reduce economic inequalities among different ethnic groups, the 
motivating factor behind the formulation of such policy was grounded in the historical 
protection of Malay sovereignty and in preserving the ideological dominance the Malay 
Special Position.   Whilst these policies were being pursued, the second Prime Minister and 
main protagonist of the NEP, Tun Abdul Razak, passed away in 1976 effecting regime change 
that saw the appointment of Hussein Onn, who was then the Deputy PM, to assume 
premiership after Tun Abdul Razak’s passing.   
Hussein Onn took over the administration of the country from 1976-1981, coinciding with the 
implementation of the Third Malaysian Plan.  During his short tenure, Hussein Onn executed 
economic policies that were relatively more inclusive in addressing the issue of poverty for all 
Malaysians compared to the ethnic centric vision of NEP under Tun Abdul Razak.  However 
the re-orientation of this ethno-centric policies into an inclusive agenda was somewhat 
derailed by the emerging factionalism not only within the ruling party UMNO but also the 
Barisan Nasional as well (MacAndrews 1977; Hui and Canak 1981).  There were serious 
problems involving federal-state relations where the executive power of Chief Ministers 
(Menteri Besar) over the use of funds at the sub-national level intensified UMNO factionalism 
at the national level as well as creating tensions with other coalition members in the Barisan 
Nasional.  Some of the Malaysian states having troubles with the issue of Menteri Besar’s 
discretionary over state funds included Selangor, Malacca, Perak, Negeri Sembilan, Kelantan, 
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Johore, Terengganu and Sabah where the core issues revolved around how party bosses at the 
subnational level distribute the benefits of office and funds among their loyalists (Muzaffar 
1978). 
These problems continued to plague the BN and UMNO when Dr Mahathir Mohamad took 
over the administration in 1981.  Through the process of selecting his loyal supporters and 
using draconian laws to intimidate any individuals that stood in his way, Dr Mahathir was 
able to personalize power by virtue of the party-state apparatus (Slater 1999; Slater and Bunce 
2008).  There was no shift in the Mahathir’s stance to human rights as he resorted to the use 
of the Internal Security Act 1966 (ISA) to detain political dissidents without trial, and also the 
Societies Act 1966 with the purpose of criminalizing ‘politicized’ groups or civil society 
movements (Mauzy 1993).   
The selective nature of government intervention in the economy during the 1970’s continued 
to shape the character of public debates in Malaysia, and this was further intensified by the 
way the ruling party UMNO tried to overcome the dissenting social forces of Islam emanating 
from within the Malay community throughout the 1980’s.  Through the government 
machinery, Mahathir tried to engineer a sense of bounded entity grounded in Malay-Muslim 
ecumenism by emphasizing the moral significance of loyalty and gratitude to the government 
for maintaining political stability and the economic progress for the Malay-Muslim 
community.  Loyalty and gratitude to the government have been held as the essential 
character of patriotic citizenship and they are repeatedly emphasized in different slogans on 
Merdeka or Independence Day celebration
217
.  The emphasis on loyalty and gratitude 
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displaces the other competing virtues like justice, equality and human rights that are 
increasingly finding a foothold among citizens in their challenge against the homogenizing 
policies of state Islamization.  These strategies were aimed at universalizing Islamic values in 
the public sphere and also to monopolize the official interpretation of Islam compromised 
some of the fundamental values that are central to the impartiality of the secular state
218
.  Dr 
Mahathir was responsible for the amending of the Constitution in 1988, and it marked the 
critical event that contributed to the loss of the independent role of the judiciary, and 
subsequently the de-secularization of state practices.  The latest publication of the Federal 
Constitution (2006) shows that there had been about 300 amendments to the Articles being 
made, excluding those made to the Schedules
219
.     
The 1988 Constitutional amendment intensified the process of de-secularization of the state at 
the institutional level.  This was ideologically by the unceasing political quest and 
contestation for legitimacy as PAS began to challenge UMNO’s credibility on Islamic 
leadership.  The Islamic revivalism since the 1980’s triggered interminable pressures for the 
ruling party to keep reforming the public institutions and make these services appear Islamic.   
Islam and the Malay identity began to furnish the ideological foundation upon which the 
political values of rights are being defined, reinterpreted and employed by the political leaders 
of the dominant Malay ethnic in public discourse.  One of the distinctive consequences of this 
has been the gradual weakening of the political commitment to the secular values of neutrality 
and tolerance, and this has led to the systemic abuse through Constitutional amendments as a 
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way to strengthen the political prowess of the ruling party UMNO within the ambit of the 
dominant Islamic political discourse. 
The 1988 amendment to the Constitution resulted in the perceived juridical autonomy of the 
Syariah courts, thus creating room for the politicization of Islam in the public sphere.  As the 
most influential set of comprehensive doctrine in Malaysia, Islam surpasses other competing 
forms of knowledge as the socially accepted guiding principles for just governance, and 
where the adjudication of legal matters are concerned, justice is mainly understood within the 
context of Fiqh or Islamic jurisprudence.  Because of its position as the official religion, Islam 
has been institutionally recognized as the standard bearer of moral truth in the public 
discourse, and for this reason it precludes the consideration of other non-Islamic values as 
morally valid.  It is on this basis that any form of critical analysis or the questioning of public 
policies formulated within the theoretical frame of Islam will be interpreted by the Malaysian 
government as violating the religious sensitivities of the Muslim community and this would 
constitute an offence under in Section 3 (1) of the Sedition Act 1948
220
. 
 
7.4 The 1988 amendment to Article 121(1) and judicial lacuna 
In the run-up to the 1988 Constitutional amendments, there were a number of significant 
events that drove UMNO’s leading agents to affect important changes into the law to maintain 
political legitimacy.  The emergence of the political and social contestations in the 1980’s 
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intensified the coercive nature of the Malaysian state.  Political repression against the 
opposition parties gradually led to the ideological split within the Malay community on the 
one hand and the polemic divide between the Muslim and the non-Muslim citizens on the 
other hand.  The socio-political background in the 1980’s underscored a number of critical 
junctures that furnished the rationale for UMNO to tighten its executive grip on the contest for 
Islamic values as a means to regain political legitimacy.   
The 1980’s marked a significant era in which Islam began to occupy a central place in the 
public political sphere in Malaysia.  The shift in the mode of thinking about Islam, about its 
prospect in the formulation of laws, in the restructuring of the moral order, in bringing back 
Islam into politics - had in many ways, challenged the meaning of Islam as the official 
religion of the Malaysian Federation.  This mode of thinking about Islam as ‘political’ 
galvanized the existing Islamic movements - Islamic youth movement ABIM (Angkatan Belia 
Islam Malaysia), PAS political party (Parti Islam SeMalaysia), Jemaah Islamiyah Malaysia as 
an NGO, and the dakwah or unregistered missionary movements of Al Arqam and Jamaat 
Tabligh, to name but a few prominent ones - to question the moral and political credibility of 
UMNO (Liow 2004; Liow 2004; Ahmad Fauzi 2007; Hamid 2008).  When Dr Mahathir 
Mohammed assumed the premiership in 1981,  there was a heightened level of political 
awareness not only about the role of Islam in revolutionizing governance and society among 
the Muslim community, but also the emergence of civil society movements from the non-
Muslim citizens (Mauzy and Milne 1983; Jesudasan 1995; Jesudasan 1996; Verma 2002; 
Weiss 2006).  
There were many different levels of contestations at the time.  Within UMNO party itself, the 
internal crisis and leadership challenges began to destabilize Mahathir’s position and 
Mahathir took on authoritarian stance to overcome challenges to his leadership (Boo Teik 
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1995; Leftwich 1995; Hilley 2001).  There was the fierce rivalry between UMNO and PAS, 
and whilst other forces of contentions also came to dominate the political scene on the 
substantive issues of education
221
, freedom of speech
222
, federal-state relations particularly the 
rift between Kuala Lumpur and Sabah (Kahin 1992; Loh Kok Wah 1992; Lim 1997; Lim 
2008), it was Islam that became the main ideological contender to capture the political agency 
of Malay identity (Ahmad 1986; Lee 1988; Abdullah 1999; Liow 2004).  Instead of allowing 
Islam to ‘re-flower’ and generate healthy debates within the public political discourse, 
Mahathir actually clamped down dissents and alternative forms of Islamic interpretations 
considered deviant from the official version (Mutalib 1990; Mutalib 1993).   
The government had to control the ‘political’ aspect of Islam, and had to rationalize with the 
liberal aspect of economic values as the moral catalysts for making modern Islamic 
entrepreneurship.  A series of institutional reforms were made to restructure the fundamentals 
of the economy to tame the political resurgence of Islamic movements.  There were reforms 
in the banking system, insurance, finance –  were aimed at casting a different light on the New 
Economic policy to empower the Malays and the Bumiputera economically, which paved the 
way for the gradual Islamization of the Malaysian capitalist system (Choudury 2000; El-
Gamal 2007; Abbot and Gregorious-Pippas 2010; Khoo and Vedi 2010).  Hence policy 
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intervention involving Islam, Malay and to a lesser extent the Bumiputera would be 
systematically entwined with the Islamizing practices of the state.  Islam played such a vital 
role in the policy deliberation of the state under Mahathir that state practices appeared to be 
institutionally synonymous with Islam (Nagata 1984; Chandra 1987; Camroux 1996; 
Martinez 2001; Hamayotsu 2003).  
The government, with the help of the Islamic authorities on issuing Fatwa has managed to 
subdue some of the dissenting forces within the Muslim community
223
.  The government was 
never hesitant in imposing detention laws upon dissidents and the Internal Security Act 
1960
224
  for instance was imposed upon the followers of Ibrahim Mahmud, following the 
Memali incident in 1985
225
.  Thirty six people were  arrested under ISA for practicing deviant 
Islamic teaching (Lee 1988; Ahmad Fauzi 2000; Tunku Muszaffar 2011).  The ISA was again 
used to arrest 106 individuals under Operation Lalang in 1987, which included the detention 
of high-profile opposition politicians, on the grounds of exploiting the racial sentiments
226
.  
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‘Do not control faith with laws’ (translation) by SIS, 29 September 2000 published in New Straits 
Times, Utusan Melayu, Malaysiakini. 
224
 ‘An Act to provide for the internal security of Malaysia, preventative detention, the prevention of 
subversion, the suppression of organized violence against persons and properties in specified areas of 
Malaysia, and for matters incidental thereto’, http://www.agc.gov.my/Akta/Vol.%202/Act%2082.pdf 
225
 On the 19 November 1985, the Acting PM and Home Minister Musa Hitam ordered 200 policemen 
to infiltrate the village of Memali in Kedah, where the leader of an Islamic sect, Ibrahim Mahmud and 
his 400 followers were residing.  The villagers defended themselves with a few hunting rifles and 
spears whilst the police used heavy armoured vehicles to destroy the houses.  The Home Minister even 
claimed that the women and children were attacking the police.  The siege left 14 civilians and four 
police officers dead. Parliamentary Debates (20-11- 1985) 
http://www.parlimen.gov.my/files/hindex/pdf/DR-20111985.pdf 
226
 According to the Government White Paper (KP14 1988) the opposition politicians attempted to 
cause racial tension for questioning the Government policies on Chinese vernacular education, the 
Education Act 1961 and most importantly the proposed commercial and housing development of an 
ancient Chinese cemetery in Malacca – which the Government White Paper did not elucidate.  
219 
 
The political upheavals in the early 1980’s merits serious examination here because prior to 
the 1988 Constitutional Amendment, individuals and groups were still able to rely on the 
justice system and the independence of the judiciary to counter the coercive use of state 
power
227
.  The 1988 Constitutional reforms initiated by Dr Mahathir was a political response 
to the legal lawsuits undertaken by 11 contending UMNO members who claimed that, 
(a) The election of the office-bearers at the general assembly on 24 April 1987 was 
unconstitutional, illegal and void and of no effect because of the existence of 
delegates from 30 unapproved branches in four divisions Registrar of Societies 
under the Societies Act 1966
228
. 
(b) A consequential declaration that the previous elected office-bearers of UMNO 
Malaysia at the 37
th
 UMNO Malaysia general  assembly still exists in law with all 
the powers subscribed to them until expiration of their full term or upon fresh 
UMNO general assembly and election being taken on a date to be fixed in 
accordance with the UMNO constitution. 
Justice Harun Hashim
229
 of KL High Court presided over the trial and dismissed the claims 
that the plaintiffs had sought.  His judgment was presented on the 4 February 1988 and the 
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reason given was that under the existing law he had no option but to find the party, UMNO, 
an unlawful society due to the existence of several unregistered branches: 
‘It follows that UMNO is still an unlawful society. That being so, the plaintiffs as 
members of UMNO cannot acquire any right which is founded upon that which is 
unlawful. The court will therefore not lend its aid to the reliefs sought by the 
plaintiffs. Having said that, I do not think it is necessary to deal with the other 
issues and I accordingly dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim.’230 
When UMNO was declared an unlawful society, it became politically critical for UMNO’s 
survival as a party because this declaration simultaneously affected its legitimacy as the 
Malaysian government. In a separate incident that was later linked to the process of the 
amendment, one of the ISA detainees under Operation Lalang – Karpal Singh – was granted 
release by order of the court on 9 March 1988 in response to a habeas corpus application
231
, 
only to be rearrested again after that.  The court’s deliberation on Karpal’s habeas corpus 
application exposed the gap in the way government officials exercise their discretionary 
power upon a person’s liberty.  This point referred to Point Number Six232 of the Home 
Ministry’s allegations made against Karpal that was not found or undetectable in the police 
case file, and so this allegation could not be admitted in the court.   The detainee was, and still 
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is; one of the leading counsels in Malaysia and the court was of the opinion that excluding 
Karpal in court to argue for his own liberty would go against the ordinary sense of fairness.  
These two court cases set off a chain of events that brought about the political conflict 
between the judiciary and the executive.  When judicial appeals were submitted for these 
cases to be heard, the Lord President fixed the dates for UMNO appeal on the 13 June 1987 
and Karpal’s habeas corpus on the 15 June 1987.  These events prompted Dr Mahathir to 
table a number of amendments to the Federal Constitution at the Parliament on the 17
th
 March 
1988, that many have now argued that these amendments had somehow curtailed the 
autonomy of the judicial power (Funston 1988; Nathan 1989; Lee 1989-1990; Harding 1990).  
The amendments were tabled in haste and in the absence of prominent opposition MPs 
detained under Operation Lalang.  The Lord President of the Supreme Court, Tun Salleh Abas 
then met up with all the judges in Kuala Lumpur on the 25 March 1988 to discuss about the 
repeated public attacks on the judiciary by the Prime Minister and how to salvage the role and 
the independence of the judiciary.  They reached a consensus to bring this matter into a 
diplomatic resolution through a letter requesting the King (Yang diPertuan Agong) to 
intervene
233
.  The King did not intervene and it has been mentioned elsewhere that the non-
intervention appeared to have been influenced by the 1983 crisis between the Rulers and the 
executive over the royal assent on the issue of legislation
234
.   
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The tension between the judiciary and the executive led to the Prime Minister officially 
suggesting to the King to remove the Lord President from his office on the grounds of judicial 
misbehaviour
235
.  The Prime Minister explained that the letter written by the Lord President 
had greatly displeased the King, despite the fact that the letter was written after joint 
consultation and that they acted well within their Constitutional remit(Harding 1990:64).  The 
removal of the Lord President in a tribunal was fixed on the 29 June 1988, and prior to the 
date, Tun Salleh Abas (the Lord President) filed an application in the High Court for an order 
of Prohibition to restrain the tribunal from proceeding on the grounds of dissatisfaction with 
the composition of the tribunal judges of whom, two occupied junior rank, one was the 
Speaker of Parliament, and another was a practising solicitor involved in business (Verma, 
Ebrahim et al. 2008:24).  The application for the order of Prohibition was only heard on the 2 
July 1988 in a special sitting of the Supreme Court in which the judges unanimously granted 
Tun Salleh Abas application for a limited stay restraining the tribunal from submitting its 
report, recommendation and advice to the King until further order.   
The five judges who granted the application were then charged with judicial misbehaviour 
following the commendation of the acting Lord President Tan Sri Dato’ Abdul Hamid Omar, 
in consultation with the Prime Minister.  Pursuant to Article 125(3) the King recommended 
that another tribunal would be established on 6 July to inquire into the conduct of the five 
judges who participated in the unauthorised 2 July Supreme Court hearing. Within the space 
of a month there were two tribunals investigating the judicial misconducts that led to the 
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removal of the Lord President in the first tribunal, and two Supreme Court judges in the 
second tribunal under Article 125(3). 
Judicial misbehaviour carries the meaning of improper conduct of a judge that renders the 
person unfit to continue in the office of a judge that could erode public confidence in the 
judiciary as the guardian of the rule of law.   The haste with which the tribunals were 
composed, conducted and came to swift conclusion seriously undermined the credibility of 
the trial in deliberating the charges of judicial misbehaviour.  The panel review of the 1988 of 
the judiciary concluded that the tribunals were unparalleled attacks on the rule of law with 
intent to subdue if not subvert the independence of the judiciary, and were unconstitutional 
under Article 125 (Verma, Ebrahim et al. 2008). 
 The events that led to the tribunal of the judges reflected the Prime Minister’s long-held 
disregard for the independent function of the judiciary.  He held the belief that the judiciary 
should function in a similar role as the civil service,  
‘The Government will ensure that each branch of its service carries out its 
respective duties so as to avoid duplication of roles.  A branch of service such as 
the Police, Army and Civil Service or Judiciary, should not interfere in the 
jurisdiction of another.  But recently there have been unhealthy trends and the 
Government will ensure that they are kept to that stage only’. (Kota Bharu, 2 
October 1987)
236
 
The Prime Minister held the view that judges should confine themselves only to the matter of 
applying the laws already passed by Parliament, instead of giving opinions the areas of law-
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making.  Mahathir’s view about the judiciary was then translated via the amendments in the 
Constitution under Act A704 in 1988 when he tabled more than 10 Articles proposed for 
amendments. For the purpose of this study the amendment to Article 121(1)
237
 is identified as 
the critical juncture that has serious implications upon the principle of the separation of 
power. The amendment to this Article had the effect of removing the judicial powers of the 
courts, thus resulting in them retaining judicial powers as and when the Parliament accords to 
the judiciary.  Effective on 10 June 1988, Article 121(1) was amended to remove the words, 
“the judicial power of the Federation shall be vested in two High Courts”, from that Article, 
thus deleting the provision that the judicial power of the Federation vested in the Judiciary. 
Instead, it was stipulated that the “High Courts and inferior courts shall have such 
jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law”238 .  As the new 
wording stands, the amendment effectively rendered the judiciary to function under the 
command of the Parliament.  A prominent ex-chief justice Mohd Dzaiddin stressed that, 
“The amendment alters in a fundamental manner the basic structure of the 
Federal Constitution, from the concept of the independence of the judiciary to 
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the dependence of the judiciary on the executive for its judicial powers.  
Malaysia’s judiciary should not be a tool used by the government for any kind of 
political expediency”239 
Since the amendment altered the judicial powers of the courts to function under the purview 
of the Parliament, the real test of the judiciary now is in deciding controversial cases that are 
ethically challenging and religiously complicated. The circumstances that led to the 1988 
amendment of Article 121(1) were political in nature and Mahathir’s critical review of the 
judiciary when tabling the motion seemed to suggest that the independence of the judiciary 
was not desirable on the grounds that: ‘some of the judges have been tacitly involved in 
politics.  Having been publicly recognized as “fiercely independent” a few judges have been 
complicit with opposition politics.  This can either mean that they reflect their independence 
or they will “bend over backwards” to make decisions in favour of the contenders of the 
Government’(Report 1988:1359).  The new clause (1A) added to Article 121 states, ‘the High 
Courts in the States of Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak shall have no jurisdiction of the Syariah 
court’ that was enforced in June 1988.  The reason for adding this new clause to Article 121 
was that,  
‘There’s been dissatisfaction among the Muslims that the High Courts have been 
able to override the jurisdictions of the Syariah courts.  The Government is of the 
opinion that the judicial power of the civil courts could undermine the legal 
competence of the Syariah Courts and the proper administration of the Islamic 
religious laws.  It is very important to safeguard the legal competence of the 
Syariah Courts because it is high time that Syariah should be given complete 
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judicial power to decide on matters within its jurisdiction precisely because these 
matters are relevant to Islamic religious laws or Hukum Syarak’ (Report 
1988:1364). 
Two decades after this amendment, the social and political repercussions have been 
considerable.  The Malaysian Bar Council concluded that the 1988 amendment to Article 
121(1) has promoted the following ideas in the public perception that:  
(a) The courts are powerless to address issues and do justice wherever there is a lacuna in the 
law; 
(b) The courts are confined to merely interpreting and implementing acts of Parliament;  
(c) The courts are no longer able to make and develop common law;  
(d) The courts are deprived of their inherent jurisdiction, along with their inherent right to 
exercise judicial review over the decisions of public bodies and Executive functions
240
. 
The Malaysian Bar Council has recently urged the Government to restore Article 121(1) to its 
pre-1988 position because of how the Judiciary is made subservient to the Executive, and 
there’s nothing to stop the Executive from dictating how justice is interpreted.  This 
amendment could be detrimental to the interpretation of the fundamental liberties in the 
Constitution, these include:: Article 5 (Right to life and personal liberty), Article 6 (No 
slavery or forced labour), Article 7 (Protection against retrospective criminal law and 
repeated laws), Article 8 (Equality – but not applicable to Article 153 and other laws)241, 
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Article 9 (Freedom of Movement), Article 10 (Freedom of speech, assembly and association) 
and Article 11 (Freedom of religion). The ‘Allah’ controversy is an example of the violation 
of Article 11 whereby the government ban was premised on a narrow interpretation of Article 
3(1) that favoured the demands of right-wing conservative Islamist.   
The socio-political impacts of the 1988 amendment have altered the conception of differential 
justice for the Muslim and the non-Muslim citizens in Malaysia.  It paved the way for the 
legal ascendency of Islamic precepts in the conception and interpretation of the meaning of 
rights and justice.  Hitherto the secular High Courts functioned as the superior courts, 
applying the same laws for all, with careful consideration of the characteristic needs of lower 
courts – i.e. the native court and Syariah.  After the 1988 amendments, Islam came to 
dominate the ideological outlook of state and other political contenders. When both public 
policies and legal statutes reflect the values and doctrinal norms of Islam, politicians from 
both sides of the political divide would start competing for the honour Islamic credentials, 
thus tilting the public political discourse into the direction of moral debates that tended to be 
theologically biased.  The organizing principles of political governance have now become 
entwined with the salience of Islam as the doctrinal foundation that favours justice for the 
Muslim majority in Malaysia; however this goes against the spirit of equality that is 
embedded in the Constitution.  What is originally thought as secular in the Constitution has 
become untenable as the Islamist outlook of the Malaysian government and the juridical 
autonomy of the Syariah begun to shape the meaning of political legitimacy.   
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The addition of Clause (1A) to Article 121 effectively restricts the High Court from 
interfering into the jurisdictions of the Syariah courts.  It gives populist appeal to the ideology 
of Islam as the legitimate political doctrine and an apparent of moral truth the legal sphere.  
The political-legal nexus of Islam is a powerful justification used by UMNO against other 
political contender - Muslim and non-Muslim alike - for questioning the legitimacy of the 
government.  At the sub-national administration
242
, this amendment strengthened the role of 
the Islamic councils, granting juridical autonomy to the Syariah courts to morally police the 
Muslim populations as provided in the State list
243
.  The buttressing of Syariah court 
coincided with the Islamization of many public institutions, thus reinforcing the process of the 
de-secularization of the state. 
The amendment to Article 121 1(A) also re-shaped the terms of public engagements between 
the Muslim and the non-Muslim citizens, whereby it accentuated the idea that the secular 
courts are alien to the moral obligations of Islam, thus creating the public impression that the 
social needs of majority Muslim citizens must be fulfilled by Syariah courts at all cost.  The 
interpretation of justice gradually bifurcated into accommodating the needs of citizens on the 
grounds of religious identities, whereby the juridical autonomy of Syariah began to supersede 
the fundamental liberties of citizens, generating unprecedented judicial complications in 
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matters relating to inter-faith relations - marriage and divorce, custodial rights, burial rights, 
the conversion of minors and apostasy.   
The judicial autonomy of the Syariah courts and the restrictions imposed upon the High 
Courts from interfering Islamic cases meant that the legal avenues for non-Muslims to appeal 
for such cases are increasingly limited.  There are two distinctive impacts that have emerged 
from the amended Article 121 1 (A).  The first one relates to the greater role of the Islamic 
institutions in regulating the collective moral behaviours of Muslim citizens in the private as 
well as in the public spheres, which in many ways do affect the nature of social relations 
among the multi-ethnic citizens in the society.  Secondly the political significance being 
attached to the Islamic identity of the Malays led to the elevation of religiously grounded 
moral arguments in the public debates.  This created the ‘secular public space’ being 
increasingly circumscribed by the ‘state’ whose primary object is to protect and entrench the 
ideological identification of Malay and Islam as an ethno-religious category.  While the 
framing of the Malaysian constitution afforded only a symbolic position for Islam with a firm 
political commitment to being secular, the increasingly strong link between Malay ethnic 
identity – which was enshrined and protected constitutionally – and revivalist Islamic 
identification has undermined the secular nature of the constitution particularly in the 
contemporary experience. 
7.5 The quest for Islamic State  
The accelerated de-secularization state has also been propelled by the quest for Islamic state 
and this phenomenon is not entirely isolated from the exogenous factors.  The 9/11 attacks in 
the US, Islamophobia and the emergence of the far-right media in the West had had 
significant impacts upon the local dynamics of identity conflicts in Malaysia (Peletz 2005).  
Post-9/11 represented an important turning point on how the local processes of interpretation 
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and the understanding of global conflicts accentuated cultural differences underlining the 
politicization of religious identity.  In the attempt to counter the tide of Islamophobia among 
right-wing media in the West, Dr Mahathir publicly declared that Malaysia was an Islamic 
state just weeks after the attack
244
.  This statement generated great outcry from the public, 
followed by a burst of debates on secular-Islamic discourse, which were then banned by the 
government.   When Abdullah Ahmad Badawi took over the premiership in 2003, he declared 
that Malaysia is “neither a secular nor a theocratic country, but a country governed on the 
basis of Islamic principles and observance to the principles of Parliamentary democracy 
grounded in the spirit of social contract within the Federal Constitution”245.   Abdullah’s 
deputy, Najib Razak (now Prime Minister) followed suit by claiming that Malaysia has ‘never 
been secular’.246   
The notion of Islamic State in Malaysia is a recent phenomenon which became pronounced 
after the 9/11 attacks.  Abdullah was trained as a Muslim scholar and he aimed to counter the 
pathological image of Islamic extremism and was determined to push for a liberal and modern 
Muslim paradigm for the future of Islamic development in the country
247
.   However the 
search for a liberal Muslim paradigm did not prevail, instead Abdullah’s broad vision of 
Islamic modernization was somewhat constrained by the constitutional demands of Article 
153 of the Federal Constitution, and these were translated into the contemporary redefinition 
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of rights clothed in the new language of social contract
248
 aimed at preserving differential 
citizenship.    
‘Perhaps the most significant aspect of the contract was the agreement by the 
indigenous peoples to grant citizenship to the immigrant Chinese and Indian 
communities.  This changed the character of the nation, from one that 
originally belonged to the indigenous peoples to one that Chinese and Indian 
citizens could also call their own.  Chinese and Indians now share political 
power with the Malays, and sit in the Federal cabinet and State executive 
councils.  In return for being granted these political rights, the immigrant 
communities agreed to special economic privileges for the indigenous 
peoples given their disadvantaged position.  This constitutes the political, 
economic, legal and moral foundation for the distributive justice policies of 
the country.’249 
The political commitment to Islam as the principle public policy combined with the state 
rejection of the political neutrality of the secular state has promoted the irregularity of civil 
and religious rights.  This resulted in the non-Muslims treated as second-class citizens in 
contemporary Malaysia
250
.   Legally speaking, non-Muslim citizens in Malaysia have been 
greatly disadvantaged by Article 121 Clause 1(A) because it prohibits the civil courts from 
interfering issues arising from the Syariah jurisdictions, thus limiting their rights to justice.  
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Whilst the ‘state’ in Malaysia was never categorically defined as secular, the rule of law by 
which the country operates remains secular
251
.  This amendment took away the commonality 
of legal rights, resulting in the unequal access to justice between the Muslims and the non-
Muslim citizens.  The restricted role of the High Courts in presiding over state-administered 
(sub-national) Syariah courts created judicial lacuna in the legal settlement of rights between 
Muslim and non-Muslim citizens.  The loss of religious liberties among the non-Muslims was 
considerable as the state increasingly dictate the terms of inter-faith dialogue between Muslim 
and non-Muslim citizens in Malaysia.   
There’s growing public disenchantments among civil society movements and intellectuals 
following the censored debate on the secular state in Malaysia, the expanded role of Islam in 
the legal system and the challenges faced by minority religious groups
252
.  Article 11 
initiatives emerged as a civil group to challenge the Islamists’ assertion that Malaysia is - in 
law - an Islamic State
253
.  Article 11 also addressed the social problems arising from legal 
logjam affecting religious conversion
254
, custodial rights
255
, body-snatching by Islamic 
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authority
256
 and others aspects of repression (see, e.g., NECF Malaysia 2007).  Around 
seventy places of worship, mostly Hindu temples were demolished within the space of a year, 
from 2006-2007
257
.   The Malaysian government has also assumed the role of legislating 
Islamic faith as it adopts a similar stance to the Syariah criminalization of apostasy
258
 (Peletz 
2002; Smith 2003-2004; Peletz 2005; Nurjaanah Abdullah 2007).  The ideological dominance 
of Islam in the government was evident when the Home Minister capitulated under the weight 
of the Malay-Muslim NGOs protesting the public discussion of conversion issues organized 
by the Malaysian Bar Council
259
.   
Leaving the Islamic faith or apostasy is generally considered as an act of betrayal to the 
Malay identity in Malaysia and the government linked Islamic agencies labelled these as the 
‘enemies of the state’ (Abdullah Saeed and Hassan Saeed 2004:68).  These Islamic bodies 
tend to follow the strict interpretation of apostasy, leading to the drafting of the Faith Reform 
Bill 1996
260
, giving the government the ultimate prerogative to measure the faith of individual 
Muslims.   
‘As a result of the law, the state has become the ultimate arbiter of Muslim faith 
and belief.  It could be said that there are inherent dangers when the state becomes 
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the ultimate adjudicator of personal faith.  This is especially the case in countries 
like Malaysia where religious institutions and religious officials are subordinated 
to political authority’ (Ibid: p.143).     
7.6 Contesting the de-Secularization of the Malaysian state 
The following cases represent the crucial trends that emerged as counter-movements against 
the de-secularization of the state.  These three are selected on the basis of the ideological 
challenge against the ban on the use of ‘Allah’, the empirical challenge against the 
government discrimination of minority citizens of Indian descent, and the challenge against 
the public demonization of the LGBT community on the grounds of religious reasons.   
7.6.1 The controversial use of ‘Allah’ 
The ‘Allah’ controversy is a legacy left by Abdullah.  He began to lose support among non-
Muslim communities as he began pushing a more stridently pro-Islamic agenda than his 
predecessor, Dr Mahathir.  The ‘Allah’ controversy emerged because of the official 
prohibition against the use of the word ‘Allah’ by the congregation and their publications.  
Hitherto, the Federal government formally banned the use of the word ‘Allah’ among the 
Christian communities in April 1986
261
 and this official circular was given to all Christian 
churches, particularly the Catholic Church in Sabah not to use the word ‘Allah’ and 15 other 
words in their Christian publications. Christian population in Sabah and Sarawak make up 
about 64% of the total Christian population in Malaysia, and many rely on the importation of 
Indonesian translation of the English Bible.  The Malaysian government banned the Malay 
translation of English Bible under the Internal Security Act 1960 for being ‘prejudicial to 
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national interests and security’262.  The official reason given was because the Arabic language 
is the official language of Islam and the use of ‘Allah’ can be confusing and may encourage 
Muslims to apostate.  One of the first casualties of such ban was the Iban-language Bible, Bup 
Kudus, in Sarawak
263
, and then followed by the seizure of Christian books imported by the 
Sabah Injil Borneo from Indonesia by the Royal Customs and Excise Department officers in 
2006
264
.   
The government restriction on the distribution of Malay-language Bible and other audio and 
video materials intensified under Abdullah administration.  In 2005 Malay-language Bibles 
were labelled "Not for Muslims" printed on the cover to restrict distribution to churches and 
Christian bookshops. The controversy over the word "Allah" also led to the confiscation of 
children’s Sunday school publications imported from Indonesia by the Customs authorities 
under Customs Act 1967.  The head of the restricted publication unit and Quran Text division 
from the Ministry of Internal Security claimed that these books contained words or phrases 
exclusive to the religion of Islam, and they were ‘Allah’, ‘Baitullah’, ‘Solat’ and ‘Kaabah’265.  
The Ministry cited Article 3 and Article 11(4) of the Federal Constitution emphasizing the 
revered position of Islam in the Federation, and the restriction of religious propaganda on 
Muslims respectively (Constitution 2002).  Confusion and public order are the reasons given 
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by the Ministry for imposing restrictions, and the confiscation was justified as a security issue 
under Section 22 of the Internal Security Act 1960
266
. 
In January 2008 the books were returned to the SIB church; however SIB continues to argue 
that the government prohibition to use the word "Allah" in all of its religious publications and 
practices is unconstitutional and unreasonable.  There was a similar but separate court case on 
this ‘Allah’ issue when The Herald, a Catholic magazine took the Home Ministry to Court in 
2007.  In December 2009 the High Court overturned the Home Ministry’s ban, thus allowing 
the Catholic magazines and other non-Islamic publications to use the word ‘Allah’ as a direct 
translation for the word 'God' in the Malay language versions of their publications
267
.  
Following this a number of Malay-Muslim NGOs began to organize public demonstrations 
after the Friday prayer against the court ruling insisting that ‘Allah is only for Muslim’268.  A 
few days after the judgment a number of churches were firebombed
269
 and it continued for 
two weeks, bringing a total number of 11 places of worship under attack
270
.  Within the space 
of about a month, these Malay-Muslim NGOs joined forces to establish a consultative council 
to ‘to defend Malays right and Islam in the country’ and continued to pressurize the 
government to ban non-Muslims from using the word ‘Allah’271 .   
The build-up of defensive sentiments towards the preservation of special citizenship for 
Malays can also be attributed to Abdullah’s inertia against growing fundamentalism in 
UMNO.  During the Assembly, young and ambitious Malay politicians were brandishing a 
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Malay Keris (dagger) to symbolize public warning against other ethnic groups not to 
challenge this Ketuanan Melayu
272
 or in other turn of phrase, Malay hegemony.  UMNO finds 
justification in claiming Malay special rights under Article 153 of the Federal Constitution 
and this was reinvigorated through Abdullah’s Islamic approach that sanctioned religious 
comprehensive doctrine as the dominant public policy in a multicultural society.   
Islam Hadhari
273
, the ideological agenda promoted by Abdullah projected an imagined 
Islamic civilization for contemporary Muslims to succeed in multiple global challenges; it 
aimed to offer an alternative modernity that is independent of Western values to make Islam 
authentic.  The privileging of the Islamic discourse gave ideological purchase to Ketuanan 
Melayu (Malay hegemony) to sustain the political legitimacy of UMNO and this continued to 
give purchase to UMNO’s warning to minority citizens not to publicly challenge the status 
quo of Islam.  The privileging of the Islamic discourse by the government created the 
condition for extremist groups to intimidate minority citizens, and the fire-bombing of the 
Churches was indicative of such intimidation.   
On the 13 August 2010, the Sessions Court judge, S.M. Komathy Suppiah sentenced two 
brothers – Mohamad Faizal Raja Ibrahim, 24 and Raja Mohamad Idzham Raja Ibrahim, 22 – 
to five years jail each for torching the Metro Tabernacle Church in a suburban Kuala Lumpur 
on the 8 January 2010.  The attack was linked to the 2009 High Court ruling that allowed non-
Muslim Malaysians using "Allah" as a translation for "God" in their worships and in all forms 
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of publications.  Following the High Court ruling, the Home Ministry initiated a legal appeal 
against the judgment and this was recently granted by the Appellate Court that held the veto 
against the use of the word ‘Allah’ by the Catholic weekly publication, The Herald274.   In 
paragraph 5 of the judgment, inter alia, the appeal judges reasoned that, 
“It is our common finding that the usage of the name “Allah” is not an integral 
part of the faith and practice of Christianity. From such finding, we find no reason 
why the respondent is so adamant to use the name “Allah” in their weekly 
publication. Such usage, if allowed, will inevitably cause confusion within the 
community.”275 
The appeal judges also concluded in paragraph 4 of the judgment that they found ‘no 
infringement of the any of the constitutional rights, as claimed by the respondent’276.  The 
legal dispute over ‘Allah’ reflects the unreasonable conduct on the part of the state that has 
failed to assume its normative role as the arbiter of equality and justice for all citizens.  The 
Islamic revivalism and identity mobilization by state elites and other non-state stake holders 
meant that the Malaysian public life is not only increasingly dominated by a one-sided 
discourse on political and civil Islam, but that these trends underscore the growing sense of 
ethno-religious polarization in recent political trends.   
The Allah controversy represents one of the many occurrences in contemporary Malaysia 
whereby religious symbolism becomes embroiled into heated political contention.   It 
challenges the mainstream notions of (civil) rights grounded in the idioms of religious 
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convictions. Whilst moderate Muslims in Malaysia do not have problems with non-Muslims 
using the word ‘Allah’ in their worship and publications, there are equally considerable 
number of Muslims who subscribe to the view that ‘Allah’ belongs exclusively to the Islamic 
religion (Masod 2008).   
‘Allah’ as the exclusive term for Islam remains the dominant view sanctioned by Jakim277 , 
the National Islamic body regulating the issuance of religious edicts (Fatwa).  As Jakim 
functions as part of the government branch, it hijacks the public interpretation of ‘Allah’ 
issue, lending credibility to government’s projection of an Islamized state.  With the official 
ban on the use of ‘Allah’ by non-Muslims, this further undermines the prospect of the secular 
values to be restored in the governmental apparatus.  In the absence of the value of neutrality 
principle in the state practices, this could seriously limit the liberal conception of justice in the 
protection of liberty and equality of rights in Malaysia.  The need for High Court intervention 
to restore the fundamental rights of minority citizens signals the critical failure of the 
Malaysian government to guarantee a basic level of justice for the practice of religious liberty 
and the exercise of civil rights in the country.  
The story of citizenship ‘rights’ in the Malaysian political narrative exposes the problem of 
adjudicating the tensions between group right and the range of choices and opportunities 
available to the individuals.  Where issues of special rights for the minority groups are 
concerned, the liberal framework normally justifies such policy for the elimination of the 
structural disadvantages affecting the minority cultures so as to empower their members to 
participate into the society dominated by a majority culture without the fear of losing their 
cultural roots and linguistic heritage (Kymlicka 1992).  In the Malaysian context, the 
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Constitution actually protects the ‘special position’ of the majority Malay ethnic group by 
virtue of the British colonial legacy.   
This particular development in the history of the Malaysian politics challenges the normative 
understanding of equal rights that dwells within the ambit of political theory.  The ideas of 
right that have emerged from the history of ethnic politics shows the perennial problem in the 
political conception of right that does not sit well with what is normatively conceived in the 
Universal declaration of Human Rights.  The ‘Allah’ controversy necessitates the call for 
serious reappraisal on the role of the state in censoring the exercise of basic religious liberties 
among minority faith groups in Malaysia. It is unreasonable for the state to restrict the use of 
‘Allah’ because it is an abstract noun that could not be legislated nor patented.  Such 
restrictive official policies on religious words and symbols demonstrate how the de-
secularization of the state violates the fundamental liberties of minority citizens.  
The normative assumption that the secular state should rise above sectarian conflicts remains 
ideologically contested in the Malaysian public sphere.  The empirical contestations over the 
idea of the secular are political but the ideological divergences about how the modern state 
should operate are largely underpinned by the historical-cultural conception of the ‘Kerajaan’ 
or Malay kingship. The idea of ‘government as a condition of having a Raja’ imposes a 
domineering criteria of cultural loyalty in defining the political relations between subject and 
ruler.  The problem with cultural loyalty as an essential aspect of the Malay sovereign 
kingship is that, such cultural bondage undermines the principle of neutrality that forms the 
institutional core of modern secular state and it has the potential to make culture, instead of 
the equality or commonality of citizenship right, as the locus of political struggle.  The 
Constitution provides the Malay rulers in each Malaysian state to be the Head of the religion 
of Islam and to safeguard the custom and affairs of the Malays.  When a section of the Malay-
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Muslim community objected to the non-Muslim use of the word ‘Allah’, this issue created a 
constitutional polemic that pit the provision to safeguard Islam and the Malay custom against 
the other provisions in the Federal Constitution that secures the freedom of religion for every 
person.    
When this happens, as the case illuminates, official arguments for the banning of non-
Muslims using the word ‘Allah’ were grounded in reasons inclined towards religious 
comprehensive doctrine to safeguard the interests of Islam and the Malay customs.  The 
conduct of the government goes against the basic tenets of a secular state to rise above 
sectarian conflicts and protect the fundamental liberties of citizens.  The non-Muslim’s right 
to use ‘Allah’ does not in any way transgress nor contribute to the deterioration of the rights 
of the Muslims.  So far there’s no evidence whatsoever to show that the non-Muslim use of 
‘Allah’ would diminish the spiritual worth of Islam.  The fact that Christians in Sabah and 
Sarawak have been using the word ‘Allah’ in the sermons for decades is enough to prove that 
the theological pre-eminence of Islam has not been undermined at all.  This is a further 
indication that such official ban is purely motivated politically in recent times, reflecting the 
growing conservatism among certain sections of the Malay community that subscribe to the 
ethno-nationalist values of UMNO. 
The religious intolerance shown by an extremist section of the Malay-Muslim community can 
be attributed to the de-secularization processes of state, which in this case shows how the 
government capitulates from the its role as the arbiter of competing comprehensive doctrines.  
It is a most bizarre situation whereby the right to use the Arabic word for God had resulted in 
a seriously contentious legal battle.  This legal episode shows how the de-secularization of the 
state diminishes the prospect of religious freedom even at the level of moral construct, but it 
also begs the question of how effective theological reasons have been applied in mediating the 
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rights of citizens in a condition of pluralism.  The legal challenge mounted by the Borneo 
Evangelical Mission and Catholic Church against the ban illustrated an encouraging sign that 
active and deliberative citizenship has not been daunted despite the restrictive interpretation 
of Malay-Islam provisions in the Constitution.  The counter conduct to the de-secularization is 
not only ideological, but empirical too as the HINDRAF demonstrates. 
7.6.2 The HINDRAF (Hindu Rights Action Force) movement in Malaysia 
The demolition of many Hindu temples since 2006 triggered massive protest movement from 
the Indian community in West Malaysia.  A paradigmatic case for the study 
of ethnic politics (Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 1985), comparative political scientists rarely 
afford much attention to the dynamics of religious mobilization in Malaysia, although 
Malaysianists – both local and international – have paid considerable attention to Islamic 
revivalism as a growing political phenomenon (Hussin 1990; Nagata 1997; Brown 2009).  
Under Abdullah, the Islamization of public policies has had serious implications upon the 
religious liberties of other communities.  If Mahathir’s regime promoted statist Islamization 
as a strategy to undermine political contestations from within the Malay-Muslim community 
and also from the opposition parties, Abdullah employed Islam Hadhari as the organizing 
principles of in the formulation of public policy – the Ninth Malaysia Plan278.  Socio-
economic marginalization has been a longstanding issue of political concern for the minority 
ethnic Indians, but the emergence of HINDRAF has been particularly triggered by the 
unprecedented increase in the violation of civil rights.  This relates to the cases of extra-
judicial killings and deaths in police custody; forced Islamic conversion and the government 
sanctioned destruction of Hindu places of worship.  These cases appeared to manifest steadily 
ever since Abdullah Badawi became Prime Minister and promoted the principles of Islam 
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Hadhari (Civilizational Islam) as the fundamental framework for good governance, furnishing 
the strategy for national development in the 9
th
 Malaysian Plan 2006.   
HINDRAF claims that there’s disproportionately higher percentage of ethnic Indians being 
imprisoned - 48% in 28 prisons nationwide
279
 - and the deaths among Indian detainees under 
police custody tend to be relatively higher compared to other ethnic groups, and in the 
extreme cases, some of families were left wondering how these bodies were returned to them 
battered conditions.  These factors motivated lawyers, P. Waytha Moorthy, P. Uthayamoorty, 
and M. Manohan representing HINDRAF, to issue a ‘petition’ to address the marginalization 
and exclusion of the Indian community.  This process led to the lawsuit against the UK 
government on 31 August 2007 by P. Waytha Moorthy to demand US$4 trillion claiming 
compensation for Indians brought to Malaya as indentured labour in the 19
th
 century.  This 
lawsuit was similar to the slavery compensation class actions in the US.  The lawsuit also 
sought to obtain a ruling to strike out Article 153 of the Federal Constitution which allows for 
official discrimination of citizens through the granting of the ‘Special Position’ for the Malays 
and indigenous Muslim groups.  
This dissertation argues that minority Indian community have been adversely affected by 
Article 121 (1A) over the destruction of the places of worship, forced conversion, child 
custody and burial.  From February 2006 to June 2007, there were a total of 79 Hindu temples 
officially demolished in Malaysia, these included historic cultural heritages like the 80 year-
old Sri Muthumariamman Alayam and the 100 year-old Maha Mariamman that were 
demolished by the authorities on the grounds of illegal structure (see Appendix I).   Forced 
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Islamic conversions were extensive as in the case of S. Banggarma
280
, a Hindu woman who 
grew up in an orphanage was converted to Islam when she was five.  Despite having been 
married in a cultural ceremony with a Hindu man, she couldn’t register her marriage because 
of her legal status as a Muslim.  In her children’s birth certificate, the father’s details were not 
available, making her looked like a single parent.  Since apostasy is a criminal offence under 
Syariah, there’s nothing much she or her husband could do to seek legal redress in such 
judicial lacuna.   The issue of conversion also presents moral dilemma to Syariah lawyers as it 
is less likely for them to defend the act of apostasy. 
Conversion to Islam gives legal leverage over child custody as in the case of Indira Gandhi, a 
kindergarten teacher whose husband of 17 years converted to Islam after some marital 
disputes.  Without her consent, he converted all their three children into Islam, making it an 
uphill legal battle for her to be the legal guardian.  Once these children become Muslims, they 
are required to study Islam at school and are subject to Syariah laws that prohibit Muslims 
from marrying outside the faith, and they are not allowed to participate in non-Muslim 
religious ceremonies
281
.  Even in death the Kuala Lumpur's Islamic Affairs Department is 
adamant about conducting Muslim burial.  The most notorious one involved the said 
Department fighting over the dead body of Malaysia’s first ever Mt. Everest climber, M. 
Moorthy over the rites of burial. The Islamic department claimed that M. Moorthy, born a 
Hindu, converted to Islam in hospital and became Mohamad Abdullah and therefore he must 
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be buried according to Islamic ritual
282
. His Hindu family vehemently denied that he ever 
converted to Islam, but the Islamic department filed a petition at the Syariah court insisting 
the body for Islamic burial.  Whilst the family asked for the same rights from the High Court, 
the secular courts had no jurisdiction over Islamic matters, and civil lawyers can not appear in 
the Syariah court because only Syariah qualified lawyers are allowed.   
The above cases are some examples of how the judicial lacuna generated by Article 121(1A) 
further marginalized the Indian community, and there were many more similar incidents, 
albeit under reported, that have triggered the communal sense of anger directed at the policies 
of discrimination condoned by the government.  As most Indians are trapped in urban 
poverty, many of those who were affected do not have legal access, let alone having the 
money to pay for legal representation.  As the leaders of HINDRAF have credible legal 
background, they have been able to comprehend the severity of Article 121 (1A) and therefore 
were able to capitalize on the plight of the urban poor among the Indian community.  
Focusing mainly on the ethnic Indian concerns, HINDRAF remained active in raising issues 
of discrimination against the Indian and Hindu communities, and continued to appeal for legal 
and socio-economic redress.  
Due to their political activism and grassroots appeal, HINDRAF has been monitored 
constantly by the authority and the office of the Human Rights Party that is linked to 
HINDRAF suffered periodic raids from the police.  Because of this, the HRP office remained 
closed most of the time after the biggest police raid on 19 November 2007.  Following the 
raid, and increasing rate of temples being demolished, a massive rally ensued on the 25 
November 2007 in Kuala Lumpur (Belle 2008; Lee 2008; Lai and MD Sidin 2012).  It was 
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the biggest Indian ethnic protest in Malaysian political history
283
 and was violently 
repressed
284
.  HINDRAF was banned and its organizers detained without trial.  HINDRAF 
legal advisors, P Uthaya Kumar and Manoharan Malayalam along with 241 targeted 
participants were forced to plead guilty for organizing the rally
285
.  The two legal advisors 
were subsequently detained under the ISA (Internal Security Act) for 514 days until 9 May 
2009 when they were finally released.  HINDRAF was declared an illegal organization and 
the Registrar of Societies refuses its application to be a registered society. 
 The lack of legal redress as a result of Article 121 (1A) has so far done the most damage to 
disempower the minority Indian community who have by far suffered socio-economic 
marginalization in the urban areas.  HINDRAF activists have explained that as most of the 
rubber plantation estates that were legacies of the colonial period have now been converted 
into housing estates, industrial parks, golf courses and luxury homes.  Hence most of the poor 
Indian workers migrated to the urban areas and the combination of inadequate compensation 
with poor education, they became the urban poor.  Generational poverty seemed to affect 
many Indian families and with the current discriminatory policies on training and education 
reserved for the Malays Special Position, many Indian youths suffer from the lack of social 
mobility
286
.  The long-term economic marginalization combined with the demolition of 
temples became the catalysts for the contemporary protests. 
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The extent to which HINDRAF played the role of raising awareness of the Indian poor and 
provide a channel to express their anger at the erosion of their fundamental rights as citizens 
contributed significantly to the loses of the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition in March 
2008.  According to some analyses, there was an estimated 80% swing in Indian votes from 
the BN to the opposition during the General Election (Singh 2009). The protests had also 
played an instrumental role in the fall of four state governments to the opposition parties 
(Brown 2008; Bunnell, Nagarajan et al. 2010).  Yet while religious markers were evident both 
in the events leading up to the main rally – particularly the destruction of Hindu temples – and 
evident in the name of the organization itself, the HINDRAF movement rapidly disassociated 
itself from a religious Hindu agenda and focused on ethnic Indian claims, such that both 
critics and supporters of HINDRAF now explicitly deny that the movement has any religious 
connotations.  HINDRAF was declared an illegal organization in October 2008 by the Home 
Minister, Syed Hamid Albar
287
, and as a way of continuing the movement the Human Rights 
Party was then formed in 2009, shifting the political focus on the specifics of human rights 
violations against Malaysian Indians living in poverty and social marginalization
288
. 
To understand the role of ethnic and religious dimensions of HINDRAF, it is necessary to 
take a look at the diversity of the Indian population within Malaysia. Originally considerable 
number of Indians migrating to colonial Malaya came as indentured labour for the plantation 
industry and to staff the colonial bureaucracy.  The Indian labourers brought into Malaya were 
regulated by the Indian Government (Stockwell 1982).  During the Great Depression and the 
economic hardship in Malaya, more than 870,000 Indian labourers left Malaya and since then 
the level of labour inflow into Malaya had remained low compared to the pre-Depression 
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period.  This was further compounded by the Indian Government’s ban on assisted labour 
emigration and the selective immigration policy of post-war Malaya (Sandhu 2010).  The 
relatively smaller number of Indians compared to the Chinese was one of the reasons why the 
scale of their political mobilization was not as considerable as the Chinese during the 
Communist Insurgency. 
 The Indian community is probably the most socially and religiously heterogeneous of the 
socially and religiously heterogeneous ‘races’ that make up Malaysia’s multi-ethnic plurality.  
According to the 2000 census, around 85% of Indian Malaysians are Hindu, 7.4% Christian, 
and 3.9% Muslim; the remainder fall into much smaller categories such as Buddhist and 
Confucianism
289
.  This religious diversity within the Indian community largely coincided with 
class divisions – the Indian brought to staff the civil services were largely Christianized, while 
the indentured labourers were overwhelmingly Hindu. These religious class division have 
largely remain intact over the post-colonial era, such that in 2000, Christian Indians were the 
most highly educated major ethno-religious group in the country with over 25% of 18-35 
years old with university education in 2000; Hindu Indians were among the least well 
educated, with an equivalent figure of around 11%. 
This division is largely representative of the original colonial migration policy, reinforced by 
the greater availability of education to Christian families through mission-backed schools. 
While for many decades after independence, less educated Hindu Indians were concentrated 
in the rubber-tapping plantation industry, the collapse of rubber prices in the mid-1980s and 
the concomitant shift toward less labour intensive palm oil has seen a substantial proportion 
of the Indian workers move to the city in search of employment, where they have come in 
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some areas to constitute an urban underclass (Wilford 2006; Wilford 2008). The structural 
segregation of the education system has also played important role in arresting the social 
mobility of the Indian community settled in plantation estates.  It has been argued that the 
present socio-economic predicament of the Indian poor is directly related to the historical 
development of the plantation estate environment (Colleta 1975; Ramachandran and 
Shanmugam 1995; Lee 2005) 
Social discontent among urban Indians was for many exacerbated by their inability to access 
anti-poverty programmes under the pro-Malay affirmative action policies (NEP) that the BN 
regime has implemented since the early 1970s (Thillainathan 2008). This resulted in a 
growing perception among Indians – rich and poor alike – that Malay poverty was not 
tolerated by the government, but that Indian was a matter of little concern. Such has been the 
clear pressure from below on this that leaders of the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), the 
senior Indian party within the BN coalition, have on occasion criticized government policy 
and called for remedial pro-Indian policies (Ramasamy 2008). 
The rising level of social discontent among the Indian community has been linked to the 
increasing instances of poverty, social marginalization and the recent cases of Hindu temples 
demolition by the government under the Abdullah administration. The HINDRAF and HRP 
are a collective civil movement that primarily focuses on targeting the political miscarriages 
of justice by the state.   The chief claim of the movement is that the state has failed to address 
the perennial socio-economic marginalization of the Indian communities, fuelling the 
trappings of long-term depravation that undercuts the prospects of social mobility particularly 
among citizens from the Indian community.  The lack of higher educational opportunities, 
jobs training and employment are but a number of factors that have restricted the prospects of 
social mobility for the Indian community, forcing a substantial number to take up low paid, 
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insecure jobs and to live at the margins of urban development.  In relation to these socio-
economic deprivations, many Indian youths also face higher risks of becoming victims of 
custodial abuse and the extra-judicial killings by the police force in West Malaysia
290
.  The 
above factors, combined with the official destruction of the places of worship under the 
Abdullah administration, un-investigated deaths in police custody
291
 and the logjam of Islamic 
conversion issues, which time and again the court ruling upheld that that only a syariah 
(Islamic) court could decide on conversion issues and that the High court does not have the 
jurisdiction
292
.  
Among the Indian community, as well as sympathetic members of other communities, 
particular alarm was raised by a series of demolitions of Hindu temples that stood in the way 
of large development projects. Most, if not all, of these temples were built on ‘squatter’ land – 
land for which titles had never been issued and which was technically illegally occupied, 
albeit for more than fifty years of independence – and government figures claimed that the 
temple committees had been offered relocation compensation, which had been refused. This 
was nonetheless taken by many within and beyond the Indian community as clear indication 
of the ‘second class’ status of their religion – it was seen as utterly inconceivable that similar 
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actions would have been taken against a mosque
293
. These have formed the necessary catalyst 
that brought the movement into the political limelight.   
In the light of these factors the HRP and HINDRAF are particularly salient for the 
reassessment of the secular state in Malaysia on two important grounds.  The first one is 
grounded in their attempt to employ the political language of human right- HRP’s slogan of 
‘right not mercy’ - to counter the burden of state Islamization upon the fundamental rights of 
citizens and the religious liberties of the Indian ethnic citizens.  Secondly the rise of Indian 
activism in the form of HINDRAF and HRP represent an important political contestation that 
aimed that challenging the ways in which the Malaysian state selectively interpret the 
Constitutional provisions to justify the differential treatment of citizens.  By challenging the 
selective and to a greater extent, the politicization of the interpretation of the Constitutional 
essentials, HINDRAF and HRP play an important role in informing the Indian community 
about the ideological source of discrimination underlining their empirical experiences of long 
term socio-economic marginalization and the restrictions on religious liberties.  The HRP and 
HINDRAF challenge against the increasing Islamization of state policies exposed the lack of 
neutrality and equality when the official thinking behind the formulation of public policies is 
grounded in theological reasoning.  These movements have used the universal ideas of human 
right
294
 to create awareness and counter the inconsistent claims made by the Malaysian state 
when it comes to the selective interpretation of these Constitutional essentials.  The universal 
call for humanistic values of freedom, equality and justice constitute the ideological strategy 
to which these movements contest the process of the de-secularization of the state in 
Malaysia.   
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Throughout the political existence of the HINDRAF and HRP, and the political nature of its 
struggle, the media has tended to portray the HINDRAF in particular, as an organization 
grounded in somewhat insular political agenda with the sole aim of championing the rights of 
the Indian ethnic citizens. Despite HINDRAF’s and HRP’s overwhelming membership and 
support coming from the Indian community, the movements have addressed some elements of 
political values of human rights consistent with the values of freedom, justice and equality 
rooted in the modernist secular ideology of the post-Enlightenment era.  However these aims 
have been interpreted as a challenge to the affirmative action policy of special citizenship that 
warrants the coercive use of force by the state in the name of maintaining national security.    
Within the context of assessing the secular state in Malaysia, the political discourse of 
HINDRAF and HRP illuminates the negative impacts of the de-secularization process of the 
state practice particularly upon the religious liberties of minority Indian ethnic citizens in the 
contemporary period.  The socio-economic marginalization and the ghettoization of the Indian 
community in both the urban and the rural areas in the Malaysian society have been linked to 
the effects of unequal treatments borne out of the National Economic Policies, privileging 
positive affirmative action for the Malays.  However the repressive measures which the 
government employed in the destruction of the places of worship, the tightening of the legal 
scope for religious liberty and the escalating Indian deaths in custody are fairly recent, and 
these have become the main triggers for the massive peace protest rally that was participated 
by a huge wave of Indian ethnic citizens in Kuala Lumpur on the 25 November 2007.  The 
media claimed that the protest rally was attended by a least 30,000 people but the HINDRAF 
organizers put an estimated figure of up to 100,000
295
.   In October 2008, Hindraf was 
declared an illegal organization under Section 5(1) of the Societies Act by the Home Ministry.  
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The justification for this was that HINDRAF had actively exploited the Indian community to 
participate in illegal assemblies and instigated street protests among the community to rise up 
against the government and promote hatred between the Malays and Indians
296
. 
The shock collapse of the BN vote in the March 2008 election saw Manoharan and 
Uthayamoorthy both ran as candidates from prison and won; Sami Vellu, the previous 
political unassailable leader of the MIC who has controlled the party since 1978, lost his seat. 
The results signalled the end for Abdullah’s administration, paving the way for his deputy, 
Najib bin Razak to assume the Premiership in April 2009. Temple demolitions stopped and 
the government began actively courting Indian grievances. At the same time, HINDRAF and 
HRP supporters and activists clearly began to steer clear of religious discourse, returning to 
the theme of ethnic marginalization. 
In a separate but related theme of HINDRAF contestation against the de-secularization of the 
state, the movement played a significant role in challenging the Ministry of Education 
proposal for the controversial novel, ‘Interlok’, as the Malay literary text for Form Five 
students for the 2011 Malaysian Certificate Education examination
297
.  Interlok (1971) is a 
Malay language novel written by Abdullah Hussain and it revolves around the story of three 
male characters – Malay, Chinese and Indian – and their families.  Set in the early 1900’ it 
narrates the meeting point of the three main ethnic groups through the characters of three men 
and the ways their lives ‘interlocked’ or intertwined during the Japanese Occupation.  Interlok 
is a political novel in that it depicts the historical formation of the plural society in Malaya, 
the social relations structured in the context of ethnic division of labour and economic 
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livelihood and it ends with a multicultural narrative on nation building that cast the left-wing 
movement as nothing more than groups of bandits and thugs.   
HINDRAF’s public protest against Interlok saw the arrests of more than 500 people in Kuala 
Lumpur on the 27 February 2011
298
.  Many of those who were arrested expressed deep 
concerns about the negative impacts of the novel upon how teenagers perceive others 
ethnicity and how these values are internalized in their daily interaction with others.  
HINDRAF’s contention over the use of the novel for Secondary School text is that novel uses 
many terms of references that normalize racial stereotypes, including other turn of phrases 
that reify derogatory depiction of the cultural values of the Chinese and the Indian 
communities in particular.  Interlok depicts the Chinese as ruthless swindlers, gamblers, with 
the readiness to sell their daughters in times of economic need. The Indian community is 
portrayed as cantankerous, violent, devious, and pariahs.  The novel ascribes depraved 
behaviours to the immigrant community, for instance, the unethical Chinese businessman who 
likes to sleep with prostitutes (who also happened to be Chinese)
299
 and describing the anger 
of one Indian character akin to a ‘mad pig’300.  The Malays on the other hand are described as 
pious and their main weakness at the time was their general unwillingness to send their 
children to secular school, preferring instead for them to learn the Quran with religious 
teachers
301
.  The lack of literacy among the Malays made them easy victims at the hands of 
unethical Chinese shop owners – one of the reasons for losing their land ownership to the 
Chinese and became poorer
302
. 
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The novel does not celebrate diversity as some of its protagonists had claimed
303
.  It locates 
people within their ethno-religious construction and develops their characters in their 
respective socio-value systems.  The women tend to stay in the kitchens waiting to be married 
off, as in the case of the Malays, or in they are either described prostitutes or victims of rape 
among the non-Malays.  Professors at UKM (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia) argue that the 
novel should be considered as literary text for the schools because of the merits of Islamic 
teaching it instilled in the Malay characters (Jusuoh and Bakar 2011).  As a historical fiction, 
many of its characters are historicized in rigid ethnic identities and the values of the migrant 
communities have been represented in many ways at odds with the values of Islamic teaching.  
So this novel has the effect of polarizing the moral ethics of the migrant community from the 
virtuous and the authentic moral grounding of Islam.  The novel ends with the destruction of 
the Communists’ hideout, and the emphasis on the hopes of harmonious integration among 
the major ethnic communities. 
Hitherto many public figures including the leader of the Opposition Coalition, Anwar Ibrahim 
did not think that Interlok contain racist elements as it depicted the social reality at the time
304
.  
Since the HINDRAF street rally against Interlok, public debate on the issue increased 
exponentially, it prompted the Education Minister to set up an independent panel of reviewers 
to evaluate the novel.  Unfortunately the panel could not come to a consensus about the points 
for amendments
305
.  In the meantime, an incident occurred at the Kuala Kubu Bharu 
secondary school, where a teacher made racist remark – Keling memang Pariah (Indians are 
pariahs) – against Form 5 students who refused the books as standard text in school.  After 
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making a police report against the teacher, five Indian students from the same school and one 
ex-student were instead arrested for allegedly threatening the teacher
306
.  Having had no 
money to pay their lawyers or bail of even RM 2,000 in the first place, they may be forced to 
plead guilty or face the prospect of a jail term of up to 7 years for making threats
307
. 
The negative ethnic stereotypes promoted by the novel for literature curriculum does not 
contribute positively to the quality ethnic relations in the country.  The risk of having the 
novel as the exam text for national examination is that students may be coerced into giving an 
‘officially correct’ interpretation of the novel in their exam papers, as these will be assessed 
by the authorities marking the exam papers.  Online petition and constant public pressure 
from NGO like NIAT (National Interlok Action Team)
308
 compelled the Education Ministry 
to drop the word ‘pariah’ from the book309, whilst HINDRAF/HRP and other NGOs wanted 
the Ministry to drop the book from the education curriculum altogether.  These societal 
pressures galvanized as the months went by
310
 and the Education Ministry finally agreed to 
revoke the novel from the exam curriculum
311
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7.6.3 ‘Mak Nyah’- challenging the Syariah court on sexuality in Malaysia 
The legal contestation against the ban to use ‘Allah’ and the political rise of HINDRAF/HRP 
both reflect the ideological as well as the empirical dimensions that are symptomatic of 
process of the de-secularization of the state following the introduction of Clause 1(A) to 
Article 121 in the Federal Constitution in 1988.  The reorganization of public policies and the 
restructuring of the dual-legal systems grounded in the comprehensive doctrine of Islam have 
had powerful impacts upon public perceptions of what’s morally defensible in politics and 
what constitutes ‘threat’ to national security. In the Malaysian political culture, one of the 
most serious threats to national security is communism and the Emergency Ordinances have 
consistently been used by the government to detain political activists and religious dissidents 
without recourse to justice.  In the recent experience, homosexuality has become the latest 
threat, not only to national security but more importantly, the moral fibre of the Islamic 
community.  
Dissenting political ideology and homosexuality have now captured the political imagination 
of those in power and these are being portrayed as the contemporary crises to the social order 
that necessitate legal and moral policing over the behaviours of public and private citizens.  
The high profile public figure that was subject to the legal-moral policing is Anwar Ibrahim, 
an ex-Deputy Prime Minister to Dr Mahathir Mohamed, who was incarcerated in 1998 for 
Sodomy.  Sodomy is categorized as Unnatural Offences under penal code 377A, 377B and 
377C
312
.  Anwar Ibrahim was sentenced to six years in prison for corruption, and in 2000, 
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377A – ‘Any person who has sexual connection with another person by the introduction of the penis 
into the anus or mouth of the other person is said to commit carnal intercourse against the order of 
nature’.   
377B –‘Whoever voluntarily commits carnal intercourse against the order of nature shall be punished 
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty years, and shall also be liable to whipping’.  
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sentenced for nine years for committing sodomy.  In 2004 the Federal Court reversed the 
second conviction and he was released.  Anwar was again arrested in July 2008 over 
allegations of sodomy by his male aide, Mohd Saiful Bukhari and after 4 years of botched 
trial, he was finally acquitted
313
.  The sodomy saga was again politicized under the 
administration of Najib Tun Razak.  The day that the Malaysian State of Sarawak dissolved 
the legislative assembly 21 March 2010, a sex tape implicating an ‘Anwar’ look-alike 
emerged, and there have been reports that these images were distributed to the voters in 
Sarawak to discredit Anwar Ibrahim, who is currently the leader of the Pakatan Rakyat 
opposition coalition
314
.  
Under Najib’s administration, the moral discourse on ‘sex’ enters into the political 
mainstream as a new threat to public order.  Whilst the sodomy trial and the sex tape were 
deliberate strategies to tarnish Anwar’s political image and his moral credentials as a leader of 
Islamic nation, the moral panic about sex and sexuality has now prompted the state 
institutions, particularly the religious departments to expose the sexual minorities as morally 
corrupt, leading to the widespread increase in homophobic attacks and the dehumanization of 
their rights as citizens.  A movement for the LGBT community, ‘Seksualiti Merdeka’315 has 
                                                                                                                                                                      
377C  - Whoever voluntarily commits carnal intercourse against the order of nature on another person 
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Penal Code, Incorporating all amendments up to January 2006  
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 Seksualiti Merdeka is an annual sexuality rights festival held in Kuala Lumpur, and represents a 
coalition of Malaysian NGOs (incl. Malaysian Bar Council, SUARAM, Empower, PT Foundation, 
United Nations, Amnesty International) and individuals.  It aims to empower individuals from the 
LGBT community to celebrate their identities through arts, workshops, music and films 
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been organizing annual public awareness events since 2008 to promote awareness, 
empowerment and platform to restore the human rights of the LGBT community in Malaysia.  
However under Najib, the government crackdown on the LGBT community and Seksualiti 
Merdeka has portrayed the LGBT community as a problematic subculture that is detrimental 
to the Malaysian society.  Homosexuality is publicly condemned by the Islamic authorities, 
putting the blame on ‘choice of lifestyle’ as a deliberate moral attack upon Islam and the 
Muslim nation (Negara Islam).  The official demonization of the LGBT community justified 
repressive actions upon them resulting in the further erosion of their rights as equal citizens 
and to seek decent livelihood.  On 3 November 2011 the police banned all events organized 
by Seksualiti Merdeka after receiving complaints from a Malay right wing organization, 
PERKASA that the event was promoting ‘abnormal and immoral activities’.  The reason 
given by the Deputy Inspector General of Police was, ‘If the event creates uneasiness among 
the vast majority of the population, it may result in disharmony, enmity and threaten public 
order’316 
The festival organizers were taken into police custody for question under Section 298A1 of 
the Penal Code
317
 and under Section 27A (1)(c) of the Police Act
318
.  Following the ban, 
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 27A. (1) Where any activity takes place on or in any land or premises which do not constitute a 
public place and— 
(c) the activity is likely to be prejudicial to the interest of the security of Malaysia or any part thereof 
or to excite a disturbance of the peace, any police officer may order the persons involved in the 
activity 
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organizers of the event filed a judicial review application with the aim to challenge police ban 
in December 2011
319
.  The police ban was upheld by the High Court, and Judge Rohaha 
Yusuf maintained that, ‘The police are empowered under Section 27 of the Police Act to stop 
an event for investigation purposes,’ adding that, ‘The country will come to a standstill if 
everyone wants to call for a review of actions taken by the police’320 
Since the condemnation of homosexuality is sanctioned by the Malaysian government, the 
public ridicule of sexual minorities became normalized and accepted.  Citizens from the 
LGBT community are witnessing the rapid erosion of their fundamental liberties in the 
country
321
.  There are now increasing public hostilities to sexual minorities to the extent that 
members of 47 Islamic NGOs protested in front of the National mosque condemning the UN 
Resolution to outlaw discrimination against gay people
322
.  Some MPs even proposed on a 
motion in Parliament to bar LGBT people from holding high office as MPs and senators
323
.  
Some of the Muslim NGOs went as far as accusing Seksualiti Merdeka of undermining Islam 
and therefore challenging the sovereign role of the Malay King who protects the religion.  
They have also charged that the LGBT is against Syariah principles and urged the police to 
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take actions against such unacceptable lifestyles
324
.  Anti-gay sentiments have permeated into 
the public imagination now that some Malay NGOs, especially Jaringan Melayu Malaysia 
(JMM) is collaborating with the parent-teacher associations in the Malaysian State of 
Selangor to stage a peaceful assembly rally to oppose ‘LGBT and free sex practices’.  The 
JMM president Azwanddin Hamzah gave the reason that the assembly was aimed at objecting 
the LGBT community who are compromising religion for political interests
325
. 
Islam seems to have become the cure-all remedy for all sorts of public disorder, including 
homosexuality, in the Malaysian public political culture, and apart from requiring surveillance 
from the public authority, there’s been a repetitive invocation of Islam as the ideological 
benchmark to restore the nation to an imagined moral order against the tide of decadent 
Western values.  This includes the language of human rights, where its prospects for liberal 
interpretation are considered to be a moral threat to sanctity of Islam and its civilization.  
Under Malaysian law, sodomy is legally categorized as unnatural offence and subject to 
criminalization, this piece of legislation actually gives purchase to right-wing and anti-gay 
groups to normalize sexual stigma, hetero-sexism and sexual prejudice in the public 
discourse.  Prominent leaders of the opposition front, notably Anwar Ibrahim and other civil 
society groups who happened to have links with the LGBT or Seksualiti Merdeka will have 
their leadership credentials tarnished in an increasingly homophobic public discourse.  Hence 
in this climate of government crackdown on the notion of unnatural sexual liaison, 
particularly from the police and the Penal Code system, official discrimination against the 
LGBT community increases the risks of sexual minorities being attacked in the public space, 
not least officially violating the fundamental liberties of citizens. 
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The Deputy Education Minister, Dr Mohd Puad Zarkashi launched a parenting guideline on 
how to handle the issue of LGBT in May 2012, stating, 
‘It is important for parents and teachers to understand this because the wayward 
practice is akin to an epidemic that may spread and become cancerous in the 
society.  It is a threat that will invite negative impact and spoil the fabric of the 
society in the country.  This is a culture that does not reflect our values and must 
be addressed before it spreads further.  The culture is like drugs, if the children 
are not introduced to it, they will not try it out’326 
Few months later the Education Ministry introduced official “guidelines” to help parents to 
identify gay and lesbian symptoms in their children so they can take early corrective 
measures. 
The guidelines list four symptoms each of gays and lesbians
327
: 
 
Symptoms of gays: 
 Have a muscular body and like to show their body by wearing V-neck and sleeveless 
clothes; 
 Prefer tight and light-coloured clothes; 
 Attracted to men; and 
 Like to bring big handbags, similar to those used by women, when hanging out. 
Symptoms of lesbians: 
 Attracted to women; 
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 Besides their female companions, they will distance themselves from other women; 
 Like to hang out, have meals and sleep in the company of women; and 
 Have no affection for men. 
The guide was published by Yayasan Guru Malaysia Bhd (Teacher Foundation of Malaysia) 
and the Putrajaya Consultative Council of Parents and Teachers Associations.  In response to 
the Ministry’s guidelines, social activists and netizens came online to organize V-neck day 
public gathering on 1 October 2012.  According to the event’s Facebook page, more than 
2,000 people have agreed to don V-neck T-shirts in the event organised through the social 
media, where a restaurant in Kuala Lumpur offered free meals for customers who turned up 
wearing V-neck T-shirts
328
.  As the issue of LGBT heats up, the Vice-President of the Muslim 
Lawyers Association of Malaysia, Azril Mohd Amin, made a statement that LGBT rights 
should be excluded from the human rights declaration currently being drafted by Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  He wrote that, 
Were ASEAN to endorse such rights in the final declaration, Malaysia as a 
Muslim-majority country would have to reiterate her strong objections; as such a 
policy clearly contradicts the principles enshrined in the religion of Islam. 
Malaysian and those who are against LGBT rights are thereby protecting the 
human race from the secular fallacy, perpetrated by the United Nations, that 
human beings may do as they please, within their so-called "sovereign borders" 
(as laid down by the European powers)’329. 
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The concept of secular in this context is understood as a doctrine that endorses the acceptance 
of homosexuality, and as homosexuality is a sin and a threat to human reproduction in the 
Islamic understanding, the denial of basic rights to the people belonging to the LGBT 
community is justified on the grounds of religious doctrine.  Religious doctrine is used as a 
way of controlling human behaviour and sexuality as Foucault has demonstrated the role of 
the pastoral power in shaping the moral conducts of its believers (Golder 2007).  In the 
Malaysian case, Islamic religious doctrine is applied as a form of policing the moral conducts 
of the believers both in the private domain of the family unit as well as the conduct of the 
Umma in the public discourse.  The legal criminalization of sodomy and the assumption of 
guilt through political association with homosexuality have become strong enough grounds 
for the government authority to reciprocate the religious castigation of homosexuality in the 
form of public Syariah law.   
 This dissertation argues that denial of legal rights is most evident among the transgender 
community because of their physical appearance.  In ‘The Struggle to be Ourselves, neither 
man nor woman: Mak Nyahs in Malaysia’, Khartini Slamah describes how the Mak Nyahs in 
Malaysia are probably the most discriminated sexual minorities within the LGBT community.  
Mak Nyahs are male by birth and are essentially effeminate, but this is not the main signifier 
of the identity of Mak Nyahs.  Instead Mak Nyahs choose to express themselves across the 
spectrum of gender and sexuality – interchangeably as women or as men in different contexts, 
hence cross-dressing is part of this expression as well (Khartini 2005:100).  In 1983 the 
Conference of Rulers in Malaysia issued a fatwa (decree) banning sex change operation on all 
Muslims, except for conditions of hermaphrodite or medically known as ‘intersexuality’ (Teh 
2002).  Subsequently, cross-dressing was also prohibited under Syariah enactments.  Muslim 
Mak Nyahs can be fined up to RM 1,000 (approximately 200 Pounds) for exhibiting ‘indecent 
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behaviours’ under the Syariah Criminal Act (Federal Territories) 1997, and/or imprisoned330, 
whereas non-Muslim transsexuals, the fine for ‘indecent behaviour’ is less severe, usually less 
than RM100 (20 pounds).   
Khartini (2005) argues that discrimination in the employment sector is one of the most 
detrimental experiences for many Mak Nyahs because they failed to fit into the heterosexual 
norms and expectations at the workplace.  In many cases, they ended up working in casual 
employment, entertainment outlets, massage parlours, and also prostitution, where the risks of 
abuse, physical violence and sexual transmitted diseases tend to be higher (Teh 2008).   Due 
to the insecure environment of their livelihood, the Mak Nyahs face increasing threat of 
arrests, detentions and also punishments form the police and particularly from the Islamic 
religious department.  In Teh’s (2002) study of the social lives of Mak Nyahs, the author 
shows that more than half of the respondents had been caught by the police, and they are more 
likely to face repeated arrests because of their existing records with the authorities.  The study 
also revealed that the main reasons that they had been caught by the police were for cross-
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 Laws of Malaysia, Act 559, Syariah Criminal Offences, (Federal Territories) Act 1997, 
Incorporating all amendments up to 1 January 2006 
 Male person posing as woman  Section (28) - Any male person who, in any public place, wears a 
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dressing (33%), indecent dressing (18%) and prostitution (16%), failing drug tests (13%), 
during a police raids or operations (10%), and for loitering late at night (6%)
331
. 
When Mak Nyahs are detained at the police stations, Khartini explains that they will be 
stripped of their women’s clothing and humiliated in front of other people, locked up with 
other men, subjecting them to further humiliation and sexual violence by the inmates. Other 
harassments include invitation to have sex, forced to change their religion, had their hairs cut 
short, their breasts and private parts assaulted.  Most of the Mak Nyahs face continuing 
harassments and humiliation at the hands of the police and the Islamic authorities, and it is 
because of the cumulative effects of these official violations of rights, they have now 
instigated legal challenge against the Syariah law on the criminalization of ‘Cross-dressing’.  
Four Mak Nahs in Seremban have recently been granted leave to challenge the criminalization 
of cross-dressing stated under Section 66 of the Syariah Criminal (Negeri Sembilan) 
Enactment 1992
332
.  Enactment 4 of 1992 (Section 66) criminalises any male person who 
“wears women’s attire” or “poses as a woman”, and as citizens of Malaysia, they argue that 
this penal code is inconsistent with various fundamental liberties guaranteed by the Federal 
Constitution of Malaysia, including: (i) Article 5(1) which protects the right to live with 
dignity, the right to work and livelihood and the right to privacy; (ii) 8(1) which guarantees 
the right to equal protection of the law; (iii) Article 8(2) which prohibits discrimination on a 
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number of grounds, including “gender”; (iv) Article 9(2) which protects the right to freedom 
333
of movement; and (v) Article 10(1)(a) which protects the right to freedom of expression
334
.  
In their application to the High Court of Malaya for the judicial review of Section 66 of the 
Syariah Criminal (Negeri Sembilan) Enactment 1992, the four Mak Nyahs sought to challenge 
the restrictions on Cross dressing through the legal avenues provided in the Federal 
Constitution
335
.  The claimants have been repeatedly arrested, detained and charged for 
offences under the Syariah law because of the choices they have made about how they want to 
express themselves, and the fact that they trapped in low-skilled jobs that expose them to 
social stigma and risks of physical violence.  The original work of the Equal Right Trust 
(ERT 2011) in documenting the testimonies by the claimants can be referred in the Appendix 
II, and are reproduced to demonstrate how the de-secularization of the state combined with 
the juridical autonomy of the Syariah contributed to the erosion of fundamental liberties 
among Muslim transgender women. 
In order to understand the legal context in which these Mak Nyah attempted to overcome the 
jurisdictional conflict between the Civil Courts and the Syariah, it is important to briefly 
understand how the Syariah laws are enacted and applied differently in each Malaysian state. 
                                                     
333
 These testimonies are included here because they are important insights into the subjective experiences of the 
Mak Nyahs, and as they face the risks of discrimination daily, it is very difficult to gain access to them.  This is 
the main reason for the author to reproduce the work of Equal Right Trust, in support of the argument of the 
dissertation. 
334
 This is an EU-funded project initiated by the Equal Right Trust in Malaysia, entitled “Empowering 
Civil Society to Combat Discrimination through Collective Advocacy and Litigation”.  ERT has been 
made aware of the discrimination faced by the Malaysian mak nyah community. ERT is currently 
providing international and comparative law research in support of a judicial review case in which 
four mak nyahs are challenging the constitutionality of the Syariah (Shari’a) law prohibition on cross-
dressing. http://www.equalrightstrust.org/equality_malaysia/index.htm 
335
 IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT SEREMBAN IN NEGERI SEMBILAN DARUL 
KHUSUS, MALAYSIA 
   APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW NO:_13-1-2011 
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The administration of Syariah is regulated by the Administration of Islamic Law Enactments 
where the Sultan in each Malaysian state is the Head of the religion of Islam.  For the Federal 
Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan, and the Malaysian states without Sultan – Sabah, 
Sarawak, Penang and Melacca, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the King is the Head of the 
religion of Islam.  There is a Council of Muslim Religion to advise the rulers on all Islamic 
matters except Syariah and the administration of justice, and the Ruler is empowered to 
appoint a Mufti or the ‘lead scholar’ of Islam in each Malaysian state to oversee the 
administration of Syariah and Fatwa. There is the National Islamic Consultative Committee to 
standardize the issuance of Islamic Fatwa or edicts, but each Malaysian state has established 
its own Fatwa committee pursuant to their respective Administration of Islamic Law 
Enactments
336
, having absolute autonomy over Islamic matters and therefore not bounded by 
the National Islamic Consultative Committee.  Generally all Muslim residents are obliged to 
observe the Fatwa once it is issued and such edict is normally recognized as an authority in 
Syariah Courts. 
The jurisdiction of Syariah Courts is specified in the item 1 of the State List
337
 in the 
Constitution’s Ninth Schedule.  Syariah Courts have jurisdiction over all Muslims in respect 
to the various matters listed in item 1, except for criminal offences, whereby the power to 
define criminal laws remains within the ambit of the secular courts by virtue of the 
Constitution’s Federal List.  Syariah Courts have jurisdiction on offences committed by 
Muslims only on those conferred by the Federal law.  Normally the criminal jurisdiction of 
the Syariah Courts is limited to religious offences where the scope of punishment does not 
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exceed three years imprisonment, a fine not exceeding RM 5,000, or whipping not exceeding 
six strokes, or any combination thereof. 
The amendment of Article 121 in 1988 (with the addition of section 1A) extended the 
provision where the Civil Courts have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the 
jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts, where the purpose of was to deter litigants appealing 
Syariah Court decisions to the High Court (Smith 2003-2004).  The addition of the new 
clause, section 1A to Article 121, the interpretation of justice will tilt in favour of the 
conception of differential rights on the grounds of religion, thus deterring these Mak Nyah 
from ever having the legal remedy to challenge kinds of discrimination and violence they face 
from the religious police and the public.   
On the 11 October 2012 the Seremban High Court dismissed application by four transgender 
individuals to challenge the ban on Muslim men to dress and pose as women under Section 66 
of the Syariah Criminal (Negeri Sembilan) Enactment.  The four applicants, Adam Shazrul 
Mohammad Yusoff, Mohammad Juzaili Mohammad Khamis, Shukur Jani and Wan Fairol 
Wan Ismail, had appealed for judicial review of Section 66 of Islamic Sharia law at the 
secular court on the grounds that Section 66 violated the Federal Constitution on the freedom 
of expression and therefore unconstitutional.  Justice Siti Mariah Ahmad, in her judgment, 
said that it was undisputed that the four applicants were Muslims and hence Section 66 
applied to them
338
.  According to the Judge, Part 2 of the Federal Constitution, which 
guarantees fundamental liberties to an individual, is exempted from the Negeri Sembilan 
Syariah penal code Section 66.  The immediate implication of this judgement sets the 
precedent for the juridical autonomy of the Syariah court that denies the rights and liberties of 
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all citizens guaranteed under the Federal Constitution.  There is also the increased risk of Mak 
Nyahs being persecuted by the religious authorities as a result of this judgment.  This fear is 
expressed by the Malaysia AIDS Council (MAC) media and communications head Azahemy 
Abdullah, 
‘We fear that this judgment could lead to increased stigma as well as acts of 
persecution and discrimination by authorities, especially from the enforcement 
officials of the religious department’339 
The de-secularization process involving the judicial lacuna that emerged from the amendment 
of Article 121 (1A) not only led to the erosion of the rights of citizens from the minority 
communities, but the increasing strength of Islamic moral discourse in the public political 
sphere indirectly tip the interpretation of law in favour of securing the religious doctrine of 
public morality over the concept of natural justice and the duty to act fairly.   
7.7 Conclusion 
This is not the first time that citizens from the sexual minorities have tried to overcome both 
the legal and bureaucratic restrictions that are undermining their fundamental liberties.  The 
high profile case prior to this one involved a Mak Nyah by the name of Aleesha Farhana who 
had applied to the court to change her name from Mohd Ashraf Hafiz Abdul Aziz to Aleesha 
Farhana Abdul Aziz.  On 18 July 2011 the High Court rejected her application despite the fact 
that she had undergone a sex reassignment surgery.  In less than a month after that she passed 
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away
340
.  The High Court judge, Mohammed Yazid Mustafa rejected the application on the 
grounds that there was no legal statute to grant the application based solely on sex 
reassignment surgery and that the applicant did not meet the criteria for being a woman – 
chromosome count, and exterior and interior organs.  He further said that, ‘In making my 
judgment, I have to take into account the legal impact as well as whether a decision would 
confuse the public’341.  
Changing name and gender does not only involve the court, but also the hospital and the 
National Registration Department where MyKad or Malaysian Identity Cards are issued.  
Muslim Malaysians will have ‘Islam’ written on the MyKad to show their religion and the 
National Registration Department has been very restrictive on making technical changes to 
gender and religion
342
.  The institutional barriers combined with the ideological underpinning 
of Islamic moral codes are indicative of the substantial process of de-secularization of the 
state apparatus, practice and official thinking in the Malaysian contemporary discourse.  It has 
now come to a point where the ‘ideal’ of Islam- as a way of life, as a way of governing and as 
a way of organizing the public moral discourse - supersedes the fundamental recognition of 
the right to decent living, equal opportunities, and most importantly the right to justice for all 
citizens.   
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Islam has increasingly become the main organizing principles in the way justice is dispensed, 
socio-economic rights are negotiated, and public deliberations are conducted.  Understanding 
the ideological effects of statist Islamization upon the fundamental rights of the Malaysian 
citizens provides critical insight into the empirical likelihood for liberal conception of justice.   
So far the three empirical cases have shown that the Malaysian government failed to allow for 
generous interpretation of the Constitutional provisions that are vital to the growth of liberal 
democratic participation.  The evidence of state repression in the forms of word censorship – 
‘Allah’, institutional discrimination and the homophobic abuses suggest that the conception of 
justice is broadly understood to rationalize dominance of Islamic thinking in the Malaysian 
public political culture.    
Statist Islamization, in other words, state-sponsored Islamization is directly correlated to the 
process of the de-secularization of the state.  This process has had discursive impacts upon 
how official reasoning can influence the ways in which coercive state power is used for the 
purpose of political legitimacy.  The three cases show how state practices that are motivated 
in theological reasons have been detrimental to the conception of equality and justice for all.  
The existence of selective laws to protect the historically dominant ethnic-religious provisions 
has led to the structuring the official policies of discrimination (whether intentional or not) 
against citizens from the minority backgrounds – religious, ethnicity and sexuality, further 
eroding the fundamental liberties of citizenship.   The process of the de-secularization of the 
state has been largely driven by the political will to power and the ideological content to this 
dynamic has been furnished by the Islamic precepts, to the detriment of the rights of non-
Muslims, and the LGBT community.  Nonetheless, the three cases have shown incredible 
awareness to galvanize contestations that are not only vital to stem the further de-
secularization of the state in Malaysia, but to create the conditions for locating the prospect of 
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common citizenship.  There’s hope yet for the emergence of an overlapping consensus 
whereby public deliberation will be motivated by publicly shared reasons in which citizens 
are regarded as free and equal.  As long as these contestations remain organic, state legitimacy 
that rests on theological reasons and ethnic bargaining will be challenged.  
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8 CONCLUSION 
8.1 Further reflections on the secular-Islamic discourse 
“I have a dream. I want Malaysia to remain an Islamic country. Let us create 
history by becoming the first Islamic country to achieve the status of a fully 
developed nation. Islam is manifested in several forms as seen in the country’s 
economic and social development, Islamic institutions and politics. We have not 
strayed or diverted from the path of Islamic teaching.  Nobody can belittle the 
Islamic faith and conscience as they please, because we have specific laws to 
safeguard them.  Nobody can even chaff any Islamic term as we have a law to stop 
them, and this is what the government has struggled for all the time.  When 
Muslims embrace moderation (Wasatiyyah), there would be unity among the 
Umma and with those from other religions. When we achieve this, the 
administration of the country would go smoothly and Malaysia would progress 
further”  
(Najib Razak, PM Malaysia at the Putrajaya International Convention Centre, 7 April 
2012, NST) 
 
Islam, Umma and the law are the ideological markers that have become dominant in 
controlling the Malaysian public political discourse.  Islam as a government-sponsored 
religious ideology is consistently being invoked by UMNO (United Malays National 
Organization) to draw political support among the Malay-Muslim believers or the Umma, 
where the law is used to dictate the conduct of citizens from questioning the political exploits 
of the party.  The obligation to support UMNO is predicated on the risk of Malay-Muslims 
losing their special citizenship rights and this is continually politicized so that other political 
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ideologies do not appeal to the interest of the Umma.  Such ideological ransom is aimed at 
both cultivating gratitude and eliciting guilt among the Umma to continue submitting to the 
political legitimacy of UMNO to protect their historically dominant political position with the 
power of the state to command the resources of the country.  
The public justification for the protection of the special citizenship right is historically 
grounded in the traditional authority of the Malay ruling elites nurtured by British 
colonialism, and this continues to furnish the official ideology of the contemporary Malaysian 
government.  The special citizenship right for the Malays was grounded in the belief that such 
legal protection was needed to secure their socio-economic well-being and future progress.  
This ideology underlined the official thinking in problematizing the issues of poverty and set 
the terms of ethnic bargaining framed in the New Economic Policy of the 1970’s.  Along with 
the politics of ethnic bargaining, Islamic moral discourse gradually dominated substantial 
aspects of public policy formulation in response to the Islamic revivalist and civil society 
movement in the 1980’s.  Islamizing the public sphere was instrumental to regulating the role 
of faith in politics, and this was justified through public investment on religious institutions 
and the strengthening of the Islamic legal apparatus.  Following the amendment to the Article 
121 of the Constitution, the role of Islamic precepts was repositioned in the governmental 
apparatus to expand the juridical autonomy of the Syariah legal system.  As a result of such 
political-legal development, Islam becomes the object of political struggle in the 
contemporary public political culture. 
When Islam becomes the reason for and the object of political struggle, as in the Malaysian 
case, political deliberations then developed into a series of self-reinforcing statements that 
cannot be disproved or challenged because they are grounded in the doctrinal truth claims 
about Islamic moral precepts.  The political obligation to accept the sanctity of Islam as both 
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the reason for a particular governmental conduct or a public policy in order to achieve the 
civilizational purpose of Islam, other matters that concern the conditions of human living and 
experiences will be relegated to secondary concerns.   Political legitimacy grounded in the 
truth claims about Islamic doctrine does not celebrate diversity as the government is more 
inclined to impose Islamic morality and ethics through coercive laws. 
The dominance of Islamic precept and its position as the official religion of the Federation is 
an accepted condition for the viability of pluralism in the Malaysian public political culture. 
The elevation of the rights of the Umma through the principle of special citizenship right 
underlines the criteria for political stability.   It shapes the politics of ethnic bargaining; public 
policy making and frames the political perimeter for the conduct of citizens in the public 
political culture.  Having said that, these ideological markers are equally subject to 
contestations because of how citizens respond to the changing conditions of their freedom 
through the exercise of reason.  It is this form of contestation between the dominance of 
ideological markers linked to Islam and the alternative mode of secular thinking that 
constantly characterizes the nature of state practice and how it informs political engagement 
in the Malaysian condition of pluralism.   
The conceptual dynamics between the Islamic and the secular in Malaysia illustrate how 
Islam has become instrumental to organizing the principles of state power.  What Rawls 
defined as the ‘plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines’ (Rawls 1997:766) 
captures a broad stream of competing claims of right which can be employed to critically 
unpack the domain of activism that problematizes the conduct of the state and the citizens in 
the Malaysian context. 
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The main contention of this dissertation is to capture the process of the de-secularization of 
the state and explain how it contributes to the erosion of fundamental liberties of citizens in a 
condition of religious pluralism.  It traces the conceptual understanding of the ‘secular’ in the 
Malaysian political context and analyses the ‘secular’ in relation to the historical agency of 
Islam in the public political domain.  The dissertation has come to the conclusion that as 
Islamic moral precepts are institutionally adopted to be part of the legal apparatus in the 
Malaysian society, adjudication of citizenship rights becomes bifurcated along the lines of 
religious backgrounds.  The three cases have shown how such bifurcation of citizenship rights 
has had their ideological and empirical implications, thus prompting the need to reassess the 
benefits of restoring the elements of secular thinking in the practice of governance.   
The privatization of religious belief rests on the assumption that secularization as a process of 
differentiation in the modern age diminishes society’s reliance upon religion as a public 
institution.  This process has given rise to the impression that the logical conclusion to 
achieving the practice of liberal democracy requires the privatization of religious belief from 
the public sphere.  However the contemporary study of religion in the modern age has largely 
been cast on the polemical debates that swing from the declining position of religion in 
modern secular society into the extreme arguments about the rising religious movements on a 
global scale.     
Religion has been shaping the secular civilization from its inception within the Enlightenment 
tradition.  In the modern secular age, the role and the position of religion in the public sphere 
have undergone major transformations where the claims of religious ‘decline’ tend to be more 
apparent in many areas of the hard sciences and cultural practices.  The relationship between 
the religious and the secular has been taken to assume that certain aspects of the modern 
cultural and political practices have moved away from older beliefs and practices, however 
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increasing evidence of transcendental beliefs remained despite substantial modernization in 
the material conditions of life.  Far from being on the collision course against Western norms 
of modernity; many non-Western countries have embraced modern technologies and even 
political systems into their societies.  The conception of the modern and the plurality of 
modernization is more complex than the strict division between religion and secular ideas 
(Kaya 2004:3).   
The secularization thesis provides important conceptual vocabularies to contextualize the role 
of religion in modern society (Lechner 1991; Lechner 1992).  Nonetheless the major pitfall of 
the secular paradigm is the tendency for its protagonists to subsume the ‘decline’ of religiosity 
as a progressive and the normative consequence of being modern and the prevailing secularist 
bias against the resourcefulness of religious ideas in politics (Casanova 1994; Fox 2002; 
Philpott 2007).   
The privatization of religious belief as the dominant premise of the secular understanding in 
modern society has undermined public recognition for the role of religion in civil society 
movement.  The comparative studies on church-state relations in Spain, Poland, Brazil and the 
United States show that religious discourse in the public sphere empowers citizens to 
challenge the authoritarianism of the state  (Casanova 2001).  Hence the dynamics of religion 
and the secular ideas have the mechanism to create multiple forms of identities in political 
contestation.  It is for this reason that democratic deliberation has become the focal point of 
modern state-making where the ideal of common citizenship can be established to enable 
civic participation for the protection of basic human rights. 
 ‘Secularism’ as a political concept central to modern state-making is historically contingent 
and politically contested in many different countries.  The term itself is burdened with the 
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normative understanding of the separation between the church and the state and how it has 
been used or analysed in certain socio-political contexts.  In many Western democracies the 
concept of secularism is generally accepted as an important agenda of the Enlightenment 
project to sustain the modern state in endorsing the norms of impartiality in an environment of 
competing worldviews.  Secularism is commonly understood to embody the ‘unifying 
elements of freedom, neutrality and equality’ as the preferred principles upon which the 
modern regimes are being constructed to secure the basic norms of human rights (Gunn 
2004).  However in reality, the issue of religious conviction and the question of liberty 
remained contested within the conceptual frame of the ‘secular’ state because the questions 
about faith and conviction will always shape the debates about the meaning of liberal 
democracy.     
The secular state is therefore normatively conceptualized to provide a template for 
adjudicating the competing forms of beliefs found in societies living in conditions of 
pluralism.  How the state governs the relationship between the state and religious beliefs 
differs in content from one country to another but these constitute the founding myths and the 
shared belief in the making of the nation-state, and therefore the public political culture.  
These differing interpretations notwithstanding, the dynamics between religious convictions 
and the liberty of conscience engendered significant roles for the state to enact laws 
circumscribing the public role of religion in the contemporary society.   
The separation thesis and the assumptions about the legal separation of religion and the state 
play significant role in the ‘differentiation’ process linked to the development of democratic 
institutions.  It is important to note that democracy is not exclusive to secularism and that 
there is the empirical need to re-negotiate the role religion in building a democratic consensus 
(Stepan 2000).  This empirical need requires an analysis of the structure of state tradition that 
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has had considerable implications upon how relations between religion and the state are 
regulated.   
The historical presence or absence of an ancien régime followed by periods of critical 
junctures in secular state-building constitutes important structural trajectories in conditioning 
the state’s relation to the role of religion in the construction of political dominion and 
legitimacy (Kuru 2007).   
“The critical condition that affects these views is the absence or existence of an 
ancient régime that combines monarchy with hegemonic religion. If such an 
ancien régime exists, then, it is hard to convince hegemonic religious groups to 
agree to the disestablishment of their religion. Moreover, the ancien régime also 
leads the secular elite, who oppose the monarchy in founding a new republic, to 
combat the hegemonic religion that justifies monarchy” (Kuru 2007:584). 
The existence of ancien regime in the form of the Malay Kerajaan combined with Islam as 
the hegemonic religion constitute the central features in the process of reinventing the 
ideological construction of Bangsa Malay and umma.  When the British muscled their way 
into the Malay world, the mode of colonial penetration was negotiated through stages of 
diplomatic consensus whereby the sovereignty the Malay Kerajaan was ceremonially 
recognized.  The parallel existence of dual political domains - the British colonial regime and 
the Malay Kerajaan – was supported by the development of twin structures of the ‘secular’ 
court and the Mohammedan laws that dealt with the affairs of the Malays and Muslim 
subjects.  The evolution of the modern Malaysian state-making coupled with the syncretic 
fusion of theocratic forces of Islam underscore the continuity of Anglo-Malay power alliance 
embedded in the secular practices of colonialism and the sovereignty of Malay Kerajaan.  
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This continuity is not only institutional in character but more importantly the theocratic vision 
of Islam established a firm grip on the values of the moral conduct of its believers – in both 
the domains of the political and non-political.  Hence throughout the historical development 
of politics in Malaysia, the ideological precedence of Bangsa Malay, Islam and Raja continue 
to endow certain quality deliverance for the state to justify its political legitimacy. 
Whilst the historical dialectic between religion and the secular has its roots embedded in 
Western philosophy, the idea secularism has often faced the charges of colonial import in 
countries that have undergone Western colonial administration.  The secular rupture or the 
emergence of Enlightenment from the theological power of religious authority is but a form of 
intellectual and political resistance that emerged as a response to the religious stronghold of 
Christendom.  The Enlightenment movement was an exclusive historical experience in the 
West, but where the ideas and the elements of the secular are practiced in the contemporary 
experience, they represent the intellectual and ideological counter movement against the 
powerful onslaught of religious persecutions.  This dissertation has identified those secular 
forces being present in the three cases that were discussed the dissertation as the intellectual 
and ideological counter movements emerging from the critical awareness against the rapid de-
secularization of the state in Malaysia and as the local form of ideological resistance to the 
government’s use of laws to coerce citizens from the minority backgrounds. 
The concept of secularism is used to analyse the empirical dimension of state practice, which 
this dissertation have applied to explore the government treatment of citizens in a religiously 
diverse and ethnically plural society.  The focus on the role of state in adjudicating the 
competing claims of citizens provides important insight into the manner with which the 
conception of justice and citizenship right are formulated to reflect the diverse political 
requirements of ethnic and religious pluralism.  In a condition of pluralism, it is only 
282 
 
reasonable for the state to ground its policies and practices upon reasons that are publicly 
shared as these will have considerable bearing upon the process of deliberation on 
fundamental political issues.  In many countries it is not uncommon to find that citizens are 
obliged to submit to the political dominance of a particular doctrine, whether religious or 
secular.  When fundamental political issues are decided on the grounds of one particular 
comprehensive doctrine, it will generate the conditions for critical awareness to arise among 
disaffected citizens to demand minimum justice to prevent further erosion of their rights.  In 
many cases such critical awareness can lead to empirical challenges in the form of legal battle 
and/or political uprising against the legitimate rule of the state, thus undermining the nature of 
political stability for a particular regime.  How the state responds to political and social 
contestations and the public reasoning given for the way these challenges are mediated will be 
crucial in determining the liberal constraints upon the conception of justice.    
8.2 The Malaysian scenario 
Since the condition of pluralism is now the norm of contemporary societies, Malaysia is not a 
special case in the way this dissertation approaches the reappraisal of secularism.  It is a case 
that is important to consider because of how it informs the wider debates about secularism, 
the role of religion in public sphere and how the decisions of state on this matter can have 
serious impacts upon the fundamental liberties of individual citizens.  The debate about the 
secular state in Malaysia is vital, not because it would pose a challenge to the official role of 
Islam in the Federal Constitution, but in allowing the avenue to debate; this would address the 
polemical divide between Islam and the ‘secular’, and problematize the structural rift inherent 
within the dual-legal system that accentuates differential rights and access to justice.  The 
censorship of debate on the secular state in Malaysia has actually exacerbated the polemical 
rift between what the secular principles stand for and the public significance of protecting the 
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Islamic faith.  The prevailing understanding of the ‘secular’ among the vocal Malay-Muslim 
NGOs tend to be narrowly conceived in terms of its potential to violate the official role of 
Islam and the risks it would pose to Islamic morality.   
The secular-religious debates in contemporary Malaysia are an ideological battle, where the 
fundamental questions of morality are grounded in Islamic resources tends to supplant other 
values that are non-Islamic related and/or moral convictions emerging from the ‘secular’ 
movement.  The re-positioning of the theological role of Islam has gained further ground in 
the formulation of public policies, in law, in reorganizing the terms of public engagements, 
down to the state policing of the moral conducts and the private lives of Muslim citizens.  
Whilst these efforts have been publicly justified on the prescriptive grounds that Islam 
demands these obligations to be set out to its adherents, the empirical consequences the 
dogmatic approach by the government has been detrimental to the prospects of democratic 
deliberation, thus undermining conditions for equal and common citizenship to flourish.  With 
respect to the questions about fundamental liberties, the rights of citizens and the fair and 
equal access to justice, it becomes impossible to do justice to these issues when the appeal to 
the doctrine of Islamic values prevailed.  In the condition of pluralism in Malaysia, the use 
‘public political power’(Rawls 1989:243) to enforce the doctrine of the Islam as the primary 
template for the formulation of public policies, is serious miscarriage of political reasoning. 
There are many layers of power struggle in the Malaysian political context but the most 
persistent one remains to be the resistance against the state monopoly of ethnic and religious 
domination.  The dissertation has shown that the condition of pluralism in Malaysia is both 
historically contingent and politically determined or shaped by the structure of the Anglo-
Malay alliance under British colonialism, and after Malayan independence in 1957, a 
predominantly Malay-centred political coalition represented by UMNO.  Independence for 
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Malaya was less about the political struggles against British colonialism, instead the pre-
independence divergences about the criteria for common citizenship continued to mar 
political deliberations in Malaya as these began to emerge and crystalize into notions of 
differential ethnic rights.  These differential terms of ethnic rights were enshrined within the 
Federal Constitution, and legally justified on the grounds of protecting the rights of the Malay 
indigenes against foreign ownership and competition.   
In 1963 Malaysia was forged into a mosaic of ‘state without nation’ after going through tough 
negotiation process to combine Malaya, Singapore North Borneo and Sarawak.   Prior to 
1963, each individual territory had a very distinctive structure of colonial authority, cultural 
identity and political contestation. When all of these territories were forged to become a new 
Malaysian nation, the politics of national belonging was fractured along the lines of ethnic 
ownership mainly advocated by UMNO and other right-wing Malay groups, against the more 
inclusive multi-ethnic ideal of ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ galvanized by the Singapore leaders, 
other opposition leaders in Malaya and representatives from the Borneo territories. 
‘Malaysian Malaysia’ broke the Malaysian Federation prompting the separation of Singapore 
from the Federation in the 1965 Constitutional Amendment.  This created the political 
precedent for the Malaysian government to use the Constitution to dictate political 
contestation against the norms of differential rights. 
 This strategy was redeployed after the 1969 riot.  The 1971 Constitutional Amendment was 
tabled to limit the scope of the freedom of speech, prohibiting the public discussion of the 
Malay special position, the Malay language as well as the sovereign position of the Malay 
Rulers.  Even MPs were barred them from publicly debating them in the Parliament.  With 
these amendments in place, the pro-Malay affirmative action program under the New 
Economic Policy legally obliged the UMNO-led government to formulate positive 
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discrimination approach in the government resource allocation for human capital investment 
among the Malays, and to some extent, the Bumiputera community. 
Ethno-religious sentiments penetrate in almost every layer of political struggle in the 
Malaysian narrative of contention.  This process came about in stages, subject to the nature of 
political contentions targeted against the state.  Power operates through framing the agency of 
a free subject, but always with the consequence of the subject responding or countering the 
imposition of power in innovative and creative ways.  The religious form of domination over 
the ‘bodies’ of its adherents through religious values internalized by individuals have been 
one of the most compelling disciplinary technologies employed by the Malaysian government 
to seek political legitimacy from the majority Muslim population in the country.  These values 
provide continual discipline through the personalization of the ecumenical bond of the Umma 
and Malay ethnic community, ideologically framing the Malay civilization in the institution 
of Malay monarchy.   
These sentiments justify defending the status quo of the Malay special citizenship through the 
faith of the Umma.  When ethnicity and religious values are internalized as a form of political 
conviction, these personalized sentiments - ethnic identity and religious persuasions - would 
be expressed as political, and because of the ways in which these values have been prioritized 
and publicly understood as ‘rights’ in the legal domain, formulated in the form of affirmative 
action in public policies, other political values have become secondary and unimportant to the 
fundamental consideration of human liberties, equal treatment and justice.  The importance of 
ethnicity and religion in the public domain has prompted the state to sustain the monopoly 
over the legitimacy to protect these values as political ‘rights’, projecting them as inimical to 
Western liberal values and employing the modern art of policy making and laws to preserve 
these  values as authentic to contemporary Malaysia.  Whilst there are emerging dissenting 
286 
 
voices to challenge the ways in which the essential values of ethnicity and religion have been 
employed for political purposes, these forms of counter conducts from the citizens will be 
greeted with punitive laws from the state. 
Under Mahathir two very important structural changes were made in the repositioning of the 
public role of Islam.  In the economy, a whole host of financial, insurance and commercial 
portfolios emerged under the banner of Islamic entrepreneurship.  In managing political 
contestations, Mahathir employed the strategies of constitutional amendment in 1988 by 
changing Article 121 in the Constitution to limit the autonomy of the judiciary, which 
effectively compromised the doctrine of the separation of power in real politics.  The legal 
changes made to the structure of the court system significantly transformed the nature of 
equality of access to justice for Malaysian citizens, particularly the inter-faith relations in 
matrimony, custody and conversion.  After more than a decade that these legal changes were 
made, many legal cases in divorce, child custody, even to the extent of burial were caught in 
serious legal logjam because the Syariah courts are limited to Muslims only.  This gave rise to 
the immediate public misconception that the High Courts have no jurisdictions on matters 
relating to the Islam.   
These cases of legal logjam became particular prominent and widespread under the Abdullah 
regime, and with the introduction of Islam Hadhari as the new approach to Islamic living and 
thinking, such ideological intervention reinvigorated Islam onto a new high of cultural 
civilization.  It emphasizes the significance of civilized mentality among the Muslims to 
counter the crises of identities in the information age.  The professed civilized mentality that 
was supposed to frame the conduct of the state under Abdullah however failed to translate 
into public reasoning when non-Muslims were officially barred from using ‘Allah’ in the 
congregation and theological publications.  Public reasoning by the state became problematic 
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with the sudden increase in the number of Hindu temple demolition under the Abdullah 
regime.  Within the space of 16 months, more than 70 temples were demolished for various 
official reasons.  The Islamization of the state alone may not be enough to explain why some 
of these official policies have been detrimental to the fundamental rights of other non-Muslim 
citizens.  The term of explanation needs to be unpacked to illuminate how the economic, legal 
and ideological changes made to the public role of Islam impinged upon the political role and 
the conduct of the state in adjudicating these competing notions of right for greater 
democratic prospects for all citizens. 
The power of the state is constantly revived and reinvented by the politicization of Islam and 
the ideological demand for expanding the Islamic legal precepts in policing the moral 
conducts of the Muslim citizens, and in regulating the political demands of the non-Muslim 
citizens in Malaysia.  Islamization under Mahathir was largely done out of the need to 
minimize political crisis within UMNO and destabilize contestation from the opposition, but 
under Abdullah, Islamization began to focus on the ideological consolidation of everything 
Islamic – complete state imposition of power over bodies, the collective mind-set and the 
public sphere - even at the cost of public reasoning.  On this score, the de-secularization of the 
Malaysian State is directly related to the discourse of party political domination over Islamic 
values formulated within the structure of the state, combined with the political use of the legal 
apparatus to justify a very narrow understanding of the official role of Islam that is enshrined 
in Federal Constitution.  The de-secularization of the state has not gone unchallenged, and this 
is where the significance of reason is employed to highlight the initiative of citizens (Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike) demanding the evaluation of the neutrality of the state on just and 
equal treatment of citizens. 
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The original commitment of secular state in the Malaysian context was grounded in the 
political consensus among the leaders of the Alliance party.  Whilst the legal qualifications 
were not categorically spelt out to frame the normative consensus of how the state should 
remain secular, the principles of the rule of law have so far been considered adequate for the 
Malaysian state to function nominally as a secular state.  Since no legal provisions were made 
to support the ideal of the secular within the institution of the government, the existing 
Constitutional provisions supporting the essence of ethnicity and religion found public 
purchase through the politicization of Islam, and this had significantly contributed to the state 
capitulation from the practices of secular considerations in the face of increasing demands for 
citizenship rights and privileges on ethnic and religious terms.   
The dominant public assumption about Malay special citizenship rights is ideologically 
grounded in the logic of protecting the position of Islam.  This argument equates the ethnic 
interest of the Malays with the official position of Islam.  Hence the official government 
position rests on protecting the legality of the status quo, and punishes individuals or groups 
that question or challenge the special position accorded to the majority Malay-Muslim 
population.  Since the overriding concern of the Malaysian government has been driven by the 
aim to protect these positions, it is evident that the norms of neutrality have not been 
established as the guiding principles of state practices.  When the political values of Malay 
special citizenship and Islamic supremacy have furnished the institutional establishment of 
government for more than five decades, public deliberation on many fundamental political 
issues will always take this position as the primary concern.  Even though the principles of 
secular state were never spelt out, the normative expectation that the state should appeal to 
reasons other than religious values is understood as the minimum required of a government 
that professes constitutional democracy.  In the Malaysian case, such normative expectations 
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are declining at a faster rate as the Islamization of politics gains momentum in the public 
political culture. 
The decline of the political neutrality of the state prompted some of the contemporary civil 
society movements and individuals to legally challenge the constitutionality of these 
religiously informed public policies as well as the Syariah penal codes.  On account of the 
Home Ministry’s official ban on the use of the word ‘Allah’, the legal challenge mounted by 
the Catholic magazine, Herald against the Federal government reflected the failure of the 
government to engage in the use of reason and instead succumbed to the politicization of 
Islam in the public sphere.  The High Court in Kuala Lumpur had granted the use of the word 
‘Allah’ to Herald in 2009 but the decision was reversed in the Appellate Court in October 
2013.  The fact the government had used its power to enforce the ideological assertion that  
‘Allah’ exclusively belongs to Muslims shows that the state has not only failed to observe the 
political norms of justice required to negotiate with the  fact of pluralism in Malaysian 
experience, but there seemed to be a deliberate strategy to uphold values that appeal to the 
dominant Malay-Muslim population by denying the basic liberties of other minority citizens 
to express their faith with the word ‘Allah’.  There seems to be no end to the ‘Allah’ issue 
because the Islamic authority in Selangor had only recently seized 300 Bibles from the Bible 
Society on the 2
nd of January 2014 because they contained the word ‘Allah’. 
On the rise of HINDRAF (Hindu Rights Action Force) in challenging the de-secularization of 
the Malaysian state to address the problem of ethnic group inequality, this is an indication of 
how Malaysian citizens are beginning to draw upon the universal ideals of human rights to 
counter state sanction values that are comparable to the past policies of Apartheid in South 
Africa or even Ethnocracy in Israel(Yiftachel 1999; Maznah 2004).  As a civil society 
movement that emerged from the collective awareness and experiences of state racism among 
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the Malaysian Indian citizens, the rise of HINDRAF was symptomatic of serious 
governmental failure to address poverty as an endemic social problem.  The government’s 
conception of poverty as an ethnic issue, guided by the pro-Malay affirmative action agenda 
in the New Economic Policy, led to very narrow formulation of public policies to address the 
socio-economic marginalization of citizens categorized under the Malay and Bumiputera 
group.  Even the latter group Bumiputera, particularly in the Malaysian states of Sabah and 
Sarawak are relatively disempowered by the government policy that focuses mainly on the 
special position of the Malays.  The HINDRAF movement brought into sharp focus the extent 
to which the regressive and proscriptive elements in the Constitution led to the deterioration 
of the quality of living especially among the Indian poor who are trapped in the cycle of 
poverty with no immediate institutional recourse to human development and social mobility.  
When public political power is used to reflect only one set of ethno-religious doctrine, 
denying justice and equal treatment for others who do not belong to the privilege group would 
only sustain the existing nature of systemic abuse which could further entrench ethno-
religious polarization in the existing condition of pluralism. 
In the current political climate, the LGBT community are seen as great moral threat to 
Malaysia’s national interest as an Islamic country.   Given that the law and the use of power 
reside within the ambit of the state, rationalizing the Islamic precepts as the legal benchmark 
to discipline and police the moral thinking and conducts of citizens has become the normative 
tool for the state to project the national image of the country as culturally free from the 
decadent influence of homosexuality, which is popularly conceived as the product of Western 
liberalism.  Gender pluralism (Peletz 2009) is one aspect of the Malaysian social reality that 
the government is not willing to negotiate, or even to give public recognition to the right of 
sexual minorities to decent livelihood. After suffering many years of physical, mental and 
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financial abuse under the Syariah authority, four Malay Mak Nyahs have recently decided to 
challenge the constitutionality of the Syariah penal code against cross-dressing.  The 
claimants appealed to the fundamental liberties and equality treatment for gender under the 
Federal Constitution to mount a legal challenge against Section 66 of the Syariah criminal 
enactment 1992.  In many ways this will address the judicial lacuna between the High Court 
and the Syariah court that the 1988 Constitutional Amendment generated through the addition 
of Clause (1) to Article 121.  Unfortunately their case was dismissed with the judge insisting 
on the Islamic authorities to overcome this social problem.  These cases show that the dual-
legal system has failed to grant justice equally, and as long as the judicial non-interference 
remains in force, this form of legal pluralism does more harm to Malaysian citizens. 
The public awareness and political awakening from the people have reached new heights 
since 2007 when civil society movements and other protest groups emerged demanding for 
political change.  The big shift from elite centred politicking to a greater non-elite movement 
via civic protests and civil society movements can be attributed to the democratizing effect of 
the social media networking and the spread of alternative news via the online portal.  Whilst 
the government retains its grip on the mainstream media and news portal, the internet has 
allowed the free flow of information particularly for the younger generation to participate in 
the new social and political movement.  This contemporary phenomenon requires greater 
exploration and study in the light of the greater public awakening that began from the urban 
centres to the semi-urban areas, in order to gauge how far the ideal of public reason is 
growing as part of the process of political awakening. 
8.3 Wither the secular state in Malaysia? 
The Malaysian secular state model is a mix of secular Constitution with strong state control 
over the public role of religion through the use of selective provisions in the Constitution, in 
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furtherance of the interests of the historically dominant Malay-Muslim group at the cost of 
citizen’s fundamental liberties.   Going back to some of the important questions in this thesis: 
whether it is possible to locate the discourse of ‘public reasoning’ in the Malaysian political 
society, and what way would public reasoning influence or shape the discourse of public 
debate on the competing ideas of citizenship for a society in transition like Malaysia.  Like 
most contemporary societies living in condition of pluralism, the structural rigidity of ethnic 
identifications and competing religious doctrines present considerable challenges to the ideal 
of common citizenship.  This dissertation claims that the emergence of public reasoning is not 
only contingent but it is also dependent upon the generous interpretation of political values 
that are transferable by human agents to counter the ideological rigidity and historical 
constructions of ethno-religious aphorisms in the country.  However in tracing the historical 
development of public debates since colonialism in Malaya, racial domination has grown as a 
result of the structure of institutional mediation between the British colonial power and the 
local ancient regime in the form of Malay Kerajaan.   
The persistence of ethnic politics and the significant ways in which religion began to 
undergird ethnicity in shaping politics and the thinking about politics is the result of the 
failure of public reasoning. Failures to reason and address the problems of common 
citizenship had been apparent as far back as the Communist Insurgency, Malaysian Malaysia, 
the legal changes made to the freedom of speech in 1971 and in the 1988 amendment to the 
judicial autonomy of the High Court.  On the back of these crises the Malaysian state has 
drawn upon the doctrinal power of Islam for the following purposes: to impose the 
ecumenical bond of Malay identity, to rationalize an official version Islam to deter political 
dissents and regulate the public and moral aspects of human living and relations.   Islamic 
reforms featured extensively in public policy formulation, gradually expanding into 
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governmental agencies, the education curriculum and higher learning institutions, banking 
and insurance, and most prominently in the legal sphere.  Islam becomes highly visible in the 
public sphere as a result of direct state intervention, and it is increasingly entwined with the 
exclusive protection of the rights and privilege of the dominant Malay ethnic group in the 
Malaysian society.   
Failure to public reasoning doesn’t mean that this cannot be elicited and practiced for a 
society like Malaysia that is well-informed and modern in almost every aspect in life.  The 
public contentions against the rigid interpretation of fundamental liberties in the Federal 
Constitution are strong enough evidence to suggest that civil society and citizens, whose 
rights have been undermined by the process of de-secularization, play important roles in 
raising awareness about the importance of values other than ones that are grounded in Islamic 
precepts.  There’s hope yet for Malaysia to become a stable liberal society but there’s a 
critical need to recognize the significance of open communication to negotiate not only the 
competing views among different beliefs and philosophies but that it is imperative to 
overcome the public ‘fear’ of the meaningful role of the secular principles among the Muslim 
populations. 
The significance of applying Rawlsian informed critique on establishing an overlapping 
consensus in the Malaysian case rests on the substantive evidence that the enforcement of one 
particular comprehensive doctrine, i.e. Islamic precept, upon the condition of pluralism that is 
diverse in terms of ethnic-religious-gender dynamics, considerably led to the erosion of the 
fundamental liberties of the individuals.  The problem with universalizing the Islamic precepts 
in government policies, law and moral public policing is that this approach fulfils a very 
narrow interpretation of moral values, failing which the risks of public discrimination, 
stereotyping and condemnation of other minority ethnic, religious and gender community will 
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increase.  In a diverse society, Rawlsian informed overlapping consensus encourages citizens 
to participate in the political conception of justice as the moral grounds for public and social 
cooperation that goes beyond the simple requirement of toleration.  So far, the Malaysian 
experience has shown that the act of toleration in itself has failed to protect the erosion of 
neutrality values against the political forcefulness of religious pressures.  The only compelling 
way for minority citizens to restore their basic elements of citizenship rights involves making 
the case for the political conception of justice to be considered as the basic common ground in 
the process of public deliberation (Larmore 1994; Larmore 1999).  
Whilst the exposition of ‘public reason’ is situated within the conceptual bounds of Rawlsian 
political liberalism, the dissertation takes this idea as a possible avenue to evaluate the 
nuanced changes in mode of political thinking and articulation in the Malaysian political 
discourse.  It is used to examine how political ideas have been communicated and justified on 
terms that do not appeal to fundamental doctrines, and to show how significant the role of 
‘public reason’ can play in a society that is undergoing tremendous challenges towards the 
process of democratization.  The role of public reasoning in this sense is useful in making the 
necessary discursive changes to the ideological content of political legitimacy in grounding 
public political debates in the country.  In appealing to the idea of the exercise of ‘public 
reasoning’, it is possible to do away with the overbearing use of Islamic percept in framing 
public conduct and political engagement.  In this way, public debates and discussions can be 
encouraged without the fear of legal sanctions and unjustified censorship. 
A reasonable liberal public space is important for common citizenship.   The conception of 
political liberalism represents a procedural framework of political constructivism (Freeman 
2007) and if liberal principles should govern the exercise of ‘public reason’ within the 
constructive framework of political liberalism, then the constructive elements with which 
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liberal principles undergirds the exercise of ‘public reason’ could be drawn from the ways in 
which issues of equal participation for citizens and the language of rights are debated in the 
Malaysian political forum.   The use of ‘public reason’ will be able to inform the shifts in the 
ways ideas of citizenship and the language of right are being conceived or reconsidered in the 
contemporary Malaysian context.  This will have important repercussions upon how 
contemporary debates are changing the way people think about politics and most importantly, 
about agency of the citizens involved in the process of critical engagement over the use of 
coercive state power (Solum 1993).   
The author is aware of the existing criticisms against adopting the Rawlsian informed ‘public 
reasoning’ for a society that does not typify the liberal democratic features, but the use public 
reasoning is vital to illuminate the challenges and potentials of a society in transition, of 
identifying new modes of political thinking that nurtures critical awareness among citizens 
and netizens widely engaged in the discourse of democratic deliberation.  The internet and 
social media networking have revolutionized the ways people think about politics.  The Arab 
Spring and the Occupy movement around the globe are recent examples of how people begin 
to embrace ideas about public engagement, deliberation, democratic demands that make up 
the core elements of liberalism in contemporary politics.  In the Malaysian experience, there 
is a critical need to restore the principles of the ‘secular’ into the practices of state, not 
because it is used to challenge the Islamic precepts or the symbolic role of Islam in the 
Constitution, but to create the avenue for overlapping consensus whereby the political 
conception of justice can be applied as a guideline to be inclusive of other humanistic values 
to be taken into consideration when fundamental political issues are deliberated and decided 
to reflect the needs of a diverse society.    
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Malaysia is a good case for an empirical evaluation of the use of ‘public reason’ because the 
country unwittingly adopts many aspects of secular principles mainly within the procedural 
dimension of politics, economy and modern cultural practices whereby God has not been 
invoked repetitively.  Despite this the legal and operational concept of what is secular and 
humanist in political debates remains fragile as the politicization of Islam continues to 
undergird the collective if not the Constitutional identity of the Malays, and this has 
increasingly contributed to the socio-political bifurcation of identities between the Muslim 
and the non-Muslim citizens.  The political conception of a secular polity that supports a non-
discriminatory public sphere would constitute the normative ideal for a liberal democracy and 
common citizenship to thrive.  The secular space needs to be given generous interpretation as 
an idea of autonomous thinking and public reasoning if these were to be aspired.  Using the 
Malaysian case as an example, this dissertation has demonstrated that affirmative action 
policies that are grounded in ethno-nationalistic and religious concerns have done more 
damage to fundamental liberties, inter-faith relations and the livelihood of citizens from the 
minority community.  Proposing the restoration of the secular humanist values into the 
practices of the state may entail the redefinition of the public role of Islam in politics and the 
legal sphere, but this is vital to mediation of justice where the judicial lacuna exists in the 
current civil-Syariah logjam.   There’s a need to go beyond toleration and ethnic 
consociationalism as the standard practice to maintain political stability because these do not 
provide effective means to counter the radical forces of within political Islam.  The strategy of 
public reasoning based on the political conception justice will create a module of 
communication that deliberates upon publicly shared values but at the same time affirms the 
convictions from within these competing doctrines.  
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APPENDIX I 
List of Hindu temples demolished in Malaysia in 16 months 
LIST OF HINDU TEMPLE DEMOLISHED – compiled by Hidraf and Human Rights Party 
From 22.2.2006 TO 13.6.2007 (one year and four months), 79 HINDU TEMPLES in 
MALAYSIA were demolished: 
FIFTEEN (15) HINDU TEMPLES DEMOLISHED IN THE KLANG VALLEY 
1. The Sri Ayyanar Sathiswary Alayam Temple (more than 65 years) Jalan Davies was 
demolished on 22.2.2006 and the statues buried at site. 
2. The Malaimel Sri Selva Kaliamman Temple Pantai(more than 100 years) was demolished 
on 17.4.2006 by the Kuala Lumpur City Hall. 
3. The Vaalmuniswarar Rajaamman Kovil(more than 60 years) at Lady Templer Hospital 
demolished on the 3.05.2006 by City Hall Kuala Lumpur. 
4. Sri Kaliamman temple at Midlands Estate, Seksyen 7, Shah Alam (more than 100 years) 
was demolished by the Shah Alam City Hall on 9.5.2006. 
5. The Sri Balakrishan Muniswarer temple in Setapak (more than 60 years) was partly 
demolished on 11.05.2006 by the Kuala Lumpur City Hall. 
6. The Sri Balakrishan Muniswarer temple in Setapak was completely demolished and deities 
broken up on 8.6.2006. 
7. The demolished Sri Kaliamman temple at Midlands Estate, Seksyen 7, Shah Alam was 
demolished for a second time on the 12.06.2006 wherein 3 main Hindu deities were 
hammered and smashed up to pieces with a sledge hammer by the Shah Alam City Council 
enforcement officers. 
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8. On 1.08.2006 the Om Sri Sakti Nagamma Allaya Hindu Temple in Taman Sri Manja, PJS 
3/30 Petaling Jaya, Selangor was demolished by the Petaling Jaya City Council. 
9. Demolishment of the Sri Subramaniam temple in Country Homes, Rawang, Selangor, 
Malaysia on 29.09.2006. 
10. On 31.10.2006 Sri Muniswarar Temple (more than a 100 years old) which was built on 
private land in Bandar Rinching, Semenyih Selangor was demolished 
11. The demolishment of the Devi Sri Karumaniamman Hindu Temple, Petaling Jaya Utara, 
Section 21, Kampung Taman Aman on 30.11.2006. 
12. On 29.12.2006 Sri Muniswarar Temple (more than a 100 years old) which was built on 
private land in Bandar Rinching, Semenyih Selangor was demolished. 
13. On 22/2/2007 the Sri Maha Nageswari Hindu Temple in Taman Cahaya 7, Ampang, 
Selangor Darul Ehsan was demolished. 
14. On 15.5.2007, the JKR Sri Muniswarar Hindu Temple, Jalan Kapar, Klang was 
demolished. 
15. On 13.6.2007 the Sri Kaliaman Hindu temple in Midlands estate Shah Alam was 
demolished. 
FOUR (4) OTHER DEMOLISHED HINDU TEMPLES LOCATED OUTSIDE KLANG 
VALLEY BUT WITHIN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA:- 
16. The Demolishment of the Sri Maha Sivalingaeswarrar Hindu Temple, Batu 7,Gemas 
Tampin 10/04/2002. 
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17. The 80 year old Sri Muthumariamman Alayam Hindu Temple in Skudai JohorBahru was 
demolished in August 2006. 
18. Statutes from Sungai Wangi Mathurai Veeran Temple (60 years old) in Sitiawan, 
Kampung Tirali, 9th Mile Jalan Air Tawar, Sungai Wangi Estate, Perak were hammered, 
smashed up and thrown into a drain and temple demolished on 17.10.2006 by the Manjung 
District Council. 
19. The 55 year old Kaliaman Alayam Hindu Temple in Taman Impiana Mengelembuin Ipoh 
was demolished on 27/11/2006. 
THIRTY ONE (31) HINDU TEMPLES WITHIN THE KLANG VALLEY THAT HAS 
BEEN THREATENED WITH DEMOLISHMENT NOTICE:- 
20. Kuil Hindu Sri Mariaman di Seksyen 11, Shah Alam has been given notice to the 
demolished on 26.4.2006 from the Shah Alam Municipal Council. 
21. The Sri Maha Mariamman Temple Taman Intan Baiduri Selayang has been given notice 
to be demolished recently (Nanban June 2006) 
22. The Sri Subramaniam Temple Kg.Jawa Klang(107 years old) has been given notice to be 
demolished (June 2006) 
23. The Mariamman Temple Jalan Meru Bandar Setia Alam, Shah Alam (101 years old) has 
been given notice to be demolished (June 2006) 
24. The Kg.Jawa Mariamman Temple (more than 120 years) has been given notice to be 
demolish (June 2006). 
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25. The Sri Maha Laxhsmi temple in Sunway has been given notice to be demolished by the 
Petalaing Jaya City Council in June 2006. 
26. The Sri Angineer Temple in Taman Tun Dr. Ismail, Kuala Lumpur built on a private land 
has been given notice to be demolished by the Kuala Lumpur City Manager(June 2006). 
27. Sri Mahamariaman Hindu Temple in Kg Semarak, Old Klang Road has been threatened 
with demolishment five (5) times before on TOL Land-Nanban(6/7/06) pg. 12 
28. Sri Sai Bala Raman Hindu Temple in Klang Jaya is being threatened with demolishment - 
Nesan (7/7/06) 
29. 101 year old Dewi Sri Karumari Aman Temple in 4 1/2 Mile Jalan Meru, Klang was 
ordered closed by Selangor State Government on 10.07.2006 and thereafter the said temple is 
threatened to be demolished to make way for housing development. 
30. The 101 year old Thevy Sri Karumariamman temple’s Bandar Setia Alam, Shah Alam 
access road to be closed on 10.7.2006 by the Selangor State Government and later to be 
demolished to make way for a private housing development. 
31. Arun Estate Temple in Shah Alam- Nesan (12/7/06) pg. 6 
32. In July 2006 the 110 year old Tepi Sungai JKR Mariaman Temple was given notice to be 
demolished. 
33. In July 2006 the Sri Muniswarar temple in Jalan Air Panas Baru Setapak was given notice 
to be demolished. 
34. In July 2006, the Sri Jada Muniswarar Hindu Temple in Danau Kota, Kuala Lumpur was 
given notice to be demolished. 
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35. Jedda Manismanar Hindu Temple in Jalan Setapak was informed to vacate is being 
threatened with demolishment - Nesan(17/8/06) 
36. Sri Maha Megeswari Hindu Temple in Lembah Jaya, Ampang is being threatened with 
demolishment -Nesan(20/8/06) 
37. Muniswarar Hindu Temple in Bandar Baru Ampang is being threatened with 
demolishment -Nesan(20/8/06) 
38. Sri Sakti Vinayar Hindu Temple in Kampung Ampang Indah is being threatened with 
demolishment -Nesan(20/8/06) 
39. Mariaman Hindu Temple in Kg Tasik Permai, Ampang is being threatened with 
demolishment -Nesan(20/8/06) 
40. Siti Subramariam Hindu Temple in Kg Tasik Permai, Ampang is being threatened with 
demolishment -Nesan(20/8/06) 
41. Sri Mariaman Temple (60 years old) in Section 18 given notice to relocate on 18/10/2006. 
42. Sri Kaliaman Temple (80 years old) in Section 18 given notice to relocate on 18/10/2006. 
43. Sri Vinayagar Temple (80 years old) in Section 18 given notice to relocate on 18/10/2006. 
44. Sri Mariaman Temple (109 years old) in Section 19 which has a sacred 100 year old tree 
given notice to relocate on 18/10/2006. 
45. Sri Mariaman Temple (100 years old) in Section 15 given notice to relocate on 
18/10/2006. 
46. Sri Maha Mariaman Hindu Temple in Section 11 given notice to relocate on 18/10/2006. 
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47. The 80 year old Sri Athi Muniswara Temple in Jalan Semarak, off Jalan Gurney in Kuala 
Lumpur was given notice to be demolished on 19.10.2006. 
48. On 21.11.2006 the Sivaksakthi Linggeswara Hindu Temple in Kampung Tropikana, Jalan 
Padang Tembak, Subang Jaya given notice to be demolished. 
49. The Sri Kamatchie Amman Telecoms Temple Cheras (more than 100 years) is being 
threatened with demolishment. 
50. Despite receiving recognition from UNESCO, Nageswari Hindu Temple in Bangsar is 
being threatened with demolishment. 
SEVENTEEN (17) OTHER HINDU TEMPLES LOCATED OUTSIDE THE KLANG 
VALLEY BUT WITHIN PENINSULA MALAYSIA THAT HAS BEEN THREATENED 
WITH DEMOLISHMENT:- 
51. The Sri Muniswarar Aalayam Seremban (150 years) and a 150 year old Raintree have 
been threatened with demolishment since March 2006 by the District and Land Office . 
52. On 26.6.2006 the 110 year old the Sri Chinna Karuppan Temple in Masai Johor was given 
notice to be demolished 
53. The 60 year old Saiva Muniswarar Temple Temple in Sg.Petani Kedah given notice to be 
demolished (Nanban 29.6.2006 pg 4) 
54. Sri Muthumariaman Aman Skudai Hindu Temple (70 years old) in Lindon Estate risks 
being demolished- Nesan (3/7/06) pg. 7 
55. Sri Muniswarar Temple in Slim River- Nesan (14/7/06) 
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56. On 15.7.2006 the Muniswarar Temple in Sitiawan was given notice to be demolished- 
Nanban(15/7/06) 
57. Hindu Temple is being threatened with demolishment - Nesan (19/7/06) pg. 6 
58. Sri Nageswari Amman Alayam Hindu Temple is being threatened with demolishment - 
Nesan (19/7/06) pg.  
59. Muniswarar Hindu Temple is being threatened with demolishment - Nesan (19/7/06) pg. 6 
60. Sri Sakti Viyanayagar Hindu Temple is being threatened with demolishment - Nesan 
(19/7/06) pg. 6 
61. Sri Maha Mariaman Hindu Temple is being threatened with demolishment - Nesan 
(19/7/06) pg. 6 
62. Sri Subramaniam Hindu Temple is being threatened with demolishment -Nesan (19/7/06) 
pg. 6 
63. Muthu Mariaman Hindu Temple in Liutan Estate Skudai threatened to be demolished on 
13.08.06. 
64. Sri Subramaniam Hindu Temple in Kampar is being threatened with demolishment -
Nesan(21/8/06) 
65. Bangi Mariaman Hindu Temple is being threatened with demolishment -Nesan(23/8/06) 
66. Taman U Hindu Temple in Skudai, Johor Bahru was on the verge of being demolished 
when about 600 Hindu devotees protested on 23.08.06. 
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67. Sri Mathuraimeeran Hindu Temple in Kampar Taman, Sri Wangi is being threatened with 
demolishment -Nanban(25/8/06). 
THREE (3) HINDU TEMPLES THAT HAVE BEEN BURNT TO THE GROUND:- 
68. The Ganggai Muthu Karumariaman temple in PMR Batu Buntung Estate Kulim,Kedah on 
15.5.2006 was torched by unknown / mysterious criminals. 
69. The Sri Kalikambul Kamadeswarar temple in Ebor Estate Batu Tiga, Shah Alam 
Selangor. 
70. The Sri Kalkattha Kaliamman temple in Kampung Sungai Kayu Ara, 47400 Petaling Jaya. 
SIX (6) TEMPLES FORCED TO BE RELOCATED NEXT TO SEWERAGE TANKS:- 
71. The Sri Muneeswarar JKR Temple, Batu 5/12, Jalan Kapar, 42100 Klang, Selangor (73 
years old) was given notice to be demolished forced to be relocated next to a severage tank 
(June 2006). (Hindraf) 
72. Sri Kumaravel Hindu Temple in Kampung Medan, Petaling Jaya, Selangor was forcibly 
relocated next to a sewarage tank, electric station (TNB) and high voltage cable on 
14.07.2006 . (Makkal Osai 15.7.06) 
73. Mariaman Hindu Temple in Bukit Beonang, Taman Bukit Melaka forced to relocate next 
to sewerage tank.(Nanban 25/8/2006) 
74. Sri Raja Rajeswarar Hindu Temple in Taman Tunku Jaafar, Senawang, Seremban. 
(Hindraf) 
75. Mariaman and Perumal Hindu Temple in Puchong Perdana, Selangor. (DAP sources) 
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76. Mariaman Temple in Desa Mewah, Sunway Semenyih forcibly relocated next to a septic 
tank. (Bandar Rincing, Semenyih Temple Chairman) 
THREE (3) HINDU TEMPLES WHERE DEITIES FORCIBLY REMOVED:- 
77. Statues from 73 year old JKR Sri Muniswarar Temple, Jalan Kapar Klang Temple was 
forcibly removed and taken away under mysterious circumstances in July 2006. 
78. Deities from the Devi Sri Karumariaman Hindu Temple, Petaling Jaya Utara, Section 21, 
Kampung Taman Aman forcibly removed and left in a construction site. 
79. Kaliamman Hindu Temple, Jalan Matin Batu 5 Seremban (more than 28 years) deities and 
temple bell was removed. (Nanban - 3.9.2006) 
APPENDIX II 
The documentary interviews by the Equal Right Trust are reproduced here: 
“The biggest challenge which we face is from the religious authorities in 
Malaysia. They arrested me one night when I was not working.  I was just sitting 
on the steps outside, waiting for my friend when a group of guys on motorbikes 
suddenly appeared and took me by surprise. They came up to me and grabbed me 
– I thought they were robbers trying to steal from me, so I tried to shut the outside 
gate of the shop. They stopped me, and pushed me against the wall. They were 
physically assaulting me. They started to grope me, and I tried to push them away 
but I did not manage because they were too big. I looked across the road and saw 
another friend of mine being beaten up by some other guys. At that point, the men 
holding me identified themselves as representatives of the Religious Department” 
(Equal Rights Trust, 2011) 
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‘Zura: I am a 24 year old Malay Muslim, born in Kelantan. I moved to Seremban 
ten years ago when I was only 14 years old because I had been orphaned when I 
was seven. I was forced to remove myself from my remaining family seven years 
later because no-one accepted me. From the age of 12, I realised that I liked to 
wear female clothes and to do the jobs which are traditionally done by women, 
like cooking and cleaning, and I enjoyed wearing make-up. I decided to go and 
live in Seremban because this is where my mother was from, and I therefore felt a 
connection to this place. I wanted to start a new life here.  
I felt responsible for providing financial support to my foster father and my 
younger brother, so I needed to earn money as soon as possible. My family was so 
poor, and my foster father was also sick and in need of medication which we were 
struggling to afford, so I was forced to finish school and start work. I tried 
working in other jobs first, but I faced too many problems. For example, when I 
worked in a restaurant, they told me that with a face like mine, I could only work 
at the back of the restaurant and only deserved five ringgit a day whilst the other 
workers were earning 50 ringgit a day. I did not want to continue living with this 
injustice so I decided it would be better for me to be a sex worker, and I have 
remained in that work since I was 15 years old.  
Last year I was arrested on four separate occasions by representatives from the 
Religious Department.  On the first occasion, I was not working.  I was just 
hanging around in the area where we usually work, wearing a nightgown.  I was 
picked up by the religious officers who charged me for wearing a nightgown.  
Apparently, as no man in their right mind would wear a nightgown, I was accused 
of impersonating a woman.  I was taken to the offices of the Religious Department 
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and forced to undress.  Even though the officers were not in the room, I know that 
they were watching me through a one-way mirror.  I was only just recovering from 
my breast augmentation surgery, so it was very embarrassing for me to have to 
change whilst they could see me.  My friend brought spare clothes for me, as the 
officers wanted to keep my nightgown as evidence against me.  I locked up for a 
night and had to pay RM 700 (140 pounds) and then released. 
On the second occasion, I was subjected to severe violence during the arrest. On I 
drove to AST (an entertainment outlet) to give some make-up to a friend of mine. 
As I was just about to give her the make-up, a raid began during which 
representatives from the Religious Department were rounding people up. 
Everyone was running everywhere. I was very shocked so I began to run as well. I 
was chased into a hotel. I was wearing a nightgown again, but I had no make-up 
on my face. I took refuge in a small store in the hotel. It was a karaoke lounge. 
After I ran in, I managed to lock the door behind me and I hid behind the counter. 
Three men began to pound on the door. They told the bouncer that if he did not 
open the door, they would break it down and he would have to pay for it to be 
fixed. They identified themselves as representatives from the Religious Depart-
ment so the bouncer immediately opened the door. They came after me. I resisted 
at first, but eventually surrendered. At first, they held me by my neck against the 
wall, and then they punched me in the nose until I was defenceless. I was slipping 
in and out of consciousness. They then threw me to the floor, stepped on my chest 
and kicked me. There was a real danger that they could have hit the silicone 
implants in my chest which could have been very dangerous. After being 
physically abused in the karaoke-lounge, I was taken to the Religious Department 
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with a few other people. This was the most violent raid I had ever experienced. 
Almost all of the people who were taken there with me had been beaten. I was 
asked to remove my clothes as evidence, but they did not take a photo of me 
because I was not wearing make-up this time. The following day, I was taken to 
court again. I was forced to plead guilty to an offence under Section 66, saying 
that if I did not, I would prolong the situation and I would have to go to jail. I 
therefore followed their advice and also paid a 1000 ringgit fine. 
On the third occasion, I was picked up once again by the same men from the 
Religious Department who had punched and kicked me on the previous occasion. I 
was just standing in AST, wearing a nightgown and waiting for friends to go for 
food. A man standing behind me grabbed my hair, and without showing me any 
form of identification, told me to follow him. I was taken to the offices of the Re-
ligious Department once again, and the following day I went to court. On this 
occasion, I did not plead guilty, and as a result, I was given a date for trial. There 
is a three strike rule, and as this was the third time I was arrested, I was forced to 
have a full trial. I paid a bond and was then released. 
On the fourth occasion, I was arrested at the same time as Miss Kay. She was 
picked up in the first batch, and I was in a second batch. On that evening, I was 
wearing a big t-shirt and football clothes. These were not female clothes! The 
representatives from the Religious Department, however, said that my physical 
appearance was that of a woman. They lifted up my shirt without my consent, and 
I asked them why they had done that because I was not wearing a bra. We do not 
wear bras; as such female lingerie item would be very obvious evidence to be used 
against us by the Religious Department. As they did not find the evidence they 
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were looking for, they took my flip flops and my hair band as evidence. I was 
taken to the office, and again in court the following day, I did not plead guilty but I 
was told that there would have to be a trial in relation to this incident, in addition 
to the trial relating to my third arrest. 
By this time, I was in communication with KRYSS (an NGO working with the 
LGBTI community in Malaysia) having met them only a few days earlier. They 
found a Syariah lawyer to represent me at the trial relating to the third arrest. The 
Syariah lawyer convinced the court to combine the trials for the third and fourth 
arrests, and then sought a postponement. Our strategy is to postpone my trial in the 
Syariah court until after the leave hearing for the judicial review case has taken 
place. 
I very much hope that as a result of our legal challenge, the situation facing trans-
women in Malaysia will change. I am prepared to die for this cause, because there 
is such a lot of discrimination against us. I found it so difficult to find a job when I 
was younger. The Malaysian people do not allow trans-women to be anything 
other than sex workers. This really is the only work that we can do because when 
we look for work elsewhere, we are ridiculed. But we also have people to feed, 
and responsibilities to manage. We should be able to make money safely, and take 
care of our people like everyone else”. 
‘Linda: I am a 25 year old Malay Muslim. I was born in Ipoh but I have lived in 
Seremban for the last seven years. Since I was 16 years old, I started to identify as 
a woman. I started to take hormone pills which I bought from the pharmacy. My 
siblings had no problem with me dressing as a woman, but my father did not like 
310 
 
it. He used to scold me and beat me, so I was forced to run away on two occasions 
to the house of a friend. After I completed my high school education, I moved to 
Seremban in order to study architecture at the college here. 
I found it incredibly difficult to study at college as a trans-woman. Firstly, I had no 
other trans-women friends on the campus. Secondly, I was forced to share a room 
(as were all of the other students) with a member of the same sex as me. Because 
my identify card says that I am male, I was made to share a room with a guy. I 
asked the Principal of the college if he could make an exception for me. I felt that 
they should demonstrate some flexibility in my situation. I should have been 
allowed either to share a room with other female friends, or to rent accommo-
dation outside of the campus. As the college rules did not permit students to rent 
elsewhere, I was forced to stay on campus. I also found the studying very difficult 
as there was a tendency to separate the college classes according to gender. This 
did not work out at all for me, and I found being forced to study alongside only 
men very uncomfortable. I also faced dilemmas every day, such as which toilet I 
should use on campus. Eventually, the campus environment became so uncomfort-
able for me that I was no longer able to continue with my studies.  I had completed 
two years of the three-year course but I could not face it anymore.  Very soon after 
I left college, I met new trans-friends, and became a sex worker.  I have been 
doing that work for four or five years now. I was very much influenced by the 
choices which my trans-friends had made. If you look around other places of 
employment, like shops or restaurants, you do not see any trans-women working 
there. Being a sex worker is the only job which gives me freedom – I am able to 
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wear what I like and I can do what I like. Apart from when the representatives of 
the Religious Department cause problems for me. 
I have been arrested twice. The first time was in 2005. It was night-time in the 
AST area and I was caught by three men. I was with another friend and they 
started to chase both of us. I tripped, but my friend managed to run. I fell down, 
but instead of helping me up, they stepped on me to keep me on the ground. They 
acted like they are above God. In Islam, there should be no compulsion. You 
should only provide advice, but not force people to do things. I was taken to the 
office of the Religious Department. They did not take a statement from me straight 
away, but they kept me and another three of my friends in overnight. Only in the 
morning did they take our statements. It seemed that they were not carrying out the 
proper process, but rather they were just making fun of us and ridiculing us. They 
did not seem to want to teach us a lesson, but rather to mock us.  
On the second occasion, I was picked up by three religious officers in a white van. 
They just picked me up from the street and took me on a joyride, asking me 
questions the whole time. They asked me to remove my clothes and they tried to 
grope my breasts. After some time, they dropped me off at the top of a hill and I 
was forced to walk home alone in the dark. The officers who picked me up were 
not actually on duty, which was why they did not arrest me. They just took me for 
a ride to mock me and to take advantage of their position of authority. 
I have become involved in the legal case because having been arrested on two 
separate occasions I believe that it is wrong that it should be a criminal offence for 
me to wear whatever I want to wear. I want to fight for my rights, and the rights of 
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my friends. These people arrest us, beat us up and break into our properties. They 
hunt us down as if we are the biggest murderers, when the only “offence” we are 
“guilty” of is wearing female attire’. 
‘Kay: I am a 27 year old Malay Muslim. I was born in Pahang and moved to 
Seremban about eight years ago. When I was about 10 years old, I began to feel 
confused about my identity. I began to dress as a woman whilst I was at high 
school, when I was probably about 15 years old. I also started to take hormone 
pills at that same time. I would use my pocket money to buy birth control pills 
from the pharmacy, or otherwise I would ask my mother for her pills. My family 
had no problem with the decisions I made because they understood me. I currently 
work in various jobs. I work as an administrative assistant in a Chinese herbal tea 
shop. I also assist my friend in her bridal make-up shop and I work as a part-time 
model. I also work as a sex worker in Seremban when I need extra money. 
I have faced many problems as a result of being a transgender woman. I have 
found it very difficult to get jobs since I started to wear trans clothing because 
people have very negative perceptions. I once applied for a job in a factory in 
Sunway City which is not far from Kuala Lumpur. I attended an interview for a 
job as an Operator, but they never called me back and I am sure it was because of 
who I was. I know this because of the way they looked at me during the interview. 
I have also found it very difficult to find places to rent. When I first arrived in 
Seremban, I was urgently looking for a house. I picked up a flier advertising 
accommodation for rent. I contacted the person, but when we met up, he told me 
that he could not rent the place to me because he had decided to sell the house 
instead. I know that this was not true, as two months later I found out that 
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someone else was renting the place. This same experience has happened to me 
many times. Eventually I was able to find someone who did understand me. She is 
happy for me to rent her property as long as I pay the rent on time. 
I also experienced problems in the hospital in Seremban. I was there recently, and 
although I am a trans-woman, I was put into a male ward. I was unconscious for 
five days after a car accident in which I hurt my head very badly. When I woke up, 
I was surrounded by men, and I freaked out. Eventually, the doctor agreed to put 
me in a different room so that I had a room to myself, but I should have been there 
from the beginning of my stay. I also found that many of the hospital workers 
shouted “pondan” at me, which is a very disrespectful name used interchangeably 
for homosexuals and transgender people.  
Women like me regularly face trouble from other people in the community. I often 
meet people who are not happy with the way that I live, and they choose to pick a 
fight with me. I have been in fist fights with people who try to cause trouble for 
me. Often it is women who are the worst in this respect.  
The biggest challenge which we face is from the religious authorities in Malaysia. 
They arrested me once. On that particular night, I was not working, so I went to 
my friend’s bridal boutique. I was just sitting on the steps outside, waiting for my 
friend to come with me to get some food. A group of guys on motorbikes suddenly 
appeared and took me by surprise. They came up to me and grabbed me – I 
thought they were robbers trying to steal from me, so I tried to shut the outside 
gate of the shop. They stopped me, and pushed me against the wall. I asked why 
they were doing this, and what was happening to me. I asked them who they were 
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and what they wanted, but they just told me to be quiet. They started to grope me, 
and I tried to push them away but I did not manage because they were too big. I 
looked across the road and saw another friend of mine being beaten up by some 
other guys. At that point, the men holding me identified themselves as 
representatives of the Religious Department. 
I was then told that I must wait for a van to arrive. While I was waiting, they 
continued to beat up my friend. It was very bad – I saw it all. While I was sitting 
waiting for the van, one of the men sat next to me and started to grope me once 
again. The van finally arrived and took me to the Religious Department in 
Seremban. When we got there, I was put in a room, and they told me to take off 
my clothes which they wanted as “evidence”. I did not want to do this because I 
had nothing else to wear. Other staff from the Religious Department kept coming 
into the room. They touched my face and commented on my breasts. Eventually I 
was given the opportunity to telephone a friend to come and offer bail for me. She 
arrived with a spare set of clothes for me to change into. My friend gave a verbal 
assurance for me, and I was then allowed to leave. 
 I have chosen to take the legal case against Section 66 because I do not agree with 
the law and I want to change the perception of transgender women in Malaysia. As 
it stands, the law means that I can be arrested for simply being myself in public. I 
want to be free to go outside during the day time without feeling scared. I am not 
doing all of this for a show – this is who I am for real.  Members of the Religious 
Department continue to hunt us down. They continue to search for trans women in 
Seremban. They know who we are, and they have now recruited the police officers 
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to assist them. So we now face problems from both the Syariah authorities and the 
civil police as well.  
I want to live a good life. I want to find a good job through legal channels. I am 
prevented from doing the jobs I would like to do – like being a model or a singer – 
because I am a trans-woman in a Muslim country where there are laws which stop 
me from being who I want to be’. 
‘Fifi: I am a 25 year old Malay Muslim. I was born in Seremban and I have been 
working as a sex worker for two years. I have been dressing as a woman, and taking 
hormones, for only three years. I have known that I was different since I was 13 or 
14, and I have always been sexually attracted to men, but I did not start to identify 
as a woman until I was 22. I became a sex worker because I am not from a very 
well-off family, and I am able to make good and easy money in this job.  I am 
treated very differently during the day time to how I am treated at night. During the 
day, people make fun of me. People talk down to me and ridicule me. They just do 
not understand what it is like to be a trans-woman. They do not understand it at all. 
My family seems to accept me dressing as a woman, but if they knew the line of 
work I am in, they would probably kill me.  
The first time I was arrested was in 2009. I was picked up on the street and taken to 
the offices of the Religious Department. I was asked to take off my clothes, which I 
did, and they then asked me to wash off my make-up. I was interviewed by a female 
religious leader, who told me that I am a very handsome boy. They did not press 
any charges against me. Whilst they were not violent towards me, I did feel very 
uncomfortable because they made me remove all of my clothes.  
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The second time I was arrested was in November 2010. I was on the pavement in 
the AST area. I was wearing leggings, a white singlet top and I was holding a clutch 
bag. I was wearing my hair down, and I had only eye make-up on. Two men came 
out of the pub near where I live, and one of them approached me and started to flirt 
with me. He asked my name, and seemed to want to get to know me. Things 
progressed quite quickly, and I was swept away by this guy. Eventually I touched 
him, and I thought that if he was from the Religious Department, he would not have 
let me do that.  
After I did that, however, he took my arm and told me not to resist because he was 
from the Religious Department. After five minutes, a van arrived and I was taken to 
their office. I was put into a detention room, and they told me to call someone who 
could provide bail on my behalf and bring some spare clothes for me. They asked 
me to remove my clothes, which I did. They confiscated them. They did not take a 
statement from me, but just took my clothes as evidence. They then told me that I 
would be taken to court the following morning.  
The following morning, they took me to court, but then realised that they did not 
have a statement from me, so they had to postpone my hearing so that we could go 
back to the office and I could give them a statement. The hearing was delayed until 
after Friday prayers. The officers were scolded by the judge because my case 
should have been heard between ten and eleven o’clock in the morning. I was not 
treated well during my time in detention at the Religious Department. I was arrested 
at 10p.m. in the evening, and by the time I was released after my court hearing at 
3p.m., I had still not been given any food. In court, I was charged with an offence 
under Section 66, and I was made to pay a fine of 1,000 ringgit. 
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I have become involved in this legal case against Section 66 because I want to 
change the law. The religious authorities are the biggest problem facing trans-
women like myself and I want this to stop. 
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